Valid XHTML 1.0 Transitional


IN 1625.




secretary to the lord admiral of the fleet (sir e. cecil), afterward
sir john glanville, speaker of the parliament, &c., &c.

never before printed.


edited, with introduction and notes, by


ll.d. (edinburgh), f.s.a. (scot.), st. george's, blackburn, lancashire.



printed by nichols and sons
25, parliament street.

[new series xxxii.]

Edited and corrected, with modernization of spelling and punctuation, by Bob Blair


FOR THE YEAR 1882-3.

J. J. CARTWRIGHT, ESQ., M.A., Treasurer.
J. R. DANIELL-TYSSEN, ESQ., F.S.A. {the late)

The Council of the Camden Society desire it to be understood
that they are not answerable for any opinions or observations
that may appear in the Society's publications; the Editors
of the several Works being alone responsible for the same.

Introduction to the Modernized Version.

Grosart's edition of Glanville's Journal is valuable for its reproduction of a fascinating manuscript and its notes. The edition does have some deficiencies when regarded from the view of 21st-century general readers, however:

In this document I have tried to repair these deficiencies. While maintaining the vocabulary and (mainly) the syntax of Glanville's journal, I have modernized spelling and punctuation. I have added additional notes and edited some of Grosart's. I have provided hyperlinks to other documents where they are available. And I have expanded and corrected the index.

If you read this document, keep in mind that the 19th-century edition printed for the Camden Society is the canonical text. Many copies of it are available in the internet, including several scanned by Google Books. There is also an HTML transcription of the journal that preserves to a great extent the conventions of the printed Camden Society edition.

Comments on this edition, including error reports, are welcome. Send them to

My comments, edits and presentation are © Bob Blair, 2012. This work is dedicated to the public domain and is freely licensed to any person for any use. It is not warranted useful for any purpose.

Bob Blair
Killeen, Texas
February 18, 2012



The Journal now herein printed for the first time, was found by the Editor, whilst pursuing his researches at Port Eliot (on the invitation of the late Earl of St. Germans) among the MSS. formerly collected by the illustrious statesman and patriot Sir John Eliot. It is one of a number of Transcripts from original documents—as well State Papers as Private—which Eliot made it matter of conscience to obtain as the basis and sanction of his memorable opposition to the King and Buckingham in their "evil courses." It is pathetic as well as satisfying to come upon these evidences of the painstaking spent by the great English Tribune in verifying the statements and related accusations made by him in his place in Parliament. That this Journal was transcribed for Sir John Eliot under his own personal supervision, gives security that the original was known by him to be authentic. But there are other indeed abundant MSS. extant, confirmatory of its entries all round. More of these immediately. I have placed the name of Sir John Glanville on the title-page, because the Manuscript vi itself presents him to us as Secretary of the "Voyage," and as such the only one who could have been present at the "Councils of War" and other consultations and meetings on board the Lord General and Admiral's ship the "Ann Royall" to make such records. (See pages 37, 62, 66, 122.) It will be observed that throughout, after having recorded himself as Secretary, he uses the first person, "I" did this and that, &c., &c. As will also emerge hereafter, part of Buckingham's "Instructions" to Wimbledon was that he (by his Secretary) should keep a "daily Journal" of all occurrences, and inform him thereof regularly. So that our MS. was the discharge of a duty laid upon the Secretary.

By a lucky accident a document (erroneously described as a "letter" in the "Glanville Records") (unpublished) drawn up by Sir John Glanville (then unknighted) seeking to be released from the appointment of "Secretary" on this "Voyage," is preserved in H.M. Public Record Office. It naturally claims a place here, as follows:

Mr. Glanville's reasons against his being employed for a Secretary at War:—

He is a mere lawyer, unqualified for the employment of a Secretary: his handwriting is so bad that hardly any but his own clerk can read it, who should not be acquainted with all things that may occur in such a service [grb: that is, the things a Secretary might have to record may be too sensitive to be seen by a scribe.].

vii He has a wife and six children, and his certain means without [grb: income outside] his practise is not sufficient to maintain them.

He sits at £60 rent per annum for a house in Chancery Lane, not worth him in effect anything but for the commodiousness of his practice: however he is to hold it at that rate for 16 or 17 years yet to come.

His wife and children are dispersed into four general [grb: several] counties, with several friends in Hertfordshire, Bedfordshire, Gloucestershire and Devonshire, during his sickness, and he cannot in his straight and upon so short warning, settle his affairs for such a journey.

His goods and evidences [grb: records] and the evidences of divers of his clients with many breviats [grb: briefs] and notes of instruction concerning their cases, are in his study at Lincoln's-Inn and house in Chancery Lane, which he cannot well dispose nor distribute in a short time, nor can now safely repair to the places where they are.

He is witness in recorderships and engaged in divers causes of importance, which affairs and businesses if he desert, much prejudice may thereby grow to very many.

His mother, an aged lady, who relies much upon his counsel and resort [grb: companionship], will become hereby much weakened and disconsolate.

His practise is now as good as most men in the kingdom of his time, he having followed the study of law these 22 years and the practise of the law these 15 years, with viii as much constancy and painfulness [grb: attention] as any man. And if he should now be put into another course though but for a while, it must needs deprive him of the fruits of all his labors, for his clients being by his absence once settled upon others, he shall never be able to recontinue them [grb: get them back] again.

His coming to Plymouth at this time was only to attend the service of his Recordership there, to assist the Mayor and his brethren to entertain his Majesty; which service he had performed accordingly. September 18th, 1625."

The handwriting is villainously bad; but it is believed above is an accurate reproduction of the original, save in extension of contractions.


This somewhat noticeable paper needs no commentary. It is to be feared that there were many besides the Secretary unwilling embarkers on the "Voyage." Certes the Calendar of State Papers (as onward) reveals how compulsory and deplorable was the impressing [grb: forced enlistment] of the seamen and soldiers alike, for the fleet.

I have stated that there are other MSS. confirmatory of Glanville's Journal. The more important may be mentioned, viz.:—

The former is slight, and consists of jottings of dates, etc. rather than of such entries as the title "Journal" suggests. The letter is full and careful, but adds comparatively little to Glanville's Journal, albeit confirmatory of it invariably.

Subsidiary to these, are numerous letters from Commanders in the "Voyage," including Sir Edward Cecyl, Viscount Wimbledon (Lord High Admiral), Sir William St. Leger, Sir Thomas Love, Sir Michael Geare, Sir George Blundell, the Lord Cromwell, &c., &c., &c. St. Leger, and Love, and Geare are passionately strong against the "Lord High Admiral," e.g. Sir William St. Leger writes to Buckingham—"Indisposition kept him from the Council of War in which it was resolved to return, but both by word and writing he protested against it.… He begs leave to kiss his Grace's hand, although he should be ashamed to look up to either his sovereign or the duke. All the officers x will fly with open mouth upon the Lord Marshal, neither can nor will he excuse him; yet he knows that they that will blame him most are not blameless." (Ibid. Dec. 18th, 1625, p. 180.) Next day (Dec. 19th) he repeats his charge against some of the Council of War—"some of them had no desire they should do anything because they would value their counsel given before. The Marshal had not such abilities as could be wished in a general. Speaks out of anguish to see so brave and chargeable a business so foully mis-carried." (Ibid. p. 181.)

Earlier (October 29), from the Bay of Cadiz, he had written home to Buckingham with extreme bitterness, of the capitulation of Puntal:—"On the 24th a rumour of an attack, the men marched towards the bridge, where, being faint and without provisions, the Marshall gave them some wine, under the influence of which they became unmanageable. On survey of the town, it appeared that it could only be taken by siege, for which they were unprovided. They embarked the men again to their great dishonour. He (St. Leger) proposed to march to Sanlúcar, but it was not hearkened unto. The action was too great for their abilities. He is so much ashamed, that he wishes he may never live to see his sovereign, which he thinks he will not do, for his heart is broken." (Ibid. p. 136.) Before setting out he had urged Conway (September 8, 1625) that Lord Essex xi should be in supreme command, "which would give new lustre to the action." (Ibid. p. 101.) Both Geare and Essex are condemned by Wimbledon in his published "Journal," (p. 9) of which anon. Again: Sir Michael Geare gives account of the Expedition to Cadiz, with the management of which he was extremely dissatisfied—"the Earl of Essex was subordinated—the troops were unceremoniously withdrawn—the West India Fleet had peacefully gone home whilst they were looking for it—great mortality and sickness in the ships—their meat not half the king's allowance, and stank as no dog in Paris garden would eat it." (Ibid. Dec. 9, 1625, p. 174.)

One can so far sympathise with these sea-lions chafing and eating their own hearts over the inaction and "miscarriage" of the Fleet; but it were scarcely credible without the undoubted proof in these and kindred letters, that the "Lord High Admiral" was thus stabbed behind his back by his own subordinate officers, and that these attacks and complaints were received and "laid up" as State Papers by Buckingham. There is no trace of these painful letters having been in any way made known to the "Lord High Admiral," albeit in one of several from him to Buckingham he blames Sir William St. Leger, (March 7, 1626: Ibid. p. 273). There is quite a body of correspondence carefully recorded in the Calendar of 1625, (as before) and hardly a single letter fails to shed side-light on the details of our xii Journal. Sometimes quite unexpected confirmation is obtained. Thus Wimbledon wrote to Coke on the tedious delays in sailing from Plymouth, fearing that he might misinterpret them. Letters from Coke show that he did so misinterpret matters, and wrote sharply. (Cf. pp. 116-119). The "Lord High Admiral's" own letters to Coke, and Buckingham, and others are matterful. (See Calendar, pp. 76, 80, 98, 100, 116 (2), 119 (2), 120, 145, 146, 262 (2), 283, 290, 340 (2), 457 et passim}.

I have been strongly tempted to fetch illustrative documents as thus pointed out by the Calendar; but I had to abandon the idea on quickly discovering that fresh materials exist for a companion volume with the present, of at least the same extent. Moreover an examination of the MSS. of this invaluable Calendar resulted in superseding communications kindly addressed to me by (a) the Mayor of Plymouth (John Shelly, Esq.) and R. N. Worth, Esq. F.R.G.S.—Extracts and Notes from the Chamberlain's Books of the Corporation of Plymouth; (b) Richard W. Banks, Esq. Ridgebourne, Kingtown—A contemporary list of "the Admiralty Squadron"" of the Voyage and "prizes" taken, &c. &c. The former are much more full and authoritative and humiliating, in the Petitions and Correspondence from Plymouth as preserved in H.M. Public Record Office (Calendar s.v. Plymouth frequenter), whilst the latter agrees with the lists of our Journal and other lists xiii recorded in the Calendar. Hence I am constrained not to use these communications; yet none the less do I thank the Senders.

Though our Journal has remained hitherto unprinted, a considerable proportion of its occurrences appear in a nearly contemporary tractate, prepared and published by no less than the "Lord High Admiral" him self. This Journal appears to have fallen out of sight and to be unknown to the Historians and all. The title-page is as follows:—





the Action which by his Maiesties Commandement, Edward Lord Cecil, Baron of
Putney, and Viscount of Wimbledon, Admiral, and
Lieutenant-General of his Maiesties Forces
did vndertake vpon the Coast of
Spaine, 1625.

Veritas premitur, sed non opprimitur.
Printed in the yeere 1627.

A copy is preserved in the British Museum. It is a thin small quarto of two sheets. In every case it accords with the entries of Glanville's Journal. It thus commences:— xiv

"The 8th of October, being Saturday, we set sail about three o'clock in the afternoon with a wind at north north-east.

On Sunday the 9th, about six o'clock in the morning, we fell in with my Lord of Essex, my Vice-Admiral, and those ships that were put into Falmouth with him, and about nine in the same morning, we discovered seven sail that were Dutch ships laden with salt; the wind continued fair enough for us all that day, to lay our course out till 12 at night. This day instructions were sent to all the Admirals, and to other officers, and to divers other ships.

The 10th, being Monday, we were becalmed.

On Tuesday the 11th, in the morning, I called a council for the settling of instructions for a sea-fight, as by the 7th and 10th articles contained in them may plainly appear, viz.:—

7 Art. If the enemy approach here in such sort as the Admiral of the Dutch and his Squadron, and the Vice-Admiral of the fleet and his Squadron may have opportunity to begin the fight, it shall be lawful for them so to do until I come, using the forms, method, and care foresaid.

10 Art. If any ship or ships of the enemy do break out or fly, the Admiral of any Squadron that shall happen to be in the next and most convenient place for that purpose, shall send out a competent [sufficient] number xv of the fittest [most suitable] ships of his squadron to chase, assault and take such ship or ships breaking out, but no ship shall undertake such a chase without the command of the Admiral, or at least the Admiral of his Squadron.

Likewise it was ordered that 5 men should be put to a mess with the allowance formerly given for 4, and warrants directed to all the fleet to that end. (pp. 1-2.)

