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IN 1625.




secretary to the lord admiral of the fleet (sir e. cecil), afterward
sir john glanville, speaker of the parliament, &c., &c.

never before printed.


edited, with introduction and notes, by


ll.d. (edinburgh), f.s.a. (scot.), st. george's, blackburn, lancashire.



printed by nichols and sons
25, parliament street.

[new series xxxii.]


FOR THE YEAR 1882-3.

J. J. CARTWRIGHT, ESQ., M.A., Treasurer.
J. R. DANIELL-TYSSEN, ESQ., F.S.A. {the late)

The Council of the Camden Society desire it to be understood
that they are not answerable for any opinions or observations
that may appear in the Society's publications; the Editors
of the several Works being alone responsible for the same.



The "Journal" now herein printed for the first time, was found by the Editor, whilst pursuing his researches at Port Eliot (on the invitation of the late Earl of St. Germans) amongst the MSS. formerly collected by the illustrious statesman and patriot Sir John Eliot. It is one of a number of Transcripts from original documents—as well State Papers as Private—which Eliot made it matter of conscience to obtain as the basis and sanction of his memorable opposition to the King and Buckingham in their "evil courses." It is pathetic as well as satisfying to come upon these evidences of the painstaking spent by the great English Tribune in verifying the statements and related accusations made by him in his place in Parliament. That this "Journal" was transcribed for Sir John Eliot under his own personal supervision, gives security that the original was known by him to be authentic. But there are other indeed abundant MSS. extant, confirmatory of its entries all round. More of these immediately. I have placed the name of Sir John Glanville on the title-page, because the Manuscript vi itself presents him to us as Secretary of the "Voyage," and as such the only one who could have been present at the "Councils of War" and other consultations and meetings on board the Lord Generall and Admiral's ship the "Ann Royall" to make such records. (See pages 37, 62, 66, 122.) It will be observed that throughout, after having recorded himself as Secretary, he uses the first person, "I" did this and that, &c., &c. As will also emerge hereafter, part of Buckingham's "Instructions" to Wimbledon was that he (by his Secretary) should keep a "daily Journal" of all occurrences, and inform him thereof regularly. So that our MS. was the discharge of a duty laid upon the Secretary.

By a lucky accident a document (erroneously described as a "letter" in the "Glanville Records") (unpublished) drawn up by Sir John Glanville (then unknighted) seeking to be released from the appointment of "Secretary" on this "Voyage," is preserved in H.M. Public Record Office. It naturally claims a place here, as follows:

Mr. Glanvills reasons against his beinge imployed for a Secretary at Warre:—

Hee is a meere Lawyer, unqualified for h'imployment of a Secretary: his handwriting is so bad that hardly any but his owne Clarke canne reade itt, who should not be acquainted with all things that may occurre in such a service.

vii He hath a wife and 6 children, and his certaine meanes without his practise is not sufficient to maintain them.

He sitteth att 60li. rent per annum for a house in Chancery Lane, not worth him in effect anie thing but for the comodiousnes of his practise: however hee is to hold itt att that rate for 16 or 17 yeares yet to come.

His wife and children are dispersed into 4 gen'rall counties, with severall frendes in Hertfordshire, Bedfordshire, Gloucestershire and Devonshire, during his sicknes, and hee cannott in his straight and upon so short warninge, setle his affaires for such a iournie.

His goods and evidences and the evidences of divers of his clients with manie breviattes and noates of instruccons concerninge their Causes, are in his Studdy att Lincolns Inne and house in Chancery Lane, which hee cannot well dispose nor distribut in a short tyme, nor can now safely repaire to the place[s] where they are.

Hee is witnesse in recordershipps and engaged in divers causes of importance, which affaires and businesses if he desert, much preiudice may therby grow to very manie.

His mother, an aged lady, who relies much upon his Counsell and resort, will become herby much weakened and disconsolate.

His practise is now as good as most men in ye Kingdome of his tyme, hee having followed ye Studdy these 22 yeares and ye practise of ye lawe these 15 yeares, with viii as much Constancie and painefulness as anie man. And if hee should now bee putt into another course though but for a while, itt must needes deprive him of the fruictes of all his labours, for his Clients being by his absence once setled uppon others, he shal never be able to recontinue them againe.

His cominge to Plymouth att this tyme was only to attend ye service of his Recordershippe there, to assist the Maior and his brethren to entertaine his Maiestie; which service hee had p'formd accordingly. Septr 18o 1625."

The handwriting is "villainously bad"; but it is believed above is an accurate reproduction of the original, save in extension of contractions.


This somewhat noticeable paper needs no commentary. It is to be feared that there were many besides the Secretary unwilling embarkers on the "Voyage." Certes the "Calendar" of State Papers (as onward) reveals how compulsory and deplorable was the "impressing" of the "seamen" and "soldiers" alike, for the fleet.

I have stated that there are other MSS. confirmatory of Glanville's "Journal." The more important may be mentioned, viz.:—

Subsidiary to these, are numerous letters from Commanders in the "Voyage," including Sir Edward Cecyl, Viscount Wimbledon (Lord High Admiral), Sir William St. Leger, Sir Thomas Lowe, Sir Michael Gayer (or Geere), Sir George Blundell, the Lord Cromwell, &c., &c., &c. St. Leger, and Love, and Gayer are passionately strong against the "Lord High Admiral," e.g. Sir William St. Leger writes to Buckingham—"Indisposition kept him from the Council of War in which it was resolved to return, but both by word and writing he protested against it.… He begs leave to kiss his Grace's hand, although he should be ashamed to look up to either his sovereign or the duke. All the officers x will fly with open mouth upon the Lord Marshal, neither can nor will he excuse him; yet he knows that they that will blame him most are not blameless." (Ibid. Decr. 18th, 1625, p. 180.) Next day (Dec. 19th) he repeats his charge against some of the Council of War—"some of them had no desire they should do anything because they would value their counsel given before. The Marshal had not such abilities as could be wished in a general. Speaks out of anguish to see so brave and chargeable a business so foully mis-carried." (Ibid. p. 181.)

Earlier (October 29), from the Bay of Cadiz, he had written home to Buckingham with extreme bitterness, of the capitulation of Puntal:—"On the 24th a rumour of an attack, the men marched towards the bridge, where, being faint and without provisions, the Marshall gave them some wine, under the influence of which they became unmanageable. On survey of the town, it appeared that it could only be taken by siege, for which they were unprovided. They embarked the men again to their great dishonour. He (St. Leger) proposed to march to St. Lucar, but it was not hearkened unto. The action was too great for their abilities. He is so much ashamed, that he wishes he may never live to see his sovereign, which he thinks he will not do, for his heart is broken." (Ibid. p. 136.) Before setting out he had urged Conway (September 8, 1625) that Lord Essex xi should be in supreme command, "which would give new lustre to the action." (Ibid. p. 101.) Both Gayer and Essex are condemned by Wimbledon in his published "Journal," (p. 9) of which anon. Again: Sir Michael Gayer (or Geere) gives account of the Expedition to Cadiz, with the management of which he was extremely dissatisfied—"the Earl of Essex was subordinated—the troops were unceremoniously withdrawn—the West India Fleet had peacefully gone home whilst they were looking for it—great mortality and sickness in the ships—their meat not half the king's allowance, and stank as no dog in Paris garden would eat it." (Ibid. Dec. 9, 1625, p. 174.)

One can so far sympathise with these sea-lions chafing and eating their own hearts over the inaction and "miscarriage" of the Fleet; but it were scarcely credible without the undoubted proof in these and kindred letters, that the "Lord High Admiral" was thus stabbed behind his back by his own subordinate officers, and that these attacks and complaints were received and "laid up" as State Papers by Buckingham. There is no trace of these painful letters having been in any way made known to the "Lord High Admiral," albeit in one of several from him to Buckingham he blames Sir William St. Leger, (March 7, 1626: Ibid. p. 273). There is quite a body of correspondence carefully recorded in the Calendar of 1625, (as before) and hardly a single letter fails to shed side-light on the details of our xii "Journal." Sometimes quite unexpected confirmation is obtained. Thus Wimbledon wrote to Coke on the tedious delays in sailing from Plymouth, fearing that he might misinterpret them. Letters from Coke show that he did so misinterpret matters, and wrote sharply. (Cf. pp. 116-119). The "Lord High Admirall's" own letters to Coke, and Buckingham, and others are matterful. (See "Calendar," pp. 76, 80, 98, 100, 116 (2), 119 (2), 120, 145, 146, 262 (2), 283, 290, 340 (2), 457 et passim}.

I have been strongly tempted to fetch illustrative documents as thus pointed out by the "Calendar;" but I had to abandon the idea on quickly discovering that fresh materials exist for a companion volume with the present, of at least the same extent. Moreover an examination of the MSS. of this invaluable "Calendar" resulted in superseding communications kindly addressed to me by (a) the Mayor of Plymouth (John Shelly, Esq.) and R. N. Worth, Esq. F.R.G.S.—Extracts and Notes from the Chamberlain's Books of the Corporation of Plymouth; (b) Richard W. Banks, Esq. Ridgebourne, Kingtown—A contemporary list of "the Admiralty Squadron"" of the Voyage and "prizes" taken, &c. &c. The former are much more full and authoritative and humiliating, in the Petitions and Correspondence from Plymouth as preserved in H.M. Public Record Office ("Calendar" s.v. Plymouth frequenter), whilst the latter agrees with the lists of our "Journal" and other lists xiii recorded in the "Calendar." Hence I am constrained not to use these communications; yet none the less do I thank the Senders.

Though our "Journal" has remained hitherto unprinted, a considerable proportion of its occurences appear in a nearly contemporary tractate, prepared and published by no less than the "Lord High Admiral" him self. This "Journal" appears to have fallen out of sight and to be unknown to the Historians and all. The title-page is as follows:—





the Action which by his Maiesties Commandement, Edward Lord Cecil, Baron of
Putney, and Viscount of Wimbledon, Admirall, and
Lieutenant-Generall of his Maiesties Forces
did vndertake vpon the Coast of
Spaine, 1625.

Veritas premitur, sed non opprimitur.
Printed in the yeere 1627.

A copy is preserved in the British Museum. It is a thin small quarto of two sheets. In every case it accords with the entries of Glanville's "Journal." It thus commences:— xiv

"The 8 of Octob. being Saterday wee set sayle about 3 of the clock in the afternoon with a wind at north north east.

Upon Sunday the 9, about 6 of the clocke in the morning, we fell in with my Lord of Essex, my Vice-Admirall, and those Shippes that were put into Falmouth with him, and about 9 in the same morning, we discovered 7 sayle that were Dutch Shippes loaden with salt; the wind continued faire enough for us all that day, to lye our course out till 12 at night. This day instructions were sent to all the Admiralls, and to other officers, and to divers other ships.

The 10, being Monday, we were becalmed.

On Tuesday, the 11, in the morning, I called a counsell for the setling of instructions for a sea-fight, as by the 7 and 10 Article contained in them may plainly appeare, viz.:—

7 Art. If the Enemies approach here in such sort as the Admirall of the Dutch and his Squadron, and the Vice-Admiral of the fleet and his Squadron may have opportunite to begin the fight, it shall be lawfull for them so to doo untill I come, using the forms, method, and care foresaid.

10 Art. If any Ship or Ships of the Enemies doe breake out or flye, the Admirall of any Squadron that shall happen to bee in the next and most convenient place for that purpose, shall send out a competent number xv of the fittest ships of his squadron to chase, assault and take such ship or ships breaking out, but no ship shall undertake such a chase without the command of the Admirall, or at least the Admirall of his Squadron.

Likewise it was ordered that 5 men should be put to a messe with the allowance formerly given for 4, and warrants directed to all the fleet to that end. (pp. 1-2.)

Here also are specific incidents that are mentioned by Granville:—

"The long Robert of Ipswich was drowned with 138 Land-men, 37 Sea-men: the Land Captaines loss in the wrecke were Fisher and Hackett, a Scotch Captaine, and Gurling, the Captaine of the Ship" (p. 2). "Besides the generall losses there was no ship in his owne particular that did not suffer more or lesse in the storm, by leakes, loss of masts, and by casualties and the like. (Ib.)"

"In this tempest we had experience of the Ann-Royall herself; her masts grew loose, her main-mast was in danger of rowling over-board, two of her great pieces of 5000 weight a peece, broke loose in the gunners room; the danger was partly by the negligence of the officers that did not see carefully to the fitting of these things while we lay in harbour; she could not Hul at all." (p. 2.)

The "Journal" has a good deal of plain-speaking in it, e.g. on the advice of the "Council" not to enter "St. Lucar," he says:— xvi

"Then I demanded both of the Sea-Captains and Masters why they could not speake of these difficulties before his Maiestie (when at Plymouth). Their answer was: It is now in the depth of winter and stormie, and that they did tell his Maiestie that it was a Barrd Haven and dangerous to all men, especially to those that had not often passed it, and that, being upon the place, they could consider more particularly upon the difficulties then discourse of it when they were farre off. So that I could say no more to them, being I was no great Seaman, and that I was strictly tide to their advice that did professe the sea." (p. 6.)

There are other tid-bits well worthy of the attention of the Historian of the period. The innocent admission of the last quotation, "being I was no great Seaman," furnishes a key to the whole un-success of the "Voyage." The impression left upon myself by the "Journal" is that the "Lord High Admiral" was singularly unqualified for high command anywhere, and emphatically "at sea." He seems to shudder at assuming authority or coming to a decision. He lacked the grand daring of Blake during the Commonwealth, and of the foremost of all seamen, Nelson. It is grotesquely sad, sadly grotesque, to come upon so many evidences of incapacity to determine for himself on a given course of action. He "hangs out the flag" for a "Council of War" on now the merest trivialities, and now on things xvii that it surely lay with himself to devise what was to be done, and then inexorably to see that he was obeyed. His heart was in the right place; he was patriotic and brave; he did not spare himself toil or personal exertion. But all was neutralised by his miserable dependence on others' judgment and his fidgetty and fussy ways. He reminds one of a later Spanish Admiral (1718) Castañeta who whilst like our own Widdrington, he fought "on his stumps" when his legs were successively shot off, was as singularly irresolute in council as he was bold in action by the verdict of so calm and judicial a historian as Earl Stanhope.

It is a sorrow to me to need thus to pronounce adversely, even strenuously condemnatory, on the head of the "Voyage;" but it were to be false to the data furnished by the "Journal," to shrink from an unmistakable pronouncement. I indulge the pleasures of hope, that when the whole story of the life and service of Sir Edward Cecil, Viscount Wimbledon, is given to the world, that other Facts and achievements will redeem the ignominousness of this "Voyage;" and it is satisfactory to know that one in every way competent is now engaged on an ample Biography from hitherto unutilized sources, viz. Charles Dalton, ESQ., F.R.S., West Cromwell Road, London. Meantime I am indebted to him for the following summary little memoir of his hero:— xviii

Hon. Edward Cecil, 3rd son of Thomas Cecil 1st Earl of Exeter. Born 29th February, 1571/2. Joined the English forces in Holland under Sir Francis Vere in 1598. Served at the defence of Bommel in 1599, and was made captain of an English foot company in the spring of that year. Served at the siege of Fort St. André in the spring of 1600. Appointed captain of a troop of horse in May 1600. Commanded his troop at the decisive battle Nieuport in Flanders 2nd July 1600, and was honourably mentioned in Sir John Ogle's account of that battle. The Spaniards laying siege to Ostend in the summer of 1601, Captain Cecil volunteered for service there, and was sent from England to the relief of that town, in command of 1000 men raised in London. On his return to England was knighted by Queen Elizabeth in September, 1601. Elected Member of Parliament for Aldborough in October. The following spring Captain Cecil returned to the Low Countries, and was made Colonel of the English horse by Prince Maurice. Accompanied the expedition of that year into Brabant, and afterwards served at the siege of Grave. On conclusion of the siege was sent with a cavalry force to Emden. Served at the siege of Sluys in 1604, and was made colonel of an English regiment in 1605. Took part in the strategic operations of the States' army in 1606 near Wesell. Appointed to the command of the 4000 English sent to besiege Juliers in 1610, with rank of general. Repeatedly mentioned for "gallantry and energy" in the English Ambassador's letters and despatches from the camp before Juliers. Accompanied Princess Elizabeth (Electress Palatine) to Germany in 1613 as treasurer. Sent by James I. on a special mission to Heidelberg in 1614. Served throughout the "phantom campaign" of that year under Prince Maurice. Was present in the chief military operations in the Low Countries, on the breaking out of the war with Spain, in the years 1620-1625. Was appointed General and Commander-in-Chief of the sea and xix land forces sent to Cadiz in the autumn of 1625. Was created Baron Cecil of Putney, and Viscount Wimbledon on 9th November, 1625.

Lord Wimbledon was a member of the Council of War temp. James I. and Charles I., and was author of several military tracts. He served with his regiment at the siege of Groll in 1627, and at the siege of Bois-le-duc in 1629. On 3rd July, 1630, Viscount Wimbledon was appointed Captain and Governor of Portsmouth for life.

Lord Wimbledon was thrice married, First to Theodosia Noel, daughter of Sir Andrew Noel, Knight, by whom, who died in 1616, he had four daughters, who survived him. He married secondly, Diana Drury, sister and co-heir of Sir Robert Drury, of Hawsted, Suffolk, by whom he had an only child, Anne Cecil, who died an infant in 1618. His third wife was Sophia Zouch, daughter of Sir Edward Zouch of Woking, Surrey, by whom he had a son, Algernon, who died an infant.

Lord Wimbledon died at his house at Wimbledon 16th November, 1638, and was buried in St. Mary's Church, Wimbledon.

I have now to gather up here certain minor things promised in my notes:

  1. "Buckingham" (p. 2c) It were out of place to annotate so many-sided a name as this; but with relation to his pseudo-relation to "the Fleet," and his ordering of the arrangements, the following entry from Walter Yonge's "Diary," 1604-1628 (Camden Society, 1848), with its accompanying "note," claims quotation:

    "15th Septr., 1625. At the end of Septr. our fleet went to sea, in which went General Colonel Cicel xx Viscount Wimelton (Wimbledon), the Earle of Essex, Denby, Mr. Glanvill. secretary of the Army, and others" (p. 88).

    On this the Camden editor (George Roberts, Esq.), writes:

    "Thus the command of the greatest joint-naval power that had ever spread sail upon salt water—the Dutch contributing 16 sail and the English 80 sail—was given to a very unsuccessful general, a landsman, whom the sailors, vexed at his appointment, viewed with contempt." (Ibid).

  2. "Hollanders Fleet" (p. 2d). The "Calendar." (as before), and Viscount Wimbledon's "Journal," (as before), give important data on the part filled by the "Hollanders." It is no mere 'imagination'—is it—that the neglect and exacerbations of the Dutch "fleet" during this "Voyage" were fatally recalled and terribly avenged by Holland's sea-kings a generation later? It amazes and abases me to find so many evidences of the then shameless unreadiness and weakness of England "at sea." That so puny a nation as Holland should so have bearded England is scarcely less humiliating than that Turkey even, contemporaneously "preyed" on her shipping on her own coasts.

  3. "St. Mary Port" (p. 35d). Instead of giving here the intended quotation on this one point from Dr. S. R. Gardiner's "History" (as cited in Notes), xxi I venture to commend the whole story of this "Voyage," as told by him, to the reader's attention. Any one interested in this "Journal" will find his reward in consulting Dr. Gardiner's admirably impartial, if not somewhat indulgent, narrative. The "Journal" certainly supplies new details of indecision and waste, unreadiness and blundering, for the historian.

  4. I may add that the " Calendar" (as before) guides us to many important documents on the preparations and non-preparations for the "Fleet"; on the mismanagement and corruption on the part of those who supplied the "Fleet"; on the pressure on the people of Plymouth and all around, as well at the first arrival and sailing as on the return of the "Fleet"; and such revelation of wretchedness and exhaustion of seamen and soldiers and the un-seaworthyness of the ships, and mad neglect of the most ordinary provisions for safety of the "Fleet" and cognate matters, as astound. Some interesting glimpses of the visit of Charles I. to Plymouth, and of the condition of the "Fleet" are to be read in the following paper:—

    "The First Visit of Charles I. to Devon, 1625. By Paul Q. Karkeek: reprinted from the Transactions of the Devonshire Association for the Advancement of Science, Literature, and Art, 1878" (pp. 16). There are valuable lists of the contingents of men furnished to the Fleet by the several counties, "impressed soldiers" xxii and others. The dry details of this paper "live and breathe" in Henry IV. (act iv. sc. 2) and 2nd part of Henry IV. (act iii. sc. 2). Shakespeare had seen the horror and the "evil issues" of "impressment." Even Sir John Falstaff's ragged regiment was out-matched by the land-sea army of the Voyage of 1625. Altogether the marvel is that ever such a fleet returned at all. The scandalum is that with "counsels" so divided and distracted, flaccid and fluctuating, aimless and headless, the good name of England was sullied and lowered. How different the account of Cadiz and the "Plate Fleet" and our "enemy" altogether, if a Raleigh, a Drake, or a Blake-like, or Nelson-like man had 'commanded' our fleet! As it was, there was movement without definite purpose, activity without advance, duty enjoined and owned without performance, "councils of war" without adequate result, and emphatically sheer and wanton waste of preparations and opportunities. Our "Journal" sheds lurid light on a page of national shame that even at this late day calls to be accentuated. A document (also preserved in H.M. Public Record Office) puts us in possession of the "Instructions" of the Government—Buckingham—and the King to the "Lord High Admiral," and is of the last interest. It reveals that the "Instructions" sent out by Wimbledon (as recorded in the "Journal") followed almost literatim those sent him by the King and Buckingham. This xxiii being the case, it scarcely seems needful to reproduce either in extenso. But a few illustrative quotations may be given for comparison with the "Journal" (as above), e. g.:—

    "First and above all things you shal provide that God be duly served twice a day by everie ships companie, according to the usual prayers and Liturgie of the Church of England." Again—"You shall take care to have all your companies live orderly and peaceably; and to cause everie Captain, Master, and other officer faithfully to performe the dutie of his place. And if anie seaman or soldier shall raise tumult or conspiracie, or committ murder, quarrel, fight, or draw weapon to that end, or bee a swearer, blasphemer, drunckard, pilferer, or sleep at his watch or sett, or shall not keep his caban cleanly: or bee discontented with the proportion of victuals assigned unto him, or shall spoile or wast them, or anie other necessarie provisions for the shippe, or that shall not keep cleane his armes, or shall go ashore without leave, or shall bee found guiltie of anie other crime or offence, you shall use due severitie in the punishment and reformation thereof, according to the known orders and customs of the sea." Once more:—"You shall require everie Captain, Master, and others to performe unto you due respect and obedience: not taking the wind of you at anie time, if they be not forc'd to do it, but keeping companie unto you as much as may be, xxiv and speaking with you everie morning to know your pleasure, if the wind do permitte, and coming abord you as often as you shall put out your flag of council," &c. Further:—"And because al particulars for sea and land service can not be limited with special instructions without leaving manie things to the wisdom, prudence, and good manageing of the commanders in al such occurrences and generally in all things which are not or shall not be expressly directed, you are to use your own best iudgement and dyscretion, following the advice of such a Council as is assigned unto you. That having your own experience and resolution fortified by the consent of at least the greater part of the said Counsellors you may give the better accompt of your actions, so as the success may be the more hopeful for the repressing of the ambition of that overgrowing power which hath long threatened and disturbed al Christendom, and of the attaining and setting of such a happie peace as both his Maiestie and his late father of renowned memorie, has long and carefully sought after, and as may tend to the honour of God, the preservation of true religion, the honour of his Maiestie, and the safetie of his kingdom." Finally—as to be noted in relation to our Journal—"You shall cause a iournal to be kept, and shall advertise mee from time to time of al your proceedings and of all things you think fit in your wisdom for mee to know or make known to his Maiestie. And so to God's blessing xxv I commend your safetie and good success. From ye Court at Hollbury, 26th August, 1625." A single sentence from the King's "Instructions" not incorporated in Buckingham's, deserves preservation. "This beinge a warre for our defence and to constraine our adversaries to reason and restitution, we require you by all means to forbeare the sheddinge of the bloode of anie that attempt you not, or resist you not unto armes, as women, children and aged men, and those that render themselves to our mercie and yours."

I would now briefly give the main facts in the life of the writer of this "Journal" Sir John Glanville, gratefully drawing the most of my facts from the following important (privately printed) book:

"Records of the Anglo-Norman House of Glanville from A.D. 1050 to 1880." By William Urmston S. Glanville-Richards, Esq., 1882 (4o pp. xx. 229).

John Glanville was a younger son of Judge Glanville, and brother to Sir Francis Glanville. He was born at Kilworthy, near Tavistock, about 1589. By his father's will he inherited Kilworthy; but with fine unselfishness he "gave up" the estate to his elder brother. At an early age he was entered as a student at Lincoln's Inn—thus sustaining the family tradition of numerous lawyers. The prestige given him by his father and ancestry, started him well. He rose rapidly in his profession, and was known to have a large "practice" as a xxvi "councillor" at law. In the year 1614 he was elected Recorder of Plymouth, and M.P., in association with Thomas Sherwell for the same town. He was successively re-elected to the Parliaments of 1620, 1623, 1625, 1626, and 1628. On February 6th, 1620, he spoke memorably in the House of Commons on "the decrease of money." His bearing and tone were like Eliot's and Pym's, though soothe to say onward, he sank the patriot in the courtier, and sustained pseudo-perogative rather than the nation's rights. The tide of high and independent spirit sorrowfully ebbed and left breadths of slime or barren sand, as compared with what it was when "Mr. Recorder Glanville and Sir Henry Martin" were intrusted with the Petition of Right to secure its passage through the House of Lords, and when the former delivered his supreme speech on The Liberty of the Subject "in the Painted Chamber at Westminster," on 23rd May 1628. The "Records" reproduces this great speech in full (pp. 107-116).

It was prior to this, viz., in October 1625, and as shewn by his "Reasons" (pages vi.-viii.) in the face of his own remonstrances, he was appointed Secretary-at-War of the "Voyage" to Cadiz.

In 1630 he was chosen Lent Reader of his House, and on the 20th May of the same year advanced to the rank of Sergeant-at-Law. In 1635 Glanville and Mr. Rolles were "ordered by the Lords sitting in the Star xxvii Chamber to end the difference (if they were able) between Lord Poulett and the Rev. Richard Gove" the latter name still quick from a golden little Puritan book of his.

He further held the office of Notary and Prothonotary to the Court of Chancery with the fee of £100 per annum (==£500 to-day) payable out of the Hamper in trust for "Lady Thomasine Carew and John Houston, his Majesty's servant, in reversion with John Glanville."

In the year 1639 he was appointed Judge in a critical case wherein Laud was profoundly interested.

In the historical Parliament of 1640 he was "chosen" as Speaker of the House of Commons. He was "coy" and humble in pleading the "disadvantage to the House" of such an appointment; but saying, "he would ne'er consent—consented."

His Speech addressed to the King on the confirmation of the "choice" of the House was relatively short but most suggestive, if not ominous. It remains among the great Speeches given in Parliament. One antique flavoured bit will shew the sentiment of it in that perilous time.

"Were this nation never so valiant and wealthy, if unity be not among us; what good will riches do us or your Majesty but enrich the conquerors? He that commands all hearts by love, he only commands assuredly; greatness without goodness can at least but command xxviii bodies. It shall therefore be my hearty prayer, that such a knot of love may be knit betwixt the head and the members, that, like Gordian's, it never be loosed; that all Jesuited foreign states, who look asquint upon our Hierusalem, may see themselves defeated of all the subtle plots and combinations, of all their wicked hopes and expectations to render us, if their mischief might take effect, a people inconsiderable at home and contemptible abroad. Religion hath taught us "si deus nobiscum quis contra nos?" and experience I trust will teach us "si sumus insuperabiles." It was found, and I hope it will ever be the term of the House of Commons, that the king and the people's good cannot be severed, and cursed be every one who goes about to destroy them."

It is pitiable that a man originally so high-hearted and strong succumbed to "the divinity" that "doth hedge a king," and forgot the kingdom in the king, the nation for the one.

In 1641 he was knighted. Through the debates on the "Subsidies" that took the place of alleged sovereign right, and "ship-money," he bore himself pliantly not stoutly impartial. He is a "poor thing," compared with John Hampden in the Parliament of 1641. The power and pathos of his speeches were as great and influential as ever; but the integrity of principle was gone from them. It was too evident he xxix sought to please, not merely advise, the King. In Royalist phrase, he became a "sufferer." It was inevitable. The House of Commons could not suffer itself to be concussed or over-ruled. The "Dissolution" of the Parliament opened a tragedy that was consummated at Whitehall window.

In 1645 Glanville was held for "a desperate malignant." He was in prison from 1645 (at least) to 1648. How different this from a former imprisonment in 1636, for having spoken "too freely of the prerogative!" In 1648 he "compounded" for his "delinquency."

He represented the University of Oxford during the Commonwealth. It raises a smile to find the Historian of the family at this time of day thus writing: "The University of Oxford, ever honourable and consistent, even under the most dangerous circumstances and times, was bold enough to return Sir John Glanville as her burgess in one of the Parliaments held in the days of the usurper." "Usurper," indeed! A more egregious anachronism is inconceivable. It is to traduce the nation's deliberate choice and to slander England's greatest Ruler. He lived on with distinction; but never recovered his early renown as a free-spoken, daring man, single-hearted for his country.

About 1615 he had married Winifred, daughter of William Bouchier of Baunley, co. Gloucester, esquire, of "good blood." By his wife he had issue four sons xxx and three daughters. His best memorial is to be found in his speeches as preserved in the "Parliamentary Debates," and Rushworth's Collections. His legal-political writings have been pronounced to be still valuable. One minor incident in his life is that he rescued the afterwards venerable and illustrious Sir Matthew Hale, later Chief Justice of England, from a "fast and idle life," under singular circumstances. He died at Broad Hinton Manor, on 2nd October, 1661. In 1673, his widow erected a 'stately' monument in the parish church, which "remaineth unto this day." In the "Records" his portrait is effectively—given a large, bluff, "King Hal" looking man—large-featured every way, nose and eyes and mouth—but not forehead—most noticeable. ("Records," pp. 106-125: Woolrych's "Lives of Serjeants," s.v., &c., &c).

It only remains that I mention four things: (a) That the MS. of this "Journal" is reproduced in absolute integrity, save that contractions are extended and the modern v substituted for u and j for i, and the like. (b)That the Notes have been intentionally made as brief as might be; my only regret being that in spite of willing and eager help, it has not been found possible to recover information on the "Captains" and other brave men whose names appear in the lists. (c) That the MS. is a small quarto in vellum. The mark / notes the end of a page of the MS. The handwriting is a xxxi most difficult one to decipher, (d) That I owe my best thanks to Samuel R. Gardiner, Esq., LL.D.; Charles Dalton, Esq.; John Shelly, Esq.; R. A. Worth, Esq.; Dr. Brinsley Nicholson; Richard W. Banks, Esq.; and the "Records" of the Glanvilles.


  St. George's Vestry,
    Blackburn, Lancashire,
      August 8th, 1883.



Since the Introduction was printed off, by the kindness of Dr. S. R. Gardiner, I have been favoured with two letters (hitherto unpublished) by Sir Edward Cecil. These, his memory is entitled to have printed, and accordingly I right gladly add them here. They have been copied, with the kind permission of Earl Cowper, from the collection of Sir John Coke, Secretary to Charles I., now in his possession at Melbourne Hall:—



Right Honourable, [Nov. 8, 1625].

I have written my particular journall to his Excie my Lo: Duke which I think will bee opened before his returne; if hee bee out of England, as he did determine at my departure: so that I shall not neede to bee so particular as otherwise I would.

All I can say is, that our journeie hath not deceived mee; beeing a winter journeie, finding an enemie so long prepared for us, having no harbour to befrend us; wanting our long boats to land our men & hardlie a ship of the whole fleete cleane enough for the chase of a prize, yet to our powers with theise inconveniences wee have not beene wanting, notwithstanding there is such a crying out of leakes & dangers of the Kinges shippes; which are old & unfitt indeed for theise seas, especiallie in winter. And my shippe hath as much xxxiv cause to complaine as anie; both for her leakes; the danger of loosing her manie [main?] mast; & her ill condition refusing by anie meanes to hull in the storme; when shee took in so much water, as all the mariners were forced to work in water up to the knees.