Here also are specific incidents that are mentioned by Granville:—

"The Long Robert of Ipswich was drowned with 138 land men, 37 sea men: the land captains lost in the wreck were Fisher and Hackett, a Scotch captain, and Gurling, the captain of the ship" (p. 2). "Besides the general losses there was no ship in his own particular that did not suffer more or less in the storm, by leaks, loss of masts, and by casualties and the like. (Ib.)"

"In this tempest we had experience of the Anne Royal herself; her masts grew loose, her main-mast was in danger of rolling over-board, two of her great pieces of 5000 weight apiece broke loose in the gunners' room; the danger was partly by the negligence of the officers that did not see carefully to the fitting of these things while we lay in harbor; she could not hull at all." (p. 2.)

The Journal has a good deal of plain-speaking in it, e.g. on the advice of the Council not to enter Sanlúcar, he says:— xvi

"Then I demanded both of the sea captains and masters why they could not speak of these difficulties before his Majesty (when at Plymouth) . Their answer was: It is now in the depth of winter and stormy, and that they did tell his Majesty that it was a barred haven and dangerous to all men, especially to those that had not often passed it, and that, being upon the place, they could consider more particularly upon the difficulties then discourse of it when they were far off. So that I could say no more to them, being I was no great seaman, and that I was strictly tied to their advice that did profess the sea." (p. 6.)

There are other tid-bits well worthy of the attention of the Historian of the period. The innocent admission of the last quotation, "being I was no great seaman," furnishes a key to the whole un-success of the "Voyage." The impression left upon myself by the Journal is that the Lord High Admiral was singularly unqualified for high command anywhere, and emphatically at sea. He seems to shudder at assuming authority or coming to a decision. He lacked the grand daring of Blake during the Commonwealth, and of the foremost of all seamen, Nelson. It is grotesquely sad, sadly grotesque, to come upon so many evidences of incapacity to determine for himself on a given course of action. He hangs out the flag for a Council of War on now the merest trivialities, and now on things xvii that it surely lay with himself to devise what was to be done, and then inexorably to see that he was obeyed. His heart was in the right place; he was patriotic and brave; he did not spare himself toil or personal exertion. But all was neutralised by his miserable dependence on others' judgment and his fidgetty and fussy ways. He reminds one of a later Spanish Admiral (1718) Castañeta who whilst like our own Widdrington, he fought "on his stumps" when his legs were successively shot off, was as singularly irresolute in council as he was bold in action by the verdict of so calm and judicial a historian as Earl Stanhope.

It is a sorrow to me to need thus to pronounce adversely, even strenuously condemnatory, on the head of the Voyage; but it were to be false to the data furnished by the Journal, to shrink from an unmistakable pronouncement. I indulge the pleasures of hope, that when the whole story of the life and service of Sir Edward Cecil, Viscount Wimbledon, is given to the world, that other Facts and achievements will redeem the ignominousness of this Voyage; and it is satisfactory to know that one in every way competent is now engaged on an ample Biography from hitherto unutilized sources, viz. Charles Dalton, ESQ., F.R.S., West Cromwell Road, London. Meantime I am indebted to him for the following summary little memoir of his hero:— xviii

Hon. Edward Cecil, 3rd son of Thomas Cecil 1st Earl of Exeter. Born 29th February, 1571/2. Joined the English forces in Holland under Sir Francis Vere in 1598. Served at the defence of Bommel in 1599, and was made captain of an English foot company in the spring of that year. Served at the siege of Fort St. André in the spring of 1600. Appointed captain of a troop of horse in May 1600. Commanded his troop at the decisive battle Nieuport in Flanders 2nd July 1600, and was honourably mentioned in Sir John Ogle's account of that battle. The Spaniards laying siege to Ostend in the summer of 1601, Captain Cecil volunteered for service there, and was sent from England to the relief of that town, in command of 1000 men raised in London. On his return to England was knighted by Queen Elizabeth in September, 1601. Elected Member of Parliament for Aldborough in October. The following spring Captain Cecil returned to the Low Countries, and was made Colonel of the English horse by Prince Maurice. Accompanied the expedition of that year into Brabant, and afterwards served at the siege of Grave. On conclusion of the siege was sent with a cavalry force to Emden. Served at the siege of Sluys in 1604, and was made colonel of an English regiment in 1605. Took part in the strategic operations of the States' army in 1606 near Wesell. Appointed to the command of the 4000 English sent to besiege Juliers in 1610, with rank of general. Repeatedly mentioned for "gallantry and energy" in the English Ambassador's letters and dispatches from the camp before Juliers. Accompanied Princess Elizabeth (Electress Palatine) to Germany in 1613 as treasurer. Sent by James I. on a special mission to Heidelberg in 1614. Served throughout the "phantom campaign" of that year under Prince Maurice. Was present in the chief military operations in the Low Countries, on the breaking out of the war with Spain, in the years 1620-1625. Was appointed General and Commander-in-Chief of the sea and xix land forces sent to Cadiz in the autumn of 1625. Was created Baron Cecil of Putney, and Viscount Wimbledon on 9th November, 1625.

Lord Wimbledon was a member of the Council of War temp. James I. and Charles I., and was author of several military tracts. He served with his regiment at the siege of Groll in 1627, and at the siege of Bois-le-duc in 1629. On 3rd July, 1630, Viscount Wimbledon was appointed Captain and Governor of Portsmouth for life.

Lord Wimbledon was thrice married, First to Theodosia Noel, daughter of Sir Andrew Noel, Knight, by whom, who died in 1616, he had four daughters, who survived him. He married secondly, Diana Drury, sister and co-heir of Sir Robert Drury, of Hawsted, Suffolk, by whom he had an only child, Anne Cecil, who died an infant in 1618. His third wife was Sophia Zouch, daughter of Sir Edward Zouch of Woking, Surrey, by whom he had a son, Algernon, who died an infant.

Lord Wimbledon died at his house at Wimbledon 16th November, 1638, and was buried in St. Mary's Church, Wimbledon.

I have now to gather up here certain minor things promised in my notes:

  1. "Buckingham" (p. 2) It were out of place to annotate so many-sided a name as this; but with relation to his pseudo-relation to "the Fleet," and his ordering of the arrangements, the following entry from Walter Yonge's Diary, 1604-1628 (Camden Society, 1848), with its accompanying "note," claims quotation:

    "15th Septr., 1625. At the end of Septr. our fleet went to sea, in which went General Colonel Cicel xx Viscount Wimelton (Wimbledon), the Earl of Essex, Denby, Mr. Glanvill. secretary of the Army, and others" (p. 88).

    On this the Camden editor (George Roberts, Esq.), writes:

    "Thus the command of the greatest joint-naval power that had ever spread sail upon salt water—the Dutch contributing 16 sail and the English 80 sail—was given to a very unsuccessful general, a landsman, whom the sailors, vexed at his appointment, viewed with contempt." (Ibid).

  2. "Hollanders Fleet" (p. 2). The Calendar (as before), and Viscount Wimbledon's "Journal," (as before), give important data on the part filled by the Hollanders. It is no mere 'imagination'—is it—that the neglect and exacerbations of the Dutch fleet during this Voyage were fatally recalled and terribly avenged by Holland's sea-kings a generation later? It amazes and abases me to find so many evidences of the then shameless unreadiness and weakness of England at sea. That so puny a nation as Holland should so have bearded England is scarcely less humiliating than that Turkey even, contemporaneously preyed on her shipping on her own coasts.

  3. "St. Mary Port" (p. 35d). Instead of giving here the intended quotation on this one point from Dr. S. R. Gardiner's History (as cited in Notes), xxi I venture to commend the whole story of this Voyage, as told by him, to the reader's attention. Any one interested in this Journal will find his reward in consulting Dr. Gardiner's admirably impartial, if not somewhat indulgent, narrative. The Journal certainly supplies new details of indecision and waste, unreadiness and blundering, for the historian.

  4. I may add that the Calendar (as before) guides us to many important documents on the preparations and non-preparations for the Fleet; on the mismanagement and corruption on the part of those who supplied the Fleet; on the pressure on the people of Plymouth and all around, as well at the first arrival and sailing as on the return of the Fleet; and such revelation of wretchedness and exhaustion of seamen and soldiers and the un-seaworthiness of the ships, and mad neglect of the most ordinary provisions for safety of the Fleet and cognate matters, as astound. Some interesting glimpses of the visit of Charles I. to Plymouth, and of the condition of the Fleet are to be read in the following paper:—

    "The First Visit of Charles I. to Devon, 1625. By Paul Q. Karkeek: reprinted from the Transactions of the Devonshire Association for the Advancement of Science, Literature, and Art, 1878" (pp. 16). There are valuable lists of the contingents of men furnished to the Fleet by the several counties, impressed soldiers xxii and others. The dry details of this paper live and breathe in Henry IV. (act iv. sc. 2) and 2nd part of Henry IV. (ct iii. sc. 2). Shakespeare had seen the horror and the evil issues of impressment. Even Sir John Falstaff's ragged regiment was out-matched by the land-sea army of the Voyage of 1625. Altogether the marvel is that ever such a fleet returned at all. The scandalum is that with counsels so divided and distracted, flaccid and fluctuating, aimless and headless, the good name of England was sullied and lowered. How different the account of Cadiz and the Plate Fleet and our enemy altogether, if a Raleigh, a Drake, or a Blake-like, or Nelson-like man had commanded our fleet! As it was, there was movement without definite purpose, activity without advance, duty enjoined and owned without performance, councils of war without adequate result, and emphatically sheer and wanton waste of preparations and opportunities. Our Journal sheds lurid light on a page of national shame that even at this late day calls to be accentuated. A document (also preserved in H.M. Public Record Office) puts us in possession of the Instructions of the Government—Buckingham—and the King to the Lord High Admiral, and is of the last interest. It reveals that the Instructions sent out by Wimbledon (as recorded in the Journal) followed almost literatim those sent him by the King and Buckingham. This xxiii being the case, it scarcely seems needful to reproduce either in extenso. But a few illustrative quotations may be given for comparison with the Journal (as above), e. g.:—

    "First and above all things you shall provide that God be duly served twice a day by every ship's company, according to the usual prayers and Liturgy of the Church of England." Again—"You shall take care to have all your companies live orderly and peaceably; and to cause every Captain, Master, and other officer faithfully to perform the duty of his place. And if any seaman or soldier shall raise tumult or conspiracy, or commit murder, quarrel, fight, or draw weapon to that end, or be a swearer, blasphemer, drunkard, pilferer, or sleep at his watch or set, or shall not keep his cabin cleanly: or be discontented with the proportion of victuals assigned unto him, or shall spoil or waste them, or any other necessary provisions for the ship, or that shall not keep clean his arms, or shall go ashore without leave, or shall be found guilty of any other crime or offence, you shall use due severity in the punishment and reformation thereof, according to the known orders and customs of the sea." Once more:—"You shall require every Captain, Master, and others to perform unto you due respect and obedience: not taking the wind of you at any time, if they be not forced to do it, but keeping company unto you as much as may be, xxiv and speaking with you every morning to know your pleasure, if the wind do permit, and coming aboard you as often as you shall put out your flag of council," &c. Further:—"And because all particulars for sea and land service can not be limited with special instructions without leaving many things to the wisdom, prudence, and good managing of the commanders in all such occurrences and generally in all things which are not or shall not be expressly directed, you are to use your own best judgment and discretion, following the advice of such a Council as is assigned unto you. That having your own experience and resolution fortified by the consent of at least the greater part of the said Counselors you may give the better account of your actions, so as the success may be the more hopeful for the repressing of the ambition of that overgrowing power which has long threatened and disturbed all Christendom, and of the attaining and setting of such a happy peace as both his Majesty and his late father of renowned memory, has long and carefully sought after, and as may tend to the honour of God, the preservation of true religion, the honour of his Majesty, and the safety of his kingdom." Finally—as to be noted in relation to our Journal—"You shall cause a journal to be kept, and shall advertise me from time to time of all your proceedings and of all things you think fit in your wisdom for me to know or make known to his Majesty. And so to God's blessing xxv I commend your safety and good success. From the Court at Holbury, 26th August, 1625." A single sentence from the King's Instructions not incorporated in Buckingham's, deserves preservation. "This being a war for our defence and to constrain our adversaries to reason and restitution, we require you by all means to forbear the shedding of the blood of any that attempt you not, or resist you not unto arms, as women, children and aged men, and those that render themselves to our mercy and yours."

I would now briefly give the main facts in the life of the writer of this Journal Sir John Glanville, gratefully drawing the most of my facts from the following important (privately printed) book:

"Records of the Anglo-Norman House of Glanville from A.D. 1050 to 1880." By William Urmston S. Glanville-Richards, Esq., 1882 (quarto, pp. xx. 229).