Our prizes are yet but 3, laden for the port of Callis (as we judge) with Dunkirkes goodes. If their bills of lading bee well examined; there will bee money (in some measure) found, as well as marchandizes. The Commissarie Generall, by my order, did give forth some butts of sack to the Colonelles, by way of provision for beuberarge [beverage], whereof their is a just account kept; & now I am speaking of Capne Mason, this commissary, I must needes recommend him to your Honour, for an honest, sufficient, carefull officer, as any could have beene employed in the place. This sack I granted to the deliverie of, yet nothing neare the proportion demanded. [This shows that the beverage mentioned at p. 52 must have been a compound of wine, and not weak cyder.] My Lo. of Essex, the Vice Admirall, had a barrell of Tabacco, & my Lo. of Denbigh another, which I could not denie them. And though I might have made myselfe an allowance in some measure, yet I have taken nothing, but a few lymons and oranges that would have beene spoiled in the passage. The Dutch Admirall looks for a fivth of the Prizes, according to the contract.

I have had so much adoe to keepe the Capnes that did chase the prizes from breaking bulk, that I know not how to prevent it; first in regard they are for the most part taken so farre off my ship as I cannot send to them in anie time; secondly by reason of the meanes & commodities they have for the secrett carriage of the abuse, by putting their owne men abourd the prizes; & now that I take a more strict order for the prevention, they grow very lazie, & will hardlie looke out for a saile. Captne Raymond (now dead) had by this deceit gotten for his private 4 or 5 barrells of Coochenille, which I have, since his death, caused to be brought xxxv into mine owne ship, where it remaines upon a safe account; considering there had beene no trusting it loose, abord the Prize again. This kind of stealing is a thing of such custome at sea, that without more wages & a more particular oath of true service, I cannot see how it will bee remidied.

I have thought fitt, with the advise of the Counsell, to send theise prizes, with some of our worst colliars, & such foote as wee can best spare, and the horse-boates, because wee find there can but litle bee done by land, and not much by sea (considering our shippes proove so faultie already), onlie (if we can) to keepe the Plate Fleete from arriving this part of the winter, for the performeing of which service (our shippes daily complayning, & our men decaying), I can find it to no purpose that my Lord Duke should send a reliefe of victual, for, having no Harbour, wee know not where wee shall bee found. If his Excie intend us a reliefe, it may please him to lett it consist rather of another fleete of 40 or 50 shippes, strong & cleane, or to give order that a number of this fleete may be returned home and made readie to come out againe (whilst the rest staie here), to continue our attendance for the Plate Fleete, which will bee the greatest hindrance to the K. of Spaines proceedinges that can be propounded, I thinke; in which service wee that are now at sea will doe our best, but by all our computaçons we are not provided to hold out heere longer then Christmas, and I shall bee sorrie to see so good a beginning to this purpose lost for want of a supplie, seeing that so long as his Matie shall have a good fleete heere at sea, wee maie with good reason hope that England and Ireland will by this meanes bee well defended & Spaine blocked up. And to this end the States will not bee wanting, because they know it is the true way, & no other; since we have begun with the K. of Spaine to drive him to the defence of himselfe, onlie that hitherto hath offended [i.e., who has hitherto only attacked] both us & our frends. xxxvi

I have appointed officers for the command of the men & the care of the victual; the men being to remainie on shipboard till his Maties pleasure bee knowne; & all this gouverned to the advantage of his Maties service. And I could wish that if his Matie resolve to continue a warre, theise landmen maie bee bestowed in some guarrisons to be exercised to their musquettes, for alwaies to raise new men will be a a charge cast away to our dishonour; but whether it will be better to have them kept in their countries where possiblie they may live with lesse charge to his Matie, I leave to the higher Powers. Besides the sick men, I have sent others for the better guard of the ships wee took (which we have now found lawfull prize), & some shippes to convoy them, which I referre to his Maties pleasure, whether they shall be returned to us or not.

There came an Argier man into our Fleete with two Prizes, one of sugars, & an Englishman laden with Spanish goods, some iron, & knee timber for shipping; wee detained neither of them. But hee hath left the Englishman with us, who is now our Prize, & sent with the rest.

I am to make an humble suite to your Honr, that in regard his Matie was pleased by my Lord Dukes meanes to give mee the choise of what place I desired my viscountship, which (at first) I did choose of Wimbledon, that now, upon better consideration I may have it to bee Lord Cecyll, Vycount Latymer, because it was the antient Title of my grandfather by my mother's side, & now extinguished. This Favour, if yow can procure mee, yow shall for ever bind mee to bee your servant. And so returning to my sea-busines, I remaine,

Yor Hrs humble servant,

From abourd the Anne royall,
the 8th of Novem. 1625.

[The title of Viscount Wimbledon, promised to him before he sailed, was not actually conferred till the following year.] xxxvii



Right Honble [Feb. 27, 1625/6.]

As God hath not ordained winter for fruite, nor greate proffitt, but rayther for calamities, miseries, and misfortunes, so we have found it true in this journey; having tasted and tried the extremities of all, neither had we any reason to expect much the contrary (as I told you before my departure) and writte the same to his Matie from shipboard, which I deferred to doe before, to avoid the opinion that I should refuse any danger, or inconvenience whatsoever; when I did see his Matie and my Lord Duke so resolved, howsoever, having learned that obedience in Italic which saith Che fa, il Principe & bin fatto. [The Secretary who wrote this from dictation does not seem to have been an Italian scholar.]

All our happines being that it hath pleased God miraculously to preserve most of his Maties shipps, and some of us, who have some more experience then we had, to do his Matie service, which is some kind of recompense for the greate charge he hath beene at in this journey, since his Matie meaneth to continue a warre. For more ignorant captans and officers can hardlie be found, and men more carelesse of his Maties honour and profitt, as if they were rather enemies then servants, studying their owne ease and comoditie more then anything els, which had they not done there might have beene much more done; and officers are so sett uppon cosnage and theeverie that they rather combine with the marriners then correct them, their oune faults are so greate and the cause of all.

When I came first one board, it seemed very strange to me to see the marriners so given to stealing; but when I found officers to favor such theeves, I likewise found that officers could not well cosin his Matie and share fees, but by having theeves at xxxviii theire commaund, to convey such fees away, whereby themselves might not be taken in the manner, and good and sufficient men will not so soone do these base offices; therefore they gett boyes, and of the worst sorte, to serve theire turnes, with whome the officers do share lickewise with them in wages when they are boyes, and unsufficient men, and his Matie by this meanes is ill served, and double cosoned: for he is not only cosoned in the officers but by the marriners themselves likewise; for they will not only steale for an other and live honestly but spend so much time and of their mindes that they find but litle leasure to looke after his Mats profitt in preserving such utencells about the shipp, that cost his Matie much in providing, and would save not a litle if it were better husbanded. But his Mats ill fortune is (if the custome be not broken) that his profitt and theires are contrary things, for his Mats losse is theire fees, which they gett not by labour but by negligence, and I feare this will hardly be remedied, unless his Matie have better and more understanding Captns. For I find that the ignorance of the Captn maketh him be led by these officers for want of knowledge to oversee them, for all his knowledge reacheth not much further then to trust to them. If the States were no better served they were never able to indure a warre against so powerfull a king as they do; for it is not only mony that maintaineth theire warre but care and industrie, and especially good husbandrie of theire monie, wherein they do excell, and I will call no other witnesse to prove this argument but the Commissioners that have saved his Matie so much by that meanes; for had his Matie all the mony in the world (not being well lookt unto, and well laid out) it would not serve the turne; for cosnage, negligence, and ignorance are more chargeable to his Matie then his paye, which maketh the expence of warre seeme more uglie then it is, there being nothing in the world which requireth more good husbandrie then warre; wherein I have found by experience in this journey much wante, both that there have beene but fewe that have xxxix any mind to do his Mats service, and if there have been any they find so much opposiçon that the most are against them, which Sir Tho: Love and I have found too common in this journey, whom if I should not commend for his care, industrie, and sufficiencie for his Mats proffitt and honour I should do his Matie and my conscience much wronge; besides he has plaid the Captn, Mr, and all other officers in the shipp wherein I have beene, where there hath beene so much neede (as in any shipp of the fleete whatsoever) and by his experience and skill I have learned to do his Matie the more service and to assist him, for we have had but fewe to helpe us.

I cannott answer for those shippis that gained England so long before us, what account they have made of their victualls and munition, which may appeare by those shipps that have beene with mee at Kinsale. For when we came from thence, which was about the xxiiith of Januarie for Beere Haven, they had 6, 7, 8, and 9 monthes victualls for themselves. As for the King's shipps, theire allowance was out the 16th of Januarie or thereabouts; and you shall find we have made shifte to hould out longer, though for the shipp wherein I am, ther is no shipp hath hadd that occasion of expence and wante, in regard of the company I did carrie with me, besides the comming to counsell, and resorte of all sortes; and yet there is wanting of her allowance 40 or 50 tuns of beare, that by those shipps were appointed to carrie for me (but as I may say better they carried away from us), for I did never see dropp of it, which hath put us to some wante and misery. But I have learned that experience to have no men hereafter carrie beare for me; and I feare this beare will not remaine accountable, unlesse it be uppon the false accounts of leakage.

We have beene as carefull for the rest of the fleete that have beene beaten uppon the coasts of Ireland (only one shipp where Capt Butler put in about Ullster uppon the North of Ireland) both for instruccons how they should order theire victualls, and in releiving them the best I could with mony, especially the king's xl shipps (for theire sicke men) in regarde they were not victualled for so long a time as the rest were; and I have releived likewise the land-sicke men and officers untill my Lord President Villiers of Munster received them into his charge by order from the Lords of the Councell, and yet with no greate charge to his Matie, for that, as you know, we had no greate store of mony with us at the first, and had we not hadd that we had beene most miserable, for there we wold have no credditt, nor any thing without mony; and, although we have beene long absent, yet we have ordred the victualls so that his Matie is not at much more charge than if these shipps that have beene in Ireland had been at Plimouth, for his Matie could not have made better proffitt then to have kept his sea-men so much the longer, upon the same charge that was first made. And when the charge of this journey shalbe compared (I meane for extraordinarie charge) with other journeyes that had no landmen with them, and by proporçon, we shall not be found ill husbands for his Matie.

And, although this journey may seeme chargeable to his Matie, for that it hath returned him no present proffitt, yet in regard it hath beene one of the first actions since our long peace, no doubt but it may turne to his Maties greate proffitt for the breeding of officers and marriners, who have had greate neede, and shewne themselves very ignorant and rawe in this journey; for it is as husbandrie is, that has cost much in plowing and sowing; but the fruite lieth yet in the ground, and his Matie may expect a good cropp in the next journey if God will please to blesse us. For, as there have beene brave Captns and officers heretofore of our nation (and now but very few), so it will no doubt, but with practise, be so againe, for men are borne (as you know) souldiers, but made and bredd soldiers and marriners [Most likely Cecil intended to have wrote "are borne, as you know, but made and bred soldiers and mariners."]; for the occupacon of warre is the greatest occupaçon in the world, for it comprehends all other occupaçons in it. And xli if his Matie hath gotten but this commoditie, that is, to have exercised his subjects in the discipline of warre, after so long a peace; and to have given by this action a publicke notice to all his allies (that have long looked for it) that he hath dared to breake with the greate king of Spaine, that hath so often broke his worde with him, and to have offred him warre so publiklie at his owne doores, both by sea and land; no doubt but it will returne much to his honor and proffitt especially to the kingdome. For, if we hadd lived any longer (as I find by this journey), we should have proved in the end the most basest nation in the world, and not to have beene able to have defended our owne kingdome, which hath beene conquered four times already, not for want of men or mony, but practise, which maketh the king of Spaine so greate, so powerfull, and so fortunate in all his proceedings. And, although I have spent most of my life in land service, this having beene my first action by sea (though true discipline doth not differ in either), for order and commaund should be as well at sea as at land, and that which is most strickt is best, wherein, for anything I see, we did passe the sea-men, but this winter journey hath learned us so much, in regard of our many inconveniencies, that I doubt not but to propound somthing unto you that shall returne much to his Mats service. For as the Commissioners have done admirable things for his Mats profitt, and for the advancing of the Navie at home, that never was done before in this kingdome, to my Lord Admiralls greate honor, in whose time it was done, whereas everyone knowes you to be the soule of the Commission, and sole doer, so I hope we that have beene abroad have studied with all care we could, how to returne some profitt to his Mats service.

The cheife thing wherein we hope to do his Mats service is to have his marriners better paid; his Matie to have more honor and his service to receave more profitt, and yet his Maties charge not to be increasd, but rather lessened, and all parties more contented, xlii for as his Mats pay is now, all good saylors flye his service both in the kingdome and out of the kingdome, and serve rather his enemies then otherwise, which is both unprofitable and unhonorable in regard that God hath given his Matie no way so advantagious against his greate enemies as by sea; and his seamen are not in that greate quantities as his landmen, especially they that are good. Therfore it were a greate pollicie (in my poore judgment) to cherrish them and breede them with as much care as may be. These which his Mtie hath had in this action wer the worst that ever were seene, and it is so confessed by the most experienced seamen that have beene with us; for they are so out of order and commaund and so stupified, that punish them or beate them, they will scarce stirre, doing theire duties so unwillinglie as if they had neither harte nor minde to do any service, theire ordinarie talke being that his Matie presseth them, and giveth them so litle meanes that they are not able to live on it, and that it were better to be hanged or serve the King of Spaine, or the Turke, then his Matie, and I have beene forced to punish some of these men soundlie. Therfore, if those men may be better encouraged by a litle more pay they will do his Matie more service, and his Matie never the more charged, I thinke it will prove no ill service. For I must confesse that the labour and misery which a good marriner sustaineth at sea, especiallie in a winter journey, is beyond all labour in the world, and needes most incouradgment; wherfore of all husbandrie in the world there cannot be less gotten then out of the wages af a marriner, which is best found by the merchaunts that gaine by them, as it is most manifiest in a travilling beast, for take away parte of his provender and what is gotten if he tyer; it being in this as in all things els as ye Italian saith which is the wisest of all nations, though the most miserable of any, that che pieu [Chi più] a spende manco spende; xliii and it is true that if his Mats pay were but as other men's are, to them that deserve it, he might have such as no Prince can have. For now his pay is as much to a boy or a child as it is to the most skillfullest and ablest marriner in the Navie, which must needes greive the best, incouradge the worst, and make his Matie to have the more boyes and children to serve him, as it is now at this instant.

If it would please my Lord Admirall to consider this point and many others by the inconveniences we have found by this journey, and call whom he will before him in your presence, who is full of understanding and industrie, to disgest some better orders for the goverment of his Maties fleete, and to have them printed; he may do his Maty a greate service, and himself a perpetuall honour; for, as it is now, there is neither order or commaund, and it seemeth never hath bin before: for I see yor Chatham men, both officers and marriners, the most disorderly and the most unprofitable to his Matie.

I cannot but give you a tast how unfortunate we have been in this winter journey with the Anne-Royall, for had I but had that experience I now have, I would have refused her for another shipp. For I find that such greate shipps (and especiallie the old ones) that are so over loaden with ordnance, are not for an offensive warre, but more fitte for a defensive at home; for when she was rowling and working in the Spanish seas in fowle weather (which we have not wanted) her owne burden did her more harme than anything els, and had we not put much of the ordnance into the hould, the shipp had sunke in the sea, she proved so leakie; so that we are all of opinion that shipps of 800, or rather of 700, 600 and so smaller and smaller stronglie built, without carving, are fitter for such journeyes, both in regarde of the charge and fittness for service, with the same charge, and may have more of them, wherein the Commissioners are much to be commended for such sized shippes as xliv they have made, which have proved so well this journey, that I cannot sufficiently commend them both for strenght and so well condiçoned. I could wish that his Matie had enough of them, and that I had been so happie to have spent as much time in one of them as I have done in the Anne-Royall, and if I had had a good and strong shipp to have kept the seas, the fleete had not quitted me, as most of them did, when we bore homeward, neither hadd I seene Ireland, where I have beene blockt up so long, by reason of the leakes of my shipp, that brought into Kinsale above 6 foote of water in her hold, scarce having had 15 sound men in a watch to pompe and handle her sayles, and her foreyard spent. We stayed in the harbour of Kinsale 7 weekes, and, the winde comming to the northwest, we put out to sea, but the winde serving but 15 houres, returned to her old corner, which was south-east with some foule weather, that beate so much to the westward, that had we not recovered Bears Haven, God knowes whether we had beene driven and (our shipp being so leakie) what had become of us. After 3 weekes we put againe to sea, and by a contrarie winde was beaten into Crooke Haven, so that we have surveyed most of the South Coast of Ireland. Here we stayed until the xxiiith, at which time the no: no: west, we put to sea the third time.

Thus you see how ill fortune hath haunted us. But that which troubleth me most is to have so many come home before me, in so unfortunate a journey, when there are so many mouths open to do ill offices, and untruth hath most creditt, and maketh most impression at the first. By two kinds of people especially, which I only suspect. The first is such as did rather envie the greatness of my comaund then pittie the greatnes of my cares and paines. The other are such as have suffred much miserie and wante, and could not have so much as they desired, nor do what they listed. I must confesse there was never any thing that did trouble me more at my going out then that I had not meanes to give everyone content; for xlv although it was not my fault, yet I knew it would fall on me; for they durst not lay it upon any one els, and being full, utter it they must. And it is one of the dangerousest pointe in commaund to commaund without mony, and to have litle mony to content them, for there is nothing that will make a man more hated or slandred than that; for to punish and not to paye is ever receaved in an armie for tirannie. But if his Matie have receaved any service by it, I shall carry my cross chearefullie, for that I suffer for his sake.

I cannott forbeare to let you knowe that of all the kings Captns Sr Mic[hael] Geere hath carried himselfe worst in his Maties service, and hath much deceaved my expectation. The perticulers I will let you know at my arrivall. If my letter seems to tedious, you must excuse it, for the tediousness of the time, living a quarter of a yeare on shipboard in havens, bredd it, and that I know your industrie and sinceritie in his Maties service so greate that you cannott be tired with any thing that doth make mention towards that which hath begotten the lenght of it.

I have sent this beerer, Captn Marberie, to my Lord Admirall, to let him knowe of my arrivall here, and to know his Excies pleasure, how he will dispose of the shipping and me. And if there be no occasion to the contrarie, as I thinke there is not, that it would please him to send me his leave. For I desire nothing more then to have the happines to see his Grace. Till when, I shall remaine on shipboard, taking that best care I can for his Maties service. And so I rest, assuring myself of your good opinion, for that I am,

Your affectionate servante,
to be commaunded,

From the Downes, the 27 of February. ED: CECYLL.

These two letters, in their strange lumbering and inaccurate style and spelling, remind one of Cromwell's xlvi speeches. They accentuate the fact of the deplorable condition of the Fleet even on setting sail. They must also be accepted as confirmation that the Admiral was badly served. But they equally confirm his helpless incapacity to grapple with bad servants and unexpected difficulties.

A. B. G.



A relation touching the ffleete and Armie of the King's most Excellent Matie King Charles, sett forth in the first yeare of his highnes Raigne 1625, and touching the order, proceedings, and actions of the same ffleete and Armie.

His most Excellent Matie having with greate costes and care prepared and furnished a Royall ffleete of fourescore and tenn Sayle of good shipps and six Catches [ketches: "vessels of the galliot order equipped with 2 masts the main and mizen usually from 100 to 250 tons burden. Ketches were principally used as yachts for conveying great personages from one place to another" (Admiral Smyth's Sailors' Word-Book).] with about 5000 sea-men to conducte and manne them: and an Armie of 10000 land soldiers readie to bee transported in the same shipps for the Coastes of Spaine, The Duke of Buckingham [See our Introduction for brief notice of Buckingham and other frequently recurring names of the MS.] his grace, Lord high Admirall of England &c. was constituted by his Matie and did intend originallie/ to have gone in person as Lord Generall and Admirall in this Action, But upon some intervenient [intervening, but with the Latinate present participle ending ient (iens) instead of ing. Bp. Hall and South use the word, and Hall uses the substantive 'intervenience.'] occasions of great importance, it was finallie resolved to the contrarie, And Sr Edward Cecyll, Knt, formerlie appointed for Lord Marshall of the feild, was now designed and 2 authorized by deputaçon from the Duke of Buckingham to goe the voyage, not onelie as Lord Marshall but alsoe as Commander in cheife both by Sea & Land, by the further titles of Lord Leiutenant Generall of his Matie's Fleete and Armie and Admirall to the Admirall of England. The ffleete contayned 265,000 tonnes, & was devided into three Squadrons, The Admirall's, Vice Admirall's, and Reare-Admiralls. The Lord Leiutenant Generall, &c. goeing as Admirall in/ his Matie's good shipp the Ann-Royall, The Earle of Essex, [son of the great Earl of the name, and later, commander-in-chief of the Parliamentary Army during the Civil War.] a Vice-Admirall in the Swift-shewer, and Sr ffrancis Steward, [On this somewhat stained name, see Dr. S. Rawson Gardiner's History of England, under the Duke of Buckingham and Charles I. vol. i. 293, 313, 314.] knt, Rere-Admirall in the Lyon. Every of these Squadrons haveing alsoe a Vice Admirall and Rere Admirall; all which places were supplied by severall shipps of his Maties.

The Armie was devided into tenn Regimentes, whereof the first belonged to the Duke of Buckingham as Lord Generall, and in his absence it was commanded by Sr John Prode, knt, [Prode—sometimes 'Proude,' was Lieut.-colonel in Sir Charles Morgan's regiment of foot in the Low Countries, and his service for this Expedition was specially requested from the Prince of Orange by Buckingham.] especiallie deputed to that purpose. The second Regiment belonged to the Lord Leiutenant Generall as he was Lord Marshall, The third to Robert Earle of Essex by the tytle of Colonell Generall, The fourth to Henry Viscount of Valentia in Ireland, [see Burke's Extinct Peerage, s. n.] Master of the Ordinance for this Action, The 5th to Sr William St. Leger, knt, [St. Leger was Sergeant-major in Cecil's regiment in the Low Countries, and was also specially asked like Prode. See Gardiner, as before, s. 129, 319; and Letters of his in Cal. of State Papers (Dom. Series) 1625.] Seriant major generall, The 6th to Sr Charles Riche, knt, [younger brother of the second Earl of Warwick and the first Earl of Holland. His mother was Penelope, sister of Queen Elizabeth's Earl of Essex. He afterwards became Lord President of Munster, and died in 1622.] by the name of 3 Colonell Riche, The 7th to Sr Edward Conwey, knt [Sr Edward Conway eldest son of the first Viscount Conway, and succeeded to the title in the 4th of Charles I. (see Burke's Ext. Peerage i. n.). He commanded an English regiment in the Low Countries in 1625. He afterwards commanded the English troops at the Rout of Newburn in 1640. (See Gardiner, as before, frequenter under Conway and Lord Conway).] by the name of Colonell Conwey, The 8th to Sr Edward Whorewood, knt [Sir Edward Harewood, who was colonel of an English regiment in the Low Countries. He was killed at the siege of Maestricht in 1632, and lies buried in the Cloister Church at the Hague, under a tablet to his memory erected by his brother officers.] by the name of Colonell Whorewood, The 9th to Sr John Burgh, knt [Buckingham's second in command at Rhe; killed there. (See Gardiner, as before, ii. 129, 142.] by the name of Colonell Burgh, and the 10th to Sr Henry Bruce, knight, [untraced among the many of the name] by the name of Colonell Bruce.

Everie Regiment consisted of about 1000 men, and was subdevided into 11 companies furnished with Captaines and all other Commanders and officers usuall in Armies, onelie the Duke's Regiment was devided but into tenn Companies.

Alsoe there were readie to bee transported for land services tenn peeces of great brass Ordinance, to batter withall, and as manie small feild peeces, with 50 horses to drawe ordinance, and well neere as many more for the use of the cheife land Commanders.

15th Sept. 1625

Upon the 15th of September 1625 the King accompanied with the Duke of Buckingham and divers other Lordes came in person to Plymouth (where the ffleete then rode at Anchor) to advance and sett forward the Action: here his Matie stayed till the 24th of the same month, and in the meane tyme went aboard many of the shipps, and at Roweborough Downe [Roborough Down, an open 'down' about 5 miles from Plymouth, on the way to Tavistock.] tooke a veiwe of the whole Armie, using all dilligence in his owne person to accomodate & send/ them forth about the intended enterprise and for an incouragement 4 to all men imployed in this service and to testifie his gratious affection towardes the sea and land Commanders, bestowed the honor of knighthood upon divers of the Captaines of his owne shipps and upon some other Captaines of land Companies.

3rd October.

The King being gone from Plymouth, the Duke of Buckingham with Sr John Coke, knt, [the historical Coke, worthy of kinship to Sir Edward.] one of his Matie's principall Secretaries of State, tarried behind certaine daies to speede the departure of the ffleete with all possible expedition, and soe farr prevailed by their extraordinary industrie, that by the third of October the Soldiers being shipped and about 40 sayle of the ffleete sent before to ffalmothe, all the rest of the shipps were/ drawne out into the Sound of Plymouth and rode there at Anchor, expecting [it may be worth while noting that in this MS. this verb is used somewhat differently from present-day use. Now, 'expecting' as distinguished from 'waiting' differs in its inferring a greater probability of occurrence, albeit it is still 'waiting for' as its derivation also implies, ex-spectare = to look out for and hence to wait for.… (Portions of Grosart's tedious pedagogy omitted.)] onlie a faire wynd to carry them off, and the comeing of the Hollanders ffleete, whoe were to ioyne with his Matie's forces in this Action.

The third of October, the Lord Leiutenant Generall caused to be reduced into writeing divers Articles of instruction and direcçon for the better goverment of the ffleete, the principall contentes wherof were to this effect:

  1. They did prescribe and enioyne a course for the daylie and due service of God.
  2. ffor preventing and punishing of swearing, drunkenness, gameing, stealing, quarrelling, fighting, conspiring, mutining, and other offences.
  3. 5 For every man to execute carefullie/ his proper office and charge in every shipp and for due obedience to be given to all officers, for every man to keepe cleane his Caban and Armes, and none to goe ashore without leave.
  4. That the ordinance Captaines should punish lesser offences, but the offenders in more hainous crymes should bee brought to the Lord Leiutenant Generall.
  5. That Sea-Captaines shold not medle with land Soldiers, nor Land Captaines with Sea men.
  6. ffor the preservation and orderlie expence of victuall, powder, shott, & other stores and provisions.
  7. ffor prevention of dangers by ffire.
  8. Against disorderlie and dangerous takeing of Tobaccoe.
  9. Against the departure of men without leave out of their proper shipps into other shipps.
  10. What severall signes to use in cases of distress by fire, spending [giving way, or another needed.] of a Mast, springing of a Leake, or running a ground. /
  11. To beare but indifferent [little, or as we might say a mean (in sense of middle sail or swell sail').] Sayle in fowle weather.
  12. ffor assigneing to the shipps of every Squadron their severall and proper colours, flage, and pendentes of distinction, with orders how to weare them.
  13. For the Vice-Admirall, Rere Admirall, and Officers of the ffleete to speake with the Admirall every morning & Evening, to receive, disperse, & execute all necessarie commandes, and to keepe a good distance in approching and falling off.
  14. Against carrieing of Candles between Deckes after the watch sett, or using anie in Cabanes otherwise then in Lanthornes.
  15. ffor putting out the ffire in the Cooke-roome every night.
  16. ffor instructing the Land-men to knowe the names and use of the ship-ropes.
  17. 6 ffor trayning and exerciseing all apte/ and fitt Sea-men in like sorte as the Land-men.
  18. Against chaceing the shipps of other Princes or states or sending abord them without order of the Admirall, Vice-Admirall, or Rere-Admirall, but onlie to staie or bring such shipps to the Admirall or other officer.
  19. Against pillaging between deckes, breaking up of Houldes & imbecilling of anie goodes seised or taken.
  20. To ffall a sterne the Admiralls every night.
  21. ffor two places of Rendez-vous in case of seperation, the first to shape a course for the Southward Cape upon the Coast of Spaine in the Latitude of 37 degrees, the other for the Bay of Cadiz or St. Lucas.
  22. For keeping of good births [berths, positions at sea.] in Calmes and ffogges and giveing notice by sound of Drums trumpettes and other noyse/ to prevent falling fowle one of another.
  23. What speciall signes to make and what course to hold in case of one or more shipps or of a whole ffieete discried by night or by daie.
  24. Against shooting of Ordinance, save onely to some of the purposes specially assigned.
  25. ffor divers cautions and perticular instructions which are here omitted because that matter was afterwardes more speciallie treated of & setled by a Councell of warr, and some of the same pointes there iterated [repeated.] whiche in thes instructions were formerlie inserted.
  26. ffor disarmeing and disgraceing of Cowardes.
  27. Against landing in forraine partes without order.
  28. Against forceing of women.
  29. Against drinking of new wynes & eating of new fruite or freshe fishe. /
  30. 7 Against sleeping on the ground or upon the Deckes because of the Serene. [chilly damp (or fog), very much like our malaria.]
  31. ffor severall signes whereby to knowe when the Councell of Warr onelie and when a General Councell should come abord the Admirall.
  32. That Sea-Captaines should have the best Caban-roome in their shipps, the land Captaines the next, The Masters the next, The Leiutenants the next, The Masters Mate the next, and the Ensignes the next.
  33. That the Admiralls before night shold fitt such Sayle as they would beare all night, or if they did lacke or shorten Sayle in the night, then how by severall certaine signes they should notifie the same, with other signes to be used between the ffleete and such shippes as have been absent and come in againe.
  34. And a generall clawse to expect land orders upon landing, as alsoe that for/ matter of Sea discipline if there shold be cause, other directions should bee given to which the ffleete was referred.
The 4th of October.

Monsieur Wm de Massawe [Onward it is Nassau = William of Nassau, illegitimate son of Prince Maurice of Nassau. See our Introduction on the Hollanders' Fleet.'] Admirall of the Hollanders arrived in the Towne of Plymouth with twentie Sayle of shipps, fifteen bound to accompanie our ffleete, and five bound for Dovorr intended to goe and lie about those partes for the better guarding of our Coastes and the more disturbance of the enemyes passage by Sea during the absence of our ffleete.

Immediatlie hereupon my Lord Leiutenant Generall came abord the Anne Royall to beginne the voyage with the first good winde & weather that God should send. And the Duke of Buckingham having seen the shipps in this forwardness, began his iourney the same afternoone from Plymouth towardes the Court, leaving Sr John/ Cooke to dispatch all occasions concerning this greate busines that might happen att Plymouth after his grace's goeing from thence.

8 5th October.

The 5th of October, early in the morning, the wind being come faire, all the shipps in the Sound of Plymouth wayed Anchor and sett sayle, making for the Coast of Spaine, and ran that course till some what after noone; about which tyme the winde altering to the contrarie, they must of necessitie beare backe for Plymouth or stand of to Seaward. My lord Leiutenant Generall (willing to take the best of these two courses) advised to that purpose with Sr Thomas Love Knt [Capt. Brett, the Duke of Buckingham's kinsman, is said to have told the Duke that the great fleet would do nothing, "as there was sent with it Bag without money, Cook without meat, and Love without charity." These are the names of three chief captains (Court and Times of Charles I. vol. i. 74). Sir Thomas Love died in Fenchurch parish 12th April, 1627, and was privately buried in the choir of the church the following night (p. 213).] Captaine of the Anne Royall, & with Mr William Cooke Mr of the same shipp.

The reasons alledged for standing of to Sea were these: that it would argue more courage & constancie/ to proceede in the voyage and prevent such ill construction and censure as might be made of retourning soe soone into the Harbour, and the lyeing in Harbour wold give opportunity to manie to goe a shore & much disturbe the course of the voyage.

The reason urged to the contrary were these, that the weather was fowle and misty, wherby manie of the shipps might be in danger to over shoote the Harbour of Plymouth or fall foule upon Edynston. [an occasional old spelling for 'Eddystone', renowned for its light-house.] That if they overshott this Porte they could hardlie with the winde as then it was putt into anie fitt harbor nearer then the Isle of Wight, wherby they should be more cast backe then if they putt into the Harbour of Plymouth, and yet ranne a greater hazard of meeting with that parte of the ffleete which was gone before to ffalmoth. And that wee might come to another Anchor this night in the Sound before Plymouth without putting into 9 Cattwater or Ham-oaz [Cattewater is the estuary of the Plym opening into Plymouth Sound on the East: Hamoaze, the estuary of the Tamar opening into the Sound on the west.] wherby Men might have litle or noe opportunitie to goe a shore. My Lord Leiutenant generall declared his owne inclination to be to the former course, yet well weying the reasons on both sides and holding those which made for the latter to be of more Sollidity & importance, he resolved to come to an Anchor that night in the Sound of Plymoth; which was accordingly performed.

The next morning the Admirall of Holland came abord our Admirall, bringing with him two or three Sea-commanders of the Dutch, and some Sea Captaines of English ships came alsoe abord us,/

The wynd was still contrary and manie signes were observed by the Sea-men boading a storme to be att hand.

Hereupon my Lo: Leiutenant Generall, &c. assisting himselfe with such Dutch and Englishe Captaines as were abord him, entred into consultation what was best to be done for the safetie of the ffleete and good successe of the voyage, either by putting further into the Harbour or rideing still in the open Sound.

The reasons insisted upon for not goeing further into the Harbour were in effect the same which were alledged the day before for the standing of to Sea.

The reasons insisted upon for putting now into full harbour were these, that by many probabilities it was coniectur'd that a storme was at hand; that the open Sound was/ noe safe rideing place in all weathers; that after a storme once begunn it was verie unlikelie that soe many shipps should putt into the harbour without falling fowle one of another. That some of the ffleete wanted water, which might bee supplied in Harbour while the wind was contrary. That if the wind came faire it could not be above half a daye's advantage to putt out of the Sound more then out of Catt-water. And that by his Lop's example in lodging & keeping aboard and 10 by strickt command to all men els to doe the like, the danger of disturbance or interuption to the speedie proceeding of the voyage by goeing of Men a shore might be prevented.

Upon this consultaçon his Lop's resolution was to putt further into the Harbour in the most convenient and advantageable order that might/ be, wherein he had three things to provide for; the first that all the shipps might ride in safety, the second that noe parte of the Harbor might bee over pestred, [overcrowded.] the third that every shipp might be apt [So onward, 'most apte to warpe' etc. = aptus, fitted, and hence 'ready.'] to come forth with the first good winde.

A parte of the Harbour called Ham-oaz lay not well as Cattwater, for great shipps to gett out with such windes as would best serve our turnes, and it was not safe to thrust the whole ffleete into Catt-water; wherefore it being observed that such wynd as would carrie the five Hollanders bound of Dovorr [weather-bound off Dover, meaning to go into Dover ut infra.] to their Rendesvous would alsoe bring them well out of Ham-oaz. And that the New Castle Shipps [of Newcastle on Tyne. (See onward, 'Colliers or New Castell shipps.')] of the ffleete being the lesser and shorter shipps were most apte to warpe and turne out of Harbour,/ with every reasonable [query 'seasonable?'] winde; and that some few shipps might well ride between the said Island and the Towne of Plymouth, his Lop willed that this his resolution should bee drawne upp into a shorte order or warrant that it might be putt in execution accordinglie.

The warrant was drawne to this effect. That whereas upon good deliberation had with the Admirall of Holland and some other 11 Sea-Captaines his Lopp thought fitt that the whole fleete should againe putt into Harbour in the most orderlie and advantageable maner that might be; his Lop did therefore authorise and command all Captaines and officers of the ffleete & Annie and all other whome it did concerne, That the five shipps of Holland which were bound for Dovorr, togeather/ with all the Colliers or New-Castell shipps in the ffleete shold forthwith putt into Ham-oaz, there to ride at Anchor, expecting the first goed wynd, And his Lop further ordered the five Hollanders to enter first and the Colliers or New Castell shipps after them. And that sixe of the best Marchantes shipps of the ffleete should putt in between the land and the Island before Plymouth. And that the King's shipps and all the rest of the ffleete, both Englishe & Dutch, shold putt into Cattwater, the smallest entring first, and then the greatest by degrees passing up as farr as they might without incumbring the place for those that should bee to enter after them. And that his Lopp did further will and command all Captaines and other officers of the/ ffleete and Armie that they should not goe a shore nor suffer any of the Mariners, Sea-men, Soldiers, or others belonging to the ffleete or Armie, to goe on shore without his Lop's speciall and expresse leave, to be signified under his hand, hee himselfe being resolved not to goe on shore without some new and urgent occasion were given.

While this warrant was makeing readie, his Lop without expecting [tarrying or waiting] till it could be finished, as holding the busines to require some hast, did fortwith dispatch away severall boates from his owne shipp to notifie the contentes thereof by word of mouth, and to enioyne the performance thereof accordinglie. Alsoe his Lop called now to mynde that Sr John Coke, knt, principall Secretarie of his Matie, whoe specially/ intended [superintended] the good of this action, remayned yet at Plymouth and might peradventure bee soe farr perplexed with the suddain retrait of the ffleete as to make some 12 unpleasing adress therupon to the Court, without knowing the true causes of his Lop's proceeding: wherfore to prevent the worst, his Lop gave instruction for the drawing upp of a letter for him to him for Sr John Coke, contayning the reasons of his Lop's retourne; which were the same in effect which were observed here before. The letter being readie to be signed, before it was fullie dispatched away, there came to my Lord a letter from Sr John Coke occasioning somewhat to bee added by his Lopp to his letter by way of post-script, which by his direçon was speedely supplied, contayning in effect some further/ explanation or inforcement of the reasons of his retrait & concluding with a desire of Sr John Coke's assistance to take order in the Towne of Plymouth for the better keeping of Men from comeing a shore by suffering noe boates to come out unto them.

While his Lopp. was in debate about putting into Harbour, and touching the order and maner of the same, manie of the ships without anie warrant att all were gone in of themselves, and the rest, having notice of his Lop's resolution and direction, began to followe, but not in soe good order as could bee wished, nor in such sorte as by his Lopp was assigned.

8th October.

The wind continued still contrarie till Saturdaie the 8th of October in the forenoone; all which tyme we laie in Harbour, my Lo: Leitenant/ General lodging every night abord according to his former resolution.

While we lay thus in Harbour, Itt was observed that by reason of the speedie putting forth to Sea the former tyme, few or none of the shipps of the ffleete had anie notice or copies of the Articles of the third of October; the want whereof, especially touching the officers comeing twice a daie to receive the Admirall's commandes and the places of Rendes-vous where to meete againe if wee should be seperated, might occasion manie errors in the ffleete, to the greate preiudice of the action; wherefore a course was now taken that such Clarkes abord the Admirall as could write well were imployed to 13 make readie several copies thereof, with all convenient expedition; and because/ the whole was long and the Articles for the dailie comeing to speak with the Admirall and knowledg of the place of the Rendes-vous were the most important, therefore till the rest could be all dispatched diverse Copies of these 2 Articles were first prepared to be dispersed with all possible speed.

Furthermore, while we lay thus in Harbour it was discovered that the Lyon, wherein Sr ffrancis Steward, knight, went Vice Admirall of the ffleete, was soe leake [leaky] & insufficient, that shee was not fitt to go the voyage, ffor which cause shee was discharged and Sr ffrancis Steward alsoe.

Instead of Sr ffrancis Steward in the Lyon, my Lord Leiutenant Generall appointed the Earle of Denbigh [see quotation from Gardiner, as before, in our Introduction, on Denbigh.] to go Rere Admirall of the ffleete in the St Andrew, another of his Matie's/ shipps, wherein Sr John Wattes, knt [He was son of John Wattes, "citizen and clothier" of London, who was knighted on 24th July, 1603, and was Lord Mayor in 1606. Stow in his "Survey" informs us that one John, "heir" of the John, was a "captain in this Expedition at Cales, where he was knighted for his good service, and being an expert soldier was made a great officer in this Expedition under the conduct of George, Duke of Buckingham, against the French at the Isle of Rhee, where he behaved himself with great courage." He continues: "Afterwards he served as a captain under Count Mansfield in the Expedition on the Rhine, on the behalf of the Prince Palatine, against the Emperor of Germany" (fol. 588). He married Mary, daughter of Thomas Bayning of Suffolk, brother to Paul and Andrew Bayning, aldermen of London. By her he had issue John, James, Paul, Richard, Edward, William, Thomas, Sarah, Magdalene, Margaret, and Alice. His son John was with him in the French Expedition. Later he stood strong for the King with Capell. Oddly enough none of the authorities give the date of either's death. Only under Hertingfordbury (vol. i. 537), Chauncey says that there is "in the church this epitaph: 'Near this place lyes buried in one grave those loyal and worthy gentlemen, Sir John Watts and Capt. Harry Hooker." See also Buntingford Charities in Chauncey (vol. i. 262, ed. 1826).] was Captaine, and did ordaine the Lord 14 Delaware [Henry West, son of the Lord Delaware, who died in 1618 as Governor of Virginia.] to goe Vice Admirall of the Admiralls Squadron in his Matie's shipp the St George, and to carrie the fflagg of St. George in the foretopp; which honor and colours were formerlie boren by the Earle of Denbeigh.

8 October.

Saturdaie the 8th of October in the fore noone, the wynd came faire; whereupon severall boates were dispatched from the Admirall to the other shipps rideing in Harbour, commanding them all instantlie to putt forth to Sea; but by reason of the low Ebb and the disordered rideing of manie small shipps, whoe delayed to gett out, few or none of the great Shipps could gett forth untill it grew towardes the evening; at which tyme we gott cleare/ of the Harbour, quitting the forte of Plymouth between 5 & 6 of the Clocke, and held on our course with good wynd.

9 October.

The next daie, being Sundaie, the Vice Admirall and Rere Admirall with the rest of the ffleete that were gone before to ffalmoth, came into us, and hayled us. This daie alsoe divers copies of the instructions dated the third of October were delivered to the cheife shipps of the ffleete & we proceeded with good wynde 10 October. till Monday night the 10th of October; at which tyme somewhat before midnight the wind changed to the contrary, soe that we could not runn our intended course but stood to our best advantage, the weather being verie calme.

11 October. Tuesday morning the 11th of October, the weather continuing still calme, my Lord Leiutenant Generall, willing/ to make the best use thereof hee cold, hung out a flagg to assemble the Councell of Warr; whoe being come abord about tenn a Clocke in the forenoone they thus proceeded:

Att a Councell of Warr holden abord the Anne-Royall
Tuesday the 11th of October, 1625.

The Councell being assembled entred into consultation touching 15 the forme of a Sea fight performed against anie ffleete or shipps of the King of Spaine or other enemye, And touching some directions to be observed for better preparaçon to be made for such a fight and the better manageing thereof when we should come to Action.

The perticular [particulars] for this purpose considerable were manie, in soe much that noe pertinent consultaçon could well/ be had concerning the same without some principles in writeing, whereby to direct and bound the discourse. And therefore by the speciall command of my Lord Leiutenant Generall (a forme of Articles for this service drawen originally by Sr Thomas Love, knt, treasurer for this Action, Captaine of the Anne Royall and one of the Councell of Warr) was presented to the assembly, and severall tymes read over unto them.

After the reading, all the partes therof were well weyed & examined, wherby it was observed that it intended to enioyne our ffleete to advance & fight att Sea, much after the maner of an Armie at land, assigneing every shipp to a perticular division, ranke, file, and station; which order and regularitie was not onely unprobable [improbable] but almost unpossible impossible to be observed by so greate a ffleete in soe uncertaine/ a place as the Sea. Hereupon some litle doubte arose whether or noe this forme of Articles should bee confirmed. But then it was alledged that the same Articles hadd in them manie other pointes of direction, preparation, and caution for a Sea fight, which were agreed by all men to be most reasonable and necessarie. And if so strickt a forme of proceeding to fight were not or could not bee punctually [in every small point or detail observed, yett might these Articles begett in our Commanders and officers a right understanding of the conceit [conception] and intent thereof; which with an indeavor to come as neare as could bee to performe, the perticulars might bee of great use to keepe us from confusion in the generall. Neither could the lymitting of every severall shipp to such a ranke or fyle, to/ such certaine place in 16 the same, bring upon the ffleete intricacy and difficultie of proceeding, soe as (if the proper shipps were absent or not readie) those in the next place were left att libertie or rather commanded to supplie their roomes & maintaine the Instructions if not absolutlie yet as neare as they could. In conclusion therefore the forme of Articles which was soe presented read and considered of, was with some few alterations & additions ratefyed by my Lord Leiutenant Generall and by the whole Councell as act of theirs passed & confirmed, and to be dulie observed and put in execution by al Captaines, Mres [mariners], Gunners, and officers in every shipp and all others to whome it might appertayne at their perills, leaving/ onely to my Lord Leiutenant Generall the nameing and rankeing of the shipps of every division in order as they should proceed for the execution of the same Articles; which in conclusion were these, touching the whole ffleete in generall and the Admirall's Squadron and every other Squadron in particular—namely.

  1. That when the ffleete or shippes of the enemy should be discovered, the Admirall of our ffleete with the shipps of his Squadron should putt themselves into the forme undermençoned and discribed, namely, that the same Squadron should be seperated into three divisions of nyne shipps in a division and soe should advance, set forward, and charge upon the enemy as hereafter more parrticularlie is directed./

    That these 9 ships should discharge & fall of 3 & 3 as they are fyled in this list:— Anne Royall, Admirall; Prudence, Capt. Yaughan; Royall Defence, Capt. Ellis.
    Barbara Constance, Capt. Hatch; Talbot, Capt. Burden; Abraham, Capt. Downes.
    Golden Cocke, Cap. Beamont; Amity, Capt. Malyn; Anthonie, Capt. Blague.
    That these 9 shipps shold second the Admirall of this Squadron 3 & 3 as they are fyled in this List:— St George, Vice-Admirall; lesser Saphire, Capt. Bond.
    Sea Venture, Capt. Knevet; Assurance, Cap. Osborne; Camelion, Cap. Seamor; Retourne, Cap. Bonithon.
    Jonathan, Cap. Butler; William, Cap. White; Hopewell. Cap. [blank]./
    That these 9 [sic] shipps should second the Vice Admirall of this Squadron 3 & 3 as they are filed in this List. Convertive, Rere Admirall; Globe, Capt. Stokes; Assurance of Dovorr, Capt. Bargey.
    Great Saphire, Cap. Raymond; Anne, Capt. Wollaston; Jacob, Capt. Goss.
    George, Capt. Stevens; Hermyt, Cap. Turner; Mary Magdalen, Cap. Coog.
    Hellen, Cap. Mason; Amity of Hull, Cap. ffrisby; Anne Spedewell, Cap. Polkenhorne.

    These 3 shipps should fall into the Rere of the 3 former divisions to charge where and when ther should be occasion or to helpe the ingaged or supplie the place of anie that should be unserviceable.

  2. That the Admirall of the Du[t]ch and/ his Squadron should take place on the Starborde side of our Admirall, and observe their owne order & methode in fighting.

  3. That the Vice Admirall of our ffleete and his Squadron should make the like division, and observe the same forme and order as 18 the Admirall's Squadron was to observe, and soe should keepe themselves in their severall divisions on the Larborde side of the Admirall, and there advance and charge if occasion were when the Admirall did.

  4. That the Rere Admirall of the ffleete and his Squadron should also putt themselves into the like order of the Admirall's Squadron as neare as might be, and in that forme should attend for a reserve or Supplie. And if anie Squadron, shipp or shipps of ours should happen to be engaged by over/ charge of the enemyes, loss of mastes or yardes or other mayne distress, needing speciall succor, That then the Rere Admirall with all his force, or one of his divisions proportionable to the occasion, should come to their rescue; which being accomplished they should returne to their first order and place assigned.

  5. That the distance between shipp and shipp in every Squadron should be such as none might hinder on[e] another in advanceing or falling of[f].

  6. That the distance between Squadron & Squadron should be more or lesse as the order of the enemie's fleete or shipps should require, whereof the Captaines and Commanders of our ffleete were to be verie considerate.

  7. That if the enemyes approache happened to bee in such sorte as the Admirall of the Dutch and his Squadron or the Vice Admirall of our ffleete his Squadron/ might have opportunitie to begin the fight, It should be lawfull for them soe to doe untill the Admirall could come upp, using the forme, methode, and care prescribed.

  8. That if the enemy should bee forced to bear upp or to be entangled amongst themselves, whereby an advantage might be hadd, That then our Rere Admirall and his Squadron with all his divisions should laie hould thereof and prosecute it to effect.

  9. That the Rere Admirall's Squadron shold keepe most strickt & speciall watch to see what Squadrons or shipps distressed of our 19 ffleete shold need extraordinarie releife and what advantage might be had upon the enemy, that a speedie & present course might bee taken to performe the service enioyned.

  10. That if anie shipp or shipps of the enemy should break out or flie, that/ the Admirall of anie Squadron which should happen to bee in the next and most convenient place for that purpose should send out a competent nomber of the fittest shipps of his Squadron to chase, assault, or take such shipp or shipps soe breaking out, but noe shipp should undertake such a chase without the Command of the Admirall or at least wise the Admirall of his Squadron.

  11. That noe man should shoote anie small or greate shott at the enemy till hee came att the distance of Calliver [caliver, a kind of musket. See Skeat's Etym. Dict. s. v. Cotgrave and Minshew, s. v., give it as = harquebus or musket.] or pistoll shott, whereby noe shoote might be made fruitless or in vaine; whereof the Captaines and officers in every shipp should have an especiall Care.

  12. That noe man should presume or attempt to bord anie shipp of the enemy without speciall order and/ direcçon from the Admirall or at leastwise the Admirall of his Squadron.

  13. That if anie of our fleete happened to bee Leeward of the enemy, every of our shipps should labour and indeavor what they might to take all opportunitie to gett to Windeward of them and to hould that advantage having once obtayned it.

  14. That the Captaines and officers of every shipp should have an especiall care as much as in them lay to keepe the enemyes in continuall fight without anie respite or intermission to bee offered them; which, with the advantage of the wynde if it might bee had, was thought the likeliest way to inforce them to beare up and intangle themselves or fall fowle one of another in disorder and confusion.

  15. That an especiall care should be had/ in every shipp that the 20 gunners shold load some of their peeces with case shott, handspikes, nayles, barrs of iron or with what else might doe most mischeife to the enemye's men, upon every fitt opportunitie, and to come neare and laie the ordinance well to passe for that purpose, which wold be apt to doe great spoyle to the enemy.

  16. That the Cabanes in every shipp shold be broken downe soe farr as was requisite to cleere the way of the ordinance.

  17. That all Beddes and Sackes in every shipp shold be disposed and used as Bullwarkes for defence against the shott of the enemye.

  18. That there shold be 10, 8, 6 or 4 men to attend every peece of Ordinance as the Master Gunner should choose out and assigne them to their severall places of service. That every one of them might knowe what belonged/ properlie to him to doe. And that this choise and assignation should be made with speede soe as wee might not be taken unprovided.

  19. That there should be 1, 2, or 3 men of good understanding & diligence according to the burden of every shipp forthwith appointed to fill Carthouses of powder [cartouches (Fr.), whence our cartouch-box or soldier's pouch and our 'cartridges'.] and to carry them in cases or Barrells, covered, to their places assigned.

  20. That the hold in every shipp should bee romaged and made prvie, [privie or private?] especially by the shipps sides, and a Carpenter with some man of trust appointed to goe fore and after in hold to seeke for shott that may come in under water, and that there shold bee provided in readines plugges, peeces of sheete lead, and peeces of Elme board to stopp all leakes that might be found within bord or without. /

  21. That in every shipp where anie Soldiers were abord the Men shold be divided into two or three partes, whereof onely one parte should fight att once and the rest should be in hould to bee drawne upp upon occasion to releive and rescue the former.

  22. 21 That the men in every shipp should bee kept as close [concealed] as reasonably might bee, till the enemye's first volley of small shott should bee past.

  23. That the Mariners in every shipp should bee divided and seperated into three or foure partes or divisions soe as every one might know the place where hee was to performe his dutie for the avoyding of confusion.

  24. That the Mr or boatswayne of every shipp, by command of the Captaine, shold appoint a sufficient and select nomber of Sea men to stand by & and attend the Sayles./

  25. That more especially they should by like command appoint sufficient helmesmen to steere the shipp.

  26. That the Saylers and helmes men shold in noe sorte presume to departe or stirr from their charge.

  27. That the mayne yard, fore yard, & top Sayle sheetes in every shipp shold bee slung, and the top sayle yardes of the wynd were not too highe; hereby to avoyd the shooting downe of sayles.

  28. That there should be Buttes or Hogshedes sawen into 2 partes filled with salt water sett upon the upper & lower Deckes in severall places, convenient in every shipp, with Buckettes, gownes, and blankettes to quench and putt out wild fire [Greek fire == an explosive compound of sulphur, naphtha, and pitch, that burned with great fierceness. See note in Way's Prompt, p. 527.] or other fire if need be.

  29. That if a fight began by day and continued till night, every shipp should bee carefull to observe the/ Admirall of her Squadron; that if the Admirall fell off & forbore the fight for the present every other shipp might doe the like, repairing under her owne Squadron to amend anie thing amiss and be readie to charge againe when the Admirall should begin.

  30. That if anie of the shipps belonging to anie Squadron or 22 division hapend to bee absent or not readie in convenient tyme and place to keepe and make good the order herein prescribed, then every Squadron and division should maintaine these directions as neer as they could, although the nomber of shipps in every division were the lesse without attending [waiting or watching for] the comeing in of all the shipps of every division. /

  31. And that these 10 shipps in regard of the munition and materialls for the Army & the horses which wer carried in them, should attend ye Rere Admirall & not engage themselves with out order, but shold remayne & expect such directions as might come from our Admirall or Rere Admirall:

    • Peter Boneventure, Cap. Johnson
    • Sarah Boneventure, Cap. Carew
    • Christian, Capt. Wharey.
    • Susan & Ellen, Capt. Leuett.
    • William of London, Capt. Amadas.
    • Hope, Sr Tho. Pigott knt. [untraced].
    • Chesnutt.
    • ffortune.
    • ffoxe.
    • Truelove.

There was noe difference between the Articles for the Admiralls Squadron & those for the Vice-Admiralls and Rere-Admiralls, save in the names of the shipps of every division, and that their Squadrons had not any perticular reserve nor above 5 or 6 shipps apeece in the third division for want of shipps to make up the nomber of 9; the munition/ and horse shipps which belonged to their Squadrons being unapt to fight and therefore disposed into a speciall division of 10 shipps by themselves to attend the generall reserve.

At this Councell alsoe, my Lord Leiutenant Generall expressing a greate Zeale to his Matie's service and takeing notice that the winde was contrarie and manie shipps of the ffleet but scantly 23 victualled at our setting forth, which defect could not be now supplied, proposed it to the Councell as a thing considerable how to take some present and seasonable course to make our Victualls last the longer. And that to this purpose both the Land and Sea men might sitt from henceforth 5 & 5 in a Mess, takeing onely the allowance formerly allotted/ to 4 men, which motion was without dispute or contradiction assented unto, and accordinglie ordered.

ffor the whole Councell was soe forward to advance the accomplishment of his Matie's designes that all reasons seeming to tend to the contrarie (as our being yet within our owne Channell, the litle tyme which the wynde had been contrarie, the dishartening or at least grudging that it might peradventure raise amongst the Soldiers and Mariners to have that course taken with them when a voyage was scarse begunn, which for the most parte hath beene applied onely as a remedie in tymes of scarcetie when men are homewardes bound after a voyage much prolonged by extraordinary cross windes, and/ the imputation of neglecte or improvidence which it might laie upon them whoe had the care of victualling the navy) were all omitted and buried in a dutifull silence.

At the riseing of the Councell a motion was made to have some of the best Saylers of our ffleete chosen out and assigned to lye of[f] from the mayne bodie of the ffleete, some to sea and some to shoreward, the better to discover chase and take some shipps or boates of the enemye's; which might give us intelligence touching the plate ffleete, whether it were come home or noe, or when it would bee expected, and in what place; and touching such other matters wherof wee might make our best advantage. But nothing herein was now resolved, Itt being conceived, as it seemed, that wee might soone enough and more/ opportunelie consider of this proposition and settle an order therein when wee came nearer to the enemie's coastes; soe the Councell was dissolved.

My Lord Leiutenant Generall tooke order for the speedie notifieing of the resoluçon touching the sitting 5 & 5 in a mess to all 24 the shipps in the ffleete, but by reason of the fowle weather which began the next daie and continued divers daies after, it could not bee signified in wryteing to every shipp as soone as was intended, and hadd otherwise been accomplished.

Alsoe, the Articles of instruction agreed upon by the Councell of Warr touching the Sea fight, &c. with an apte title prefixed, were with all possible speed dispersed by the care of My Lord Leiutenant Generall to the severall shipps of his owne Squadron, and to the Vice Admirall and Rere Admirall of the ffleete, to bee duely put in execuçon, and with directions/ alsoe for them to deliver out copies thereof to the severall Shipps of their Squadrons.

12 Octob.

Upon Wednesdaie the 12th of October, about one a clocke in the morning, as wee were going to praier and Sermon, the winde came good againe, wherof wee presentlie tooke advantage; but that night it blew verie high and grew into an extraordinarie storme, which lasted all that night and all the next daie and night, much dispersing and endangering the whole ffleete in generall, and much distressing our shipp in perticular. Our auntientest Seamen tould us they hadd never been in a greater Storme.

The perticular disasters threatening distruction to our shipp were: The maine Mast like to goe over borde through the slackness and insufficiency of the shrowdes, and the getting loose of 2 of the greatest peeces of ordinance/ of 5000 weight a peice. But such diligence was used that both these mischeifes in the Gunn roome were quicklie remedied. Our perticular losses were of a man blowen into the Sea from the Maine yard by the violence of the wynd, and our long boate splitt and broken in peeces as shee was towed att our sterne.

14 Octob.

ffridaie the 14th of October the storme was well abated, and about 20 of our shipps discovered to be in veiw.

The wynd blew faire for our course during all the storme, which was a great benefitt unto us, and soe it continued manie daies, during all which tyme wee held on our course for Cape St Vincent, 25 bearing but an easie Sayle and gathering upp our scattered shipps every day more and more, and keeping such a distance from the Spanishe Coastes that wee might not be descried as wee passed. /

The ships of our owne and other Squadrons used great neglect in not comeing upp to speake with us morning and evening as they should, whereby wee were deprived of all meanes to be advertised, touching the Success of our ffleete in the late storme, or to convay to every severall shipp such instructions as wee desired.

17th October.

Monday the 17th of October, about tenn a clocke in the morning we discried from our maine topp the high land of Spaine, and estimated it to bee about xx leagues off.

My Lord Leiutenant thought now that it was tyme to prepare things in a readines in expectation of the enemy. And therefore his Lopp caused this daie a list to bee made of all the gentlemen voluntiers & their Servantes, as alsoe of all his Lop's owne servantes that were in the shipp. The whole number of those whoe were thus/ listed was about ffortie, of whome my Lord appointed Mr. ffrancis Carewe [untraced among the multitude of this name.] a gentleman of the privie Chamber to his Matie to bee Captaine, whoe readily and cheerfullie undertooke the charge. The Companie was armed with firelock peeces & Swordes, and intended to doe service neare about my Lorde's owne person a shipborde, or a shore, or to performe other speciall service as his Lopp should command.

This daie alsoe our Shipp was romaged and putt in order according to the Articles of the 11th of October, that shee might be readie to performe a fight with the best advantage against the enemye, whensoever the first occasion should present it selfe.

18th October.

The 18th of October was a Calme, wherof my Lord Leiutenant Generall takeing advantage, hung out the flagges and assembled a Councell, wherein it was thus proceeded./ 26

Att a Councell of Warr holden abord the Anne Royall,
Tuesday, 18 Octob. 1625.

The Councell being sett, the Lord Leiutenant Generall declared that by reason it was now a Calme he had called them togeather to three purposes.

The first to notifie the disorders of the ffleete in not comeing upp dailie to hayle him and receive his direçons upon all intervenient occasions; for which hee said hee would att this tyme only admonish them.

The second was to have their opinions what they thought was become of the Vice Admirall and Rere Admirall with above 40 ships of our ffleete, which hadd been missing ever since the late storme; touching which point it was alleadged that the vice Admirall with divers shipps was seen to pass a head of us upon Thursday last/ as wee laie at hull [to lie with all sails taken down and the helm lashed a-lee. See Skeat, as before, s. v. hull (2).] in the Storme. And the winde then and for the most parte ever since blew faire and strong for the Rendesvous. Alsoe it was observed that ever since the storme, wee hadd boren but a small sayle, wherby our fflagging must needes have drawne them up to us if in the storme they had remained a sterne of us, whereupon it was concluded by the opinion of all that they were a head of us and that it was fitt for us to beare more sayle thereby to fetch them upp. And it was agreed and ordered by the whole Councell that from henceforth wee should soe doe.

The third point was to understand the deffectes and losses that had happened in the late storme, that we might prepare a remedie thereof if it might bee, and make such/ other use of the true knowledge thereof as might be requisite: wherupon it was ordered [to be recorded] that the Long Robert, a Marchante's shipp of the ffleete, of the burthen of 240 and odd tunnes, wherein were 37 Sea men, 138 land men, was drowned in the storme neare to his 27 Matie's shipp the Convertive, whoe sent out her long boate to have saved some of the Men belonging to the Robert. However the long boate not onlie fayled to save the other Men but perished herselfe in the service. Moreover we were advertised that the Dolphin of Silly a Catch or Barke victualled and sett forth for his Matie's speciall service in this action at the costes of Mr. ffrancis Carew, was cast awaie in the storme and her Pilott and his Sonne both drowned. Alsoe the Viscount Valencia, the Viscount Cromwell [see Burke's Extinct Peerage, s.u.], Captaine Blague and others began to rehearse their/ perticular damages received some by loss of long boates, Barges and Skiffes, some by wetting and spoyling greate quantities of Gun-powder and match, bread and other provisions, some in springing of Mastes, getting of leakes and other disasters; which seemed to bee soe many that it was moved to abstaine from inquiring anie further how things now stood, least while every one sought to aggrevate his owne misfortunes some discouragement might thereby growe to the preiudice of the voyage, now that every mans defectes could not be supplied as they might at home; hereupon noe further mention was made att this tyme of the losses by this storme. But only touching the Dread-nought, whose defectes being much pressed by Sr Beverley Neucomb [untraced] allegeing that hee thought her to bee utterlie unserviceable. It was thus resolved/ and ordered in Councell concerning her in regard shee was one of his Matie's shipps and a shipp of greate value not onely suspected but confidently affirmed by her Captaine to be in his iudgement defective in soe high a degree. That therefore the Lord Leiutenant Generall, &c. att anie tyme when it should be required should appoint such Comittees as his Lop should thincke fitt to visite her and by all waies and meanes to find out and discover her true condition and estate and thereof to make certificate to his Lop, whereupon such further order shold bee taken as should bee fitt.


At this Councell complaint was made that manie of the Muskettes delivered for the service of this action were insufficient, some of them soe grosly that they had noe touch-holes;/ ffurther complaint was alsoe made that the bullets delivered did not fitt the peeces to which they were assigned, and that the mouldes for Bullettes were soe disorderlie shipped that they could not bee found out, to bee made use of. All which Captaine Johnson whome it seemed to concerne laboured to excuse in such sorte that nothing was now ordered concerning this matter.

Towardes the riseing of the Councell the Lord Viscount Valencia acquainted the Lord Leiutenant Generall, &c. by way of complaint that one John Graunt Mr of his Matie's good shipp called the Reformation, wherein the Viscount Valencia went as Vice Admirall of the Vice Admiralls Squadron, and Mr Raleigh Gilbert [son of Raleigh's illustrious brother-in-law] as captaines, had comitted a greate insolence and contempt not onely in refuseing to obay the direcçons of the Lord of Valencia, but by telling his Lopp in direct termes that the shipp was in the Master's charge and not in his Lop's, and that therfor hee would not hoyse sayle when his Lopp commanded. Howbeit the Lord of Valencia acknowledged the shipp to some purposes as touching the manner of entring into harbour and the like to bee absolutlie in the Maister's charge. Hereupon Captaine Gilbert affirmeing Mr Graunt to be generally an able and an honest man but sicke at this present and interposeing some wordes of qualification on the Mr's behalfe, My Lord Leiutenant Generall tooke occasion to declare his opinion and direction to this effect.

That every noble Man goeing in anie shipp in this voyage is the cheife comander in the shipp but with this distinction, That for saveing of the/ honor and office of the Captaine his Lop is to bee sparing in his commandes and to deliver them immediatlie to the Captaine and to none other; which being done the Captaine is to 29 give them in charge to all other officers and ministers [servants] in the shipp; soe as hee conceived my Lord of Valencia had not gone the right way in Commanding the Mr immediatlie, yet by reason the Master's wordes seemed to be verie peremptorie & unmanerly My Lord Leiutenant Generall wished that the Mr would make some submission to the Lord of Valencia, and soe the busines to take some end. But this hee did not by way of order or resolution of the Councell but onelie by delivery of his owne opinion every man seeming satisfied with the former declaration and overture; soe the Councell was dissolved.

Sr William St Leger Seriant Maior Generall abstayned from comeing to this Councell, excuseing it by a letter to Sr Thomas Love, that this morning the plague was discovered to bee in his shipp 2 sicke and one other with the Sore running upon him: professing his greate Sorrowe for this and other disasters mentioned in his letter, and praying direcçon both touching his owne person and his Matie's shipp the Convertive wherin he was.