John Glanville was a younger son of Judge Glanville, and brother to Sir Francis Glanville. He was born at Kilworthy, near Tavistock, about 1589. By his father's will he inherited Kilworthy; but with fine unselfishness he gave up the estate to his elder brother. At an early age he was entered as a student at Lincoln's Inn—thus sustaining the family tradition of numerous lawyers. The prestige given him by his father and ancestry, started him well. He rose rapidly in his profession, and was known to have a large practice as a xxvi councillor at law. In the year 1614 he was elected Recorder of Plymouth, and M.P., in association with Thomas Sherwell for the same town. He was successively re-elected to the Parliaments of 1620, 1623, 1625, 1626, and 1628. On February 6th, 1620, he spoke memorably in the House of Commons on the decrease of money. His bearing and tone were like Eliot's and Pym's, though soothe to say onward, he sank the patriot in the courtier, and sustained pseudo-prerogative rather than the nation's rights. The tide of high and independent spirit sorrowfully ebbed and left breadths of slime or barren sand, as compared with what it was when Mr. Recorder Glanville and Sir Henry Martin were entrusted with the Petition of Right to secure its passage through the House of Lords, and when the former delivered his supreme speech on The Liberty of the Subject in the Painted Chamber at Westminster, on 23rd May 1628. The "Records" reproduces this great speech in full (pp. 107-116).

It was prior to this, viz., in October 1625, and as shown by his "Reasons" (pages vi.-viii.) in the face of his own remonstrances, he was appointed Secretary-at-War of the Voyage to Cadiz.

In 1630 he was chosen Lent Reader of his House, and on the 20th May of the same year advanced to the rank of Sergeant-at-Law. In 1635 Glanville and Mr. Rolles were "ordered by the Lords sitting in the Star xxvii Chamber to end the difference (if they were able) between Lord Poulett and the Rev. Richard Gove" the latter name still quick from a golden little Puritan book of his.

He further held the office of Notary and Prothonotary to the Court of Chancery with the fee of £100 per annum (==£500 to-day) payable out of the Hamper in trust for "Lady Thomasine Carew and John Houston, his Majesty's servant, in reversion with John Glanville."

In the year 1639 he was appointed Judge in a critical case wherein Laud was profoundly interested.

In the historical Parliament of 1640 he was chosen as Speaker of the House of Commons. He was coy and humble in pleading the "disadvantage to the House" of such an appointment; but saying, "he would ne'er consent—consented."

His Speech addressed to the King on the confirmation of the choice of the House was relatively short but most suggestive, if not ominous. It remains among the great Speeches given in Parliament. One antique flavoured bit will show the sentiment of it in that perilous time.

"Were this nation never so valiant and wealthy, if unity be not among us; what good will riches do us or your Majesty but enrich the conquerors? He that commands all hearts by love, he only commands assuredly; greatness without goodness can at least but command xxviii bodies. It shall therefore be my hearty prayer, that such a knot of love may be knit between the head and the members, that, like Gordian's, it never be loosed; that all Jesuited foreign states, who look asquint upon our Hierusalem, may see themselves defeated of all the subtle plots and combinations, of all their wicked hopes and expectations to render us, if their mischief might take effect, a people inconsiderable at home and contemptible abroad. Religion has taught us "si deus nobiscum quis contra nos?" [if God is with us, who is against us?] and experience I trust will teach us "si sumus insuperabiles" [if we are unconquerable]. It was found, and I hope it will ever be the term of the House of Commons, that the king and the people's good cannot be severed, and cursed be every one who goes about to destroy them."

It is pitiable that a man originally so high-hearted and strong succumbed to "the divinity" that "doth hedge a king," and forgot the kingdom in the king, the nation for the one.

In 1641 he was knighted. Through the debates on the Subsidies that took the place of alleged sovereign right, and ship-money, he bore himself pliantly not stoutly impartial. He is a poor thing, compared with John Hampden in the Parliament of 1641. The power and pathos of his speeches were as great and influential as ever; but the integrity of principle was gone from them. It was too evident he xxix sought to please, not merely advise, the King. In Royalist phrase, he became a "sufferer." It was inevitable. The House of Commons could not suffer itself to be concussed or over-ruled. The Dissolution of the Parliament opened a tragedy that was consummated at Whitehall window.

In 1645 Glanville was held for a desperate malignant. He was in prison from 1645 (at least) to 1648. How different this from a former imprisonment in 1636, for having spoken too freely of the prerogative! In 1648 he compounded for his delinquency.

He represented the University of Oxford during the Commonwealth. It raises a smile to find the Historian of the family at this time of day thus writing: "The University of Oxford, ever honourable and consistent, even under the most dangerous circumstances and times, was bold enough to return Sir John Glanville as her burgess in one of the Parliaments held in the days of the usurper." "Usurper," indeed! A more egregious anachronism is inconceivable. It is to traduce the nation's deliberate choice and to slander England's greatest Ruler. He lived on with distinction; but never recovered his early renown as a free-spoken, daring man, single-hearted for his country.

About 1615 he had married Winifred, daughter of William Bouchier of Baunley, co. Gloucester, esquire, of good blood. By his wife he had issue four sons xxx and three daughters. His best memorial is to be found in his speeches as preserved in the Parliamentary Debates, and Rushworth's Collections. His legal-political writings have been pronounced to be still valuable. One minor incident in his life is that he rescued the afterwards venerable and illustrious Sir Matthew Hale, later Chief Justice of England, from a "fast and idle life," under singular circumstances. He died at Broad Hinton Manor, on 2nd October, 1661. In 1673, his widow erected a 'stately' monument in the parish church, which "remaineth unto this day." In the "Records" his portrait is effectively given—a large, bluff, "King Hal" looking man—large-featured every way, nose and eyes and mouth—but not forehead—most noticeable. (Records, pp. 106-125: Woolrych's Lives of Serjeants, s.v., &c., &c).

It only remains that I mention four things: (a) That the MS. of this Journal is reproduced in absolute integrity, save that contractions are extended and the modern v substituted for u and j for i, and the like. (b)That the Notes have been intentionally made as brief as might be; my only regret being that in spite of willing and eager help, it has not been found possible to recover information on the "Captains" and other brave men whose names appear in the lists. (c) That the MS. is a small quarto in vellum. The handwriting is a xxxi most difficult one to decipher, (d) That I owe my best thanks to Samuel R. Gardiner, Esq., LL.D.; Charles Dalton, Esq.; John Shelly, Esq.; R. A. Worth, Esq.; Dr. Brinsley Nicholson; Richard W. Banks, Esq.; and the Records of the Glanvilles.


  St. George's Vestry,
    Blackburn, Lancashire,
      August 8th, 1883.



Since the Introduction was printed off, by the kindness of Dr. S. R. Gardiner, I have been favoured with two letters (hitherto unpublished) by Sir Edward Cecil. These, his memory is entitled to have printed, and accordingly I right gladly add them here. They have been copied, with the kind permission of Earl Cowper, from the collection of Sir John Coke, Secretary to Charles I., now in his possession at Melbourne Hall:—



Right Honorable, [Nov. 8, 1625].

I have written my particular journal to his Excellency my Lord Duke which I think will be opened before his return; if he be out of England, as he did determine at my departure: so that I shall not need to be so particular as otherwise I would.

All I can say is, that our journey has not deceived me; being a winter journey, finding an enemy so long prepared for us, having no harbor to befriend us; wanting our long boats to land our men and hardly a ship of the whole fleet clean enough for the chase of a prize, yet to our powers with these inconveniences we have not been wanting, notwithstanding there is such a crying out of leaks and dangers of the King's ships; which are old and unfit indeed for these seas, especially in winter. And my ship has as much xxxiv cause to complain as any; both for her leaks; the danger of losing her mainmast; and her ill condition refusing by any means to hull in the storm; when she took in so much water, as all the mariners were forced to work in water up to the knees.

Our prizes are yet but three, laden for the port of Calais (as we judge) with Dunkirk goods. If their bills of lading be well examined; there will be money (in some measure) found, as well as merchandise. The Commissary-General, by my order, did give forth some butts of sack to the Colonels, by way of provision for beverage, whereof their is a just account kept; and now I am speaking of Captain Mason, this commissary, I must needs recommend him to your Honor, for an honest, sufficient, careful officer, as any could have been employed in the place. This sack I granted to the delivery of, yet nothing near the proportion demanded. [This shows that the beverage mentioned at p. 52 must have been a compound of wine, and not weak cider.] My Lord of Essex, the Vice-Admiral, had a barrel of tobacco, and my Lord of Denbigh another, which I could not deny them. And though I might have made myself an allowance in some measure, yet I have taken nothing, but a few lemons and oranges that would have been spoiled in the passage. The Dutch Admiral looks for a fifth of the Prizes, according to the contract.

I have had so much ado to keep the captains that did chase the prizes from breaking bulk, that I know not how to prevent it; first in regard they are for the most part taken so far off my ship as I cannot send to them in any time; secondly by reason of the means and commodities they have for the secret carriage of the abuse, by putting their own men aboard the prizes; and now that I take a more strict order for the prevention, they grow very lazy, and will hardly look out for a sail. Captain Raymond (now dead) had by this deceit gotten for his private use four or five barrels of cochineal, which I have, since his death, caused to be brought xxxv into my own ship, where it remains upon a safe account; considering there had been no trusting it loose, aboard the prize again. This kind of stealing is a thing of such custom at sea, that without more wages and a more particular oath of true service, I cannot see how it will be remedied.

I have thought fit, with the advise of the Council, to send these prizes, with some of our worst colliers, and such foot as we can best spare, and the horse-boats, because we find there can but little be done by land, and not much by sea (considering our ships prove so faulty already), only (if we can) to keep the Plate Fleet from arriving this part of the winter, for the performing of which service (our ships daily complaining, and our men decaying), I can find it to no purpose that my Lord Duke should send a relief of victual, for, having no harbor, we know not where we shall be found. If his Excellency intend us a relief, it may please him to let it consist rather of another fleet of 40 or 50 ships, strong and clean, or to give order that a number of this fleet may be returned home and made ready to come out again (while the rest stay here), to continue our attendance for the Plate Fleet, which will be the greatest hindrance to the King of Spain's proceedings that can be propounded, I think; in which service we that are now at sea will do our best, but by all our computations we are not provided to hold out here longer then Christmas, and I shall be sorry to see so good a beginning to this purpose lost for want of a supply, seeing that so long as his Majesty shall have a good fleet here at sea, we may with good reason hope that England and Ireland will by this means be well defended and Spain blocked up. And to this end the States will not be wanting, because they know it is the true way, and no other; since we have begun with the King of Spain to drive him to the defence of himself, only that hitherto has offended [i.e., who has hitherto only attacked] both us and our friends. xxxvi

I have appointed officers for the command of the men and the care of the victual; the men being to remain on shipboard till his Majesty's pleasure be known; and all this governed to the advantage of his Majesty's service. And I could wish that if his Majesty resolve to continue a war, these land men may be bestowed in some garrisons to be exercised to their muskets, for always to raise new men will be a a charge cast away to our dishonour; but whether it will be better to have them kept in their countries where possibly they may live with less charge to his Majesty, I leave to the higher powers. Besides the sick men, I have sent others for the better guard of the ships we took (which we have now found lawful prize) , and some ships to convoy them, which I refer to his Majesty's pleasure, whether they shall be returned to us or not.

There came an Algiers man into our Fleet with two prizes, one of sugars, and an Englishman laden with Spanish goods, some iron, and knee timber for shipping; we detained neither of them. But he has left the Englishman with us, who is now our prize, and sent with the rest.

I am to make an humble suit to your Honor, that in regard his Majesty was pleased by my Lord Duke's means to give me the choice of what place I desired my viscountship, which (at first) I did choose of Wimbledon, that now, upon better consideration I may have it to be Lord Cecil, Viscount Latimer, because it was the ancient title of my grandfather by my mother's side, and now extinguished. This favor, if you can procure me, you shall for ever bind me to be your servant. And so returning to my sea-business, I remain,

Your Honor's humble servant,

From aboard the Anne Royal,
the 8th of Nov. 1625.

[The title of Viscount Wimbledon, promised to him before he sailed, was not actually conferred till the following year.] xxxvii



Right Honorable [Feb. 27, 1625/6.]


As God has not ordained winter for fruit, nor great profit, but rather for calamities, miseries, and misfortunes, so we have found it true in this journey; having tasted and tried the extremities of all, neither had we any reason to expect much the contrary (as I told you before my departure) and wrote the same to his Majesty from shipboard, which I deferred to do before, to avoid the opinion that I should refuse any danger, or inconvenience whatsoever; when I did see his Majesty and my Lord Duke so resolved, howsoever, having learned that obedience in Italian which saith Che fa, il Principe and bin fatto. [The Secretary who wrote this from dictation does not seem to have been an Italian scholar.]

All our happiness being that it has pleased God miraculously to preserve most of his Majesty's ships, and some of us, who have some more experience then we had, to do his Majesty service, which is some kind of recompense for the great charge he has been at in this journey, since his Majesty means to continue a war. For more ignorant captains and officers can hardly be found, and men more careless of his Majesty's honor and profit, as if they were rather enemies then servants, studying their own ease and commodity more then anything else, which had they not done there might have been much more done; and officers are so set upon cosenage and thievery that they rather combine with the mariners then correct them, their own faults are so great and the cause of all.