My Lo. Leiutenant being acquainted with this letter retourned an answere full of comfort to Sr Wm, hopeing it would not prove to bee the plague (as afterwardes in deed it did not) and wishing him to expect [wait and watch] a while with patience, keeping in the meane tyme as much seperate as might bee from the parties suspected to be infected./

This daie alsoe there came to his Lopp a voluntary [volunteered, spontaneous] certificate from some of the officers and companie of the Dread-nought rehersing some arguments to prove her a defective Shipp but not concluding her in their Judgement to bee unserviceable: wherefore his Lopp thought not good to enter into anie consideration of dischargeing or speciall releiveing her; which might occasion allmost all the shipps in the ffleete by this example to sue for the like favor 30 and soe induce [lead in] a greate trouble and disturbance to the whole ffleete.

19th October. Wednesdaie the 19th of October betymes in the morning wee discryed plainly the high land of Mountdego [Cape Mondego], and gave chase for 3 or 4 howres to 10. or 11. shippes to leeward of us, supposing them to bee of the West-Indian/ Spanish ffleete; but at last wee found them to be some of our owne ffleete, much condemning their iudgementes and carelesnes; which by holding a course to gett from us and omitting to make the signes prescribed by the orders of the third of October, had given us occasion to spend soe much tyme in vayne now that we were come into the first place of Rendesvous. But for want of meanes to distinguish one shipp from another att a farr distance and their mingling themselves soone after amongst the rest of our ffleet the perticular offenders in this kind were not discovered.

This daie about noone, our Vice-Admirall and Rere-Admirall, with about 40 shipps more of the ffleete whoe hadd beene absent from us ever since the late storme came from the/ shore-ward and joyned themselves againe unto us hayling us with greate signes of ioy and telling us that they had been in this first place of Rendesvous these 2 daies and more, haveing as it seemeth boren a much better sayle than we, both in the storme and afterwardes.

This evening there was brought aborde us one ffrancis Gonsales, Mr of a small Carvile of Trecera taken by our Rere Admirall with 2 other Portugalls of the Companie of the same Carvile. They were examined aparte, and did in effect ioyne all in this relation. That they came from the Island of Graciosa bound for Trecera loaden with Corne and hennes and some other provisions to sell, and that being driven by the violence of the late Storme and fowle weather, they were cast upon this shore against their wills, not knowing/ well where they now were; where descring our ffleete they came into us 31 of their owne accord to seeke for mercie and releife to save their lives, being in extraordinarie necessitie and almost starved for want of fire and having drunke their owne urine in distress for want of other drinke. They said they could give noe notice or intelligence touching the West-Indian or plate fleete, save onlie that five Carakes [carracs, carricks, etc. from carrace, "a name given by the Spaniards and Portuguese to the vessels they sent to Brazil and the East Indies; large, round-built, and fitted for fight as well as burden. Their capacity lay in their depth [Query—and breadth above and below?] which was extraordinary. English vessels of size and value were sometimes so-called." (Admiral Smyth's Sailors' Word-Book.)] had been latelie att Trecera, where one of them was cast awaie but her loading saved; and that the other 4 sett sayle togeather from thence the 4th of this moneth (meaning it should seeme after their stile) but what was since become of them they knew not.

They alsoe said that they had heard that [the] King of Spaines Brasill ffleete [the yearly Brazil fleet laden with treasure, &c.] was expected to ioyne for the guarding/ home of the West Indian or plate ffleete, and that another greate ffleete was readie in Spaine for the same purpose.

Lastlie, they said that they had advertisement two monethes since in Trecera by a Carvile, of advice sent from Portugall, that there was a greate Englishe ffleete of above 100 sayle of shipps readie to set forth, being intended as they coniectured for Brasill or the Straightes, but the certaintie therof they said they knew not.

This reporte of theis Portugalls was the rather beleived for that their Carvile was but of 10 or 12 tonnes, an open boat with 25 persons in her, whereof some were women and children; soe as wee tooke her cleerlie to be noe Carvile sent purposely for an advizer or Intelligencer, neither were anie letters found in her,/ nor would they confess that ever they hadd anie.

Besides it was not gaynesaied by some of our men whoe were att 32 the takeing of them that they thought they might have gone from us by Sayleing if they had resolutely endeavoured it.

20th October. The Lord Leiutenant Generall having yesterday sent wordes by severall Catches to the Admirall and Vice-Admirall, that hee would sitt in Councell this 20th of October earlie in the morning, the flagges were now hung out to that purpose: yet some of the shipps hadd soe farr dispersed themselves this night that it was verie late in the Afternoone this daie, ere a full Councell was assembled; such as had dispersed themselves excuseing by alleaging that they could not see our light whereby to/ direct their course.

Before the comeing togeather of the Councell the Lord Leiutenant Generall acquainted mee that the wynd being now faire to putt in for St Lucas and the more Southerlie partes of Andalouzia his Lopp intended to advise seriouslie with the Councell what was fittest to bee done. And for a better preparation to enter into the busines, hee delivered mee a paper, willing me to acquaint my selfe with the contentes thereof that I might read it or deliver the sence of it the more effectuallie to the Councell att their meeting, as the subiect and foundation whereon they were chieflie to treat. This paper declared in effect that the proiectes for the intended action were 3.

  1. ffirst to destroy the King of Spaine's shipping./
  2. Secondlie to possess some place of importance in his Cuntry.
  3. Thirdlie to hinder his Commerce and especiallie the arriveing of the plate ffleete as the principall proiect.

It imported further that the places to performe these designes in were likewise three. Lisbourn [Lisbon], Cadiz, and St Lucas, whereof St Lucas would serve for the undertaking of Cadiz and the wining of the Harbour there for the undertakeing of Sevyl & intercepting of the plate ffleete, which in all Judgementes was thought the best. And that for the undertakeing of all these designes, it was thought 33 fittest to possess our selves of St Lucas: with this, that in case we were impeached [blamed] else where, Itt was resolved wee should runn soe farr into the River, till wee should finde a landing place fittest/ for our disbarkeing. And that all this hadd been discourst and thus farre agreed upon by a full Councell of Warr his Matie being present, But that yet nevertheless after all, the finall resolution of the whole was referred to a further Consultation to be hadd upon the place. This pap[er] att first I tooke to be the copie of an Act of the Councell of Warre, but afterwards I rather conceived it to be onely a note taken by my Lord for his owne memorie of what hadd passed at Plymouth; noe absolut act of Councell touching this matter being ever entred or concluded for anie thing which I could ever learne.

After a long expectation, a full Councell was att the last assembled and proceeded thus in their affaires./

Att a Councell of Warr holden abord the Ann Royall Thursday the 20th of October 1625 about Cape St Vincent.

The Councell being sett I read the paper twice unto them, and then his Lopp opening more perticularlie the contentes thereof, togeather with the effect of what had passed att Plymouth when the King was present, the Councell beganne now to debate and advise where to putt in and where to land, as in the most convenient place to effect our designes, by occasion whereof wee haveing allreadie over run Lisbourn, severall places lieng to the South or Eastward of us were now propounded besides St Lucas and Cadiz, as the fittest to bee attempted in the judgemt of some of the Councell./

More specialle Gibraltar & Malaga were a while insisted upon, but neither of them was intertained by the Councell, the former as I conceive, because it was but a poore place and yet verie difficult of access by nature, and too stronglie fortified by art: The latter because it was scituate soe farr within the mouth of the Straightes, 34 that it would drawe us quite out of the way for the mayne proiect of intercepting the plate ffleete, and the enemie in the partes thereabouts being verie strong in horse, Itt would make that place as difficult as Cadiz or Gibraltar.

Howbeit those that moved for these places wanted not their reasons, alledging for the former that Gibraltar was a verie strong rode for our shipping; That about old Gibraltar/ was a good ground for landing our Men, and from thence to March upp to the New Towne were but poore, yet the place was of great importance as being such by the advantage wherof the trade from all partes of the Levannt might be brought under our commande; That being but a small peice, it was the easier to be manned, victualled, and holden if once taken; That reputaçon & future benefitt was to bee preferred before present pillage; That strength on the enemye's side and hazard on our owne partes was to bee expected and undergone where ever we went, and that if wee prevayled, the difficulter the attempt was the more should bee our honour.

ffor Malaga it was alledged that it was a rich place and a Citie of/ good fame in England; That it was of less strength then Cadiz or Gibraltar, and of more commodious entrance for our shipping then St Lucas; That our Nation haveing been long without warr it could not be soe fitt now as hereafter, upon better experience to attempt the strongest places; That if wee undertooke some strong place and fayled, it would bee an imputation to our iudgementes and a disheartening to our people; That, this being our first attempt, if wee could take some easier place of good wealth therby to encourage the Soldiers and preserve our owne honors, it would be sufficient for a begining after soe long a peace.

But the cheife question rested still between St Lucas and Cadiz; towardes the deciding wherof the Masters/ of shipps being called in and their informations heard touching the severall natures of those Fortes and the shores adioyning for the better prepareing of the Councell of Warre to ground their judgemtes, It was alledged by 35 divers in the further debate had att this Councell, That St Lucas is a barred Haven and of such difficult entrance (especiallie for shipps of greate burthen as his Matie's shipps are) that they cannot pass in nor come out but onely att Spring tides, in calme seasons and with favoring windes, nor ride safely att Anchor in all weather without the Barre, Alsoe it was observed by others that the most parte of Masters in the ffleete will hardlie adventure to carrie their shipps in and out at St Lucas in the best tydes & weather,/ for want of perfect knowledge of the Rockes and Shelves there, and the right use of the land markes, wherby that Porte is to bee gayned and quitted in safety. Besides, it was feared that if wee should putt the whole ffleete into such a strayt, we should be more apt to bee blocked and spoyled by our enemys then to annoy them. And that our shipps could not easilie get out from St Lucas to doe service att Sea or make approach to anie other place, what ever occasion might happen.

But at last it was affirmed and admitted, that St Mary Port [See our Introduction for quotation from Gardiner, as before, on St. Mary Port.] neer the Bay of Cadiz was a lowe shore and more apt for landing of Men then anie place about St Lucar, and that our shipps might gett in and out about those partes/ at all tydes, and ride att safetie there, and in the Bay of Cadiz adioyning, out of shott of the enemies land ordinance, That in this Port and Bay it was most likely for us to find the Galleys and shipps of our enemyes, which wee might distroy to their greater preiudice, And that by running some of our New Castell shipps aground in fitt places which the nature of this Shore would afford, and mounting their ordinance to plaie uppon such blockhouses and small fortes as the enemie hath in those partes, we might happely batter the same downe & dismount their ordinance, thereby and with our other great shott from the rest of our ffleete to cleare and guard a place for the landing of our forces. And wee might heare/ putt in and come out with more varietie of wynd and weather, or if opportunitie were offered or need required might 36 march from hence by land to St Lucas, to assault and take it, being not aboute 12 miles or a short daies March from St Mary Port.

Hereupon it was finallie resolved and ordered by the Lord Leiutenant Generall with the advice & consent of the Councell att Warre, That the whole ffleete should forthwith beare in for St Mary Port as the fittest place to land in for the reasons lastlie expressed. And our Vice-Admirall with his Squadron was assigned to enter and come to an anchor first, our Admirall with his Squadron in the next place, and then the Rere Admirall with his Squadron./

When it was thus resolved to goe to St Mary Port, it was moved in Councell to proceede to a resolution for the manner and order of our landing and touching such actions att Sea or on shore as wee should then forthwith fall upon, lest else wee might bee driven to consult in a straight when we ought more properlie to bee in action or execution. More especiallie the Lord Cromwell did often presse this point which yet was not at this tyme considered of anie further, My Lord Leiutenant declaring that hee intended to take St Mary Porte cheiflie to releive the ffleete with fresh water, and that when wee were come to an Anchor according to our present resolution, hee would there advise what was next to bee donne; soe (it groweing towardes night) the assemblie dissolved./

Immediatlie afterwardes our whole ffleete, whereof about 96 sayle besides the Hollanders were now in veiwe one of another, began to beare for the bay of Cadiz.

21 Octob. The 21th of October I desired his Lopp to give mee the names of the Councell of Warr and how they were to be ranked in order; whoe thereupon dictated them unto me to bee theis.


In our course towardes Cadiz wee descried 3 shipps to whome some of the most windwardly of our shipps gave chase. They sought a while to save themselves by good sayling, but, being deepe loaden and finding that our shipps did winne upon them and were come upp soe neare to them that/ nowe one of our shipps begann to shoote at them, they quicklie strucke sayle and submitted themselves.

The shipps were called the Post horse, the Red-hart, and the ffortune, belonging to Copen haven [Copenhagen], Callice [Calais] & Hamborough, loaden with Cochinell, wynes, wooll, figges, raisins, orenges, lemmons and other commodities taken in att St Lucas and consigned all to Callice in ffrance.

However we suspected the goodes to be Dunkerkes or other enemyes shipped in those bottomes and thus consigned to Callice onely for a colour to obscure and conceale the true owners.

These shipps were commanded to attend our ffleete till the matter concerning them might bee better examined; and for our better securitie of them wee tooke out their Masters and some of their men, putting into them in their steades others of our owne sufficient for skill and nomber to command them./

Saturday the 22th of October about three o'clocke in the afternoone wee came into the Bay of Cadiz, my Lord of Essex with his Squadron entring first. There were rideing now att anchor before the Towne of Cadiz 15. or 16. good shipps of the enemyes, whereof the Admirall of Naples, said to be 1200 tonnes and carrieing 60. good brasse peices, was the cheife. There were alsoe here 8. or 9. Galleys of the Enemye. Our ffleete came on by Squadron and Squadron in three devisions, with convenient distance betweene every Squadron and in verie good order, save onlie that the shipps of the Vice-Admirall's Squadron fell too much asterne, sufficing him to enter into the Bay and pass upp before the Towne alone, a greate way before all the rest of the ffleete.


Upon the full discovery of our ffleete/ the enemye's shipps and galleys riding before Puntall [a fort at Cadiz which was taken by Essex on the 23rd Oct. 1625, i. e., the very day following the present entry. See Gardiner, as before, s.v.] hoysed their sayles, cutt their cables, and rann a head of our Vice-Admirall athwart the bay of Cadiz upp into a Creeke called Port Royall, where they thrust themselves as farr a shore as they might.

As our Vice Admirall came on to pass by the Towne they made a shott or two att him from the Shoare before ever hee or anie of our ffleete shott att them or att their shipps.

Alsoe the enemyes shipps & Galleys as they passed a head of our Vice Admirall's Squadron shott at us and wee att them.

The first that came upp to second my Lo: of Essex were Sr John Chidley in the Rainebowe and Captaine Gilbert in the Reformation, whoe amongst them shott one of the enemyes Galleys into the Wast [waist, i.e. mid-hull.] and as some say suncke her./

It was thought that if my Lord of Essex had bin more immediatlie seconded and have attempted it, hee might have prevented the enemye's shipps from gayning Port Ryall and taken them in the Bay of Cadiz. But his Lopp had noe speciall order other then onely to come to an anchor hereaboutes and expecte the resoluçon and direction of a further consultation; which hee did.

Yet others were of opinion [they] needed not to have forsaken their Anchors, being there under protection of the Towne of Cadiz in such sorte that we could not assault them without comeing within the danger not onelie of their shipps but alsoe of the Townes ordinance.

Itt was floweing water when wee came in, giveing the enemyes shipps the meanes thus to putt upp into Port-Riall; which if wee hadd come/ in att an Ebbe towardes lowe water they could not have done.

My Lord of Essex being now come to an Anchor above the 40 Towne of Cadiz, our Admirall with his squadron and the Duche cast Anchor before the Towne. And the Rere Admirall before St Mary Porte att the entrance into the Bay.

Our fflete being thus att Anchor, the opportunitie of pursueing the enemies shipping (fled upp into Port Riall) was for the present lost, and my Lord Leiutenant Generall calling to mynd that both by promise and for necessitie's sake he was here speedely to advise what was next to be donne, caused the fflagg to be forthwith hung out for assemblie of the Councell of Warr.

While the Councell was assembling, there came abord us one Jenkinson Mr of an Englishe shippe loaden with fishe, whoe lay here at Cadiz to sell/ his fishe and was ashore in the Towne when our ffleete was first discryed.

He told us that wee were come to the Towne unexpected. And that they were not well manned nor provided for us, but in great feare & distraction, blameing the Conde de Olivares [See Gardiner, as before, s.v.] as the cheife cause of provoking us to come thus to invade them.

Yet hee tould us that the last night there came newes to Cadiz that our King had been lately att Plymouth, And that there was a ffleete of above 80 Sayle to come from England, but when to sett forth or whether bound they could not certainlie tell; whereby wee were confirmed in our opinions that nothing of importance is publiquely done in England but the Spaniard hath intelligence of it with all speede possible.

He informed us likewise that the/ enemyes shipps fledd upp into Port Ryall were for the most parte Neopolitanes, drawen hether lately for the King of Spaines speciall service, and that the Spanish ffleete, which hadd lately been at Brasill, was now att Malaga or Gibraltar, as the constant reporte went att Cadiz.

This man being observed by the enemyes to take boate and make towards us, they shott att him soe as a greate shott bassed [bruised: or qy. abased, laid low, tumbled over by 'bruising] him 41 between his legges, making a round hole the widness of the Bullett in his breeches, yett touched not his skin, onely with the splinters of the Shott hee was a little hurt in the nose and in one of his handes.

At a Councell of Warr holden abord the Ann Royall Saturday the 22th of October 1625 in the Bay of Cadiz.

The Councell being mett, it was taken into consideration what was necessary further to bee done for the effecting/ of our designes. And it was conceived that by the flight of the enemies shipps att our entrance into the Bay, and by such intelligence as wee hadd now gotten from Cadiz, that wee were come hither unlooked for and the Towne not verie well provided, but in greate fear and distraction by reason of our suddaine approache, soe as for anie thing yet appearing to the contrarie it seemed unto some that by a present attempt upon the Towne of Cadiz before they might recollect and settle themselves or obtayne further supplies of amunition Men and victualls to wistand our forces, wee might probably carry it with assault or composition in a short space. But our shipps rode yet some of them within shott of the Towne and other within shott of the ffort of Puntall. And it was held a vaine thing to consult or thincke of attempting Cadiz or any other place untill wee hadd provided a safe harbor for our shipps, the/ cheife Bullwarkes of England and only hope of our retourne, which was now conceived could not be done without gayning the ffort of Puntall; ffor the water up towardes St Mary Porte upon better information or discovery thereof appeared now to bee shallowe, namely but 10. or 12. foote att full sea and five or 6 foote att lowe water, that it was noe fitt harbour for our whole fleete. And that we should not bee able to make altogeather soe readie use of that place for landing our Men as was once hoped. And by reason wee must rowe somewhat farr with our boates to deliver our men a shore. But about Puntall was verie good Anchoring, soe as if wee were once Masters of that fforte 42 all our shipps might well be disposed of to ride in the Bay of Cadiz in safety.

Itt was therefore resolved by the Lord Leiutenant Generall, with the assent/ of the Councell of Warr, that the fforte of Puntall should be forthwith assaulted by a Battery to be made upon it by five Du[t]ch shipps, to bee particularly assigned by the Admirall of Holland and by 20 Colliers or New Castell shipps, to bee perticularlie assigned by the Lord Leiutenant Generall, with three of the King's Shipps to make towardes the place for the better countenance of the Service; The Du[t]ch shipps and Colliers to goe upp as neare to the fforte as they might, whereby their battery and small shott might have the better effect.

In the next place it was moved by some of the Councell, that a present course might bee agreed upon and prosecuted, for the takeing, sincking, blocking upp, or fireing of the shipps and galleys, fled from us upp into Port Riall, as being a thing of greate consequence to weaken the enemy and strengthen us if wee could gett/ their Shipps, or but their ordinance and loading, which [we] were informed to beare of greate value. And that it was not good to give them anie respitt, whoe by the benefitt of tyme having the shore to freind and being wel skilled in the Channell might gather more harte, and upon long and serious advice take some course to frustrate our desires touching those shipps, by landing their ordinance and planting them a shore or by other meanes; or peradventure the change of wynd and weather might hinder us of comeing att them when wee wold. But it was replied that those shipps were in effect our owne allreadie, being lodged in a place where they were safe enough and could not stirr from us, And that Puntall was first to bee obtayned and a safe harbour for our ffleete therby to bee provided, before anie other thing was to bee thought upon. Theis speeches prevayled soe farr that without anie further resolution or consultation att this tyme, either touching the landing of our Armie upon the Island of Cadiz (which pointes hadd been lightlie touched at) the Councell was soone dissolved.


According to this resolution for the assault of Puntall, the Admirall & Vice Admirall of Holland being present att the Councell, tooke notice what was to be done by them. And my Lord Leiutenant Generall appointed Sr Michael Gayer and Mr ffrancis Carew to goe forthwith by Barge and warne 20 of the New Castell shipps of our ffleete perticularly to ioyne with the Hollanders and begin an instant battery upon the ffort of Puntall. And the Earle of Essex, Vice Admirall in the Swift-Shewer, with Sr John Chidley/ in the Rainbowe, and Captaine Gilbert in the Reformation, were appointed for the King's three shipps that should countenance this assault.

Sr Michael Gayer and Mr Carewe attended the service, and gave notice to such New Castle shipps as should perticularly goe on upon this imploymt.

The Du[t]ch with sixe or eight shipps beganne a Batterie forthwith upon this ffort and continued it till 9 or 10 a Clocke, but few of the Englishe came upp this night to second them. And the King's shipps by reason of the Ebbe could not this night come upp to the service.

About 11 a clocke att night the Du[t]ch gave over their battery, having by this tyme made about 500 shott att the fforte, which retourned not one for tenn to them againe, wherby we collected that they hadd few or noe peices mounted, or els that they wanted powder and shott; which did the more embolden and incourage us against them.

23 Octob. The 23th of October, being Sonday, by 4 a clocke in the morning as wee were about to goe to praiers and receive the Sacrament of the Lorde's Supper, the Admirall of Holland with some of the Du[t]che came abord us, complaineing (and as it seemed not without cause) that they were not well seconded the last night in the assault begune upon Puntall, alleging that they might have taken it that night if our shipps had assisted as it was ordered in Councell He further alledged that two of their shipps were aground and verie 44 dangerouslie shott in such sorte that if there were not a speedy course taken to releive them against it should be daylight, they would bee utterlie lost.

My Lord Leiutenñt made answere that hee would take present order herein, and soe dismissed them./

Before 5 a clocke we went to praiers and beganne the Communion, which as soone as my Lord with Sr Thomas Love and some others had received, they left the shipp before the Comunion ended and without my knowledge went to the Earle of Essex shipp, riding neare to Puntall; where they spent the whole day.

As soone as it was cleere day light wee might observe that some passed between Puntall and the Towne of Cadiz, reinforceing it with men and munition as wee conceived. The towne alsoe begann to shoote at our Admirall where shee rode att Anchor; but they hadd not above one or two peices that would reach us and that butt at randum, soe as haveing shott one onely bullett into our shipp which did us no hurte, about noone, they gave over shooting at us anie more.

In the meane tyme my Lo. Leiutenñt/ Generall hadd drawen some of the King's shipps and other of the ffleete verie neare to Puntall and began and continued the batterie a fresh upon the ffort from morning till Middafter noone, both with greate ordinance and also with Muskett shott: for diverse of our shipps came close up within the distance of Calliver and pistell shott and plyed the defle [playd the devil. The MS. looks like 'deftle'.] soe busilie from our shipps, that by reason of the parapett of the ffort was but lowe, they that defended the fforte could not attend to travas [traverse—a phrase used for manoeuvring weapons in fight, i. e. to wheel or alter the direction of a cannon to left or right. There is a substantive 'travis.'] and manage their ordinance, but after a while gave over shooteing att us, the rather (as it seemed) for that some of their ordinance were become useles through the shott which they received 45 from us, soe as they hadd not above one serviceable peice of ordinance left in the ffort, which Don ffrancisco Bustamante (whoe att/ this tyme commanded the fforte) did himselfe in his owne person charge and discharge; few or none els of his Companie (as it seemed) having the skill or courage to doe it.

In this assault Captaine Porter in the Convertive and his Master Mr Hill and Captaine Raymond in the greate Saphire with his Master Mr Kenton were moved to doe the best service, wherof the two latter were slaine with a greate shott from the ffort.

This daie about noone wee perceived from our shipp that the Enemyes galleys passed from Cadiz to St Mary Port carryeing as wee thought the wealth of the place and might come backe in the night bringing men or munition or both, to our preiudice, and albeit some of our shipps which rode about those partes putt themselves under sayle and shott att the Galleys, yet it was to/ litle purpose for anie thing wee could observe, of all which I forthwith advertised his Lopp by letter praieing him to take it into present consideraçon and applie a fitt remedie.

Towardes 4 of the Clocke my Lord Leiutenant Generall gave order for the landing of some of our troopes with intent to scale the ffort of Puntall, and soe to take it or att least to take from them all hope of releife from the towne of Cadiz, and soe inforce them the sooner to surrender.

The first that attempted land was Captaine Edw. Bromigeham, Captaine of my Lo. Dukes Companie, whoe comeing on valientlie with his sword drawne under the fforte walles was slaine in his boat with a Muskett shott and divers of his men that came in the same boat with him were killed with stones rolled over the parapett./

What the reason was why he adventured to land thus under the fforte, I knowe not, but have heard he did it by direcçon, and that the reasons of such direction were, for that the ffort, not haveing made anie shott att us in a long tyme before nor many Muskateeres 46 shewed themselves of late upon the platforme, it was thought safe enough for him to goe a shore in this place and more for the honour of our Action, and for that it was doubted there might be ambushes placed in the partes adioyning; but the enemy whoe hadd long before much concealed and contayned themselves, takeing present advantage of his approach soe much within distance of the fforte and in effect iust under it, made us quicklie to see our Error; which was instantlie reformed by commanding the next companies to land further/ of[f], which they speedelie performed, finding no ambushes there, & began to drawe themselves into order.

Colonell Burgh by speciall order from the Lord Leiutenant Generall had the charge and command of the first troopes that landed of what Regiment soever they were, until the other commanders and the rest of the Armie (if there were cause) shold alsoe bee landed; which service hee performed with good resolution and Judgement.

They of the ffort noe sooner sawe our men landing and drawing into order but they hung out flagges or made signes for truce and p'ley [parley]; whereupon wee sent a Drumme to them and putt Sr Alexander Brett [See Gardiner, as before ii. 132, 182. Query brother to Arthur Brett and the Countess of Middlesex, wife of the Lord Treasurer (Middlesex)? See further in the Progresses of King James I. vol. iii. pp. 970, 984, and "Diary of Walter Yonge, Esq." (Camden Society), p. 76.] into the Castell to secure Don ffrancisco Bastamente, while hee came forth and treated first with Sr John Burgh and then with Sr William St Leger to agree the condiçons for a Surrender./

Att first hee demaunded not onlie to marche away with their colours flieing, their Swordes by their sides, their muskettes charged with match burning in Cocke, their bandeleirs full, and bullettes in their mouth, but verie bouldlie propounded to have awaie all their ordinance belonging to the ffort and a certificate from us that hee had behaved himselfe like a valiant and good Soldier to his 47 King in defending the fforte as long as might bee; but att last hee agreed and did surrender without the two latter conditions and forgott to contract when or to what place hee should be suffered to goe.

The ffort being thus taken in, there were found to bee in it about 120 men and 15 barrells of powder with some greate and small shott, but noe great store of either. There were alsoe found some dead bodies which the enemyes to dissemble their loss/ had cunninglie buried in the Rubbishe. Don ffrancisco Bustemante behaved himselfe like a noble and brave Captaine in defending of this peice, alleaging in excuse of himselfe for his Surrendring it soe soone that it was suddainly manned (not with Soldiers, but for the most parte with Townesmen), whoe, being over terrified with the incessant battery of our greate shott and utterly dismayed with the continuall volleys of our Muskettiers threatned to kill him if hee would not surrender, or els hee (as he affirmed) would have made us buy it dearer; yet hee pretended that wee hadd made att it in all above 2000 great shott.

He sought to lessen all things that might encourage us and advance the contrarie, sayeing to that end that he doubted not but he hadd slaine att least 100 of our men, yet affirmed confidently that hee hadd not lost above one/ or two; both which pretenses were utterly false, for wee, haveing slaine manie more of his men then hee would confesse of, lost yet scarce soe manie of our owne in all the service about takeing in this fforte as we slew of his.

He reputed Cadiz to be extraordinary well manned and victualled and thoroughlie stored with amunition. But in respect hee was an enemy and wee had observed his humor by his former speeches wee were sparing to give overmuch creditt to his wordes.

The ffort of Puntall is scituate upon a point of land shooting forth between two litle bayes on either side and is set soe farr into the water that at every flood it becometh an Island.

When wee came into it, wee found it to bee a large and goodly 48 foundation intended for 30 or 40 peices of ordinance/ in several plotformes one above another, butt it was now but in building, nothing neare finished nor furnished; for there were only 8 peices mounted on the lower plott-forme towardes the Sea, the rest of the plotformes not being yet well capable of ordinance nor their parapettes raysed, neither was the gate of the fforte as yet finished but another slight doore hung on to serve for the tyme, the defect whereof was supplied by a great multitude of stones rolled and heaped upp togeather in the Arche and entrance into the fforte, wholy filling upp the passage, in such sorte as did sufficientlie secure it. This fforte was built of a kinde of stone not apt to splinter, and soe well filled between the walles for mounting of the plottformes that our great shott hadd done but litle/ hurte save in batterie of some parte of the parapett which seemed to bee the onlie defect in all the fortification; ffor it was thought by us to bee too thinne and too lowe, not answerable in strength or proportion to the rest of the worke.

There was within the ffort a pitt well of badd water, which the enemyes before they quitted the place had dammed upp that it might bee of noe use to us till it were new digged & cleered againe.

The enemye haveing quitted the fforte, we placed therein a Garrison of 200 of our Men, under the Command of Capt. Gore and Captaine Hill and conveyed Don ffranccisco Bustamente with his Companie to the other side of the Bay and there sett them a shore that they might goe to the Towne of Cadiz. Soe wee were become Master of a sufficient parte of the harbour for the safe/ rideing of our shipps out of shott of the Towne and for the safe landing of all the rest of our menn with our horses ordinance and provisions upon the Island, if it should bee soe thought fitt.

About 9 a clocke att night my Lord Leiutenant Generall retourned to his owne shipp, haveing given order that all the rest of the Armie with the horses and ordinance should bee landed att Puntall with all speed possible. Wherein such dilligence was 49 used that most of our forces were landed by the next morning, save onely 600 or 800 men transported out of Englishe ships belonging to the Rere-Admirall's Squadron remayned yett aborde, for those shipps rideing farr belowe before St Mary Port could not land their men soe soone as our other shipps by reason of the greate distance betwixt that place/ and Puntall. And albeit the ffort of Puntall were now taken in and manned, whereby the full intent of yesterdaies resolution in Councell for provideing in the first place a safe harbour for our shipps was accomplished, yet wee proceeded to land still more and more of our Soldiers upon the Island of Cadiz and spent this whole Sonday night with greate dilligence in that service, By what order it was soe done I knowe not, onlie I suppose that my Lord Leiutenant Generall this Sonday while hee was in my Lord of Essex shipp, where alsoe divers of the Councell of Warre were present with him, came there to some latter resolution for the landing of our whole Armie and power in this place, and to thincke noe more of St Mary Port./

24 Octob. Upon Munday morning the 24th of October my Lord Leiutenant Generall tooke his barge from his owne shipp which rode then between Cadiz & Puntall and rowed upp to the Earle of Denbighe, rideing then before St Mary Porte, and after some short conference hadd with the Earle, they both tooke barge and rowed towardes Puntall.

As they passed, a rumor mett them that the Reformation was on fire, the suspition whereof was encreased by the greate Smoke that arose from her; and the danger that might growe thereby was apprehended to bee the greater by reason most of the shipps of our ffleete haveing resorted to Puntall about the assault thereof or for the landing of our men lay there aboutes verie thicke togeather in greate disorder and confusion. My Lord dispatched away Sr Michael Gaire/ to inquire out the state of the Reformation touching the suspected fire, and held on his course for Puntall, where hee arrived about 9 a Clocke, the whole Armie well neare by this tyme landed 50 save onlie such Soldiers as hadd been transported in the Rere Admiralls Squadron, whoe rideing farre belowe from Puntall could not soe soone land as those that rode neerer up to Puntall.

There were divers of the Councell of Warr now assembled att Puntall and my Lord Leiutenant Generall declared his intention here to advise with them what was next and best to bee done.