When I came first on board, it seemed very strange to me to see the mariners so given to stealing; but when I found officers to favor such thieves, I likewise found that officers could not well cosen his Majesty and share fees, but by having thieves at xxxviii their command, to convey such fees away, whereby themselves might not be taken in the manner, and good and sufficient men will not so soon do these base offices; therefore they get boys, and of the worst sort, to serve their turns, with whom the officers do share likewise with them in wages when they are boys, and insufficient men, and his Majesty by this means is ill served, and double cosened: for he is not only cosened in the officers but by the mariners themselves likewise; for they will not only steal for one other and live honestly but spend so much time and of their minds that they find but litle leisure to look after his Majesty's profit in preserving such utensils about the ship, that cost his Majesty much in providing, and would save not a litle if it were better husbanded. But his Majesty's ill fortune is (if the custom be not broken) that his profit and theirs are contrary things, for his Majesty's loss is their fees, which they get not by labor but by negligence, and I fear this will hardly be remedied, unless his Majesty have better and more understanding Captains. For I find that the ignorance of the Captain makes him be led by these officers for want of knowledge to oversee them, for all his knowledge reaches not much further then to trust to them. If the States were no better served they were never able to endure a war against so powerful a king as they do; for it is not only money that maintains their war but care and industry, and especially good husbandry of their money, wherein they do excel, and I will call no other witness to prove this argument but the Commissioners that have saved his Majesty so much by that means; for had his Majesty all the money in the world (not being well looked unto, and well laid out) it would not serve the turn; for cosenage, negligence, and ignorance are more chargeable to his Majesty than his pay, which makes the expense of war seem more ugly then it is, there being nothing in the world which requires more good husbandry then war; wherein I have found by experience in this journey much want, both that there have been but few that have xxxix any mind to do his Majesty's service, and if there have been any they find so much opposition that the most are against them, which Sir Thomas Love and I have found too common in this journey, whom if I should not commend for his care, industry, and sufficiency for his Majesty's profit and honour I should do his Majesty and my conscience much wrong; besides he has played the Captain, Master, and all other officers in the ship wherein I have been, where there has been so much need (as in any ship of the fleet whatsoever) and by his experience and skill I have learned to do his Majesty the more service and to assist him, for we have had but few to help us.

I cannot answer for those ships that gained England so long before us, what account they have made of their victuals and munition, which may appear by those ships that have been with me at Kinsale. For when we came from thence, which was about the 23d of January for Bearhaven, they had 6, 7, 8, and 9 months' victuals for themselves. As for the King's ships, their allowance was out the 16th of January or thereabouts; and you shall find we have made shift to hold out longer, though for the ship wherein I am, there is no ship has had that occasion of expense and want, in regard of the company I did carry with me, besides the coming to council, and resort of all sorts; and yet there is wanting of her allowance 40 or 50 tuns of beer, that by those ships were appointed to carry for me (but as I may say better they carried away from us), for I did never see drop of it, which has put us to some want and misery. But I have learned that experience to have no men hereafter carry beer for me; and I fear this beer will not remain accountable, unless it be upon the false accounts of leakage.

We have been as careful for the rest of the fleet that have been beaten upon the coasts of Ireland (only one ship where Captain Butler put in about Ulster upon the North of Ireland) both for instructions how they should order their victuals, and in relieving them the best I could with money, especially the king's xl ships (for their sick men) in regard they were not victualled for so long a time as the rest were; and I have relieved likewise the land-sick men and officers until my Lord President Villiers of Munster received them into his charge by order from the Lords of the Council, and yet with no great charge to his Majesty, for that, as you know, we had no great store of money with us at the first, and had we not had that we had been most miserable, for there we would have no credit, nor any thing without money; and, although we have been long absent, yet we have ordered the victuals so that his Majesty is not at much more charge than if these ships that have been in Ireland had been at Plymouth, for his Majesty could not have made better profit then to have kept his sea men so much the longer, upon the same charge that was first made. And when the charge of this journey shall be compared (I mean for extraordinary charge) with other journeys that had no land men with them, and by proportion, we shall not be found ill husbands for his Majesty.

And, although this journey may seem chargeable to his Majesty, for that it has returned him no present profit, yet in regard it has been one of the first actions since our long peace, no doubt but it may turn to his Majesty's great profit for the breeding of officers and mariners, who have had great need, and shown themselves very ignorant and raw in this journey; for it is as husbandry is, that has cost much in plowing and sowing; but the fruit lies yet in the ground, and his Majesty may expect a good crop in the next journey if God will please to bless us. For, as there have been brave captains and officers heretofore of our nation (and now but very few), so it will no doubt, but with practice, be so again, for men are born (as you know) soldiers, but made and bred soldiers and mariners [Most likely Cecil intended to have written "are borne, as you know, but made and bred soldiers and mariners."]; for the occupation of war is the greatest occupation in the world, for it comprehends all other occupations in it. And xli if his Majesty has gotten but this commodity, that is, to have exercised his subjects in the discipline of war, after so long a peace; and to have given by this action a public notice to all his allies (that have long looked for it) that he has dared to break with the great king of Spain, that has so often broke his word with him, and to have offered him war so publicly at his own doors, both by sea and land; no doubt but it will return much to his honor and profit especially to the kingdom. For, if we had lived any longer (as I find by this journey), we should have proved in the end the most basest nation in the world, and not to have been able to have defended our own kingdom, which has been conquered four times already, not for want of men or money, but practice, which makes the king of Spain so great, so powerful, and so fortunate in all his proceedings. And, although I have spent most of my life in land service, this having been my first action by sea (though true discipline doth not differ in either), for order and command should be as well at sea as at land, and that which is most strict is best, wherein, for anything I see, we did pass the sea men, but this winter journey has learned us so much, in regard of our many inconveniences, that I doubt not but to propound something unto you that shall return much to his Majesty's service. For as the commissioners have done admirable things for his Majesty's profit, and for the advancing of the Navy at home, that never was done before in this kingdom, to my Lord Admiral's great honor, in whose time it was done, whereas everyone knows you to be the soul of the Commission, and sole doer, so I hope we that have been abroad have studied with all care we could, how to return some profit to his Majesty's service.

The chief thing wherein we hope to do his Majesty's service is to have his mariners better paid; his Majesty to have more honor and his service to receive more profit, and yet his Majesty's charge not to be increased, but rather lessened, and all parties more contented, xlii for as his Majesty's pay is now, all good sailors fly his service both in the kingdom and out of the kingdom, and serve rather his enemies then otherwise, which is both unprofitable and unhonorable in regard that God has given his Majesty no way so advantageous against his great enemies as by sea; and his sea men are not in that great quantities as his land men, especially they that are good. Therefore it were a great policy (in my poor judgment) to cherish them and breed them with as much care as may be. These which his Majesty has had in this action were the worst that ever were seen, and it is so confessed by the most experienced seamen that have been with us; for they are so out of order and command and so stupified, that punish them or beat them, they will scarce stir, doing their duties so unwillingly as if they had neither heart nor mind to do any service, their ordinary talk being that his Majesty presses them, and gives them so litle means that they are not able to live on it, and that it were better to be hanged or serve the King of Spain, or the Turk, then his Majesty, and I have been forced to punish some of these men soundly. Therefore, if those men may be better encouraged by a litle more pay they will do his Majesty more service, and his Majesty never the more charged, I think it will prove no ill service. For I must confess that the labor and misery which a good mariner sustains at sea, especially in a winter journey, is beyond all labor in the world, and needs most encouragement; wherefore of all husbandry in the world there cannot be less gotten then out of the wages of a mariner, which is best found by the merchants that gain by them, as it is most manifest in a travelling beast, for take away part of his provender and what is gotten if he tire; it being in this as in all things else as the Italian says, which is the wisest of all nations, though the most miserable of any, that che pieu [Chi più] a spende manco spende ; xliii and it is true that if his Majesty's pay were but as other men's are, to them that deserve it, he might have such as no Prince can have. For now his pay is as much to a boy or a child as it is to the most skillful and able mariner in the Navy, which must needs grieve the best, encourage the worst, and make his Majesty to have the more boys and children to serve him, as it is now at this instant.

If it would please my Lord Admiral to consider this point and many others by the inconveniences we have found by this journey, and call whom he will before him in your presence, who is full of understanding and industry, to disgest [perfect] some better orders for the government of his Majesty's fleet, and to have them printed; he may do his Majesty a great service, and himself a perpetual honour; for, as it is now, there is neither order or command, and it seems never has been before: for I see your Chatham men, both officers and mariners, the most disorderly and the most unprofitable to his Majesty.

I cannot but give you a taste how unfortunate we have been in this winter journey with the Anne Royal, for had I but had that experience I now have, I would have refused her for another ship. For I find that such great ships (and especially the old ones) that are so over loaded with ordinance, are not for an offensive war, but more fit for a defensive at home; for when she was rolling and working in the Spanish seas in foul weather (which we have not wanted) her own burden did her more harm than anything else, and had we not put much of the ordinance into the hold, the ship had sunk in the sea, she proved so leaky; so that we are all of opinion that ships of 800, or rather of 700, 600 and so smaller and smaller strongly built, without carving, are fitter for such journeys, both in regard of the charge and fitness for service, with the same charge, and may have more of them, wherein the Commissioners are much to be commended for such sized ships as xliv they have made, which have proved so well this journey, that I cannot sufficiently commend them both for strength and so well conditioned. I could wish that his Majesty had enough of them, and that I had been so happy to have spent as much time in one of them as I have done in the Anne Royal, and if I had had a good and strong ship to have kept the seas, the fleet had not quitted me, as most of them did, when we bore homeward, neither had I seen Ireland, where I have been blocked up so long, by reason of the leaks of my ship, that brought into Kinsale above six feet of water in her hold, scarce having had 15 sound men in a watch to pump and handle her sails, and her foreyard spent. We stayed in the harbor of Kinsale seven weeks, and, the wind coming to the northwest, we put out to sea, but the wind serving but 15 hours, returned to her old corner, which was south-east with some foul weather, that beat so much to the westward, that had we not recovered Bearhaven, God knows whether we had been driven and (our ship being so leaky) what had become of us. After three weeks we put again to sea, and by a contrary wind were beaten into Crookhaven, so that we have surveyed most of the south coast of Ireland. Here we stayed until the 23rd, at which time the north north-west, we put to sea the third time.

Thus you see how ill fortune has haunted us. But that which troubles me most is to have so many come home before me, in so unfortunate a journey, when there are so many mouths open to do ill offices, and untruth has most credit, and makes most impression at the first. By two kinds of people especially, which I only suspect. The first is such as did rather envy the greatness of my command then pity the greatness of my cares and pains. The other are such as have suffered much misery and want, and could not have so much as they desired, nor do what they listed. I must confess there was never anything that did trouble me more at my going out then that I had not means to give everyone content; for xlv although it was not my fault, yet I knew it would fall on me; for they durst not lay it upon any one else, and being full, utter it they must. And it is one of the most dangerous points in command to command without money, and to have litle money to content them, for there is nothing that will make a man more hated or slandered than that; for to punish and not to pay is ever received in an army for tyranny. But if his Majesty have received any service by it, I shall carry my cross cheerfully, for that I suffer for his sake.

I cannot forebear to let you know that of all the king's Captains, Sir Michael Geare has carried himself worst in his Majesty's service, and has much deceived my expectation. The particulars I will let you know at my arrival. If my letter seems too tedious, you must excuse it, for the tediousness of the time, living a quarter of a year on shipboard in havens, bred it, and that I know your industry and sincerity in his Majesty's service so great that you cannot be tired with any thing that doth make mention towards that which has begotten the length of it.

I have sent this bearer, Captain Marberry, to my Lord Admiral, to let him know of my arrival here, and to know his Excellency's pleasure, how he will dispose of the shipping and me. And if there be no occasion to the contrary, as I think there is not, that it would please him to send me his leave. For I desire nothing more then to have the happiness to see his Grace. Till when, I shall remain on shipboard, taking that best care I can for his Majesty's service. And so I rest, assuring myself of your good opinion, for that I am,

Your affectionate servant,
to be commanded,

From the Downs, the 27 of February. ED: CECYLL.

These two letters, in their strange lumbering and inaccurate style and spelling, remind one of Cromwell's xlvi speeches. They accentuate the fact of the deplorable condition of the Fleet even on setting sail. They must also be accepted as confirmation that the Admiral was badly served. But they equally confirm his helpless incapacity to grapple with bad servants and unexpected difficulties.

A. B. G.



A relation touching the fleet and army of the King's most Excellent Majesty King Charles, set forth in the first year of his highness's reign 1625, and touching the order, proceedings, and actions of the same fleet and army.