Sr Michael Gaire brought word that all was well in the Reformation, but with all a suddaine rumour came that some forces of the enemyes were comeing on by land towardes the Towne/ of Cadiz, and were in some neerness to skirmishe with our men. Hereupon his Lopp thincking that his personall presence would be requisite in the Armie to directe and assist our troupes for the receiving and repelling of the enemye, And calling to mynde alsoe that the pointes touching which he intended now to have held his Councell were of much importance and required good expedition, hee called unto him the Earle of Denbighe and acquainted him in few wordes how the state of things stood; and withall desired and assigned his Lopp to supplie the place of Admirall of the whole ffleete, while my Lo. Leiutenant Generall should remayne a shore, and more especially that hee would forthwith goe abord the Swiftshewer rideing then neare to Puntall and there by the proper fflagges hung out to assemble a generall/ Councell and by their advice to settle these three pointes with their necessarie circumstances.

  1. To make provision for victualling of the land forces for some competent tyme from hence forth till further order might bee taken.
  2. To dispose of the whole by their severall Squadrons to ride in the most convenient places and best order that might bee, for their owne safety and for offence to the enemy.
  3. To consider and resolve what is fittest to be done touching the enemyes shipps and Galleyes which were runn upp into Port Riall.

According to this direction of my Lord Leiutenant Generall, the 51 Earle of Denbigh went forthwith aboard the Swift-sewer and caused the flagg of Councell to be hung out.

Before the Councell could be assembled the Earle of Denbigh, calling to mynd/ that besides the three pointes given in charge by my Lord Leiutenant Generall to bee settled in Councell, his Lopp had absolutely commanded another thing to bee done touching the present landing of such soldiers transported by the Rere-Admirall's Squadron as were not yett sett a shore, gave order for a warrant to bee drawne to that purpose; which was speedely accomplished. By this warrant tis required all Captaines and Commanders of shipping in the ffleete to visite the shipps of the Rere-Admirall's Squadron and enquire what Soldiers unlanded were in anie of them. And that they should attend and applie themselves with all their Catches and Boates forthwith, to land such of them as were not yett landed and then repair again to their owne Squadrons.

This warrant was noe sooner drawne and signed but it was sent to Sr John/ Wattes to bee by him putt in due execution.

While these things were in doeing, Capt. Johnson, whoe commanded in a shipp of amunition, came and complained to the Earle of Denbigh that hee wanted a boat to supplie his occasions for the landing or conveying to or fro of himself and such provisions as were requisite to supplie the Sea and land service; for remedie whereof, his Lopp tooke present order, giveing him a warrant signed agreeable to his desire, wherby hee enabled him to press and take any boate of the fleete that hee should thinke fitt (except the boates belonging to the king's shipps).

Between 10 & 11 of the Clocke a competent nomber of the Councell of Warr and other Sea Captaines being assembled the 3 speciall pointes committed to the Earle of Denbigh's charge were taken into consideration and well debated and in conclusion thus farr resolved./ 52

Att a Councell of Warr holden abord the Swift-Shewer in the Bay of Cadiz upon Monday the 24th of October 1625.

This Councell was assembled & holden by the right honoble the Earle of Denbigh deputed by my Lord Leiutenant General to bee Admirall to all purposes when my Lo. Leiutenant Generall shold bee a shore (as now he was) about land-service.

More especiallie the Earle of Denbigh was desired att this tyme to settle these three pointes with their necessary circumstances, namely:

  1. To make provision for victualling of the land forces for some competent tyme from henceforth till further order might be taken.
  2. To dispose of the whole fleet by their severall Squadrons to ride in the most convenient places and best order that might be for their owne safety and for offence to the enemye./
  3. To consider and resolve what is fittest to be donne touching the enemyes shippes and Galleys which were runn upp into Port Riall.

Between tenn and eleven of the Clocke in the forenoone a Competent nomber of the Councell of Warre and other Sea-Captaines being assembled, these three pointes were taken into consideration and well debated and in conclusion thus farr resolved.

For the first, it was held fitt & agreed that the Captaines and Commanders of all shipps in the ffleete wherein anie Soldiers were transported should send and Convay from every of their shipps provision of meate and drinke for such nomber of Soldiers as were or should be landed out of their severall shipps respectively for 7 daies from the tyme that their Soldiers were discharged from them after the rate of 5 to a mess, accompting such provisions of this kind (if anie were) as they had formerlie/ sent to bee parcell of their 7 daies store. And in every such case to adde now onlie a proportion to make upp the rate for the whole tyme. Itt was alsoe thought fitt and agreed that the 7 daies provisions for the first three daies of the 7 should bee bread and cheese, and for the latter 4 daies bread and beefe, and the drinke for the whole tyme beare or biverage [beverage, a sweet kind of cider made of the leavings of the better kind.] as 53 it could most readely be come by in every shipp. That all these provisions should bee delivered to the Commander of the ffort of Puntall or to his deputie, the bread and cheese, beare, and beverage forthwith and the beefe readie dressed as soone as it could be watered and boyled: ffurthermore that all these provisions should be carefullie stowed and sent in baggs or vessels fitt for the purpose with an Inscription to bee sett uppon/ every such bagg or vessel, makeing mention of the quantitie and qualitie of every parcell of meate and drincke therein contayned, and for how manie soldiers, and of what companie or Regiment the same was assigned and belonging. And that every one delivering such provisions should take an acquitance from the Commander of Puntall or his deputie, testifieng his receipt of the same provisions accordinglie.

Alsoe it was thought fitt and agreed that the Commander of Puntall or his deputie should receive into custodie all these provisions of meate & drinke, and bestowe and keepe the same in safe and convenient places, and not to issue them forth other then by warrant from the Lord Leiutenant Generall, or some other of the Colonells, Captaines, or Commanders of the ffeild for their/ severall troupes, Regimentes, & Companies respectively. And that the same Commander or his deputie, by the helpe of some fitt Clarke, should keepe a true note of the quantitie and qualitie of all such victualls as they received, and of the tyme when and parties from whome they soe received the same.

In preparation of the resolution for this first point the Councell intended and tooke care that the Armie should bee victualled for such a tyme as might not too soone require anie other consultation to bee holden about the same matter. And yet not for soe long a tyme as might peradventure exceede the tyme of their staying a shore. That every shipp should vittaile her owne Soldiers & know certainlie what to send and how to compute the 7 daies. That the Soldiers should not be putt to anie fishe allowance this first weeke, butt/ be victualled of the best for their incouragement. And if it 54 hadd been conceived that bear enough could have been come at in every shipp without romageing, Beverige had been for this weeke excluded. That the soldiers provision might come wholesomlie and neatlie to them. That it might be discernable who did observe and whoe did neglect these directions, whereby offenders might be punished if there were cause. That all provisions to be sent a shore might there bee safely kepte in a place of fitt distance and secure access to serve the Armie. And that every Companie of Soldiers might knowe how to challenge the victualls belonging properlie to themselves without trouble or confusion. All which perticulars are conceived to bee competentlie provided for in the precedent Act.

Touching the second speciall point/ referred to the Councell, Itt was thought fitt and agreed that all the shipps of the Admirall's Squadron shold forthwith prepare to ride in faire birthes about the Ann Royall, in the place where shee was then at Anchor, being between Cadiz and Puntall. And that all the shipps of the Vice Admirall's Squadron should forthwith repaire to ride in like sorte about the Swift-Shewer neare Puntall, being the place where shee was then att Anchor. And that all the shipps of the Rere Admirall's Squadron (haveing landed their Soldiers) shold repaire forthwith to ride in faire birthes about the St Andrewe over against Santa Castalena, [Sta Catalina, the point to the west of Puerto de Santa Maria.] where shee was then att Anchor, and dispose themselves there into such order that they might keepe all shipps, galleys, and boates of the enemies from goeing in or out to or from/ Cadiz and St Mary Port, or other the partes adioyning. But for the Du[t]che Squadron it was thought fitt & agreed to leave them att their owne libertie, to ride in such place as they themselves should elect and thinke most convenient, soe as it were without preiudice to this order assigned for the Englishe ffleete.

For the third, which was held the most important of all the rest, It was alleaged that it was a shame to us that those shipps and 55 galleys fledd upp by Port Ryall hadd been soe long neglected, and that it argued fear or improvidence in us to suffer them soe long unattempted. That wee rode in verie greate danger of being fired in harbour if wee dispatched not our busines and putt to sea againe with expediçon. That if the enemyes ffleete and shipps of/ Warr should come in upon us, as wee were howerlie to expect they might by helpe of their galleys and by some other meanes rowe or gett out of Port Ryall and soe assault us before and behind and from the Towne of Cadiz all at once, to the greate endangering of our whole ffleete & dishonour of our nation. And lastly that these shipps and galleys would bee a faire purchase if they could bee taken, or a great loss to the enemye if they might bee confounded; wherfore it was thought fitt and fully agreed, that the Vice-Admirall of our ffleete with all the shipps belonging to that Squadron (the Admirall of Holland and all his shipps ioyning with him) should forthwith prepare themselves to attempt these shipps and galleyes of the enemyes. And that with the first opportunitie of wynd and tyde they/ should goe in hand with this service and prosecute it to effect with all expedition, till they hadd taken or fired or otherwise distroyed those shipps and galleys, or soe manie of them as possible they might. But touching the further meanes and manner how to undertake and accomplishe this designe, Itt was thought fitt & agreed, that it should bee left to the Judgement of the cheife commanders of the shipps belonging to these Squadrons; for whose better enabling nevertheless two of those vessells of our fleete wherein horses were transported, with sufficient combustible matter to bee expended in either of them, should attend the pleasure of the Commanders for this action; disposed and to be made use of as they should direct, for setting on fire of the enemyes shipps and galleys as/ occasion should be offered, and that whosoever should be found remiss or negligent in performing anie parte of these directions should answere the same att their uttermost perils.


Att this meeting, Itt was moved that the Councell would bee pleased to sett an order and prescribe the meanes how the Soldiers and Land service might bee supplied with powder and shott. Butt it was not taken into consideration, partlie for that it was none of the 3 pointes speciallie referred by my Lo. Leiutenant Generall, and partlie because it was conceived to belong partlie to the care and charge of the Viscount Valencia as hee was Mr of the Ordinance in this expedition.

Att the riseing of the Councell the Earle of Denbigh, observing that as/ the weather and tyde then were nothing could forthwith bee done touching the assault of the shipps and Galleys att Port Ryall and bearing speciall respect to my Lo. Leiutenant Generall whoe was now a shore, but was not conceived to bee verie farr off, shewed himselfe desirous that his Lopp should bee made acquainted with the proceedinges and effect of this consultaçon and his approbaçon thereof obtayned before it should bee putt in execution. To this purpose it was forthwith ordered that I should forthwith goe to the ffort of Puntall and there acquaint my Lo. Leiutenant Generall with what hadd passed at this meeting, or if I found him not there then to command a horse and seeke out his Lop elswhere and soe accomplishe the service enioyned./

Itt was now about one of the Clocke and soe the Councell dissolved. According to the commandement of the Earle of Denbighe I went to Puntall, being convayed thither by Sr John Chidley in his Barge, but, missing my Lord Leiutenant Generall there, I was inforced to seeke him out elswhere, and soe with much adoe I gott a dull and ill paced horse, by the helpe wherof I rode as farr as to Hercules pillar [This would ordinarily mean Gibraltar, but it must here be some place in the Isle of Leon.], where I found the Lord Leiutenant Generall with 7 or 8 Regimentes of the Armie readie, as they then expected, to encounter instantlie with the enemy, supposed to bee at hand in good nomber, though afterwardes it prooved otherwise. I tould 57 my Lord the occasion of my comeing, offering to read unto him my notes touching the resoluçons taken abord the Swift-shewer but hee alleaged he had then/ noe tyme to heare them read, desiring mee to informe him shortlie of the effect therof: which I did, and his Lopp declared instantlie that hee did well approve and fullie ratefie the same in all things, desireing that the Earle of Denbigh would noe longer forbear to have it putt in execution.

Moreover his Lopp gave in charge to comend to the Earle of Denbighe consideration how a companie of 100 foote or more might bee raised out of the Sea men by selecting and armeing a man or two out of every shipp that could best spare them; of which Companie hee would have Captaine Osborne to be made Captaine, and to attend his further directions about Puntall.

Alsoe hee willed mee to putt the Earle of Denbigh in mynd that/ for want of attendance of boates att Puntall messages could not bee readilie convayed between the Army and the shipps, nor the victuall of the Soldiers brought from Puntall to Hercules Pillars and such places further upp in the Island of Cadiz as the service of the soldiers in these partes seemed now to require.

I made backe for Puntall with what speed I could, but by reason of the ill way and badness of my horse, it was allmost night ere I gott thither and it was soe long ere I could gett a boate that it was hard night ere I could gett a board the Admirall.

The Earle of Denbigh att this tyme was gone aboard his owne shipp rideing farr downe before St Mary Port 3. or 4. myles distant from the Admirall, soe as by reason thereof/ and for that the boates of the Shipp were now abroad on other service, I could not goe nor send that night to the Earle of Denbigh. But his Lop had promised to come aboard us the next morning betymes, there againe to sitt in Councell if need were, and to dispatch such busines incident to the Admirall's place as might fall out to bee necessary. And then I thought I might in good tyme acquaint him with my Lo. Leiutenant Generall's answere and directions.


By my late being a shore in the Island of Cadiz I understood that my Lord Leiutenant Generall had by word of mouth given order for the bringing of some victualls for the Soldiers to Puntall, wherof I knew nothing, while the Earle of Denbigh sate in Counsell in the Swift-shewer; and in my returne from Hercules pillars/ I observed manie boates roweing to and fro between that and Puntall with provisions for the Armie, not well knowing where nor to whome to deliver them; the reason of which disorder as I understood afterwardes was, because those of Puntall where my Lord Leiutenant Generall had appointed the provisions to be delivered and where most of the boates offered first to deliver the same, refused to receive them, saying they had noe order to that purpose. This caused much loss of tyme and labour and was a further reason why some of the shipps assigned to goe for the Port Ryall could not well attend the same this daie for want of their boates; which were occupied for the most part in the service of convayeing victualls for the Soldiers to Puntall and from/ thence to other places, finding there noe discharge.

While the Earle of Denbigh bestirred himselfe thus a shipboard, my Lord Leiutenant Generall being a shore, the same 24th of October, began to marche with the whole Armie towardes the Bridge of Cadiz, intending as it seemed to possess that or the Straight of the Island and to make it good there, to hinder the enemyes bring[ing] anie supplies into the Towne of Cadiz by land.

But it was now discovered that those of the Towne had drawne forth an Ambushe of muskettiers into a vineyard or Orenge garden behind Puntall not farr from the way where our men and carriages were to pass with our feild ordinance and provisions from Puntall towardes the Armie; whereby they/ cutt of some few of our improvident [careless] and stragling men.

To prevent this inconvenience therfore and such others as might 59 happen to us while the mayne bodie of the Armie was removed further off, my Lord Leiutenant towardes the Evening appointed two Regimentes to marche backe towardes Cadiz under the Conduct of Colonell Burgh & Colonell Bruce, to discrie and disperse the enemyes ambushes for preservaçon of our loose men and to keepe those of the Towne from sallieing out upon us, lest els the enemyes forces comeing on from the Bridge, we might att once bee sett upon both behinde and before to our great danger.

Sr John Burgh and Sr Henry Bruce, marching back with soe many Soldiers of their Regimentes as were now/ landed, took upp their lodging that night before Cadiz, but not neare the Towne; yet soe as they secured us against the Ambushes & Salleys of the Towne.

My Lord Leiutenant with the rest of the Armie marched on two or three miles beyond Hercules pillars, where they found the houses of diverse gentlemen and Cavalliers utterlie forsaken by the Inhabitantes and all their goodes carried awaie, save onely what was left to doe us mischeife; for there was found in these houses exceeding great plenty of new wyne in Iron bound Caske[s], foure or 500 pipes or more.

It was now growen soe late that my Lo. Leiutenant, not being well able to marche anie further, tooke upp his lodging here with all his/ Troupes for this night. Here the Soldiers of his Lop's speciall favor having obtayned a competent proporçon of a Butte of wyne for every Regiment, therewith to refreshe themselves, were soe disordered in the expence [expenditure, or using] thereof, that some of the worser sorte, being first distempered therewith, sett on the rest and grew to demand more wyne, in such disorder and with such violence that they contemned all command and sett light not onlie by their ordinary officers but even by the more eminent Commanders, not respecting my Lo. Leiutenant himselfe, nor abstayned from slighting his authority, useing base and contemptuous wordes both against his person and place. Noe wordes of exhortation, noe blowes of correction would restrayne 60 them, but, breaking with violence into/ the roomes where the wines were, cryeing out that they were King Charles his men and fought for him, careing for noe man els. They claymed all the wyne as their owne, due to them for their service, & proceeded to distemper themselves therewith still more, till in effect the whole Army except only the Commanders, was all drunken and in one Common confusion: some of them shooting one att another amongst themselves. Nor could this mischiefe be wholie restrayned, though by the speciall Command of his Lopp all the rest of the wyne was staved with as much expediçon as might bee; ffor then with their hattes and head peices they dipped it upp in the Cellars and vaultes where it swame about, swearing and protesting manie of/ them that they had not tasted a drop of beare or wyne that day, nor the day before, though they were absolutely drunken when they said soe.

Howbeit true it is, that some of them by reason of the uncertaine course which was yet houlden touching their victualling and the not deliverie and misdeliverie of their provisions hadd nott been att all releived with meate and drincke since their landing, or att least wise not in such orderly and good sorte as they might or should have been; ffor being suddenly landed, either for hast or want of good order formerly taken, manie of them brought not in their knap sackes such victualling as hadd been fitt, or else they hadd wastfulle consumed at one meale that which should have served them for divers daies; but the case of/ the most was that they brought with them only their knap sackes without any victualls at all.

The next morning, being Tuesdaie, my Lo. Leiutenant finding the unworthines of the Soldiers and their unfittness for service by reason of their base condition & unskilfulnes in the use of their Armes, as alsoe through the long fasting and late distemper of the most of them, resolved to desist from marcheing anie further towardes the Bridge. And therefore his Lopp with the maine bodie of the Armie retourned towardes the Towne of Cadiz to the other two Regimentes. Some of the Soldiers through the weakness of their late 61 drunkness or other faintness not being able, and others through their base unworthiness not careing to carrie their Armes with them./

The same Tuesday morning between 4 & 5 of the Clocke, our ffleete was putt into noe little fear of ffireing; apprehended by reason of the Hull of a shipp of the enemyes of about 200 tonnes, which came floating with the tyde from St Mary Porte or Cadiz towardes our ffleete, supposed to bee a shipp with fier workes sent forth by our enemies, to floate or drive in amongst us and there to take fire by a trayne. But at last manning out some boates with Muskettiers, we fastned grappers in her and soe towed her a head of, over to the Porte Riall side, and then entring and searching her, found her to bee an emptie vessell readie prepared to bee sunken, and broken loose by negligence as most men conceived. Howbeit, some they were who thought shee/ was lett goe onlie to trie the true inclination of the ffloate & drift of the tyde against another tyme. And that if shee had beene now manned by the enemies, who by boates brought for the purpose might probably have escaped in the night when the trayne hadd been readie almost to take fire and shee gotten soe neare to our ffleete, that wee could not thus have fastned a towe [rope or cable] unto her, nor prevented her driveing in amongst us, especially if 3 or 4 shipps and boates fastned togeather att good distances with Iron chaines hadd soe come towardes us.

Having thus towed her aside, wee sunk her forthwith in the Bay, for shee was soe leake [leaky] and forward in sinking when wee entred her,/ that we could [not] preserve her anie longer to make other use of her.

This morning also there swam to us from Port Riall a Du[t]ch boy that was formerly detayned prisoner in some of the shipps fled upp thether.


This boy declared unto us in what manner those shipps had disposed of themselves and what meanes they hadd used to prevent us from comeing up to them.

About 8 a clocke the Earle of Denbigh came abord the Ann Royall and being by mee advertised how my Lord Leiutenant Generall had confirmed the resolutions of yesterdaie's Councell, he thereupon signed two warrantes, dated as of yesterday; The one directed to the Captaines and Commanders of the shipps for/ the victualling of the Soldiers for 7 daies, and therein to observe the directions of the resolution touching that point taken aborde the Swift-shewer. The other directed to the Commander of Puntall or to his deputie, requiring the performance of soe much of the same resolution as concerned them.

These warrantes were delivered forthwith to Mr. Westbrooke one of our Masters Mates, whoe spent the whole daie in rowing to Puntall and from shipp to shipp to deliver and notifie them to the parties whom they concerned.

As soone as his Lop had dispatched away these warrantes hee caused the fflagges of Counsell to be hung out, and it was not long ere diverse of the Counsell were assembled, proceeding as followeth./

25 Octob.

Att a Counsell of Warr holden abord the Ann Royall in the Bay of Cadiz, Tuesday the 25th of October 1625.

Att this Councell I declared how I had attended the Lord Leiutenant Generall yesterday, and acquainted him with the resolutions of the Counsell holden the same daie abord the Swift-shewer, and how his Lop hadd in all things ratified the same, willing it to bee putt in execution with speede. Alsoe I now acquainted the Councell (as the truth was) that his Lopp hadd given mee further in charge to deliver unto them how hee desired a Companie of foote of 100 or more Sea men to be raised and armed by takeing one or two men out of every shipp as they could spare & to assigne them under the Command of Captaine Osborne to attend his Lop's/ pleasure about Puntall for his Maties service. And that order should be 63 given for boates to attend att Puntall to carrie passengers and provisions of victuall & amunition to and fro to places requisite uppon all occasions.

It was now about 9 a clocke and instantlie hereupon the Earle of Denbighe by the approbation of the Councell of Warr now assembled, enioyned Sr Samwell Argall, Captaine of the Swiftshewer (whoe in the absence of the Earle of Essex and now on shore attending his charge there of Colonell Generall) was to command at Sea as Vice-Admirall of the ffleete, That hee with all the shipps of that Squadron showld forthwith attend and prosecute to full effect the service upon the enemies shipps and galleys at Port Riall/ according to the resolution taken yesterday.

Advertisement was alsoe now given to the Du[t]ch Squadron of the same resolution and intention that they might ioyne with us in the service.

Att this tyme manie marriners and Sea-men belonging to the Vice-Admirall's Squadron were now on shore about Puntall, without whom their shipps not being well manned could not convenientlie sett about the service required, wherfore the Earle of Denbigh, by assent of the Councell of Warr now assembled, sent speedily a warrant directed to the Commander of Puntall or to his deputie, therby willing and commanding him forthwith to proclayme by beating of a Drum, That all Marriners and Sea-men belonging to anie shippes of that Squadron, which then were ashore att Puntall or in the partes adioyning,/ should forthwith repaire abord their severall shipps, upon paine of death.

Alsoe att the same tyme, out of his further care to advance the service, hee granted by like assent of the Councell of Warr another Warrant to Sr Samwell Argall, thereby authorishing [sic] him to take and dispose as hee should thincke fitt anie one or two flie boates ["A large flat-bottomed Dutch vessel, whose burden is generally from 300 to 600 tons. Distinguished by a remarkably high stern resembling a Gothic turret and by very broad buttocks below. Also a swift canal passage-boat." (Admiral Smyth's Sailors' Word-Book).] 64 then emptie, wherein horses were transported, that hee might make use of them for the service now enioyned as occasion should bee offered.

By that tyme these thinges were finnished, manie of the Councell had withdrawen thamselves to attend their perticular charges, soe as the Earle of Denbigh finding now noe iust cause to attend here anie longer, departed for this tyme; promising to come againe to morow morning,/ and willing mee then to putt him in mynd about the matter of raising a companie for Captaine Osborne, and for the boates to give better attendance about Puntall.

In the afternoone, about 2 a clocke, my Lord Leiutenant, &c., came abord the Admirall, wherby hee declared that hee hadd given order if any Soldiers remained yet aborde, they should not now bee landed att all, unless further order came from him to that purpose; wherby I collected some inclination in his Lopp not to keepe the Army long a shore in the Island of Cadiz; and after a while his Lop went againe a shore to attend the service by land, leaving still the Sea-command to the Earle of Denbigh.

As soone as the wynd and tyde/ would permit Sr Samwell Argall, with the Squadron and shipps assigned to that service, weyed Anchor, and sett sayle for Port Riall, takeing with them for their better information the Du[t]ch boy that hadd soe swem unto us this morning and a Cach; which was imployed to goe before and sound the Channell for the better direction of their entrance. Att their comeing upp before the Creeke, where the enemyes shipps were runn in, they found 4 shipps to be sunken in their waie, with a passage left only for one shipp to enter at once as the Du[t]ch boy had before informed us; wherefore, considering now that our shipps could enter but one and one and only bring their chase peices to play upon the enemyes whoe hadd soe/ disposed of their shipps that many of them att once might plaie upon us with their whole brode-sides. And for that it was suspected they had alsoe planted ordinance a shore for our further annoyance if once wee came on within distance, 65 it was feared to bee a service verie dangerous and unlikelie to succeede well if wee should further attempt the takeing of the said shipps & Galleys of the enemyes by force in the place where now they were.

And touching the confounding of them by fireing or blocking up, this alsoe was become verie difficult: and the Mars of the horse boates appointed to this service (whether out of a desire to save the Vessells or for that they were not yett fullie discharged of their horses,/ hay, and other provisions I knowe not) shewed a backwardnes in attending the commandes of Sr Samuell A[r]gall, concerning the same.

This day alsoe Captaine Oxenbridge Captaine of the Dragon began a battery upon a Sconce [fortified place (usually small)] of the enemies at St Catalena neare St Mary Port, requireing Captaine Plumley of the William and Thomas to fall a sterne and assist him, saying hee had order soe to doe, whereas indeed hee had not. They received some damage from the Sconce but did litle or none to it.

My Lo. Leiutenant being retourned to the Armie, consulted there this evening with divers of the Colonells and Councell of Warr, whether without loes of honour they might shipp their Souldiers againe, quitting the Towne of Cadiz: and what was fittest to bee/ done for preservation of the ffleete and Armie and accomplisheing the service enjoyned us by his Matie.

Hereupon in the first place Itt was held noe matter of dishonor for us to quite the Towne upon good iudgement, haveing not yet engaged our selves by any battery against it, nor breaking ground to entrenche ourselves before it.

In the next place it was thought best to shipp our Armie againe with all convenient expedition; of which opinion I conceive these to be the reasons.

  1. ffor that the maine matter given us in charge was the intercepting 66 of the plate ffleete, which by our stay here was neglected, the uttmost tyme of their approach by the course of the yeare draweing on now apace; and if wee laie still here it could/ not be expected that they would come in upon us or to St Lucar: rather by the benefitt of such advice as might be sent them would putt in att Lisbon or els where more Northerly, soe to escape us while wee remained in these South Esterly partes of their Cuntrie.

  2. ffor that our shipps rideing here in the enemyes harbour were thereby subiect to those dangers wherof some observation is here before made uppon another occasion.

  3. ffor that the Towne of Cadiz was apprehended to bee soe stronglie fortefied that it was not to bee carried without a Seige, for which we were not thoroughly victualled.

  4. ffor that the Galley having already passed to and from the Towne/ they had in all probabilitie carried awaie the best of their goodes, eased the place of their superfluous Inhabitantes and supplied it with Soldiers and munition; which must needes occasion the longer and more difficult seige.

  5. That, the Towne being scituate in an Island, betwixt which and the continent was noe passage for our shipping, we could onlie beseige it by Sea on the one side before the Towne, where wee might ride att Anchor by the benefitt of the Bay or Harbour, but in other places on the other side towardes the pointes of the Island, they might take advantage, especiallie in the nightes; and by the helpe of their Galleys to releive the Towne with all thinges necessary, wherein wee should noe way be able to prevent or hinder them./

  6. And lastlie for that our Soldiers by the experience which the Commanders had now gotten of them were found verie unserviceable and unfitt for a designe.

I was not present my selfe att this consultation but have followed in this relation thereof the best observations that I could make out of other relations.


My Lord Leiutenant lodged this night a shore in the Armie, walking the round twice or thrice in the night to see all things in good order.

Sr Thomas Love, whoe hadd beene a shore att this present att this deliberation, came againe abord the Admirall the same Tuesdaie night and there directed how in the Marche of the Armie towardes the Bridge of Cadiz [The Puente de Zuazo, joining the island with the main land.] ther were found a litle/ beyond Hercules pillars 10 or 12 great boates or shallopps for Tonny fishing, with great store of Nettes and Corke, supposed to belong to the Duke of Medina Sidonia [Son of the Duke who commanded the Armada.], which shallopps would bee verie usefull for us to shipp our soldiers againe, and might in some sorte repaire our damage formerly sustained in the loss of our long boates. He added further how my Lord Leiutenant had directed that the next daie some of the boates belonging to our shipping should attend to fetch awaie these shallopps and bring them to Puntall for shipping the Soldiers: His Lop with the former 7. or 8. Regimentes of the Army intending to marche backe to the place where they remayned (drawen a shore and stowed in store houses) the better to secure and guard the fetching/ thence of them; and for the better speed and furtherance of the service, hee gave commande that our Barge & other boates of our ffleete should attend the next morning by tymes, readie manned to goe for these other boates of the enemye.

The next morning being Wednesdaie the 26th of October, Sr 26 Octob. Thomas Love with the Barge and boates belonging to our shipps and a competent nomber of other boates, went to fetche the shallopps from Hercules pillars; and 7 or 8 Regimentes of the Army marched alsoe to the place, the better to secure the bringing of them awaie.

This morning alsoe the Earle of Denbighe came againe abord the Admirall, ther to dispach such occasions of Sea-command as might be requisite,/ where observing the negligence of our hors-boates in not 68 goeing upp towardes Port Riall, hee sent a Command in wryteing under his hand to the Masters and owners of all vessells in the ffleete wherein horses were transported, requireing them upon paine of death forthwith to goe upp to the Swift-shewer, there to acquaint Sr Samuell Argall of their comeing and to performe his further directions in all things.

This afternoone there came a message from my Lo. Leiutenant, desireing the Earle of Denbigh to take order that all Captaines and pursers of shipps in the ffleete should bee att the ffort att Puntall att 3 of the clocke in the Afternoone, with all their boates, there to attend the Lord Leiutenant Generall and to receive his further/ direction; his Lopp (as it seemed) intending att his retourne from taking the shallopps to begin to shipp his Men; and upon conference with the pursers to understand the State of the victualls of every shipp, therby the better to ground a consultation for the further proceeding of the ffleete and Army.

My Lo. of Denbigh upon receipt of this message, tooke present order by a warrant signed, to publishe it through out the ffleete.

But his Lop being putt in mynd of the matter [of a] companie to bee raised for Captaine Osborne and the boates to attend better att Puntall, his Lop conceived that the late restraint of landing anie more Men and the purpose to shipp againe those that were landed, had made/ the former needles; and some boates being this day imployed to fetch the Shallopps and the rest assigned to attend of 3 of the Clocke according to a more speciall direction of my Lord Leiutenant, the latter alsoe was in effect discharged, soe that his Lopp forbare to doe anie thing more concerning either of them.

While the Earle of Denbigh remayned yet aborde the Admirall, a message came to him from the Vice Admirall's Squadron, that the Channell att Port-Riall was of it selfe soe narrowe and shallowe, and now become inaccessible through the enemyes shipps sunken in the passage upp, that they doubted of doing anie good by proceeding further into the attempt upon the enemyes shipps, 69 yet would not for their owne honor's sake desist nor fall of without new ordeer./ And therfore they desired that the place might be veiwed by some sea-Captaines of best Judgement not being of this Squadron, nor perticularlie assigned to this service, whoe in all likelyhood would be aptest to certifie most indifferentlie [impartially], how they found the occasion feasible or not, upon returne of whose certificate such further directions might bee given touching the same as should then appear most requisite.

The Earle of Denbigh holding this request reasonable and much to concerne his Maties service, dispatched forthwith a Warrant signed, wherby hee desired Sr Thomas Love and Sr Michael Gayer to veiw the Channell att Port Riall the next morning att 9 of the Clocke, and thereupon to certifie their opinions whether they thought it fitt to proceed in the attempt for burning, takeing, or sinking the enemyes shipps there, or els to sinke some other shipps/ in that Channell for the blocking upp of the enemyes, or what other course was fittest to bee taken touching the same.

When it grew towardes three of the clocke, I would have gone to Puntall, there to attend such imployment as my Lord Leiutenant Generall might have for me att his meeting of Captaines and pursers; but I could not gett a boate, till the Earle of Denbigh as he was retourning downe to his owne shipp putt mee aboard the St George, and desired Sr Michael Gayer to send mee to Puntall in the barge belonging to that shipp.

After a while Sr Michael Gayer went with mee to Puntall, where I understood the meeting of Captaines and Pursers was putt off to 8 a Clocke the next morning, My Lord Leiutennt being not yet retourned from this daie's March, nor expected till it should bee late at night.