His most Excellent Majesty having with great costs and care prepared and furnished a royal fleet of fourscore and ten sail of good ships and six ketches ["vessels of the galliot order equipped with 2 masts the main and mizen usually from 100 to 250 tons burden. Ketches were principally used as yachts for conveying great personages from one place to another" (Admiral Smyth's Sailors' Word-Book).] with about 5000 seamen to conduct and man them: and an army of 10,000 land soldiers ready to be transported in the same ships for the coasts of Spain. The Duke of Buckingham [See our Introduction for brief notice of Buckingham and other frequently recurring names of the MS.] his grace, Lord high Admiral of England &c. was constituted by his Majesty and did intend originally to have gone in person as Lord General and Admiral in this Action, but upon some intervening occasions of great importance, it was finally resolved to the contrary, and Sir Edward Cecil, Knt., formerly appointed for Lord Marshal of the field, was now designed and 2 authorized by deputation from the Duke of Buckingham to go the voyage, not only as Lord Marshal but also as commander in chief both by sea and land, by the further titles of Lord Lieutenant-General of his Majesty's fleet and army and Admiral to the Admiral of England. The fleet contained 265,000 tons, and was divided into three squadrons: the Admiral's, Vice-Admiral's, and Rear-Admiral's. The Lord Lieutenant-General, &c. going as Admiral in his Majesty's good ship the Anne Royal, The Earl of Essex, [son of the great Earl of the name, and later, commander-in-chief of the Parliamentary Army during the Civil War.] a Vice-Admiral in the Swiftsure, and Sir Francis Stewart, [On this somewhat stained name, see Dr. S. Rawson Gardiner's History of England, under the Duke of Buckingham and Charles I. vol. i. 293, 313, 314.] knight, Rear-Admiral in the Lion. Every of these Squadrons having also a Vice-Admiral and Rear-Admiral; all which places were supplied by several ships of his Majesty's.

The army was divided into ten regiments, whereof the first belonged to the Duke of Buckingham as Lord General, and in his absence it was commanded by Sir John Prode, knt., [Prode—sometimes 'Proude,' was Lieut.-colonel in Sir Charles Morgan's regiment of foot in the Low Countries, and his service for this Expedition was specially requested from the Prince of Orange by Buckingham.] especially deputed to that purpose. The second regiment belonged to the Lord Lieutenant-General as he was Lord Marshal; the third to Robert Earl of Essex by the title of Colonel-General; the fourth to Henry Viscount of Valentia in Ireland, [see Burke's Extinct Peerage, s. n.] Master of the Ordinance for this action; the 5th to Sir William St. Leger, knt., [St. Leger was Sergeant-major in Cecil's regiment in the Low Countries, and was also specially asked like Prode. See Gardiner, as before, s. 129, 319; and Letters of his in Cal. of State Papers (Dom. Series) 1625.] Sergeant major-general; the 6th to Sir Charles Rich, knt., [younger brother of the second Earl of Warwick and the first Earl of Holland. His mother was Penelope, sister of Queen Elizabeth's Earl of Essex. He afterwards became Lord President of Munster.] by the name of 3 Colonel Rich; the 7th to Sir Edward Conway, knt. [Sir Edward Conway eldest son of the first Viscount Conway, and succeeded to the title in the 4th of Charles I. (see Burke's Ext. Peerage i. n.). He commanded an English regiment in the Low Countries in 1625. He afterwards commanded the English troops at the Rout of Newburn in 1640. (See Gardiner, as before, frequenter under Conway and Lord Conway).] by the name of Colonel Conway; the 8th to Sir Edward Harewood, knt. [Sir Edward Harewood, who was colonel of an English regiment in the Low Countries. He was killed at the siege of Maestricht in 1632, and lies buried in the Cloister Church at the Hague, under a tablet to his memory erected by his brother officers.] by the name of Colonel Harewood; the 9th to Sir John Burgh, knt. [Buckingham's second in command at Rhe; killed there. (See Gardiner, as before, ii. 128, 142.] by the name of Colonel Burgh; and the 10th to Sir Henry Bruce, knight, [untraced among the many of the name] by the name of Colonel Bruce.

Every regiment consisted of about 1,000 men, and was subdivided into 11 companies furnished with captains and all other commanders and officers usual in armies, only the Duke's Regiment was divided but into ten companies.

Also there were ready to be transported for land services ten pieces of great brass ordinance, to batter withal, and as many small field pieces, with 50 horses to draw ordinance, and well near as many more for the use of the chief land commanders.

15th Sept. 1625

Upon the 15th of September 1625 the King, accompanied with the Duke of Buckingham and divers other Lords, came in person to Plymouth (where the fleet then rode at anchor) to advance and set forward the action: here his Majesty stayed till the 24th of the same month, and in the mean time went aboard many of the ships, and at Roborough Down [an open 'down' about 5 miles from Plymouth, on the way to Tavistock.] took a view of the whole army, using all diligence in his own person to accommodate and send them forth about the intended enterprise and for an encouragement 4 to all men employed in this service and to testify his gracious affection towards the sea and land commanders, bestowed the honor of knighthood upon divers of the captains of his own ships and upon some other captains of land companies.

3rd October.

The King being gone from Plymouth, the Duke of Buckingham with Sir John Coke, knt., [the historical Coke, worthy of kinship to Sir Edward.] one of his Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, tarried behind certain days to speed the departure of the fleet with all possible expedition, and so far prevailed by their extraordinary industry, that by the third of October, the soldiers being shipped and about 40 sail of the fleet sent before to Falmouth, all the rest of the ships were drawn out into the Sound of Plymouth and rode there at anchor, expecting [it may be worth while noting that in this MS. this verb is used somewhat differently from present-day use. Now, 'expecting' as distinguished from 'waiting' differs in its inferring a greater probability of occurrence, albeit it is still 'waiting for' as its derivation also implies, ex-spectare = to look out for and hence to wait for.… (Portions of Grosart's tedious pedagogy omitted.)] only a fair wind to carry them off, and the coming of the Hollanders' fleet, who were to join with his Majesty's forces in this action.

The third of October, the Lord Lieutenant-General caused to be reduced into writing divers articles of instruction and direction for the better government of the fleet, the principal contents whereof were to this effect:

  1. They prescribed and enjoined a course for the daily and due service of God.
  2. For preventing and punishing of swearing, drunkenness, gaming, stealing, quarreling, fighting, conspiring, mutinying, and other offences.
  3. 5 For every man to execute carefully his proper office and charge in every ship and for due obedience to be given to all officers, for every man to keep clean his cabin and arms, and none to go ashore without leave.
  4. That the ordinance captains should punish lesser offences, but the offenders in more heinous crimes should be brought to the Lord Lieutenant-General.
  5. That sea-captains should not meddle with land soldiers, nor land-captains with sea men.
  6. For the preservation and orderly expence of victual, powder, shot, and other stores and provisions.
  7. For prevention of dangers by fire.
  8. Against disorderly and dangerous taking of tobacco.
  9. Against the departure of men without leave out of their proper ships into other ships.
  10. What several signs to use in cases of distress by fire, spending [giving way, or another needed.] of a mast, springing of a leak, or running aground.
  11. To bear but indifferent [little, or as we might say a mean (in sense of middle sail or swell sail').] sail in foul weather.
  12. For assigning to the ships of every squadron their several and proper colors, flag, and pendents of distinction, with orders how to wear them.
  13. For the Vice-Admiral, Rear-Admiral, and officers of the fleet to speak with the Admiral every morning and evening, to receive, disperse, and execute all necessary commands, and to keep a good distance in approaching and falling off.
  14. Against carrying of candles between decks after the watch set, or using any in cabins otherwise then in lanterns.
  15. For putting out the fire in the cook-room every night.
  16. For instructing the land men to know the names and use of the ship ropes.
  17. 6 For training and exercising all apt and fit sea men in like sort as the land men.
  18. Against chasing the ships of other Princes or states or sending aboard them without order of the Admiral, Vice-Admiral, or Rear-Admiral, but only to stay or bring such ships to the Admiral or other officer.
  19. Against pillaging between decks, breaking up of holds and embezzling of any goods seized or taken.
  20. To fall astern the Admirals every night.
  21. For two places of rendezvous in case of separation, the first to shape a course for the Southward Cape upon the coast of Spain in the latitude of 37 degrees, the other for the Bay of Cadiz or Sanlúcar.
  22. For keeping of good berths [positions at sea] in calms and fogs and giving notice by sound of drums, trumpets and other noise to prevent falling foul one of another.
  23. What special signs to make and what course to hold in case of one or more ships or of a whole fleet descried by night or by day.
  24. Against shooting of ordinance, save only to some of the purposes specially assigned.
  25. For divers cautions and particular instructions which are here omitted because that matter was afterwards more specially treated of and settled by a council of war, and some of the same points there iterated [repeated.] which in these instructions were formerly inserted.
  26. For disarming and disgracing of cowards.
  27. Against landing in foreign parts without order.
  28. Against forcing of women.
  29. Against drinking of new wines and eating of new fruit or fresh fish./
  30. 7 Against sleeping on the ground or upon the decks because of the Serene. [chilly damp (or fog), very much like our malaria.]
  31. For several signs whereby to know when the Council of War only and when a General Council should come aboard the Admiral.
  32. That sea-captains should have the best cabin-room in their ships, the land captains the next, the masters the next, the lieutenants the next, the master's mate the next, and the ensigns the next.
  33. That the Admirals before night should fit such sail as they would bear all night, or if they did lack or shorten sail in the night, then how by several certain signs they should notify the same, with other signs to be used between the fleet and such ships as have been absent and come in again.
  34. And a general clause to expect land orders upon landing, as also that for matter of sea discipline if there should be cause, other directions should be given to which the fleet was referred.
The 4th of October.

Monsieur Wm. de Massawe [Onward it is Nassau = William of Nassau, illegitimate son of Prince Maurice of Nassau. See our Introduction on the Hollanders' Fleet.'] Admiral of the Hollanders arrived in the town of Plymouth with twenty sail of ships, fifteen bound to accompany our fleet, and five bound for Dover intended to go and lie about those parts for the better guarding of our coasts and the more disturbance of the enemy's passage by sea during the absence of our fleet.

Immediately hereupon my Lord Lieutenant-General came aboard the Anne Royal to begin the voyage with the first good wind and weather that God should send. And the Duke of Buckingham having seen the ships in this forwardness, began his journey the same afternoon from Plymouth towards the Court, leaving Sir John Coke to dispatch all occasions concerning this great business that might happen at Plymouth after his grace's going from thence.

8 5th October.

The 5th of October, early in the morning, the wind being come fair, all the ships in the Sound of Plymouth weighed anchor and set sail, making for the coast of Spain, and ran that course till somewhat after noon; about which time the wind altering to the contrary, they must of necessity bear back for Plymouth or stand off to seaward. My lord Lieutenant-General (willing to take the best of these two courses) advised to that purpose with Sir Thomas Love Knt. [Capt. Brett, the Duke of Buckingham's kinsman, is said to have told the Duke that the great fleet would do nothing, "as there was sent with it Bag without money, Cook without meat, and Love without charity." These are the names of three chief captains (Court and Times of Charles I. vol. i. 74). Sir Thomas Love died in Fenchurch parish 12th April, 1627, and was privately buried in the choir of the church the following night (p. 213).] Captain of the Anne Royal, and with Master William Cooke, Master of the same ship.

The reasons alleged for standing off to sea were these: that it would argue more courage and constancy to proceed in the voyage and prevent such ill construction and censure as might be made of returning so soon into the Harbor, and the lying in harbor wold give opportunity to many to go ashore and much disturb the course of the voyage.

The reason urged to the contrary were these, that the weather was foul and misty, whereby many of the ships might be in danger to overshoot the harbor of Plymouth or fall foul upon Edynston. [an occasional old spelling for 'Eddystone', renowned for its light-house.] That if they overshot this port they could hardly with the wind as then it was put into any fit harbor nearer then the Isle of Wight, whereby they should be more cast back then if they put into the harbor of Plymouth, and yet ran a greater hazard of meeting with that part of the fleet which was gone before to Falmouth. And that we might come to another anchor this night in the Sound before Plymouth without putting into 9 Cattewater or Hamoaze [Cattewater is the estuary of the Plym opening into Plymouth Sound on the east: Hamoaze, the estuary of the Tamar opening into the Sound on the west.] whereby men might have little or no opportunity to go ashore. My Lord Lieutenant-General declared his own inclination to be to the former course, yet well weighing the reasons on both sides and holding those which made for the latter to be of more solidity and importance, he resolved to come to an anchor that night in the Sound of Plymouth; which was accordingly performed.

The next morning the Admiral of Holland came aboard our Admiral, bringing with him two or three sea commanders of the Dutch, and some sea captains of English ships came also aboard us.

The wind was still contrary and many signs were observed by the sea men boding a storm to be at hand.

Hereupon my Lord Lieutenant-General, &c. assisting himself with such Dutch and English captains as were aboard him, entered into consultation what was best to be done for the safety of the fleet and good success of the voyage, either by putting further into the Harbor or riding still in the open Sound.

The reasons insisted upon for not going further into the harbor were in effect the same which were alleged the day before for the standing off to sea.

The reasons insisted upon for putting now into full harbor were these, that by many probabilities it was conjectured that a storm was at hand; that the open Sound was no safe riding place in all weathers; that after a storm once began it was very unlikely that so many ships should put into the harbor without falling foul one of another. That some of the fleet wanted water, which might be supplied in harbor while the wind was contrary. That if the wind came fair it could not be above half a day's advantage to put out of the Sound more then out of Cattewater. And that by his Lordship's example in lodging and keeping aboard and 10 by strict command to all men else to do the like, the danger of disturbance or interruption to the speedy proceeding of the voyage by going of men ashore might be prevented.

Upon this consultation, his Lordship's resolution was to put further into the harbor in the most convenient and advantageable order that might be, wherein he had three things to provide for; the first that all the ships might ride in safety, the second that no part of the harbor might be over pestered, [overcrowded.] the third that every ship might be apt [So onward, 'most apte to warpe' etc. = aptus, fitted, and hence 'ready.'] to come forth with the first good wind.

A part of the Harbor called Hamoaze lay not well as Cattewater, for great ships to get out with such winds as would best serve our turns, and it was not safe to thrust the whole fleet into Cattewater; wherefore it being observed that such wind as would carry the five Hollanders bound off Dover [weather-bound off Dover, meaning to go into Dover ut infra.] to their rendezvous would also bring them well out of Hamoaze. And that the Newcastle ships [of Newcastle on Tyne.] of the fleet being the lesser and shorter ships were most apt to warp and turn out of Harbor, with every reasonable [query 'seasonable?'] wind; and that some few ships might well ride between the said island and the town of Plymouth, his Lordship willed that this his resolution should be drawn up into a short order or warrant that it might be put in execution accordingly.

The warrant was drawn to this effect. That whereas upon good deliberation had with the Admiral of Holland and some other 11 sea captains his Lordship thought fit that the whole fleet should again put into harbor in the most orderly and advantageable manner that might be; his Lordship did therefore authorise and command all captains and officers of the fleet and any and all other whom it did concern, that the five ships of Holland which were bound for Dover, together with all the colliers or Newcastle ships in the fleet should forthwith put into Hamoaze, there to ride at anchor, expecting the first good wind; and his Lordship further ordered the five Hollanders to enter first and the colliers or Newcastle ships after them. And that six of the best merchant ships of the fleet should put in between the land and the island before Plymouth. And that the King's ships and all the rest of the fleet, both English and Dutch, should put into Cattewater, the smallest entering first, and then the greatest by degrees passing up as far as they might without incumbering the place for those that should be to enter after them. And that his Lordship did further will and command all captains and other officers of the fleet and army that they should not go ashore nor suffer any of the mariners, sea men, soldiers, or others belonging to the fleet or army, to go on shore without his Lordship's special and express leave, to be signified under his hand, he himself being resolved not to go on shore without some new and urgent occasion were given.

While this warrant was making ready, his Lordship without expecting [tarrying or waiting] till it could be finished, as holding the business to require some haste, did forthwith dispatch away several boats from his own ship to notify the contents thereof by word of mouth, and to enjoin the performance thereof accordingly. Also his Lordship called now to mind that Sir John Coke, knt., principal Secretary of his Majesty, who specially intended [superintended] the good of this action, remained yet at Plymouth and might peradventure be so far perplexed with the sudden retreat of the fleet as to make some 12 unpleasing address thereupon to the Court, without knowing the true causes of his Lordship's proceeding: wherefore to prevent the worst, his Lordship gave instruction for the drawing up of a letter for him to him for Sir John Coke, containing the reasons of his Lordship's return; which were the same in effect which were observed here before. The letter being ready to be signed, before it was fully dispatched away, there came to my Lord a letter from Sir John Coke occasioning somewhat to be added by his Lordship to his letter by way of postscript, which by his direction was speedily supplied, containing in effect some further explanation or enforcement of the reasons of his retreat and concluding with a desire of Sir John Coke's assistance to take order in the town of Plymouth for the better keeping of men from coming ashore by suffering no boats to come out unto them.

While his Lordship was in debate about putting into harbor, and touching the order and manner of the same, many of the ships without any warrant at all were gone in of themselves, and the rest, having notice of his Lordship's resolution and direction, began to follow, but not in so good order as could be wished, nor in such sort as by his Lordship was assigned.

8th October.

The wind continued still contrary till Saturday the 8th of October in the forenoon; all which time we lay in harbor, my Lord Lieutenant-General lodging every night aboard according to his former resolution.

While we lay thus in harbor, it was observed that by reason of the speedy putting forth to sea the former time, few or none of the ships of the fleet had any notice or copies of the Articles of the third of October; the want whereof, especially touching the officers coming twice a day to receive the Admiral's commands and the places of rendezvous where to meet again if we should be separated, might occasion many errors in the fleet, to the great prejudice of the action; wherefore a course was now taken that such clerks aboard the Admiral as could write well were employed to 13 make ready several copies thereof, with all convenient expedition; and because the whole was long and the articles for the daily coming to speak with the Admiral and knowledge of the place of the rendezvous were the most important, therefore till the rest could be all dispatched diverse copies of these two articles were first prepared to be dispersed with all possible speed.

Furthermore, while we lay thus in harbor it was discovered that the Lion, wherein Sir Francis Stewart, knight, went Vice Admiral of the fleet, was so leaky and insufficient, that she was not fit to go the voyage, for which cause she was discharged and Sir Francis Stewart also.

Instead of Sir Francis Stewart in the Lion, my Lord Lieutenant-General appointed the Earl of Denbigh to go Rear-Admiral of the fleet in the St. Andrew, another of his Majesty's ships, wherein Sir John Watts, knt. [He was son of John Watts, "citizen and clothier" of London, who was knighted on 24th July, 1603, and was Lord Mayor in 1606. Stow in his "Survey" informs us that one John, "heir" of the John, was a "captain in this Expedition at Cales, where he was knighted for his good service, and being an expert soldier was made a great officer in this Expedition under the conduct of George, Duke of Buckingham, against the French at the Isle of Rhee, where he behaved himself with great courage." He continues: "Afterwards he served as a captain under Count Mansfield in the Expedition on the Rhine, on the behalf of the Prince Palatine, against the Emperor of Germany" (fol. 588). He married Mary, daughter of Thomas Bayning of Suffolk, brother to Paul and Andrew Bayning, aldermen of London. By her he had issue John, James, Paul, Richard, Edward, William, Thomas, Sarah, Magdalene, Margaret, and Alice. His son John was with him in the French Expedition. Later he stood strong for the King with Capell. Oddly enough none of the authorities give the date of either's death. Only under Hertingfordbury (vol. i. 537), Chauncey says that there is "in the church this epitaph: 'Near this place lyes buried in one grave those loyal and worthy gentlemen, Sir John Watts and Capt. Harry Hooker." See also Buntingford Charities in Chauncey (vol. i. 262, ed. 1826).] was captain, and did ordain the Lord 14 Delaware [Henry West, son of the Lord Delaware, who died in 1618 as Governor of Virginia.] to go Vice-Admiral of the Admiral's Squadron in his Majesty's ship the St. George, and to carry the flag of St. George in the foretop; which honor and colors were formerly born by the Earl of Denbeigh.

8 October.

Saturday the 8th of October in the forenoon, the wind came fair; whereupon several boats were dispatched from the Admiral to the other ships riding in Harbor, commanding them all instantly to put forth to sea; but by reason of the low ebb and the disordered riding of many small ships, who delayed to get out, few or none of the great ships could get forth until it grew towards the evening; at which time we got clear of the harbor, quitting the fort of Plymouth between five and six of the clock, and held on our course with good wind.

9 October.

The next day, being Sunday, the Vice-Admiral and Rear-Admiral with the rest of the fleet that were gone before to Falmoth, came into us, and hailed us. This day also divers copies of the instructions dated the third of October were delivered to the chief ships of the fleet and we proceeded with good wind 10 October. till Monday night the 10th of October; at which time somewhat before midnight the wind changed to the contrary, so that we could not run our intended course but stood to our best advantage, the weather being very calm.

11 October. Tuesday morning the 11th of October, the weather continuing still calm, my Lord Lieutenant-General, willing to make the best use thereof he could, hung out a flag to assemble the Council of War; who being come aboard about ten o'clock in the forenoon they thus proceeded:

At a Council of War held aboard the Anne Royal
Tuesday the 11th of October, 1625.

The Council being assembled entered into consultation touching 15 the form of a sea fight performed against any fleet or ships of the King of Spain or other enemy; and touching some directions to be observed for better preparation to be made for such a fight and the better managing thereof when we should come to action.

The particulars for this purpose considerable were many, insomuch that no pertinent consultation could well be had concerning the same without some principles in writing, whereby to direct and bound the discourse. And therefore by the special command of my Lord Lieutenant-General (a form of Articles for this service drawn originally by Sir Thomas Love, knt., treasurer for this action, Captain of the Anne Royal and one of the Council of War) was presented to the assembly, and several times read over unto them.

After the reading, all the parts thereof were well weighed and examined, whereby it was observed that it intended to enjoin our fleet to advance and fight at sea, much after the manner of an army at land, assigning every ship to a particular division, rank, file, and station; which order and regularity was not only improbable but almost impossible to be observed by so great a fleet in so uncertain a place as the sea. Hereupon some litle doubt arose whether or no this form of Articles should be confirmed. But then it was alleged that the same Articles had in them many other points of direction, preparation, and caution for a sea fight, which were agreed by all men to be most reasonable and necessary. And if so strict a form of proceeding to fight were not or could not be punctually [in every small point or detail observed, yet might these Articles beget in our commanders and officers a right understanding of the conceit [conception] and intent thereof; which with an endeavor to come as near as could be to perform, the particulars might be of great use to keep us from confusion in the general. Neither could the limiting of every several ship to such a rank or file, to such certain place in 16 the same, bring upon the fleet intricacy and difficulty of proceeding, so as (if the proper ships were absent or not ready) those in the next place were left at liberty or rather commanded to supply their rooms and maintain the instructions if not absolutely yet as near as they could. In conclusion therefore the form of Articles which was so presented read and considered of, was with some few alterations and additions ratified by my Lord Lieutenant-General and by the whole Council as act of theirs passed and confirmed, and to be duly observed and put in execution by all captains, mariners, gunners, and officers in every ship and all others to whom it might appertain at their perils, leaving only to my Lord Lieutenant-General the naming and ranking of the ships of every division in order as they should proceed for the execution of the same Articles; which in conclusion were these, touching the whole fleet in general and the Admiral's Squadron and every other Squadron in particular—namely.

  1. That when the fleet or ships of the enemy should be discovered, the Admiral of our fleet with the ships of his Squadron should put themselves into the form undermentioned and described, namely, that the same squadron should be separated into three divisions of nine ships in a division and so should advance, set forward, and charge upon the enemy as hereafter more particularly is directed./

    That these nine ships should discharge and fall of three and three as they are filed in this list:— Anne Royal, Admiral; Prudence, Capt. Yaughan; Royal Defence, Capt. Ellis.
    Barbara Constance, Capt. Hatch; Talbot, Capt. Burden; Abraham, Capt. Downes.
    Golden Cock, Cap. Beamont; Amity, Capt. Malyn; Anthony, Capt. Blague.
    That these nine ships should second the Admiral of this Squadron three and three as they are filed in this list:— St. George, Vice-Admiral; lesser Sapphire, Capt. Bond.
    Sea Venture, Capt. Knevet; Assurance, Cap. Osborne; Cameleon, Cap. Seymour; Return, Cap. Bonithon.
    Jonathan, Cap. Butler; William, Cap. White; Hopewell, Cap. [blank]./
    That these nine [sic] ships should second the Vice-Admiral of this squadron three and three as they are filed in this list. Convertive, Rear-Admiral; Globe, Capt. Stokes; Assurance of Dover, Capt. Bargey.
    Great Sapphire, Cap. Raymond; Anne, Capt. Wollaston; Jacob, Capt. Goss.
    George, Capt. Stevens; Hermit, Cap. Turner; Mary Magdalen, Cap. Coog.
    Helen, Cap. Mason; Amity of Hull, Cap. Frisby; Anne Speedwell, Cap. Polkenhorne.

    These three ships should fall into the rear of the three former divisions to charge where and when there should be occasion or to help the engaged or supply the place of any that should be unserviceable.

  2. That the Admiral of the Dutch and his squadron should take place on the starboard side of our Admiral, and observe their own order and method in fighting.

  3. That the Vice-Admiral of our fleet and his squadron should make the like division, and observe the same form and order as 18 the Admiral's squadron was to observe, and so should keep themselves in their several divisions on the larboard side of the Admiral, and there advance and charge if occasion were when the Admiral did.

  4. That the Rear-Admiral of the fleet and his Squadron should also put themselves into the like order of the Admiral's Squadron as near as might be, and in that form should attend for a reserve or supply. And if any Squadron, ship or ships of ours should happen to be engaged by overcharge of the enemy, loss of masts or yards or other main distress, needing special succor; that then the Rear-Admiral with all his force, or one of his divisions proportionable to the occasion, should come to their rescue; which being accomplished they should return to their first order and place assigned.

  5. That the distance between ship and ship in every squadron should be such as none might hinder one another in advancing or falling off.

  6. That the distance between squadron and squadron should be more or less as the order of the enemy's fleet or ships should require, whereof the captains and commanders of our fleet were to be very considerate.