Here also wee found many Soldiers/ complaineing of sicknes and others of fayntness, affirming that they hadd not tasted any meat 70 nor drinke since Sunday. Sr Michael Gayer mediated soe farr on their behalfe, that hee gott a promise of Captaine Grove, one of the Commanders of Puntall, to take the most distressed for that night into the ffort, all men els seeming to neglect them.

This whole day was spent in fetching the shallops from Hercules pillars; yet of twelve we brought away but 8, burning the rest with all the provision of Nettes and Corke belonging to them.

Att the place where these shallops were, we found one of our Soldiers dead with his eares and nose cutt off.

These shallopps being gayned, my Lord Lieutenant placed an ambush of 300 muskettiers in some of the buildings thereaboutes, which were commodious enough for the purpose, with direction for them not to shoot at anie enemies that/ should come on till they were cleere within their distance and danger. And then returned with the maine bodie of the Armie towardes the Towne of Cadiz. As they were in their march of retrait, some horse of the enemies to the nomber of [blank], as neare as I could enquire out the certainty, shewed themselves before the place, where our Ambush lay, sending forth a small nomber of themselves, not above 8 or 10 horse, for discoverie, whoe approaching well neare within distance of our Ambush, they gave fire att them somewhat of the soonest before the[y] were come upp, wherby wee did them noe damage att all: however the Alarme thereof reached unto our troupes that were then about to eate and drincke some what for their refreshing, causing them suddenly and hastelie not without much disorder and confusion to marche or rather/ some of them to runn backe with apprehension of the danger; which yet when they came neare appeared to bee litle or none, for the enemye was retired.

The whole Armie was quartered this night a side of Puntall before the Towne, where my Lord Leiutenant in his owne person performed verie carefullie all the duties of a Generall.

It was verie foule & rainy weather almost all the tyme the Armie 71 was a shore; which, togeather with the noysome serene [mildew damp. See note on page 8.] falling every night, did not a little weaken and cast downe the poore Soldiers, lodginge open and being ill cloathed. And, though the ground were of a Sandy and drie nature, yet it was verie uneven and ill to goe upon, adding thereby verie much to the toyle & wearines of our men in three daies marche to and fro, with litle or noe respecte/ att all afforded unto them for their refreshing, Circumstances much conducing to make the more unserviceable.

Thursdaie the 27th of October betymes in the morning, I went 27 Octob. a shore to Puntall, where I found my Lord Leiutenant Generall with diverse of the Counsell of Warr formerlie assembled, about the dispatch of shipping of our [men], and quitting the ffort of Puntall.

ffor his Lopp tould me that hee hadd been over ruled by most voices in Councell. That we should not Man this ffort but only to take thence the enemyes ordinance; which were 8 brasse Culvering [culverin, ordnance so-called a cannon of about 5-1/2 inch bore, 9 to 12 feet long, carrying a ball of 18 lbs. It was a favourite sea-gun. From coluber, because it had a snake and dragon upon it forming its handle. (See Admiral Smyth's Sailors' Word-Book.)], and raze the structure as much as wee could, and soe leave it.

The reasons hereof I collected to bee thus. That being but a single ffort not fullie finished, in an enemies Countrie, it was not likely that wee/ could keepe it against them by force; nor of anie great importance being holden, sith we must come over with a strong Navie and excessive charge to releive a place that would not make us Commanders of anie territory att all, nor hinder the enemy in anie such sort but that hee should still have a sufficient parte of the Bay of Cadiz out of Command of this ffort, to serve for a harbour to his shipping in generall and more especiallie for the shipps belonging to Cadiz.

Before wee went in hand to shipp our men, two things were 72 necessary to bee done, the one touching the shipps att Port Riall, the other touching the ordinance at Puntall; for Sr Thomas Love and Sr Michael Gayer having taken noe view of the channell nor made any certificate/ concerning that affaire, Sr Samuell Argall refused to relinquishe that attempt till hee should have further order. Wherefore my Lord Leiutenant, being confident of the wisdom, valour, and integritie of Sr Samuell Argall, and willing to speed the landing of our men, sent him a warrant signed, that if Sr Samuell in his owne Judgement found difficultie in presenting [carrying out or prosecuting] the design, which he had in hand, he was now left at libertie to desist. And that there upon hee should take order for all such shipps of the Vice Admiral's Squadron as carried Soldiers, forthwith to repaire to Puntall, to shipp them againe, with as manie boats of their owne and others to further the service as possiblie hee could procure, upon which warrant Sr Samuell Argall made his retrait & caused that Squadron to attend for/ the shipping againe of their Souldiers. ffor the ordinance att Puntall his Lopp had sent three severall warrantes to the Captaines of the Ann Royall, the St George and the Convertive, commanding them forthwith to send 40 men a piece to Puntall, to take downe and shipp those ordinance. Sr Thomas Love from the Ann Royall forthwith sent his boatswaine Mr Rabnett with 40 men, whoe bestirred themselves soe well in the busines that within an houre or two, the ordinance were all dismounted and sixe of them convayed abord our ffleete, and the other two abord some of the Du[t]ch shipps, to whome my Lord Leiutenant adjudged them to belong by condiçons that were betwixt his Matie and them touching the division of the pillage or spoyles to bee gotten this voyage.

And that the more expedition/ might be used in shipping the Soldiers, his Lopp appointed Captain Boteler to dispose of the boates of the ffleete for that service according to the directions of 73 his Lopp, giving him withall a speciall warrant under his Lop's hand to procure the better obedience to his Commandes.

When the enemies ordinance were agreed to bee taken downe, [it] was propounded to bring and plant there out of our shipps, two or three peices of old iron ordinance of small valewe, therewith the better to guard the retreat of such of our forces as should come off last. But then it was alledged that to leave anie of our ordinance behind us, though of never soe meane a value, would be dishonorable, and that our Muskettiers from the ffort and our great shott from some of our shipps where they rode att Anchor, might as aptlie secure our/ finall retrait as anie ordinance from the fforte, or els by planting some of our ffeild peices neare the fForte the worke might be as well affected. Soe the proposition of planting anie of our ordinance upon the ffort, finding noe further seconding, died away of it selfe.

And now most of the shipps being come upp close about Puntall, wee began to shipp our men apace, to which purpose the 8 shallopps which wee had gotten from the enemies, afforded us no meane assisttence.

There came to Puntall this daie above 62 pursers [The "Purser" was an officer in the Navy who took charge of the provisions, etc. He is now called "pay-master," though formerly he had little to do with the pay. In Elizabethan days there were "pursers" in other than vessels of the Royal Navy: and so it is still.] of shipps, the rest absenting themselves, and by the acknowledgement of such as were present, taken by Captaine Mason Commissarie generall of the Armie, Itt was found that 34 of them were victualled for full 4 moneths, twelve of them for 3 months 1/2, 8 of them for three moneths, and the rest for 2 moneths 1/2 in meate, but that there was some want of beare, water, & Candles amongst some few of them, which hee thought might be supplied by beverage to be made of wyne to be hadd out of the prizes which wee had taken, himselfe 74 offering to deliver Candles out of the store to such as were in most neede.

After dinner, my Lord commanding me noe further speciall service and nothing being now in hand but the execution of what was resolved touching the shipping of our men, I went abord againe, where I stayed till towardes the evening. By this tyme most of our forces were close by retired and shipped. When the Towne perceived our troupes to be drawen off [they] sallyed out in loose Companies without order, and soe skirmished/ with that part of our Armie which kept the ffeild to accomplishe the finall retrait, which were the Lord of Valencia and Colonell Whorwoodes Regimentes.

The wynd and tyde served now verie well for our shipps to gett out of the Bay, and it was feared if wee neglected this opportunitie, the enemy when wee should be gone aboard and noe ordinance of our[s] left in Puntall, might drawe some of theirs out of the Towne and plant them on the shore to beat us as wee rode at Anchor, which would endanger us verie farre, especiallie if the wynd should come contrarie. Wherfore by the allowance of Sr Thomas Love I and our Master went a shore to Puntall, there to move his Lop thatt our shipp (which was to take in noe Soldiers) might fall downe this tyde towardes the Puerios [See former note (p. 67) on Puente de Zuazo.] and there cast Anchor, leaving his Lopp to come after in another shipp. But my Lord was now absent from Puntall, rowing from shipp to shipp and giveing further order about the speedie reimbarking of our men, and more especiallie takeing care for the shipping our horses, for that it would bee a greate dishonour to leave anie of them behinde us. This worke belonged properlie to the charge of the Master of the ordinance but it seemed not to bee by him sett forward with such diligence as our present condition did require, which caused my Lo. Leiutenant himselfe thus extrordinarily to intend [superintend, as before.] it.

Though we hapned now to find my Lord Leiutenant att Puntall, 75 yet was our comeing thither usefull to another purpose, for att this tyme our Regimentes whoe for a while retrayted/ orderlie enough, being now at want of amunition or att least wise pretending soe to be, haveing blowen upp or wasted their powder, began att last to fall off some what too hastilie, the enemies following verie egerlie, and by the faire carrieng of their peices Itt was manifest that some of them were Harque-bush of Crocke.

Sr William St Leger observing the disadvantage of our men & conceiving that parte of [our] ffleete rode in place apt to releive them, willed us to give order to such of our shipps as rode most convenientlie for the purpose, that they should play upon the enemie with their greate shott.

Wee rowed to diverse of our shipps informing them what was to bee done and they instantlie applied themselves to accomplishe the directions/ given them; which made the enemy to staggar and intermitt now and then the pursuite of our retireing troopes. However att last they tooke the boldnes to followe us soe neare to Puntall that they killed one of our Men in the ffort with a small shott. But then wee discharged upon them some of our Drakes [small piece of ordnance so-named.] or field peices loaden with small shott; which slew some of them and soe farr discouraged all the rest that they never more shewed themselves against us, but suffered us to shipp the rest of our men at our pleasure. Soe wee gott them all abord this night except the garrison of the ffort, whoe held it this night under the Command of Colonell Burgh; ffor as hee was the first Colonell that landed soe had he the honor to come off the last./

Some of our horses were not shipped till the next morning and one or two of them being unserviceable were by us killed, least the enemy might take it their glorie to say wee hadd quitted their shore in such fear that wee hadd left our horses behind us for hast. There was in the Island of Cadiz, neare Puntall, a Magazin of Mastes and yardes for shipping, out of which some of our shipps 76 that hadd deffectes releived themselves, and the rest of the store was burned, cut in pieces, and destroyed by us.

This night the Towne of Cadiz shott of[f ] all the ordinance in the Towne and all their muskettes placed in a ring round about their walles, in a kind of triumphe & exultaçon at our retrait.

Howbeit wee quitted not the ffort of Puntall till the next daie, when/ our horses, feild peices, and all our other provisions were shipped.

But then wee sett sayle, falling downe towardes the mouth of the Bay, and came there againe to an Anchor, well neer within shott of the Towne of Cadiz.

As we passed downe, the Towne shott at us, especiallie att our Vice Admirall and att the Admirall of Holland, one of whose shipps being become unserviceable, was fired or sunken that shee might not remaine as a spoyle for the advantage of the enemye.

Being come to an Anchor, the fflagg was hung out for the Councell of Warr to come togeather; whoe were quicklie assembled, and proceeded thus./

28 Octob. 1625.

Att a Councell of Warr holden upon ffriday the 28th of October 1625. abord the Ann Royall, riding att Anchor about the Mouth of St. Mary Port.

The Councell being sett, diverse things were drawen into dispute, wherof some were ordered, and others referred to a further tyme.

In the first place information was given that [not] onely the Dread-nought formerly complayned of, but alsoe the Rainebowe, another of his Maties shipps was verie leake and unserviceable, not fitt to bee continued anie longer in the voyage but to bee sant home with all speed possible: Touching which it was ordered without contradiction that both these shipps should bee visited by such Comittees as my Lord Leiutenant should thincke/ fitt; and upon their certificate further order to bee taken.

In the next place itt was moved to be considered of whether wee 77 should now putt forth to sea and lie of[f] and on for the intercepting of the plate ffleete or els seeke harbour there, to destroy the King of Spayne's other shipping, which point being first well debated and then perticularly voted, It was resolved without a negative voyce, that wee should putt to sea to lye for the plate ffleete; the reasons of which resolutions were these, first, that our cheifest strength is by Sea. 2dly that noe man proposed anie Harbor safe for us to now to putt into, where it was likelie to find shipping fitt to be attempted. 3dly that the Sea is a like freind to us as to the enemy, whereas wee have noe advantageable shore in these partes to frend. 4thly that a contrarie winde maie keepe us/ long in harbour, to our utter overthrowe. 5thly that the plate ffleete was ever the mayne project of our voyage and therfore cheiflie to be attended. And that the tyme was now at hand wherein the same ffleete must come home, or els not at all for this yeare.

Alsoe it was offered to the consideration of the Councell whether wee should putt to sea without first takeing in freshe water, and if need soe required, how wee might goe into St. Mary Port to that purpose.

That what Rendez-vous to agree of in case wee should be seperated att Sea and what course was fittest to bee taken for our sicke, wounded, and unserviceable men; all which being matters of good importance, towardes the right ordering wherof the information and opinions of all the Captaines and Mrs of shipps/ in the ffleete was held necessarie, they were all referred to a further generall Councell to be holden the next morning between 7. and 8. a Clocke.

This day Sr John Chidley complayned to his Lopp that through the sickness of his Men hee was soe farr distressed that hee wanted some to helpe pumpe and pull ropes in his shipp. His Lopp granted a warrant directed to Captaine Oxenbridge, Captaine of the Dragon, commanding him to deliver to Sr John or to his assignes out of Sr Edward Conwaye's companies which were aboard the Dragon, 30. 78 good and able men with victuall proporçionable for the whole voyage.

29 Octob. The 29th of October about 7 of the Clocke in the morning, diverse Captaines and Masters of shipps being come togeather, the winde blew verie fairlie to carie/ us forth to sea, according to the resolution taken yesterday in full Councell; wherof his Lopp (as hee had just cause) was verie loath to loose the advantage; onlie the matters yesterdaie referred to the resoluçon of this morning's Councell were some of them soe essentiall to bee first determined, that without the decideing therof our goeing generallie to Sea could not promise anie good success; for noe limittes wherein to lye off & on att sea nor Rendez-vous in case of seperation were yet agreed or assigned.

The Councell of Warr was slowe in assembling, in soe much that his Lopp thinking hee should loose too much of the faire wynde if hee staied any longer for their comeing togeather, did [decide] upon hearing of the advice of divers of the Captaines and Mrs whoe/ were now abord him, to take upp and publishe a present resolution to this purpose.

That the whole ffleete should forthwith sett sayle and plye [sail usually short trips to and fro] from the Bay of Cadiz to the Souther[n] Cape, standing of to the Westward 60 leagues from the land; where his Lopp purposed to spend as much tyme as might bee to looke for the plate ffleete and to keepe themselves as neare as they could in the Latitude of 37 degrees and a halfe and in the Latitude of 36 degrees and 36 & a halfe, for that his Lopp intended not to goe anie further to the Southward.

That if by strong westerlie wyndes they should bee forced to beare upp into the Straightes, the Rendez-vous should bee att Budgeroe [No such name occurs in the map, but in a chart on a large scale of the last century, a place called Burge is marked just outside Malaga to the west, as if it had a tower on a hill, which would therefore serve as a good sea-mark.] to the Westward of Malaga, where his Lopp intended all the ffleete should then meete and there water.


That if by strong Southerly wyndes they/ should bee forced to the Northward, then they should repaire to the Isles of Bayon in Galicia [The following rare book explains this: "A True Relation of a Brave English Stratagem, Practised lately upon a Sea-Towne in Galizia (one of the Kingdomes in Spaine), and most valiantly and successfully performed by an English Ship alone of 30 Tonne .... 1626 (4o)." The islands of Bayon lie off the town: hard by is the "Bayona's hold" of Milton's Lycidas.], where in such case it was intended to meet and water.

With a perclose [Conclusion. The 'close' which is 'per' or through is a definite close or ending.] that what other instructions should bee thought fitting, they should receive the same as occasion should present, in the meane tyme chargeing all Commanders carefullie to observe these directions and to keepe companie with his Lopp and the ffleete, and to looke out to seize upon the Subiectes and goodes of the King of Spaine, or others our enemyes.

Touching the pointes whether there were a necessitie to water before wee putt to sea, and whether it might aptlie bee done att St. Mary Port, the latter was first spokn to; and it was now alleadged by divers Mrs that there are but two wells in St Mary Port, which will dispatch but two or three shipps in a day, wherby it would take too much precious time from our goeing to lye for the plate ffleete if our whole ffleete should heare [want] water.

Besides, it was evident, that noe water was now to bee hadd in this place without landing of forces; which alsoe would not onely spend tyme but extreamlie incumber us, in a kind wherof wee lately felt the trouble, and hadd in effect resolved to make noe more such landings.

ffor the unfitness therefore & difficultie to water here, it was thought best not to attempt it: And this opinion (for this tyme) prevented the dispute of the other question: Because if wee should not water att St Mary Port none other fitt place was propounded, soe as then of necessitie wee must to sea without first watering./

And touching the sicke, wounded, and unserviceable men, wee 80 were to carry them along with us in the way towardes Englande till wee came to the South-Cape of Spaine and we might betwixt this and that have manie oportunities to consult touching them; for whome it seemed noe course could bee soe proper as to send them into England; which might thus bee dispatched without loss of tyme, though it were not now resolved.

Soe wee instantlie wayed Anchor and sett saile, plieing for the Souther[n] Cape.

This forenoone 8 shipps were discovered plieing for the Barr of St Lucar [bar of San Lucar or Lucar de Barrameda, the port of Seville.]; for the chaseing and takeing wherof his Lopp gave instant order; which I thincke was attempted but in vaine, our shipps being foule and consequently ill Saylers, and the other shipps too farr/ out of distance when they were first discovered./

About 3 a clocke in the afternoone, the wynd fayling us, his Lopp thought fitt to make the best use of the tyme and by a Councell now to be holden to resolve and settle the pointes under proposition left unresolved yesternight and this morning: soe the fflagg was hung out and the Councell assembled.

29 Octob.

Att a Councell of Warr holden abord the Ann Royall the 29th of October, 1625.

The matter for our places of Rendez-vous in case of seperation appeared to be settled by an order of his Lop's taken and published this morning, against which noe man now opposed, neither did anie man move to drawe us backe to St Mary Porte to water, but seemed to rest satisfied with the reasons formerlie made against that course:/ howbeit diverse of the ffleete protested themselves to bee in such want, that of necessitie they must speedilie goe to some place or other to releive themselves with fresh water.

Hereupon it was taken into consideration when, where, and in what manner wee should goe to water. Itt was alledged that to 81 putt backe into any of the straightes was to loose the oportunitie for the plate ffleete. That there was noe Port in Spaine in the way of our course, where anie great nomber of shipps could quicklie bee dispatched for fresh water, unless it should bee gained by landing forces; which would spend too much tyme and crosse with our former resolutions.

That the shipps complayning of extreame necessitie were verie few. That the most part of the ffleete/ hadd reasonable store of beare, though they wanted fresh water; and they might use salt water to dresse their meate and spend their beare first, abating some of their dailie proportion to make it last the longer, and upon their watering, afterwardes come to their beverage in the last place. That some extremity was to bee undergone for his Maties service now that need soe required rather then to disperse our selves and quitt one another, when the season of the yeare assured us that the plate ffleete was at hand or els would not come home this yeare.

That the course which wee were to hould for the meeting with the plate ffleete would bring us a good way onward for England, as at Bayon in Galicia (being further in our way) it was saied there was/ good easie watering for our ffleete.

For these reasons, and especiallie for the zeale which every man hadd to doe his Matie service and to runn all hazardes whatsoever, rather then to loose anie opportunitie for the accomplishement thereof, the thought of present watering was now laid a side; and thereupon it was resolved and ordered by the Lord Leiutenant Generall with the consent of the Councell of Warr, that when absolute necessitie should require, the whole ffleete should goe to water att Bayon in Galicia by Squadron and Squadron.

After this resolution they entred into dispute what should be done with our sicke, wounded, and unserviceable men.

Some few would have onely the wounded men sent for England,/ alleaging that sickness might bee counterfeit and those that are sicke now may recover againe and bee serviceable when those that are 82 now well are growen sicke. To this was added that sickness was incident to all sea voyages, and if the same might once bee allowed as a sufficient reason to send men home, the example might prove dangerous to future actions, and occasion manie to pretend sickness without iust cause. For unserviceable men, it was saied they were hardlie to bee discerned unless they were such through apparant sickness or wounding, and that many of the best men in the fleete or Army might easelie be shifted away under colour of unserviceableness in the Generall.

The rest were more cleerlie of another mynd, as our perticular case/ now stood, concludeing that not onlie the wounded but the sicke & unserviceable should bee sent home. Their reasons were these that wee were now in hand with a sea-service yet had 10,000 land soldiers aboard us, whereof more then the greatest parte might well bee spared, for that they would but cumber the shipps and endanger the losse of more men if wee came to fight with the enemies ffleete.

That noe overture was yet made for anie land service: wherfore if some few able men slipt awaie under colour of sicke or unserviceable, it was noe great matter; our present estate and intentions duely considered.

And that the Captaines and officers in every shipp and companie whose informations and certificates were/ to be hadd in this case, could by observation give some good Judgement whoe was a man dangerouslie sicke and absolutlie unserviceable as well as discerne by the viewe whoe was a hurt man though not all together soe certainlie.

These latter reasons gave best satisfaction: Soe it was resolved and ordered by the Lord Leiutenant Generall and the Councell of Warr, that all our sicke, wounded, and unserviceable men should be sent into England with the first convenient opportunitie.

Att the riseing of the Councell a motion was made to know what should be done with our horses: whereupon without dispute or 83 contradiction [it was resolved] that they should all bee likewise sent home.

While Sr ffrancis Steward was Rere Admirall of the ffleete before his discharge att Plymouth by reason/ of the leakness of his shipp the Lyon the Earle of Denbighe in the St Andrew was Vice Admirall to the Admirall's Squadron, carrying in the foretopp a redd flagg with a litle white, and St George's Crosse therein at the topp of the fflaggstaff. My Lord of Valencia in the Constant-Reformation was Vice-Admirall to the Vice-Admirall's Squadron, carrieing in the fore topp a blew flagg. And my Lo. Cromwell Vice-Admirall to the Rere-Admirall's Squadron carrieing in the fore topp a white flagg. But upon the discharge of Sr ffrancis Steward, The Rere-Admiral's place with the white fflag to be borne in the mayne topp was assigned by his Lopp to my Lord of Denbigh; and the fflagge and place of of Vice-Admirall to the Admirall's Squadron formerly belonging/ to my Lord of Denbigh and now voyd by his removeal and preferement was by his Lop's free choyce bestowed upon my Lord Delaware goeing in the St George; which fflagg & place he bore and exercised from our setting forth out of England till our remove from before Puntall. But now my Lord Cromwell alleaged that hee and my Lo. of Valencia, being Viscountes of Ireland, were in place before my Lord Delaware, being but a Baron, though of England. That in the instructions for this voyage they were ranked or named before my Lord Delaware. That by succession upon the preferrment of my Lord of Denbigh, his former place ought to devolve to the next in place; which as hee alleaged was my Lord of Valencia, my Lord of Valencia's/ former place to him and his to my Lord Delaware. And though my Lord of Valencia seemed to neglect his right yet my Lord Cromwell desired that hee might not suffer therein, but be preferred to bee Vice-Admirall to our Vice-Admirall's Squadron, with power to carrie the blew fflagg in the foretopp.

Upon this information and request, my Lord Leiutenant Generall 84 perusing his instructions and finding the Irishe Viscountes to bee there ranked before the Englishe Baron and considering with all not onelie how in England the Irishe Viscountes take place of Englishe Barrons but alsoe that wee were all now out of England where the Territory could give no priviledge to my Lord Delaware, He assigned the Red flagg to my Lord of Valencia,/ the blew to my Lord Cromwell, and the white to my Lo. Delaware. Whereupon my Lord of Valencia and my Lord Cromwell altered their flagges accordinglie. But my Lord Delaware, being advertized hereof by letter did not presentlie take downe his former flagg, insomuch as now hee and my Lo. of Valencia did both beare once and the same [one and the same] colours, in the same manner as if wee hadd two Vice Admiralls to the Admirall's Squadron. But withall my Lord Delaware both wrote and spoke to my Lo. Leiutenant Generall, desireing hee might continue the flagg and place hee was in possession of till his cause were heard and resolved by a Councell of Warr, alledging for himselfe these reasons./

That under offices in a ffleete or Armie are not allwaies to bee conferred by succession or upon the man of next precedence but by the election of the Generall.

That it was noe wrong to my Lo. of Denbigh in the first distribution of the Commanders in the ffleete, though Sr ffrancis Steward being but a Knight was allotted to goe Rere-Admirall before his Lopp being an Earle.

That my Lo. Leiutenant Generall hadd of his owne free choyce bestowed the place of Vice-Admirall to his Squadron on my Lord Delaware without his seekeing; which office he hadd exercised now 3 weekes and could not bee removed without dishonor and disgrace to his person, which hee hadd noe waie deserved;/ implyeing that hee either should have never been preferred or els not now displaced without cause arrising since his preferrment.


That this was an Englishe and not an Irishe action, and the colours contended for the fflagg of St George and not of St Patericke, which hee intimated to himselfe being a Baron of England much auntient to my Lord Cromwell (whoe alsoe is a Baron of that Realme) to bee more proper and worthie to carry then anie Irish Viscount whatsoever.

That however the Irish Vicountes have a precedence of curtesie they are there to bee placed and ranked after them, as appeareth by the Act of Parliament, wherby the subsidies were granted that were the cheife meanes of setting forth this ffleete; ffor there the Lo. Carew,/ a Baron of England, is named before the Lord Grandison [John, Viscount Grandison, later Baron Tregoze in the English Peerage. See Gardiner, as before, i. 58, 295: ii. 65.], a Viscount of Ireland: the matter of right having been first disputed and resolved in the House of Commons; and that the writeing of his name sooner or latter in my Lord Leiutennt General's instructions (which how it might occurre hee knew not) must not conclude [lead to a conclusion or decision.] him of his right.

Upon these allegations of the Lord Delaware, the Lord Leiutenant Gen. was contented things should stand as they were and that my Lord Delaware should beare his ould fflagg till the matter were decided by a Councell of Warr.

Other passages there are belonging to this question which fell out shortly after: however I thinck it will not bee amisse to rehearse them here all togeather for that the tyme concerning the same are not matteriall./

Att the next Councell of Warr towardes the rising of the Assemblie, the mattter was offered to their considerations. But then they instantlie rose, shewing an unwillingness to be troubled with determining a question which hadd growen alltogether out of my Lord Leiutenant Generall's actes and was in his owne power to 86 determine of himselfe without drawing them to express themselves on either side in a cause of personall contestation.

These three Lordes imbarked in this controversie, shewed no unkindness one to another in all the proceedings but rather conversed lovinglie togeather as if they more desired a true Judgement touching the right in generall then the victorie to any of themselves in perticular.

However my Lo. Leiutenant Generall, fearing the worst and considering/ what discord groweth often tymes amongst great Lordes about matter of honor and precedencie, to the disturbance of great actions, as alsoe bearing a good and equall affection to all the parties interessed in the question; out of these respectes and his natural ingenuitie [ingenuousness] (inclineable and studious to mentaine amity and concord) did applie himselfe to devise some way of reconciliation wherby all might receive satisfaction; to which purpose hee declared himselfe that hee intended the fflagg of St George to my Lo. Delaware at first but provisionably: and then it was noe disgrace for him to quitt it now according to the condiçon of the first donation, and that this would bee rather the expiration then the taking awaie/ of an office. But my Lo. Delaware protested that what ever my Lord Leiutenant Generall's private intençon might bee hee never heard of anie provisionall conferring of the fflagg upon him, nor would have accepted it upon such terms, hadd hee knowen it or but suspected the same.

Wherefore my Lo. Leiutenant Generall, in pursuite of his former good intention, was compelled to bethinke himselfe of some other meanes for effecting and perfecting the reconciliation intended.

It was verie inconvenient & strang[e] that both my Lo. of Valencia and my Lord Delaware should continue to beare the same fflagg after the same manner without difference; wherfore the more speed was to be used for bring[ing] the busines into order./


My Lord Delaware desired onelie that himselfe might not be disgraced by being putt out of a place which he had not deserved to loose. My Lord of Valencia had hitherto bin meerely passive in the busines My Lord Cromwell seemed without all question to be now in his right place, being Vice Admirall to the Vice Admirall; for if my Lord Delaware as a Baron of England ought to bee preferred before the Irish Vicountes in this Action, my Lord Cromwell as a puisne Baron of England ought to have the place next to my Lord Delaware before my Lo. of Valencia, whoe was only a Viscount of Ireland, but had noe Englishe honor att all. And if the Irishe Vicountes were to bee preferred then was my Lord Cromwell to bee next/ to my Lord Valencia as puisne Viscount of Ireland, my Lord Dela. having noe Irishe honor att all, neither did the Lord Cromwell (as I heare verie credible) disclayme now in his Engiishe title however the first motion by him of removeall or alteration touching these places was grounded upon the Irishe title.

To bring thinges back to the state they were before this late alteration would offend and discontent both my Lord of Valencia and my Lo. Cromwell; whoe both should bee thereby dispreferred without cause growen since their preferment.

In the end therefore my Lord Leiutenant Generall devised a waie which hee hoped might have reconciled all, which was That my Lo. of Valencia/ should carrie the redd flagg with the St George's Cross in the maine topp as a kind of extraordinary or cheif or cheife deputy or Vice Admirall to the Admirall or to his Squadron, soe to distinguish him from my Lo. Delaware with some preferment alsoe to my Lord of Valencia; and by warrant from my Lo. Leiutenant Generall my Lord of Valentia for a while wore his fflagge in the mayne toppe accordinglie. Howbeit within some few daies after, whether it were that the noveltie of this course which was applauded att first continued not to please, or that if the Lord Cromwelle's Irish Viscountshipp were a sufficient title for him to clayme the 88 next place to my Lord of Valencia hee might upon that ground seeke now to be removed from the place hee was in to the place which my Lord Delaware now had and soe ren [sic] upon worse termes the question soe much sought to bee extinguished; or for what other cause I knowe not, my Lord Leiutenant Generall wished my Lord of Valentia to weare his flagg no longer in the maine toppe; whoe declared his unwillingness, saieing it would bee a dispreferment undeserved from that which without suite hee hadd been putt in possession of by his Lopp's owne directions. To this my Lord Leiutenant Generall replied that what he did therein was but provisionallie; wherof nevertheles my Lord of Valencia denied knowledge and seemed to bee a litle discontented at their proceedings; howbeit hee/ acknowledged my Lord Leiutenant Generall's power and professed a readines to obay his Lop's commandes. And not long after both my Lord of Valencia and my Lord Delaware for reasons best known to themselves tooke downe their fflagges and the ffleete grew to bee separated soe as noe finall resolution was ever hadd of this question of Navall honor and right of preferment to such an office of Command in a ffleete at Sea.

30 Octob.

Sundaie the 30th of October we discovered 4 shipps to windeward of us, and coniectured them to bee Spanish shipps, but wee could fetch upp none of them, and this daie and night the weather was verie gustie and showrie of great raine.

31 Octob.

The 31th of October wee had a skant/ and bare wind inclineing to drive us from the Coast of barbarie or backe into the Straightes of Gibraltar.

The same daie by direction of my Lord Leiutenant Generall I tooke the examinations of ffrancis Gonsales, and Emanuell Muschade two of the Portugalls taken in the litle Carvill that came from Trecera, but they informed of nothing materiall, more then what was vulgarlie knowen unto us before; wherfore their examinations are not here inserted.

89 1 Novemb.

Att a Councell of Warr holden aborde the Anne Royall 1o Novembris, 1625:

Att this Counsell the Lord Leiutenant Generall proposed three things to bee treated of.

First what should bee done touching/ all the Catches in the ffleete which were not like to live att Sea in such stormes as the season of the yeare began now to threaten.

Secondlie how to fitt a dispatch of Men and shipps for England.

Thirdlie how to man the three prises which wee had taken, for Masters and Mariners to conduct them, and how wee should dispose of them.

  1. Touching the first it was insisted upon by some, That the Catches had endured as greate a storme outwardes as hath bin ever knowne to anie Sea men in the ffleete; wherfore they might adventure to doe the like homeward. And that to sinke them would bring an unnecessary charge upon the King, whoe in such case must answere the values of them to their owners./ But on the other side it was alledged that the former storme came with a faire winde, which if [it] had come otherwise, not onely the Catches but many of our best shipps would hardlie have endured it. That the Catches were not manie nor of greate valewe to bee sunken, the rather for that onlie the hulks of them should bee soe disposed of, their Anchors, Sayles, and tackling first taken abord our other shipping. And that to preferr the saving of a smalle charge before the care of soe many mens lives as were in the Catches was an unworthie and unchristian thing, which wee ought in anie case to shunne.