  7. That if the enemy's approach happened to be in such sort as the Admiral of the Dutch and his squadron or the Vice-Admiral of our fleet his squadron might have opportunity to begin the fight; it should be lawful for them so to do until the Admiral could come up, using the form, method, and care prescribed.

  8. That if the enemy should be forced to bear up or to be entangled among themselves, whereby an advantage might be had; that then our Rear-Admiral and his squadron with all his divisions should lay hold thereof and prosecute it to effect.

  9. That the Rear-Admiral's squadron should keep most strict and special watch to see what Squadrons or ships distressed of our 19 fleet should need extraordinary relief and what advantage might be had upon the enemy, that a speedy and present course might be taken to perform the service enjoined.

  10. That if any ship or ships of the enemy should break out or fly, that the Admiral of any squadron which should happen to be in the next and most convenient place for that purpose should send out a competent number of the fittest ships of his squadron to chase, assault, or take such ship or ships so breaking out, but no ship should undertake such a chase without the command of the Admiral or at leastwise the Admiral of his Squadron.

  11. That no man should shoot any small or great shot at the enemy till he came at the distance of caliver [a kind of musket. See Skeat's Etym. Dict. s.v. Cotgrave and Minshew, s. v., give it as = harquebus or musket.] or pistol shot, whereby no shot might be made fruitless or in vain; whereof the captains and officers in every ship should have a special care.

  12. That no man should presume or attempt to board any ship of the enemy without special order and direction from the Admiral or at leastwise the Admiral of his Squadron.

  13. That if any of our fleet happened to be leeward of the enemy, every of our ships should labor and endeavor what they might to take all opportunity to get to windward of them and to hold that advantage having once obtained it.

  14. That the captains and officers of every ship should have a special care as much as in them lay to keep the enemy in continual fight without any respite or intermission to be offered them; which, with the advantage of the wind if it might be had, was thought the likeliest way to enforce them to bear up and entangle themselves or fall foul one of another in disorder and confusion.

  15. That a special care should be had in every ship that the 20 gunners should load some of their pieces with case shot, handspikes, nails, bars of iron or with what else might do most mischief to the enemy's men, upon every fit opportunity, and to come near and lay the ordinance well to pass for that purpose, which would be apt to do great spoil to the enemy.

  16. That the cabins in every ship should be broken down so far as was requisite to clear the way of the ordinance.

  17. That all beds and sacks in every ship should be disposed and used as bulwarks for defence against the shot of the enemy.

  18. That there should be 10, 8, 6 or 4 men to attend every piece of ordinance as the Master Gunner should choose out and assign them to their several places of service. That every one of them might know what belonged properly to him to do. And that this choice and assignment should be made with speed so as we might not be taken unprovided.

  19. That there should be one, two, or three men of good understanding and diligence according to the burden of every ship forthwith appointed to fill carthouses of powder [cartouches (Fr.), whence our cartouch-box or soldier's pouch and our 'cartridges'.] and to carry them in cases or barrels, covered, to their places assigned.

  20. That the hold in every ship should be rummaged and made privy, especially by the ships sides, and a carpenter with some man of trust appointed to go fore and after in hold to seek for shot that may come in under water, and that there should be provided in readiness plugs, pieces of sheet lead, and pieces of elm board to stop all leaks that might be found within board or without./

  21. That in every ship where any soldiers were aboard the men should be divided into two or three parts, whereof only one part should fight at once and the rest should be in hold to be drawn up upon occasion to relieve and rescue the former.

  22. 21 That the men in every ship should be kept as close [concealed] as reasonably might be, till the enemy's first volley of small shot should be past.

  23. That the mariners in every ship should be divided and separated into three or four parts or divisions so as every one might know the place where he was to perform his duty for the avoiding of confusion.

  24. That the master or boatswain of every ship, by command of the Captain, should appoint a sufficient and select number of sea men to stand by and and attend the sails./

  25. That more especially they should by like command appoint sufficient helmsmen to steer the ship.

  26. That the sailors and helmsmen should in no sort presume to depart or stir from their charge.

  27. That the main yard, fore yard, and topsail sheets in every ship should be slung, and the top sail yards if the wind were not too high; hereby to avoid the shooting down of sails.

  28. That there should be butts or hogsheads sawed into two parts filled with salt water set upon the upper and lower decks in several places, convenient in every ship, with buckets, gowns, and blankets to quench and put out wild fire [Greek fire: an explosive compound of sulfur, naphtha, and pitch, that burned with great fierceness. See note in Way's Prompt, p. 527.] or other fire if need be.

  29. That if a fight began by day and continued till night, every ship should be careful to observe the Admiral of her squadron; that if the Admiral fell off and forbore the fight for the present every other ship might do the like, repairing under her own squadron to amend any thing amiss and be ready to charge again when the Admiral should begin.

  30. That if any of the ships belonging to any squadron or 22 division happened to be absent or not ready in convenient time and place to keep and make good the order herein prescribed, then every squadron and division should maintain these directions as near as they could, although the number of ships in every division were the less without attending [waiting or watching for] the coming in of all the ships of every division. /

  31. And that these 10 ships in regard of the munition and materials for the Army and the horses which were carried in them, should attend the Rear-Admiral and not engage themselves without order, but should remain and expect such directions as might come from our Admiral or Rear-Admiral:

    • Peter Bonaventure, Capt. Johnson
    • Sarah Bonaventure, Capt. Carew
    • Christian, Capt. Wharey.
    • Susan and Ellen, Capt. Levett.
    • William of London, Capt. Amadas.
    • Hope, Sir Tho. Pigott knt.. [untraced].
    • Chesnut.
    • Fortune.
    • Fox.
    • Truelove.

There was no difference between the Articles for the Admiral's Squadron and those for the Vice-Admirals and Rear-Admirals, save in the names of the ships of every division, and that their squadrons had not any particular reserve nor above five or six ships apiece in the third division for want of ships to make up the number of nine; the munition and horse ships which belonged to their Squadrons being unapt to fight and therefore disposed into a special division of ten ships by themselves to attend the general reserve.

At this council also, my Lord Lieutenant-General expressing a great zeal to his Majesty's service and taking notice that the wind was contrary and many ships of the fleet but scantly 23 victualed at our setting forth, which defect could not be now supplied, proposed it to the Council as a thing considerable how to take some present and seasonable course to make our victuals last the longer. And that to this purpose both the land and sea men might sit from henceforth five and five in a Mess, taking only the allowance formerly allotted to four men, which motion was without dispute or contradiction assented unto, and accordingly ordered.

For the whole Council was so forward to advance the accomplishment of his Majesty's designs that all reasons seeming to tend to the contrary (as our being yet within our own Channel, the little time which the wind had been contrary, the disheartening or at least grudging that it might peradventure raise among the soldiers and mariners to have that course taken with them when a voyage was scarce begun, which for the most part has been applied only as a remedy in times of scarcity when men are homeward bound after a voyage much prolonged by extraordinary crosswinds, and the imputation of neglect or improvidence which it might lay upon them who had the care of victualling the navy) were all omitted and buried in a dutiful silence.

At the rising of the Council a motion was made to have some of the best sailers of our fleet chosen out and assigned to lie off from the main body of the fleet, some to sea and some to shoreward, the better to discover, chase and take some ships or boats of the enemy's; which might give us intelligence touching the plate fleet, whether it were come home or no, or when it would be expected, and in what place; and touching such other matters whereof we might make our best advantage. But nothing herein was now resolved, it being conceived, as it seemed, that we might soon enough and more opportunely consider of this proposition and settle an order therein when we came nearer to the enemy's coasts; so the Council was dissolved.

My Lord Lieutenant-General took order for the speedy notifying of the resolution touching the sitting five and five in a mess to all 24 the ships in the fleet, but by reason of the foul weather which began the next day and continued divers days after, it could not be signified in writing to every ship as soon as was intended, and had otherwise been accomplished.

Also, the Articles of instruction agreed upon by the Council of War touching the sea fight, &c. with an apt title prefixed, were with all possible speed dispersed by the care of my Lord Lieutenant-General to the several ships of his own squadron, and to the Vice-Admiral and Rear-Admiral of the fleet, to be duly put in execution, and with directions also for them to deliver out copies thereof to the several ships of their squadrons.

12 Octob.

Upon Wednesday the 12th of October, about one o'clock in the morning, as we were going to prayer and sermon, the wind came good again, whereof we presently took advantage; but that night it blew very high and grew into an extraordinary storm, which lasted all that night and all the next day and night, much dispersing and endangering the whole fleet in general, and much distressing our ship in particular. Our ancientest seamen told us they had never been in a greater storm.

The particular disasters threatening destruction to our ship were: The main mast like to go overboard through the slackness and insufficiency of the shrouds, and the getting loose of two of the greatest pieces of ordinance of 5000 weight apiece. But such diligence was used that both these mischiefs in the gun room were quickly remedied. Our particular losses were of a man blown into the sea from the main yard by the violence of the wind, and our long boat split and broken in pieces as she was towed at our stern.

14 Octob.

Friday the 14th of October the storm was well abated, and about 20 of our ships discovered to be in view.

The wind blew fair for our course during all the storm, which was a great benefit unto us, and so it continued many days, during all which time we held on our course for Cabo de Sao Vicente, 25 bearing but an easy sail and gathering up our scattered ships every day more and more, and keeping such a distance from the Spanish coasts that we might not be descried as we passed. /

The ships of our own and other squadrons used great neglect in not coming up to speak with us morning and evening as they should, whereby we were deprived of all means to be advertised, touching the success of our fleet in the late storm, or to convey to every several ship such instructions as we desired.

17th October.

Monday the 17th of October, about ten o'clock in the morning we descried from our main top the high land of Spain, and estimated it to be about 20 leagues off.

My Lord Lieutenant thought now that it was time to prepare things in a readiness in expectation of the enemy. And therefore his Lordship caused this day a list to be made of all the gentlemen volunteers and their servants, as also of all his Lordship's own servants that were in the ship. The whole number of those who were thus listed was about forty, of whom my Lord appointed Mr. Francis Carew [untraced among the multitude of this name.] a gentleman of the privy Chamber to his Majesty to be captain, who readily and cheerfully undertook the charge. The Company was armed with firelock pieces and swords, and intended to do service near about my Lord's own person on shipboard, or on shore, or to perform other special service as his Lordship should command.

This day also our ship was rummaged and put in order according to the Articles of the 11th of October, that she might be ready to perform a fight with the best advantage against the enemy, whensoever the first occasion should present itself.

18th October.

The 18th of October was a calm, whereof my Lord Lieutenant-General taking advantage, hung out the flags and assembled a council, wherein it was thus proceeded./ 26

At a Council of War held aboard the Anne Royal,
Tuesday, 18 Octob. 1625.

The Council being set, the Lord Lieutenant-General declared that by reason it was now a calm he had called them together to three purposes.

The first to notify the disorders of the fleet in not coming up daily to hail him and receive his directions upon all intervenient occasions; for which he said he would at this time only admonish them.

The second was to have their opinions what they thought was become of the Vice-Admiral and Rear-Admiral with above 40 ships of our fleet, which had been missing ever since the late storm; touching which point it was alleged that the Vice-Admiral with divers ships was seen to pass ahead of us upon Thursday last as we lay at hull [to lie with all sails taken down and the helm lashed a-lee. See Skeat, as before, s. v. hull (2).] in the Storm. And the wind then and for the most part ever since blew fair and strong for the rendezvous. Also it was observed that ever since the storm, we had borne but a small sail, whereby our flagging must needs have drawn them up to us if in the storm they had remained astern of us, whereupon it was concluded by the opinion of all that they were ahead of us and that it was fit for us to bear more sail thereby to fetch them up. And it was agreed and ordered by the whole Council that from henceforth we should so do.

The third point was to understand the defects and losses that had happened in the late storm, that we might prepare a remedy thereof if it might be, and make such other use of the true knowledge thereof as might be requisite: whereupon it was ordered to be recorded that the Long Robert, a merchant ship of the fleet, of the burthen of 240 and odd tons, wherein were 37 sea men, 138 land men, was drowned in the storm near to his 27 Majesty's ship the Convertive, who sent out her long boat to have saved some of the men belonging to the Robert. However the long boat not only failed to save the other men but perished herself in the service. Moreover we were advertised that the Dolphin of Scilly, a ketch or bark victualled and set forth for his Majesty's special service in this action at the costs of Mr. Francis Carew, was cast away in the storm and her pilot and his son both drowned. Also the Viscount Valentia, the Viscount Cromwell [see Burke's Extinct Peerage, s.u.], Captain Blague and others began to rehearse their particular damages received some by loss of long boats, barges and skiffs, some by wetting and spoiling great quantities of gunpowder and match, bread and other provisions, some in springing of masts, getting of leaks and other disasters; which seemed to be so many that it was moved to abstain from inquiring any further how things now stood, least while every one sought to aggravate his own misfortunes some discouragement might thereby grow to the prejudice of the voyage, now that every man's defects could not be supplied as they might at home; hereupon no further mention was made at this time of the losses by this storm. But only touching the Dreadnought, whose defects being much pressed by Sir Beverley Newcombe [untraced] alleging that he thought her to be utterly unserviceable. It was thus resolved and ordered in Council concerning her in regard she was one of his Majesty's ships and a ship of great value not only suspected but confidently affirmed by her captain to be in his judgment defective in so high a degree. That therefore the Lord Lieutenant-General, &c. at any time when it should be required should appoint such committees as his Lordship should think fit to visit her and by all ways and means to find out and discover her true condition and estate and thereof to make certificate to his Lordship, whereupon such further order should be taken as should be fit.