    These latter reasons gave cleare satisfaction to the Councell; and it was thereupon resolved and ordered that the Hull of every Catch in the/ ffleete, whose Mr and companie were unwilling to hazard themselves anie longer in such Catches should be sunken, her anchors, Sayles, and tackling, men, victualls, and other loading being first taken aborde the Admirall, Vice-Admirall, or Rere-Admirall respectivelie, to woome such Cach soe to be sunken did belong.

  2. 90

    It was resolved in the Councell of the 29th of October that all our sicke wounded & unserviceable men should be sent into England with the first convenient opportunity and likewise our horses; but whoe should be those sicke and unserviceable men intended by the former order, or what shipps in particular, or what number of shipps should bee imployed in this service was not yet declared./

    Wherfore the second proposition now to be handled (namelie how to fitt a dispatch of men and shipps for England) gave occasion to the Councell to inquire further into the present state of the ffleete touching the sicknes of Men and defectes of shipps, whereby they might the better ground their Judgementes touching the matter wherein their advice was now required.

    The Captaines or Mrs of diverse of the King['s] shipps and of many other shipps of the ffleete were now present; whoe being all enjoyned to delare what nomber of men and of those how manie sicke men they hadd aboard every of their shippes, It was thereupon affirmed that of 200 Sea-men in the Swift-shewer/ there were sicke 60, of 250 in the St Andrew sicke 30, of 220 in the St George 60, of 180 in the Bonaventure 50, of 180 in the Convertive 50, of 250 in the Rainbowe 60. However Captaine Raleigh Gilbert, Captaine of the constant Reformation, protested that all his 250 men were well and in good health (a rare thing and giveing iust occasion to inquire into the causes, how those of his shipp should bee all well when none other [were] in the like condition nor scarce anie shipp in the whole ffleete).

    The Captaines of marchantes and Newcastell shipps now present were about to give in the like informations for the state of their severall shippes. But it was like to prove so tedious a worke for/ one man to take the same in writing [in the] sitting [of] the Councell that they were directed to sett downe in writeing the present state of their severall [ships] in respect of sicknes or leakes or anie other defectes, and deliver the same to my Lord Leiutenant Generall's 91 Secretarie, to bee presented to his Lopp for his better consideration thereof hereafter.

    This particular overture touching the weake estate of the King's shipps (which indeed was seconded with the like information in generall touching the whole ffleete) made the Councell see that it was tyme to hasten their dispatch for England, though it gave them noe full light how to cull out the perticular shipps or men that should bee sent, or to assertaine their nomber.

    But consultations must have an End/ that execution maie followe. The horses were resolved to bee sent home, which could not now bee but in the same vessells wherein they were allreadie shipped. And the keeping here of the prises which wee had taken brought but care and trouble upon us, delaieing the use that might be made of them in England. Wherefore as far a parte of the intended dispatch Itt was resolved and ordered by the Councell that the horse shipps and prizes shold be some of the shipps that with the first opportunitie should bee sent for England.

    But it was conceived that these shipps onlie were not capeable of soe many men as should bee sent home; wherfore it was taken into consideration how manie other shipps and of what kind would bee fittest to goe with them./ The shipps carrying munition for the Armie and enioyned by the Councell of Warr of the 11th of October to attend the Rere Admirall and not ingage themselves in fight without order, seemed the best to bee spared, in reguard that noe overture was yet made for anie further land service, albeit this were the third meeting in Councell since wee left Puntall; wherby there was litle or noe likely hood for anie such to bee propounded and embraced in this voyage. Soe the name of 3 or 4 of those shipps were called for and a note taken of them in writeing, with the names alsoe of one or two New-Castell shipps informed by some of the Sea-Captaines now present to be of the most defective and inserviceable shipps in the ffleete;/ and the Councell shewed an inclination to sett a resolute order now that these shipps with the 92 horse shipps and prises should bee the shipps which should goe for England. How ever att last they concluded not soe fullie nor soe perticularlie but resolved onlie thus.

    That 12 shipps of the most unserviceable in the whole ffleete (in which nomber the horse shipps and prises were to bee included) should bee sent into England with the first opportunity and consigned to the Harbour of Plimouth, with this perticular, That the Golden Cocke should bee one other of the nomber, and Captaine Beaumont, Captaine of the same shipp, to bear the office of Admirall in this ffleete of 12, in their passage homeward.

    There were yet 4 or 5 of the 12 shipps/ that should goe for England not certainlie and absolutely named and assigned; and the wounded sicke and unserviceable men whoe should bee sent home were not yet particularly declared. Neither was there anie more spoken att this Councell of these matters, nor of the meanes or manner how to mann the prizes.

    The reason herof I conceive might bee, that soe long as our ffleete was shorte of Cape St Vincent noe tyme was left touching our despatch for England; for till then, wee and such as were bound for England, were runne all one course, and by reason of bare and badd windes wee were yett far short of that Cape.

Att this Councell Sr John Prode accused Captaine Squibb, Captaine of the Lyon, upon many circumstances,/ that cowardlie and against his dutie he had wilfullie shunned to come neare 2 or 3 Spanishe shipps (which were discovered in our passage from England towardes the Southar[n] Cape, while the ffleete was seperated by the storme), and had in like sort refused to make upp to Captaine Osborne and a shipp or two more of our ffleete, to assist them for a fight to have been hadd with those Spanishe ships: wherof one came and hayled Captaine Osborne and verie proudlie required him to come and speake with their Admirall. Sr John Prode declared further how Captaine Osborne in his answere to this prowd demand and in seeking by all meanes to provoke the enemye to fight, behaved himself verie bravely, and yet had Captaine Squibb given 93 out wordes/ of disgrace against him as if Capt. Osborne were onelie in the fault that the Spanishe shipps were not fought with. Wherefore it was desired that the matter might be examined, and Captaine Squibb punished according to his demerittes; but by occasion of some intervenient division noe further consideration was now hadd of this complaint nor anie order given therein.

Att the close of this Councell the Right Hoble the Earle of Denbigh gave information that while his Lop rode at Anchor before St Mary Porte. Captaine Oxenbridge, Captaine of the Dragon, one of the Shipps belonging to his Lop's Squadron, did without anie order or direction from his Lop begin a batterie upon a fforte or Block house at Sainta Catalena./ neare the entrance into St Mary Port, and drew Captaine Plumleigh, Captaine of the William & Thomas (another of his Lop's Squadron) to fall a stern and second him in this attempt, saying he had order for what hee did, whereas he had none. That this attempt tended to the disgrace and preiudice of our ffleete, and was in his Lop's opinion an offence to bee punished for example's sake. Wherfore hee desired that [he] might be questioned and proceed[ed] against according to his demerittes. But the Councell being now riseing made not anie order nor gave anie directions att all touching this busines.

ffrom this ffirst of November to the 4th of the same nothing memorable occurred.

Upon the 4th of November, in the morning, wee discovered two shipps to bee shoreward of us, which our shipps that were next unto them could not well chase by reason it was a calme. But our Admirall manned out her Barge with Muskettiers under the charge of one of our Masters mates; whoe willinglie undertooke the Service of discovering what shipps they were and bringing certaine word with all speed possible.

The Calme continueing caused my Lord Leiutenant Generall for the better husbanding of tyme (which could not now be spent in sayling) to hang out the fflagges for a Councell; which being assembled proceeded thus./


Att a Councell of Warr holden abord the Anne Royall the 4th of November, 1625.

It stood resolved by former Councelles that our wounded, sick, and unserviceable men should be sent home and that to this purpose 12 of our most unserviceable shipps should goe for England; wherof some shipps were perticularlie agreed on but the rest not; nor could the choise of them be well made, nor the sicke and unserviceable men that should goe home in them, untill perfect certificates were hadd touching the state of every shipp in respect of sickness or otherwise; ffor diverse Captaines and Officers not now present nor att the last Councell, had not yet certified touching this matter, and manie of those which were then/ present, being taken on the suddaine, could not peradventure deliver in soe perfect certificate as they might make upon better survey of their shipps and Companies; and something fitt to bee knowne might have hapned since. Besides it was alledged that the sickness began greatlie to increase in our ffleete, more men falling downe now in a daie or two then in a week or two at the begining of our voyage, and that more and more defectes in our shipping and provisions began dailie to breake in upon us, or discover themselves to presse some very sore (things most seriouslie considerable) not only touching the fitting of a dispatch of some few shipps for England, but peradventure might occasion/ a iust dispute what new or further course it were best to take for preservation of the whole ffleete. Wherfore it was propounded and accordinglie resolved and ordered by the whole Councell, That the Sea and Land officers in every shipp respectivelie, should forthwith make a list in writeing of the names of all their wounded, sicke, and unserviceable men in every shipp and company respectivelie. And should in like sort set downe the defectes of their severall shipps as well in the Vessells themselves as in their Victualls or any other provisions whatsoever, and send the same forthwith aboard the Admirall of the ffleete.

My Lo. Leiutenant Generall by his resolution of the 29th of 95 October/ prescribeing the place and manner where and how our ffleete should lie to intercept the plate ffleete, had declared that hee intended to spend as much tyme as might bee to that purpose; which being somewhat uncertaine (though expressing a noble purpose in his Lopp to undergoe the uttmost toyle and hazard that his Matie's service should require), It was now propos'd to be consulted of whether it were not fitt to limitt the certaine day how long our ffleete should soe lie out in expectation of the plate ffleete without goeing to take in water.

The reasons insisted on to have a certaine daie agreed upon and published to this purpose were these:

That soe long as it was left thus indefinitly (to as much tyme as may bee) all shipps seperated from/ the ffleete in the night by fowle weather or other causualtie (though not by strong westerlie or Southerly windes, in which cases onlie severall places of Rendezvous were provided) might take a colourable occasion to leave the ffleete and goe for England or peradventure about their owne private endes, upon pretence they had stayed out in the latitude and distance prescribed as long as might bee. That our shipps were provided of Victualls, beere, and beverage, some for longer and some for shorter tyme, and if they once knew the certaintie how long we should lie out for the plate ffleete it would give them such a guess of the leng[th] of the voyage, that therby they would growe both able and carefull to shorten or enlarge their allowances accordinglie; wheras/ now peradventure being in expectation every daie to heare of a resolution to make for England they might omitt that dutie and perishe in conclusion through the omission therof. That it would bee a comfort to the Sea men and Soldiers to know the utmost tyme they were to staie out, and every one would bee encouraged and arme himselfe with more patience to indure all extremities incident to the voyage, when hee should know the period of his attendance. That the weather grew every daie now more stormy then other by the comeing on of Winter, and if wee 96 tooke not a resolution herein att this meeting, wee might peradventure want seasonable weather to assemble in and come to such a resolution when we would: which (in case of sepa[ra]tion of our ffleete, without knowledge of the tyme how long,/ the latitude and distances hereunto assigned should bee kepte) might occasion manie of the best affected amongst us out of a desire not to quitt their station without warrant, to endeavor soe long to mainteyne the same through all hazardes till they miscarried in striveing to observe their dutie. And that by appointing a daie with the longest, wee might in some sort be sure to loose noe opportunitie of effecting our desires by such reduceing of our tyme of stay unto a certaintie. But the difficulty was upon what day to pitch; for the decideing wherof the opinions of the Sea Captaines and Masters of shipps understanding the course of Spaine touching the usuall arrivall of the plate ffleete were demanded; whoe seemed to bee all of one mynd, That the plate ffleete was/ either in Spaine allreadie or wold be here by the midle of this moneth att the farthest, or els would not come home att all for this yeare. It being verie probable that some advice soe to doe had been sent unto them out of Spaine since the comeing of our ffleete upon these costes. The debate being ended, the pointe was held of good importance and not fitt to bee concluded without perticular voting, which was accomplished.

And soe it was resolved and ordered by the Lord Leiutenant Generall with the consent of the Counsell of Warre, that the tyme which our ffleete should keepe the Sea to awayte the comeing home and intercepting of the plate ffleete should bee onlie untill the twentieth daie of this moneth of November 1625, and that in the meane/ tyme wee should not goe to take in fresh water.

Hereupon Captaine Ruckwood, Captaine of the Lyon, of Ipswitch, being now present, and having in his shipp as he alledged 30 Seamen and 112 land men, did solemnlie protest that he hadd onely two tonne of beere and two of Water unspent, soe as it was not possible for him to observe the order now taken, and praied some 97 course might bee prescribed for his enlargement from the order, or to supplie him with beere and water. But it was a perticular case and concerned not anie of the kinge's owne shipps; for which causes as I conceived, the Counsell of Warr tooke not his request into consideration, whereby hee seemed to remaine as one left to bee releived by order of my Lord Leiutenant Generall upon/ his suite, to bee made unto his Lopp in tyme convenient for that purpose.

In the next place a motion or complaint was made that the Sea Captaines in generall keepe not their proper Squadrons, much less their Subsquadrons or divisions, according to the distribution of the instructions dated iith of October 1625, nor doe in anie good order spread themselves abroade in their Sayling, nor looke out as they ought for the discovery of the plate ffleete or other prize; whereupon it was without anie dispute or contradiction assented unto and ordered by the Councell,

That whosoever should hereafter offend in anie of these pointes should be punished by a strickt imprisonment.

Alsoe it was now observed & spoken/ of, that shipps not of our ffleete falling in amongst us by night might passe through all our Squadrons and gett off undiscovered; which was an inconvenience tending not only to our loss of manie good prizes but alsoe giveing meanes to our enemies by the escape of such shipps to have intelligence of our being att Sea and by observation of our course and order of proceeding to guess at our intentions and seeke to prevent them; for remedy thereof it was advised and without debate or opposition ordered by the Councell,

That our ffleete should have a word to know one another by in the night and that what soever shipp comeing neare anie of our ffleete in the darke could not give that worde should be taken for a stranger/ and might bee shott att or dealt with accordinglie. And the word agreed upon and assigned to this purpose was St. George.

Lastlie the Councell being at pause, Sr John Wattes spake breiflie 98 unto them to this effect. That hee should be hartelie sorie to goe home without doeing yet some better service if possiblie it might be. That wee were gotten now soe farr off att sea that with a Southerlie wynd wee might reach the Maderaes. That those Islandes were rich, and would yeild good pillage for the releife of his Matie towardes his greate charges and the incouragement of the poore Sea-men and Soldiers after their ill bargaine att Cadiz. That to goe backe to the appointed Rendez-vous to the Westward of Malaga within the mouth of the Straightes,/ all along the enemyes countrie & Fortes, now we were growne soe weake and the yeare see farr spent, was to expose the whole ffleete to unnecessarie hazard and allmost to certaine ruine if wee should there be wind-bound but a verie litle while.

That as the Maderaes are more leagues from England then the mouth of the Straightes soe doe they lie better in the waie of a wynde for England, which is a sufficient recompence for their greater distance from thence. That wee should come to the Maderaes unlookt for and might happen to take them not well provided; which if wee did the King of Spaine could readilie supplie them, being remote Islandes, as he might his Cities and Townes in the mayne continent/ of Spaine. Wherfore he moved that it might be duely considered if the windes should prove Southerlie and blew strong, whether in such case it would not bee both fitter and safer for us to goe to the Maderaes and attempt the takeing and pillageing therof, then to putt backe into the Straightes onlie for the Rendezvous sake and to take in fresh water, there being noe order or overture as yet made for anie service to bee therein performed.

This motion contained matter of greate waight and was verie fairelie induced [brought in, introduced], which made the Councell desirous to handle it as it deserved. And because the most considerable circumstances wherby the same was rightlie to/ be decided were to rise from a 99 true knowledge of the nature and state of the Islandes themselves, Such Captaines and Masters of shipps now present as hadd of latter tymes been there, were required to informe the Councell herein.

Soe it was alleadged that there were in the Maderaes severall strong ffortes usuallie well stored with ordinance, Soldiers, & munition, scituate in places most apt to annoy our shipping and hinder our aproaches [mis-written 'reproaches'] to land. That there is not anie harbour att all belonging to those Islands but onlie some wide and unsafe Rodes lieing open verie dangerouslie to many windes.

That the danger of these Rodes is much increased by the deepnes of the Seas; the best places to Anchor/ in being for the most part in thirtie fathom water or thereaboutes.

That the landing of men there is more difficult then in other places partlie through the nature of the Shores and partlie through the workeing high goeing (or Zuft [variant of 'Sough'—"An old northern term for the distant surging of the sea; a hollow murmur or howling, or the moaning of the wind before a gale." (Admiral Smyth, as before). "A buzzing, a hollow murmur or roaring …. the form 'swough' is common in early English " (Halliwell Phillipps, s.v.)] as they call it) of the Sea against the same shore. That there being [only] one place where men maie land out of shott of the ffortes, the waie to marche from thence to the cheife Towne of the Maderaes is soe ill and narrowe that a verie few enemies by advantage of place may here cutt off a whole Armie in their passage.

These allegations being heard, the Councell of Warr (as it should seeme) conceiving them to bee of more importance to diswade us from goeing to the Maderaes/ then the former inducementes weare to incline us, did not enter into any reasoning among themselves about the matter of this motion, but rose, leaving it wholie unresolved; whereby of course the former order of my Lord Leiutenant Generall dated the 29th of October 1625, touching the Rendez-vous att Budgeroe remayned still of the same force it was before.


It had beene proposed to the Councell of Warr that they should consider how to manne our 3 prizes and how to dispose of them; wherein nevertheless they had as yet done nothing. But my Lord Leiutenant Generall further perusing (as it should seeme) his instructions from the King's Matie and from the Duke of Buckingham, observed therein that which gave him occasion this 4th of November 1625 to direct a Warant to bee drawne/ in this manner, by the good use wherof the Councell of Warr might bee eased of this matter. The warrant was drawne as his Lpp directed and it was thus:

Whereas by vertue of severall Comissions and instructions from the King's most Excellent Matie and the Duke of Buckingham his grace, I am enabled and authorised amongst other things to constitute & appoint 4 or more Comissioners, the one halfe of Land officers and the other halfe of Sea-officers, to take upon them the care and charge of all such prizes as are or shall bee taken by his Matie's ffleete or anie parte thereof, and of all such goodes and commodities as are or shalbee found in anie of the same prises, that noe parte therof be conceiled imbeaziled or wasted but safelie preserved to his Matie's use, and to doe all other things necessarey/ touching the same service. These are therefore to enable & require you 6 or anie 5 or 4 of you whose names are hereunder written as Commissioners in that behalfe, to nominate and assigne a competent and sufficient nomber of men for the conducting and manning of all and every such prizes as aforesaid. And alsoe to have and take the care and charge of the severall goodes and commodities therein to his Matie's use as aforesaid and speedelie to place such men as aforesaid in every of the said prizes to the purposes aforesaid. And to informe your selves of all waies and meanes you canne of the true estate of every such prize and of her loading and commodities and all other things & circumstances/ necessarie for the same, or his Matie's service therein. And of all yor doeinges and proceedinges therein from tyme to tyme, and with all convenient expedition, to 101 give mee advertisement; and for your soe doeing these shalbe your sufficient Warrant, dated &c.

This warrant his Lopp caused to bee directed to 6 such Comittees or Commrs as hee thought best to nominate for this service, and it was not long after delivered to some of the same Comittees, but what they did therein I never heard.

5o Novemb. Saturdaie morning the 5th of November our Barge which wee hadd manned forth with Muskettiers the day before, upon discovery retourned, bringing word that they hadd been abord a floating shipp loaden with Sugar readie to sinck through the leakes;/ which as they thought were wilfullie cutt and made in her by some man of warr whoe had taken her as a prize and towed her a good while in veiwe of some of our ffleete but quitted when they could or durst towe her noe further. This night was a storme.

6o Novemb. Sunday morning the 6th of November, being foule and close weather, a Turkishe Man of Warr commanded by a Portugall Renegado fell in amongst our ffleete: ere [we knew] hee was neare, as it seemed; being shott att by us, hee presentlie came under our lee and submitted himselfe to our disposall. So we sent our Barge to command the cheife of them to come abord, which was performed; and amongst the rest an English Renegado whoe was/ one of their companie came abord us. This Turkishe Man of Warr had now with him two shipps which hee had taken, the one of Brasile shipp and goodes as prize, the other of Englishe, whereof was Mar a Scottish Man, dwelling at Dover; which shipp the Turke sayed hee had but seized upon to make her loading prize. The cheife amongst them and some others of them were examined by his Lopp, but the Portugall, a man of a fluent speech and subtile witt, protested himselfe soe seriouslie to be of Argeir [Algiers. Algiers is similarly spelled in "Diary of Walter Yonge, Esq. 1604-1628," published by the Camden Society (1 vol. 1848). See p. 41. So, too, in the following little known, but singularly interesting book by Francis Knight: "A Relation of Seven Yeares Slaverie under the Turkes of Argeire, suffered by an English Captive Merchant 1640.… (4o).]" and not of Sally [Salee on the coast of Morocco.] nor of anie 102 other place enemy to us, and that hee laie there onely to take Spaniardes and Spanishe goodes, and noe waie to molest the Englishe; making his allegations soe probable by/ some circumstances wherein the rest and more especiallie the Dover Man agreed in substance with him, That his Lop onelie commanded him to attend our ffleete awhile for chase or discovery, his shipp being an extraordinary good Sayler; and soe dismissed him, without putting anie guard of ours into his shipp that might bee too strong for him and soe command his companie. The Brazile prize had spent his Mastes soe as before hee mett with us hee towed her, and now my Lord assigned some of our shipps to performe that service. The Dover man was loaden with timber and Iron, and other Spanishe goodes taken abord in Biskey and bound for Lisbon.

The Portugall renegade alleadged/ that hee would onelie make use of the vessel to carrie the goodes for Argier, paieing her full and due fraight for the same, and then leave her free to goe where shee would.

And the Master of the Dover shipp confessed that such was the Turkes sayeing unto him upon his first seising of him and ever since. Howbeit some amongst us suspected that the Turkes soe sayeing was onelie a tricke to make the Dover man yeild the more easelie unto him, and that when they should have once brought him to Argeir or anie other Turkish Porte, they would there both detayne the shipp and putt the men to ransom, or sell them for slaves. This suspition was increased by that which followed; ffor by the next/ morning this Turkish man of Warr was slipt awaie soe as wee never heard more of him.

7 Novemb. Monday, the 7th of November, we chase some of the shipps of our owne ffleete, thinking they had been enemies.

8 Novemb. Tuesdaie, the 8th of November, wee lay by the lee to accomodate and finishe all things touching our dispatch for England. And to that purpose hadd both our fflagges of Counsell out all daie; which drew manie of the Councell of Warr and divers Captaines and 103 Masters of shipps aborde us. However noe sitting in Councell was hadd, but the tyme spent by his Lopp in preparing manie things necessarie about the dispatch; but all was not finished this day./

Wednesdaie 9 November wee laie alsoe by the Lee and spent 9 Novemb. the tyme as yesterdaie in preparing the dispatch for England: onely the flaggs of Counsell were not now hung out. The finishing of the dispatch was somewhat hindred by the absence of some of our shipps upon a chase, and the dispersed and remote lieing of some others, wherby it was verie difficult for his Lopp to call out and come by those men and shipps which were intended to goe for England; insoemuch that att last the delay pressed him to a resolution to take the most convenient of such other shipps neare him as might be had.

This daie Certificate was made to his Lopp by such Commissioners as to that purpose hee hadd deputed, of the state of the Rainebowe and/ of the Dread-nought, whereby the former was certified to have a verie dangerous leak, and that shee was insufficient and unfitt to bee continued and hazarded any longer att Sea; but the latter was found and certified to bee staunch and serviceable.

Wee were now in the latitude of 37 degrees and his Lop's observations of the unskilfull or negligent proceedings of diverse of our ffleete since our comeing from Cadiz, togeather with his desire and care to explane and reinforce his former directions, dated 3 October, which some men seemed in parte not well to understand, gave occasion to his Lopp upon this day to deliver out to the Sea Captaines new papers of instructions under his hand: the/ tenor whereof was thus:

By reason of the difficultie of the Journey and the variation of the weather, we being now come unto the latitude of 37 degrees, Itt was thought fitt to add these instructions that all the ffleete maie take notice to proceed accordinglie.

The resolution houldes to lie 60 leagues off the land. And for that it is conceived the West-Indian ffleete may as well hayle in for 104 the rocke as for the South Cape, wee doe intend to plie between the degrees of the Latitude of 36 and 37, and not to goe further to the Southward then the degree of 36.

If the winde be Easterlie I would have the Squadrons lie 2 or 3 leagues distant one from another upon a north and South Line, & soe farr as you maie not loose/ sight one of another. It is conceived that these 4 Squadrons may spread neare a degree in latitude.

If the wynd be westerlie we will lie upon a North and South line as aforesaid, and plie to the windeward, keeping our selves in the latitudes aforesaid.

If the wind bee northerlie or Southerlie, wee will keepe our selves in the distance of Longitude aforesaid, and strive to keepe our selves in the Latitude aforesaid.

Itt is alsoe intended that every morning all the ffleete shall strike a Hull [take down or furl all sail, as before.], and there lie an hower or two to looke out what they can see abroad, and then sett Sayle.

As the Squadrons spread, soe may each shipp in every Squadron, some a head, some a sterne, some to windeward, some to leeward, to bee neare/ and readie for anie chace in the morning.

Itt shall be lawfull for every shipp and shipps in anie Squadron, to undertake anie possible chace, giveing some signe to the rest of the ffleete by shooting of one peice or many peices as there bee shipps, or brayling upp [drawing up the sail before it is thoroughly stowed away. See Skeat, s.v. haul, as before (scarcely accurate).] his mayne sayle or foresayle togeather if it bee a ffleete, if otherwise by strikeing and hoysing his mayne topp sayle and fore topp sayle, if there bee cause that the rest of the ffleete may take notice that he chaseth.

If you discover anie of our Squadrons and give chace unto them, the chaced shall strike his top-Sayle and brayle up his Maine saile and foresayle, whereby it maie bee knowen that hee is of our owne/ ffleete, to the end wee may not chace one another.


If you meete with the West-Indian ffleete or enemies, you shall assayle, and by all meanes endeavor to take them by bording or otherwise, speciallie the Marchantes shipps. And for all shipps seized or taken noe man shall presume to breake hold or bulk, but in case of fight, and that onely between the deckes, but shall bring them to mee or to my officers.

Lastlie, I doe hereby charge and command all Captaines and Masters to speake with the Admiralls of their Squadrons every morning, and to keepe them selves in their severall divisions, and not to departe but by licence of their cheife Commanders or for chace. And whosoever shall/ neglect his dutie herein for want of looking night and daie, or doe not observe these orders, hee shall bee dismissed and discharged of his office and place with disgrace, and the same conferred upon some other.

10 Novemb. Thursday Morning the 10th of Novemb, wee chaced for a while about 20 of our shipps: the rest of the day was spent in prosecuting the preparation of our dispatch for England.

11 Novemb. Friday 11o November, wee lay againe by the Lee keeping out both our flagges of Councell from morning till it was almost night.

Nevertheless, there came not abord us this daie above 3 or 4 of the Councell of Warr, and those not till late in the afternoone and long one after another. Soe as whatsoever/ was by his Lopp intended, there was noe Councell of Warr holden this daie. But diverse Sea-Captaines (not of the Councell of Warr) to the nomber of allmost 30 being found aborde us, My Lord Delaware made declaration and complaint to my Lord Leiutenant Generall of the sicknes in his shipp the St George, soe greatly increased on the Suddaine that unles some of his sicke men were taken from him and other healthie Sea-Men give him in their steades, his companie was so weake thay could not man nor conduct the shipp but must let her drive in the Sea.

The matter concerning a shipp of his Maties of good burthen & great value, my Lo. Leiutenant Generall was verie sensible of it, 106 and soe carefull to applie a timelie remedie that hee forthwith assembled all the Sea/ Captaines now present, and causing a note of their names to bee taken, did strictlie require and command them to deliver with all speed possible by their owne boates abord the St George, two good and healthie Sea-men apeice, and to receive and accept out of the same two sicke men a peice in stead of them.

This evening my Lord Leiutenant had finished his dispatch and sent awaie 12 shipps, whoe now sett sayle for England, being consigned to the Port of Plymouth.

The 12 shipps were his Mates shipp the Rainebowe, 3 of our horse shipps, 2 of our prizes (the third being missing) and 6 other shipps, not all of them the same which his Lopp desired, but the most convenient that could be had, while our ffleete grew every/ daie more dispersed then other.

Into these shipps were convayed diverse wounded, sicke, and unserviceable men, but not such a nomber nor the same men peradventure as should have been sent home upon a veiwe or mustar of them if the dispatch had been made a shore; for the difficult access of one shipp to another especiallie in varietie of weather makes it almost impossible (within anie reasonable tyme) exactlie to accomplishe a worke of this nature at Sea.

12 Novemb. The 12 November wee laie att Hull in the morning according to the late new instructions, but the day brought forth nothing of note.

13 Novemb. The 13 November wee gave chace to a shipp of our owne, in which kind of error wee hadd too often before/ bin unfortunate, to the loss of much tyme and often diversion of our course; an inconvenience which great ffleetes are much subject unto, albeit they use never soe much caution by signes or otherwise to prevent it.

14 Novemb. Monday 14 November Sr William St Legar and Captaine Porter, Captaine of the Convertive, came abord us, and complayned of the Sicknes soe farr increased in their shipp that they wanted men to hoyse and take in their Sayles; whereby without a present course 107 for their releif the shipp must needes be lett drive att the mercy of the Sea and wynd. The complaint concerning a shipp of the King's which my Lord Leiutenant Generall held to bee of such importance/ that hee thought fitt to call a Councell of Warr to advise how to releive her. Soe the fflages were hung out and a warning peice shott of[f]; whereby a Councell was assembled, proceeding thus:

Att a Councell of Warr holden abord the Ann Royall the fourteenth daie of November 1625,

The first point considered of was how to supplie the Convertive with more Sea-men in her distress; to which purpose onelie two waies were propounded. The first by causeing some other shipps of the ffleete to deliver a Man or two as they could spare, The second to sincke one of the Catches and to take all her Men for this service. The former course hadd beene/ in parte allreadie made use of to releive the Saint George, and was found to come off but hardlie with some of the Sea Captaines, manie of whose shipps were alsoe in much distress, though they could not justlie challenge alltogeather soe greate a care to be hadd of them as of the King's shipps. Besides by their former parting with men, they were become the less able to doe soe againe. And there were now here one or two Sea-Captaines of other shipps makeing the like complainte as Sr Willm St Leger did for want of Sea-Men; whence my Lord Leiutenant Generall being to take care of [all] hee hadd yet none other meanes to releive them but by pursueing the course hee tooke for my Lord Delaware; wherfore/ it was conceived that a sufficient supplie of men proportionable to [the] wantes of the Convertive and other shipps now complaineing, could not well be hadd from the rest of the ffleete without sinking some of the Catches. But if anie Catches should bee suncke as by a former act of Councell was provided that they might, then ought the King to answere to their owners the value of their Hulls, which being uncertaine and not easie to bee cleered in England after the Catches should here be sunk, That uncertaintie might putt a poore owner to a longer or 108 more chargeable suite for his money then would bee requisite. To prevent which inconvenience/ and towardes the supplie of the present want of the Convertive, it was thus finallie agreed and ordered by the Councell of Warr.

That Captaine Beamont & Captaine Wolliston, William Hill & Richard Hooper, Masters William Apsley and Robert Tomber, Carpenters, should forthwith visit the Catch called the Anthony and sett a reasonable and indifferent [impartial, as before] value upon the Hull of her as shee was then worth to bee sold in their Judgementes, which being done, her Anchors, sayles, and tackling with all the men and victualls in her should be received into his Matie's good shipp the Convertive, and the said Catch to be sunk or imployed for wood to burne./

We found ourselves now to bee in the latitude of 38 degrees and a halfe and estimated that wee were 50 or 60 leagues off from the shore; whereupon three things were moved.

  1. To send home our weake shipps.
  2. To returne into the degrees of 36 and a halfe &c.
  3. To lie nearer to the shore.

But none of them were entertayned nor anie order therein given by the Councell.

After the Councell of Warr ended, my Lord Leiutenant Generall caused a note to bee taken of the names of all Sea-Captaines now present whoe had not sent anie men to the releife of my Lord Delaware, and assigned some of them to deliver a man a peice more to Sr William/ St Leger, because those of the Catch appointed to bee sunke being but nyne in nomber were not sufficient, And others of them hee commanded to doe the like to other Sea Captaines now present and complaineing of their extremities.

This evening there were about 60 of our ffleete in veiwe of the Admirall, but the whole Du[t]ch Squadron with our Vice-Admirall and all or the most parte of his Squadron hadd been absent and out of veiwe ever since the 9th of this moneth.


15 Novemb. The 15 Novemb in the morning there were onlie about 20 of our shipps in veiwe; but the next daie towardes night there were about 60 of them againe in veiwe./

17 Novemb. Thursday the 17th of November the Earle of Essex with his whole Squadron or the greater parte of them, haveing been missing now a full weeke, came into us againe and hayled us, and with all gave notice that they were extreamelie distressed through the increasing sicknes amongst their men, himselfe in perticular, To whose shipp there belonged 250 Sea men, not haveing 2 or 3 and thirtie sound Men, namelie 16 to serve in one watch and 17 in another; which was much to soe small a number to attend and Man the Sayles of soe greate a vessell, especiallie in gusty and stormie weather, wherof we had of late felt more then enough and could not expect better, the winter drawing on now apace./

This Complaint of sicknes in the ffleete came now soe thicke and grew soe generall, that it seemed impossible the sound shold bee able to supplie the defective and suffize to man home all our ffleete if speedelie wee returned not into England or releived and refreshed our selves elswhere; the consideration whereof gave occasion to my Lord Leiutenant Generall even this afternoone, while the weather would permitt and that ffleete was happelie reunited (all but the Du[t]ch Squadron) to call a generall Councell for the handling and setling of this great busines, by the opinions of all, which so much concerned the honor of his Matie and the safetie of his whole ffleete and Armie.

The fflagges were hung out and/ the Councell of Warre came speedelie abord the Admirall; where being assisted by manie other Captaines and Mars of shipps they proceeded thus.

Att a Councell of Warr holden abord the Ann-Royall the 17th of November, 1625.

The matter proposed by my Lord Leiutenant Generall to this Councell to be considered of, was whether our ffleete att the 20th of this moneth should stand directlie for England or els for Bayon, there to Water.


This overture tending to the conclusion of the voyage, wherin the honor of our King and Nation was verie much concerned, begott in all the Councell a desire to handle with as much care and/ gravitie as the waight of the matter deserved, which desire alsoe they accomplished as followeth:

For our goeing to Bayon it was alleaged, That it stood resolved by a former Act of Counsell and it would savor of inconstancie to reverse it, That if diverse in the ffleete could hardly forbeare goeing to water almost 3 weekes since, they could worse forbeare it now. That manie shipps takeing notice of the former resolution hadd noe doubt spent their provisions of bear and water accordinglie, in expectation to water att Bayon; which if they should now be putt from would in all probability verie much distress them. That if wee adventure to stand for England without touching first/ att Bayon, then if a strong East wynde should take us and hold us long when wee came neare home (as was to bee feared it might) wee should bee driven off to Sea unable to releive our selues anie where and peradventure perish for want of fresh water, and whereas it was obiected by some whoe inclyned to goe for England that at the Islandes of Bayon there was not sufficient Store of Water to bee hadd in anie convenient tyme to supplie the wantes of soe greate a ffleete as ours, hereunto it was replied that our shipp[s] might ride safelie att those Islandes and wee with our Catches and boates repaire not farr of[f] to the mayne land/ from whence wee might releive our selves with sufficient speed & safetie.

On the other side, for the standing of our ffleete directlie for England, thus it was resolved, That the Councell hadd power to controll their owne actes, and it is the parte of wise men to change their opinions and resolutions upon new and better reasons.

That the former act of Councell, being passed in October, one reason (not then observable) hath since occurred, which tendeth more to perswade us for England and from Bayon, then allmost all the rest, namely, the excessive increase of sickness in our ffleete/ as 111 well among officers as inferiour persons, not likelie to leave us men enough to bring home our shipps att all if wee make not the more hast. That the shipps greatlie complaineing for want of Water were not manie, and if some shipps needed a different order from the rest, it was fitter to provide for them by a perticular exemption from the generall order touching the whole ffleete then to hazard the whole ffleete for a few shippes sake. That to goe for Bayon was to loose the opportunitie and benefitt of a wynd for England, the same wynd serving to carrie us for either place. That it was dangerous in tyme of Winter to unbay [sail out of the bay. To 'embay' is to get into a bay and be unable to get out.] our/ selves soe deepelie as wee must doe by touching att Bayon, especially with soe greate shipps as his Mate's. That we ought as much more to fear that a westerlie wynd might keepe us from comeing out of Bayon as that an Easterlie wynd should surprise us goeing for England. That if wee stood directlie for England and passed a good way to the Northward of Bayon, those contrarie windes which would keepe us from gaineing England would for the most parte serve to bring us back againe to Bayon, where at last in case of necessitie, and not otherwise, wee might best adventure to put in. That if wee came to an Anchor att Bayon, our shipps being allreadie/ in soe greate weaknes, we should never bee able to gett them out againe but remayne as a praie for our Enemyes, to the scorne of our selves and our nation, if the sicknes amongst us (which was the most likelie) increased for the tyme to come as it hadd done far these 10 or 12 daies past, especially if wee met with anie adverse wyndes to hinder our speedie retrait. That all men would arme themselves with the more constant resolution to endure extremities when they knew they were homeward bound, with out anie speciall intention to divert or interrupt that course. That the victualls in manie of our shipps began to growe short, and albeit wee could supplie our selves with fresh watter att Bayon/ yet could wee not hope there to increase 112 our store of victualls, nor bee more assured of goeing from thence towardes England. That an East wind should not befall us by the way, then if wee made directly homewards without goeing att all for Bayon. And to meete with a cross winde when wee should irreparablie want victualls, would bring an equall if not worse mischeife upon us then to bee soe encountred, wanting onely freshe water.

That as wee could not hope att Bayon to renew our victualls soe was the same noe fitt place for our ffleete to stay in, for the search & amendement of our Leakes, now growen soe manie and soe greate that diverse of our shipps were therby/ in danger of perishing if wee gott not home with expedition.

That if all circumstances els favoured us to goe for Bayon, yet could wee not (as it was said by some) gett fresh water upon the continent there, without landing of forces, which wold spend more tyme than wee hadd now to spare.

That the Towne of Bayon it selfe (our present weake estate considered) was too strong for us, and for anie of the other villages or places thereaboutes, it was conceived they were altogeather unworthie of our attempt.

That it was fitt to make hast homeward now when the tyme for Sea-service was almost past and noe approved new overture as yet made for anie further land/ service. That by all our late actions att Puntall wee hadd declared our selves enemies to the Spanish Nation and soe farr provoked their King that it was expected hee wold against the next spring make some preparation to invade or annoy us in England or Ireland; ffor which cause it was necessarie that our shipps which hadd been long off the ground were growen verie foule, should bee in England as soone as convenientlie might bee, to bee new trimmed and made readie for the better guarding of our narow Seas and defence of our Realmes against the tymes of neede.

And lastlie that the safetie of his Matie's shipps and the rest of our ffleete (depending much upon our/ speedie goeing for England) 113 was a matter especiallie recomended to the care of my Lo. Leiutenant Generall and a point highlie to be regarded as well in respect of the condition and great values of the perticular vessels now abrode, as in regard of the singular usefulnes of our Navy for the safegard of our Coastes and Kingdomes. And upon this Reason did my Lo. Leiutenant Generall cheiflie insist and ground his judgement.

The debate being ended, the perticular votes of the Councell of Warr were solemnlie taken, and by the cleare opinions of them all but one, Itt was resolved and ordered,

That the whole ffleete should stand directlie for England immediatlie/ after the expiration of the tyme formerlie sett for our keeping the Sea to expect the plate ffleete; with this nevertheless, that if anie particular shipps were in urgent & absolute necessitie of fresh water, they were left libertie to goe to the Islands Bayon to releive themselves, useing all care and diligence for their owne safetie in their entrance, stay, and returne. But none without such urgent cause should presume to goe thither under colour of pretended necessitie, upon payne of severest punishment.

This resolution being passed, Itt was observed that it prescribed not what course wee should hold imediatlie from henceforth/ untill the 20th of this moneth; for which cause a motion was made to knowe the certaintie in that particular: Whereunto it was replied by one of the Councell of Warr and not contradicted by anie, That wee should in this meane tyme runn as northerlie a course as we might.

In the assemblie of this Councell, all the Sea and land officers were againe admonished and required forthwith to bring in their Listes and certificates according to the resolution and order of the 4th of this moneth, which hetherto, as it seemed, hadd not been duely performed.

18 & 19 Novemb. The 18th of November was stormie, gusty, and raynie. Soe was the 19th; upon which day Mr Wriotesley [Doubtless of the Southampton family. Shakespeare's Earl of Southampton and his eldest son both died in 1624, in the memorable wars of "the Low Countries."] our purser dyed, and by 114 our/ observation of the Sunn taken this daie att noone wee found our selves to bee in 40 degrees and 15 minutes.

From the 19th to the 22th of November it continued still gustie and stormy weather, with variable and ill windes, wherby our ffleete was much dispersed, onlie 20 or 30 sayle of them being now in veiwe. And by our observation of the Sunne this daie, wee found our selves beaten back into the latitude of 39 degrees and 27 minutes.

Hereupon my Lord Leitenant Generall takeing notice how by contrarie windes our voyage might bee soe much prolonged that our state of drincke might fayle us, unless some tymely course were used to prevent it, gave order and made declaration to the Companie of our shipp that from henceforth (till God should send us better winde and/ weather) a third part of the ordinary allowance of beare should be cutt of[f] from every messe and onelie two Canns a day allowed unto them, whereas formerlie they had three.

23 Novemb. The 23th of November we had a skant winde blowing soe hard & driveing us soe much to shoreward, that wee doubted greatlie of weathering the Cape. In the afternoone and at night it was a storme, wherein wee slipt our foretop sayle which we hadd bin forced to beare out to keepe us from driveing too much towardes the lee shore.

24 Novemb. The 24th and 25th of November were alsoe verie gustie and stormy daies, but the next daie we hadd reasonable good wind and weather.

27 Novemb. Sundaie the 27th of November, a suddain gust broke our fore yard into foure peices, which putt us to noe litle trouble/ and hindrance; for the wynd now and for some daies following blew verie faire and a fresh gale for England, while we through this disaster could make but litle use of it; ffor our great shipp, not being able to beare either fore sayle or fore top sayle, would neither sayle speedelie nor steire orderlie, onlie for the present by the advice of Mr. Apsley our Master Carpenter (a well tempered ingenious, & industrious man), we tooke our mayne 115 missne [mizen. The mizen mast is the after-mast, the mizen yard is the lowest or chief yard (spar or timber on which the sail is set) of the mizen mast.] yard and sayle and fastned the same as well as we might, in place, to supplie our want of a fore sayle.

The next daie we went in hand to lift up our Missne mast (which was a worke of noe meane difficultie) intending according to the further direction of our Master Carpenter,/ to have it hewen and fitted for a new fore yard; for we had besides it a Rere or Bone venture missne, which would somewhat helpe our shipp to steire, and it was much better to want our mayne misne then our fore yard.

Upon veiwe of the peices of our broken fore yard, it appeared by an ould Cleft peircing quite through it about the midst of the Tree, that it was verie ould, rotten, and insufficient before our comeing out of England.

By Monday noone wee had gotten upp our misne Mast. By Tuesday noone it was wrought into a fore yard, and before night it was done on to the fore Mast and the Sayle putt to it, two breadth thereof being first taken out to make it fitt, for the misne was about two foot shorter/ then the ould fore yard.

We had noe sooner fitted our selves with our fore Sayles, but the winde skanted [lessened] verie much upon us, And as wee estimated wee could not loose less then the running of a whole degree by the occasion of spending our foreyard.

The next daie we had good wind and weather and found our selves to be in the Latitude of 46 degrees and 30 and odd minutes.

o Decembr. The first and second of December we had il windes and weather, and great complaint was now made for want of wood and Candles, as alsoe touching the disorderlie & excessive expence of beere, through the fraude of quarter masters Coopers, Swabbers [driers or cleaners of the decks after being washed. Hence 'swabs'—a sort of long mop of rope yarn, to clean or dry up the decks. Often now used by sailors in a reproachful sense. Formerly in the Royal Navy there was a petty officer, whose duty it was to see that the deck was clean, and he was called 'swabber' par excellence.], and the over bignes 116 of some Canns of allowance; which Complaintes our Captaine tooke into examination & sought to reforme./

The Surgeon of our shipp being now required to make a list of our sicke men, gave in the name of above 130. Besides we had formerly throwen diverse men over Borde and had now in our shipp manie other weake and unserviceable persons, not reckoned in the number of men absolutlie sicke.

3o Decemb. The 3d of December the winde came verie faire, but we lost a greate parte of the benefitt thereof in bearing less Sayle then we might to stay for one of our Catches, which we conceived to be in some distress by reason of her not comeing up to us, and it was thought unchristian to forsake her. Howbeit we were shortly informed by another Catch which we sent to hasten her upp, that shee was not in anie distress, but boare all/ the Sayle and made all the hast she could, whereby it was concluded by some that in a strong and faire wind a Catch cannot keep companie with a greate shipp if the shipp beare out all her Sayles (an observation verie considerable if it be true), for albeit Catches being short and round built bee verie apt to turne up and downe and usefull to goe to and fro, and to carry messages between shipp and shipp almost with anie wind in faire weather and to sound a shore or Creeke upon occasion, yet if they can harnlie live in a growen storme hapening with adverse windes, and be not able to keepe companie with the greatest shipps when the winde bloweth strong and faire, then are they/ not fitt to be imployed amongst such a ffleete as ours, partlie for that they are soe apt to miscarry in stormes and partlie for that they must in the best windes be forsaken by the ffleete, or the ffleete lose a great parte of the benefitt of such windes by staying for them, as our shipp the Admirall did now by staieing for this Catch; which would be to anie ffleete and att this tyme was unto us, noe small inconvenience.

4 Decemb. Sundai night, the 4th of December, was a strange kind of tempest: noe winde at all stirring, yet did the Sea worke and goe soe high 117 that our shipp did rolle more and fetch deeper and more dangerous Seeles [lurching, or sudden heeling over and quick return] then in the greatest storme wee mett with all this Voyage./

The next daie [we] were in the latitude of 40 degrees and a halfe, and estimated our selves for longitude to be between 20 and 30 leagues off from the Coast of ffrance, The night was stormie and gustie, causing some of our shroudes to breake, which formerly were insufficient. But soe good industrie was used that the defect was speedely and soone amended.

The two next daies nothing of note occurred.

8 Decemb. The 8 of December wee mett a distressed Barke of Plymoth, but she could give us noe information for our instruction.

The same evening wee sawe 6 or 7 shipps farr off a head of us, which by the fflagg of one of them wee tooke to bee some of our ffleete.

Wee were gladd to see them, hopeing/ the next morning to fetch them upp, for haveing every daie lost more and more of our ffleete since the 17th of the last moneth, when wee resolved to stand directlie for England, wee had but 2 or 3 shipps and 2 Catches of all the ffleete now left to attend the Admirall.

By our sounding this daie, wee were in 48 fadom with such gravell as is usuallie found about the gulfe, and some thought wee were neare the shore; however we could not before night discover anie land; and therfore wee tacked about againe and stood off to Sea till 4 of the Clocke the next morning, and then retourned to our former tacke, giving notice/ therof by a peice shott off.

The shipps which wee sawe last evening were not this morning to bee seen, wherby it seemed they tooke not themselves to be soe neare the shore nor did therfore tack about nor stand off to Sea as wee did.

This daie wee fell againe to coniecture by our Soundings where wee should bee for longitude. But wee were in diverse opinions; 118 some thincking we were shott farr into our owne channell, and others that wee were yet much to the west of Silly, soe as between our care not to fall fowle upon our owne shore in the Darke, and our feare of loosing tyme and opportunitie by standing soe much off to Seaward in the nightes that wee could hardly fetch it upp againe in the dayes,/ wee remayned a while in some doubt what course was best for us to take.

But about 4 of the clocke in the afternoone, we descried a small French barke and by a message sent unto her by one of our Catches, caused her to come to us; of whom inquiring whereaboutes shee tooke us and her selfe to bee, shee tould us shee had even now seen the Islandes of Silly and thought they were still within ken from our topp mast head.

Upon this information wee sent up some to looke out, whoe were not gone halfe Mast high, but they plainlie discovered the Islandes of Sylly to be 3 or 4 leagues off, and bearing towardes the East of us.

This gave us assured knowledge where wee were and settled all our/ doubtes, but the winde was nowe att East South-East; with which it was impossible to gett either Silly or anie other parte of England. Wherfore, the night comeing on, we easelie resolved to tacke about and stand off to Sea to avoyd the danger of the shore, and in hope of a larger winde. This tacke we held all night, but the wind continued still where it was and blew verie strong, soe as although our shipp Caped South, yet was shee driven much to the Westward. This night 3 of our men dyed.

The next morning a proposition was made by our Master and his Mates to stand for Corke or Kinsale in Ireland.

Their reasons were these—That England could not bee gayned with this winde. That above 130 of our/ men were found sicke & unserviceable above a weeke since, and the nomber was now soe farr increased that wee were hardlie able to mann our Sayles and pump: for the weather was uncertaine and gustie and our shipp 119 growen verie leak, soe as wee were driven to pumpe twice a watch, with verie short intermissions of rest. That if wee kepte the Sea awhile longer with this winde, we should be driven soe farr to the west, that wee should be able to gett neither England, Ireland, nor ffrance but perishe through our leakes, wanting men to plie our pumpes. That a faire winde to carrie us into England was as likelie to befall us goeing for Ireland as standing off to sea; and if any such change hapned in our passage,/ wee might att anie tyme stand about and take the benefitt thereof, otherwise Ireland was a good Countrie of his Matie's, affording safe harbour for our shipping till god should send us a good wynd for England; and where in the meane tyme wee might refresh our sicke men a shore with fresh victuall att a cheape rate, renew store of ffresh water, have our shipp searched and our leakes stopped, and peradventure alsoe gett some supplie for our want of Seamen. Against this proposition some light objections were made to this effect, that wee looked yesterdaie upon Silley, a parcell of the kingdome of England, and it would argue litle courage in us if wee kept not the Sea more then one night after, in hope of a faire winde, before wee sett Sayle for another shore. That/ questionles manie of our shipps have allreadie gotten England and it will cause some ill rumours to the disgrace of our Judgementes if wee with the same windes shall not bee able to doe the like. That wee want a long boate wherewith to moare our Anchors, and that our goeing into anie harbor would surelie occasion a greate expence of tyme, to the delaie of our returne into England. Herunto was answered that if wee stood off to Sea with this winde till wee could reach noe land att all and then perished, Itt would be a rashnes and noe true courage that carried into such a mischeife. That safetie was to bee preferred before rumore. That if any shipps be allreadie gone home they have the more offended in foresaking their Admirall; for they were to wayte upon us, not we on them. That wee mett with a perticular disaster of/ breaking our fore yard, whereby wee lost more then the running of a degree, 120 which maie justlie excuse us, though wee have not gotten England with the same windes that others have. That our other boates with the helpe of our Catches or such fisher boates as wee shall be sure to find in Ireland, will serve us verie well for the moaring of our Anchors. And that if it were necessarie to staie long in harbour for supplie of defectes then such staie was not to be blamed; if otherwise by good order & direction it might bee prevented, and our dispatch out of harbour sufficientlie speeded.

My Lord Leiutenant Generall being informed of the substance of this proposition and reasoning, did in his Judgement soone resolve and give order that wee shold stand directlie for Kinsale in Ireland, and about 9 a clocke in the morning wee sett sayle accordinglie.

We had not now in our companie/ above 2 or 3 shipps and two Catches of all our ffleete, haveing [lost] every daie more and more since the 9th of the last moneth; and the whole Squadron of the Du[t]ch had bin absent from us ever since that day. But whether to impute this great seperation of our ffleete (whoe should wayte on their Admirall) to the carelesnes or wilfulnes of the Captaines, Masters and other officers in shipps or to the causualtie of Sea-service or badnes of the weather, which was for the most parte stormie ever since the iith of the last moneth, when we sent awaie the 12 shipps for England, or what other cause to ascribe it to, I know not.

11 Decemb. Sunday the 11th of December about noone wee came into the Harbour of Kinsale, not haveing Sea men enough in health for the fitting of our shipp/ to come to an Anchor without assistance of the gentlemen voluntiers and their servantes, who all wrought with their owne handes for the better accomodating of the busines.

Being come to an Anchor, we searcht our shipp and found her to have now sixe foot water in hold, whereby wee concluded that if wee had kept the sea but a daie or two longer wee must needes have perished.

Here we understood that some of the King's shipps and manie 121 others of our ffleete were latelie putt into severall harbours of this kingdome, and others came in shortlie after, distressed for the most part, as wee were, with sicknes amongst their men.

The Lord President of Munster [We learn incidentally from Walter Yonge's "Diary" (Camden Society) that he was Sir Edward Villers [or Villiers], p. (95). He was half-brother of the Duke of Buckingham.] and the Earle of Corke, haveing notice of my Lord Leiutenant Generall's arrivall/ att Kinsale, came speedelie unto him and with much dilligence assisted his Lopp to provide for the releife and refreshing of our sicke men.

Itt was like to be long ere our shipp could be made fitt to putt to Sea againe and manie windes for England might bee lost in the meane tyme.

Hereupon it came aptlie into consideration whether my Lord Leiutenant Generall were best to staie in Ireland till this shipp might be made readie for him or els to take some other good shipp or barke, and therein seeke the speediest passage that might be had, leaving his owne shipp in the charge of her Captaine and Mr to be brought home with the first opportunitie of winde and weather after her defectes should bee supplied.

But his Lops care and desire to shunne the imputation and dishonor of abandoning his Matie's shipp in her distress, seemed to prevayle soe farr above anie reasons presented to him to the contrarie, that hee resolved onelie to send a dispatch for England and not to goe himselfe, till his owne shipp were readie for him.

Soe, leaving Sr Thomas Loue att Kinsale to see her new trimmed and to gett her defectes supplied, his Lop went to Youghall there to remaine with my Lord President till hee should heare from Sr Thomas Love that all things were readie, which it was conceived could hardlie bee till after Christmas./

In the meane tyme his Lopp sent a dispatch for England by Mr ffrancis Carewe from Youghall, and I with his Lopp's leave upon Christmas eve went to Lismore to the Earle of Corke's, ii myles 122 from Youghall, purposeing to staie there but three or foure daies att the most, and then to retourne and wayte upon his Lopp. But I was prevented by a long and dangerous sicknes which alsoe is the cause that I can give noe further accompt of this voyage.

A list of the names of the cheife Commanders, Captaines, Leiutenantes and Antientes of his Maties Armie imployed this voyage:

  1. His Excie Regimente:—Captaines Sr John Prode, Seriant Maior Thornix, Capt. Gifford, Knolles, Capt. Elpheston, Capt. Paddon, Capt. Reynelles, Capt. Kirton, Capt. Countrey, Capt. Preston. Leiutenantes Bromingham, Prowde, Pottes, Neuell, Tremaine, Colwell, Whitehead, Donne, Brett, Lee. Ensignes Owen, Russell, Barsey, Greene, Moore, Pennannt, ffearne, Otby, Warde, Bagg.

  2. Lord Marshall's Regimente:—His Companie—Captaines Sr George Blundell, ffarrer, Croftes, Christmas, Crispe, Paprill, Bridges, Gore, Edw. Leigh, Anth. Leigh. Leiutenantes Powell, Booth, Basset, Grimshaw, Cheverton, Wormewood, Burthogg, Homer, Browne, ffelton, Talbott. Ensignes Hawkins, Marbery, Carlile, Halls, Dodson, Lindsey, Disson, Carewe, Pagitt, Dedham, Bagnall.

  3. Mr of ye Ordinance Regimente:—His Companie—Captaines Sprye, ffennithorp, Hammond, Brett, Taylor, ffisher, Hackett, Bruce, Porter, Tolkarne. Leiutenantes ffrodisham, Searle, Judge, Bowyer, Appleyard, Wilton, Brooke, Bemersyde, Reynolds, Mathewes, Barnett. Ensignes Bowyer, Greenfeild, Bennett, Markham,/ Appleyard, Leigh, Ogle, Bullock, ffullerton, Veale, Ogle.

  4. Colonell Generall's Regimente: His Companie—Captaines 123 Sr Thomas Yorke, Hacklett, Carleton, Tucke, Hone, Shugborough, Alley, Crispe, Leake, Bowles, junr. Leiutenantes ffrogmorton, Hynton, Hacklett, Ottey, Spring, Barington, Calvert, Quarles, Jarman, Goodridge, Vernon. Ensignes Pelham, Trye, Gwynne, Kelke, Wattes, Smith, Ban. Leigh, Heigham, Pottes, Mathewes, Jennison.

  5. Serieant Mar General Regimente:—His Companie—Captaines Gibson, Frier, Courtenay, Richards, Mathews, Mostyne, Reade, Bowles senr, Bucke, Moldisworth. Lieutenantes Judd, Abraham, Stevens, Prideaux, Grove, Powell, Warde, Cole, Sherrock, Coop. Ensignes Whitney, Hall, Spilling, Trefuse, Bockard, Parker, Hookes, Maddison, Bowles, Bruerton,/ Sidenham.

  6. Colonell Riche's Regimente:—His Companie—Captaines Sr John Ratcliff, Standishe, Stewart, Grey, Skelton, Leighton, Waller, Cooke, Staverton, St Leger. Lieutenantes Rich. Leigh, Drury, Waller, Crispe, Grover, Gray, Williams, Brand, Parry, Chadwell, Holdham. Ensignes ffrith, Coitt, Hunkes, Bowyer, Ramscroft, Story, Price, Dudley, Jarves, Wormwood, Wright.

  7. Colonell Conwey's Regimente:—His Companie—Captaines Willoughby, Clapham, Pelham, Rainsford, Williams, Alford, Goring, Dixon, Hammond, Ogle. Leiutenantes Dawson, Chaworth, Browne, Powell Morg., Huson, Heigham, Shelley, Moone, Welcombe, Markham, Plesington. Ensignes Pinchbecke, Ottey, Welles, Kettleby, Bartlett, Cross, Hudson, Maxey, Ayres, Netherton, Browne.

  8. Colonell Horwood's Regimente:—His Companie.—S4 Tho. Moreton, Watkins, Jackson, Abraham, Gibthorp, Gibthorpe, Heatley, Dowglas, Seymour, Masterson, Morgan. Lieutenantes Alcock, Dawson, Humfreys, Tillier, Lewkin, Bridges, Briges, Anderson, Woodward, Wescott, Love, Games. Ensignes Arkeld, Betnam, Stewart, Stanton, Champnowne, Lucas,/ Lucas, Hunt, Saltingstone, ffoscue, Stevens, Eden.

  9. Colonell Burgh's Regimente:—His Companie—Captaines Sr Alexr Brett, Sr Edw. Hanley, Bettes, Terrett, Hill, Bond, Lindsey, Grove, Lindsey, Greenfeild, Parkinson. Leiutenantes Jeffereyes, 124 Tourney, Wattes, Yates, Atchinson, Outridd, Searles, Jones, Dodsworth, Jones, Pollard, Long. Ensignes ffanshawe, Bluddell, Watnam, Gibbes, ffoliatt, Knolles, ffoy, Thorpe, Cludd, Thorp, Ayleworth.

  10. Colonell Bruce's Regimente:—His Companie:—Captaines Sr Hen. Killegrewe, Scott, Wood, Cornwell, Gilpin, Ashley, Glynne, Meutus, Norton, Yates. Leiutenantes St Paule, Broadribbe, Cowley, Saundilaunce, Coffin, ffoxe, Honniwood, Powell, Bathurst, Jarvis, Houghton. Ensignes Gibbes, Bruce, Boswell, Willoughby, Lowe, Vaughan, Robinson, Hobbes, Williams, Webb, Greene./




  Shipps. Commanders. Tonnes. Seamen. Landmen.
King's Shipps Ann Royall Lord Marshall
Sr Tho. Love, Knt
1000 400  
St George Lord Delaware
Sr Michael Gayre, Knt
895 250  
Convertive Sr Wm St Leger
Captaine Porter
500 200  
  Assurance Capt. Osborne 373 69 198
Prudence Capt. Vaughan 350 64 181
Anne Capt. Wollaston 245 40 150
Royall Defence Capt. Ellys 304 57 160
Lesser Saphire Capt. Bond 303 56 158
Assurance of Dover Capt. Barsey 300 58 159
Jonathan Capt. Boteler 371 69 197
Amitie Capt. Malyn 203 32 131
Jacob Capt. Gosse 218 34 134
Anthonie Capt. Blaque 240 40 150
Hermyt Capt. Turner 203 32 131
Hopewell of New Castell Capt. —— 179 30 116
Abraham Capt. Downes 235 36 134
Barbara Constant Capt. Hatch 351 64 197
Camelyon Capt. Seamour 213 34 132
Sea Venture Capt. Knivett 216 35 133
William Capt. White 225 37 138
Retorne Capt. Bonithon 212 34 132
Hellen Capt. Mason 200 37 142
Talbott Capt. Burden 260 47 135/
Great Saphire Capt. Baymond 420 73 220
Golden Cock Capt. Beamont 250 45 151
Globe Capt. Stoakes 290 56 160
George Capt. Stevens 298 56 200
Mary Magdalen Capt. Cooper 257 40 150
Anne Speedewell Capt. Polkenhorne 192 32 130
Provision Shipp Amitie of Hull Capt. ffrisby 260 30  

The Some of this Squadron.




  Shipps. Commanders. Tonnes. Seamen. Landmen.
King's shipps Swift-sure Earl of Essex
Sr Sam. Argall, knt
876 250  
Reformation Lo. Viscount Valencia
Capt. Gilbert
750 250  
Rainebowe Sr John Chudley, knt 650 250  
  Zouch Phenix Capt. Philpott 319 60 169
Martha Capt. Barber 278 50 142/
Sea fflower Capt. Sidenham 200 38 142
Mary Anne Capt. Harman 208 33 131
Carnation Capt. Walsingham 209 33 131
Robert Capt. Gurling. 244 37 138
True Love Sr Jo. Hamden, knt 242 40 150
ffreindshipp Capt. John Harvey 311 57 164
Mary Constant Capt. Mervin Burley 276 50 140
Tyger Capt. Welden 240 40 150
Retorne Capt. Hagthorp 216 34 133
Mary Magdalen Capt. Whiddon 242 40 148
Timothy Capt. Pawlett 200 32 132
Venture Capt. Mohun 218 34 134
Royal Exchange Capt. Edw. Harvy 453 83 236
Esperance Capt. Wm Reskymer 212 34 132
Patient Adventure Capt. Bargrave 221 36 135
Amitie Capt. Skipwith 232 38 140
Barking Capt. ffitton 177 30 116
Lyon of Ipswich Capt. Ruckwood 168 30 112
Samuell Capt. Walters 239 38 140
Munition Ships Peter Bonaventure Capt. Johnson 213 39  
Sara Bonaventure Capt. Carew 200 38  
Christian Capt. Wharey 167 37  
Horse shipps Chesnutt   300 20  
ffortune   400 20  
Catches Willm & John Tho. Tentes, Mr      
George Willm Wm Sueddall, Mr      

The Sume of this Squadron.




  Shipps. Commanders. Tonnes. Seamen. Landmen.
Kings shipps St Andrewe Earl of Denbigh
SrJohn Wattes
895 250  
Bonaventure Lo. Cromwell
Capt. Collins
674 200  
Dreadnough Sr Beverley Newcome 458 160  
  Abigail Capt. Povie 309 58 163
Tryall Capt. Stradling 200 33 131/
Jane Bonaventure Capt. Rous 182 31 122
Supplie Capt. Duppa 183 31 112
Matthew Capt. Jo. Reskymer 222 36 135
Convert Capt. Barna. Burley 240 36 146
Centaure Capt. Jones 189 31 127
Dragon Capt. Oxenbridge 453 83 304
Hopewell Capt. Marbery 240 40 150
Adventure Capt. Browne 206 33 121
Susan Capt. Sacheverill 245 40 150
Rose Capt. Powell 250 40 150
Wm & Thomasin Capt. Plumleigh 188 32 130
Samuell Capt. Cheeke 371 69 197
Alyan Capt. Hake 266 50 141
Blessing Capt. Kettelby 210 39 142
Confidence Capt. Dunne 213 34 132
Desire Capt. Morgan 233 34 132
Isaacke Capt. Peywell 207 33 133
Lion Capt. Squibbe 210 33 131
Munition shipps Susan & Hellen Capt. Levitt 253 40  
William of London Capt. Amadas 198 37  
Hope Sr Tho. Pigott 277 40/  
Horse shipps ffoxe        
Catches Prosperous Roger Barton, Mr      
Isaackson Austin Carpenter, Mr      

Sum'e of this Squadron.


Sum'a total'.