At this Council complaint was made that many of the muskets delivered for the service of this action were insufficient, some of them so grossly that they had no touch-holes; further complaint was also made that the bullets delivered did not fit the pieces to which they were assigned, and that the molds for bullets were so disorderly shipped that they could not be found out, to be made use of. All which Captain Johnson whom it seemed to concern labored to excuse in such sort that nothing was now ordered concerning this matter.

Towards the rising of the Council the Lord Viscount Valentia acquainted the Lord Lieutenant-General, &c. by way of complaint that one John Grant, Master of his Majesty's good ship called the Reformation, wherein the Viscount Valentia went as Vice-Admiral of the Vice-Admiral's Squadron, and Master Raleigh Gilbert [son of Raleigh's illustrious brother-in-law] as captains, had committed a great insolence and contempt not only in refusing to obey the directions of the Lord of Valentia, but by telling his Lordship in direct terms that the ship was in the Master's charge and not in his Lordship's, and that therefor he would not raise sail when his Lordship commanded. Howbeit the Lord of Valentia acknowledged the ship to some purposes as touching the manner of entering into harbor and the like to be absolutely in the Master's charge. Hereupon Captain Gilbert affirming Master Grant to be generally an able and an honest man but sick at this present and interposing some words of qualification on the Master's behalf, My Lord Lieutenant-General took occasion to declare his opinion and direction to this effect.

That every nobleman going in any ship in this voyage is the chief commander in the ship but with this distinction: that for saving of the honor and office of the Captain his Lordship is to be sparing in his commands and to deliver them immediately to the Captain and to none other; which being done the Captain is to 29 give them in charge to all other officers and ministers [servants] in the ship; so as he conceived my Lord of Valentia had not gone the right way in Commanding the Master immediately, yet by reason the Master's words seemed to be very peremptory and unmannerly, my Lord Lieutenant-General wished that the Master would make some submission to the Lord of Valentia, and so the business to take some end. But this he did not by way of order or resolution of the Council but only by delivery of his own opinion every man seeming satisfied with the former declaration and overture; so the Council was dissolved.

Sir William St Leger, Sergeant Major-General abstained from coming to this Council, excusing it by a letter to Sir Thomas Love, that this morning the plague was discovered to be in his ship, two sick and one other with the sore running upon him: professing his great sorrow for this and other disasters mentioned in his letter, and praying direction both touching his own person and his Majesty's ship the Convertive wherein he was.

My Lord Lieutenant being acquainted with this letter returned an answer full of comfort to Sir William, hoping it would not prove to be the plague (as afterwards indeed it did not) and wishing him to expect [wait and watch] a while with patience, keeping in the mean time as much separate as might be from the parties suspected to be infected./

This day also there came to his Lordship a voluntary [volunteered, spontaneous] certificate from some of the officers and company of the Dreadnought rehearsing some arguments to prove her a defective ship but not concluding her in their judgment to be unserviceable: wherefore his Lordship thought not good to enter into any consideration of discharging or special relieving her; which might occasion almost all the ships in the fleet by this example to sue for the like favor 30 and so induce [lead in] a great trouble and disturbance to the whole fleet.

19th October. Wednesday the 19th of October betimes [early] in the morning we descried plainly the high land of Mountdego [Cape Mondego, or Cabo Mondego, Portugal], and gave chase for three or four hours to ten or eleven ships to leeward of us, supposing them to be of the West-Indian Spanish fleet; but at last we found them to be some of our own fleet, much condemning their judgments and carelessness; which by holding a course to get from us and omitting to make the signs prescribed by the orders of the third of October, had given us occasion to spend so much time in vain now that we were come into the first place of rendezvous. But for want of means to distinguish one ship from another at a far distance and their mingling themselves soon after among the rest of our fleet the particular offenders in this kind were not discovered.

This day about noon, our Vice-Admiral and Rear-Admiral, with about 40 ships more of the fleet who had been absent from us ever since the late storm came from the shoreward and joined themselves again unto us hailing us with great signs of joy and telling us that they had been in this first place of rendezvous these two days and more, having as it seems borne a much better sail than we, both in the storm and afterwards.

This evening there was brought aboard us one Francis Gonzales, master of a small caravel of Terceira taken by our Rear-Admiral with two other Portuguese of the company of the same caravel. They were examined apart, and did in effect join all in this relation: that they came from the Island of Graciosa [Santa Cruz de Graciosa in the Azores] bound for Terceira laden with corn and hens and some other provisions to sell, and that being driven by the violence of the late storm and foul weather, they were cast upon this shore against their wills, not knowing well where they now were; where descrying our fleet they came into us 31 of their own accord to seek for mercy and relief to save their lives, being in extraordinary necessity and almost starved for want of fire and having drunk their own urine in distress for want of other drink. They said they could give no notice or intelligence touching the West-Indian or plate fleet, save only that five Carakes [carracs, carricks, etc. from carrace, "a name given by the Spaniards and Portuguese to the vessels they sent to Brazil and the East Indies; large, round-built, and fitted for fight as well as burden. Their capacity lay in their depth [Query—and breadth above and below?] which was extraordinary. English vessels of size and value were sometimes so-called." (Admiral Smyth's Sailors' Word-Book.)] had been lately at Terceira, where one of them was cast away but her lading saved; and that the other four set sail together from thence the 4th of this month (meaning it should seem after their style) but what was since become of them they knew not.

They also said that they had heard that [the] King of Spain's Brazil fleet [the yearly Brazil fleet laden with treasure, &c.] was expected to join for the guarding home of the West Indian or plate fleet, and that another great fleet was ready in Spain for the same purpose.

Lastly, they said that they had advertisement two months since in Terciera by a caravel, of advice sent from Portugal, that there was a great English fleet of above 100 sail of ships ready to set forth, being intended as they conjectured for Brazil or the Straights, but the certainty thereof they said they knew not.

This report of these Portuguese was the rather believed for that their caravel was but of 10 or 12 tons, an open boat with 25 persons in her, whereof some were women and children; so as we took her clearly to be no caravel sent purposely for an advisor or intelligencer, neither were any letters found in her, nor would they confess that ever they had any.

Besides it was not gainsaid by some of our men who were at 32 the taking of them that they thought they might have gone from us by sailing if they had resolutely endeavoured it.

20th October. The Lord Lieutenant-General having yesterday sent words by several ketches to the Admiral and Vice-Admiral, that he would sit in council this 20th of October early in the morning, the flags were now hung out to that purpose: yet some of the ships had so far dispersed themselves this night that it was very late in the afternoon this day, ere a full council was assembled; such as had dispersed themselves excusing by alleging that they could not see our light whereby to direct their course.

Before the coming together of the Council, the Lord Lieutenant-General acquainted me that the wind being now fair to put in for Sanlúcar and the more southerly parts of Andalucia his Lordship intended to advise seriously with the Council what was fittest to be done. And for a better preparation to enter into the business, he delivered me a paper, willing me to acquaint myself with the contents thereof that I might read it or deliver the sense of it the more effectually to the Council at their meeting, as the subject and foundation whereon they were chiefly to treat. This paper declared in effect that the projects for the intended action were three.

  1. First to destroy the King of Spain's shipping./
  2. Secondly to possess some place of importance in his country.
  3. Thirdly to hinder his commerce and especially the arriving of the plate fleet as the principal project.

It imported further that the places to perform these designs in were likewise three. Lisbon, Cadiz, and Sanlúcar, whereof Sanlúcar would serve for the undertaking of Cadiz and the winning of the harbor there for the undertaking of Seville and intercepting of the plate fleet, which in all judgments was thought the best. And that for the undertaking of all these designs, it was thought 33 fittest to possess ourselves of Sanlúcar: with this, that in case we were impeached [blamed] elsewhere, it was resolved we should run so far into the river, till we should find a landing place fittest for our disembarking. And that all this had been discoursed and thus far agreed upon by a full Council of War his Majesty being present; but that yet nevertheless after all, the final resolution of the whole was referred to a further consultation to be had upon the place. This paper at first I took to be the copy of an Act of the Council of War, but afterwards I rather conceived it to be only a note taken by my Lord for his own memory of what had passed at Plymouth; no absolute act of Council touching this matter being ever entered or concluded for anything which I could ever learn.

After a long expectation, a full Council was at the last assembled and proceeded thus in their affairs./

At a Council of War held aboard the Ann Royal Thursday the 20th of October 1625 about Cabo de Sao Vincente.

The Council being set I read the paper twice unto them, and then his Lordship opening more particularly the contents thereof, together with the effect of what had passed at Plymouth when the King was present, the Council began now to debate and advise where to put in and where to land, as in the most convenient place to effect our designs, by occasion whereof we having already overrun Lisbon, several places lying to the south or eastward of us were now propounded besides Sanlúcar and Cadiz, as the fittest to be attempted in the judgment of some of the Council./

More specially Gibraltar and Malaga were a while insisted upon, but neither of them was entertained by the Council, the former as I conceive, because it was but a poor place and yet very difficult of access by nature, and too strongly fortified by art: The latter because it was situated so far within the mouth of the Straights, 34 that it would draw us quite out of the way for the main project of intercepting the plate fleet, and the enemy in the parts thereabouts being very strong in horse, it would make that place as difficult as Cadiz or Gibraltar.

Howbeit those that moved for these places wanted not their reasons, alleging for the former that Gibraltar was a very strong road for our shipping; that about old Gibraltar was a good ground for landing our men, and from thence to march up to the New Town were but poor, yet the place was of great importance as being such by the advantage whereof the trade from all parts of the Levant might be brought under our command; that being but a small piece, it was the easier to be manned, victualled, and held if once taken; that reputation and future benefit was to be preferred before present pillage; that strength on the enemy's side and hazard on our own parts was to be expected and undergone where ever we went, and that if we prevailed, the more difficult the attempt was the more should be our honor.

For Malaga it was alleged that it was a rich place and a city of/ good fame in England; that it was of less strength then Cadiz or Gibraltar, and of more commodious entrance for our shipping then Sanlúcar; that our nation having been long without war it could not be so fit now as hereafter, upon better experience to attempt the strongest places; that if we undertook some strong place and failed, it would be an imputation to our judgments and a disheartening to our people; that, this being our first attempt, if we could take some easier place of good wealth thereby to encourage the soldiers and preserve our own honors, it would be sufficient for a beginning after so long a peace.

But the chief question rested still between Sanlúcar and Cadiz; towards the deciding whereof the masters of ships being called in and their informations heard touching the several natures of those forts and the shores adjoining for the better preparing of the Council of War to ground their judgments, It was alleged by 35 divers in the further debate had at this Council, that Sanlúcar is a barred haven and of such difficult entrance (especially for ships of great burden as his Majesty's ships are) that they cannot pass in nor come out but only at spring tides, in calm seasons and with favoring winds, nor ride safely at Anchor in all weather without the Bar. Also it was observed by others that the most part of masters in the fleet will hardly adventure to carry their ships in and out at Sanlúcar in the best tides and weather, for want of perfect knowledge of the rocks and shelves there, and the right use of the landmarks, whereby that port is to be gained and quitted in safety. Besides, it was feared that if we should put the whole fleet into such a strait, we should be more apt to be blocked and spoiled by our enemies then to annoy them. And that our ships could not easily get out from Sanlúcar to do service at sea or make approach to any other place, what ever occasion might happen.

But at last it was affirmed and admitted, that Puerto de Santa Maria [See our Introduction for quotation from Gardiner, as before, on St. Mary Port.] near the Bay of Cadiz was a low shore and more apt for landing of men then any place about Sanlúcar, and that our ships might get in and out about those parts at all tides, and ride at safety there, and in the Bay of Cadiz adjoining, out of shot of the enemy's land ordinance; that in this port and bay it was most likely for us to find the galleys and ships of our enemies, which we might destroy to their greater prejudice; and that by running some of our Newcastle ships aground in fit places which the nature of this shore would afford, and mounting their ordinance to play upon such blockhouses and small forts as the enemy has in those parts, we might happily batter the same down and dismount their ordinance, thereby and with our other great shot from the rest of our fleet to clear and guard a place for the landing of our forces. And we might here put in and come out with more variety of wind and weather, or if opportunity were offered or need required might 36 march from hence by land to Sanlúcar, to assault and take it, being not above 12 miles or a short day's march from Puerto de Santa Maria.

Hereupon it was finally resolved and ordered by the Lord Lieutenant-General with the advice and consent of the Council at War, that the whole fleet should forthwith bear in for Puerto de Santa Maria as the fittest place to land in for the reasons lastly expressed. And our Vice-Admiral with his squadron was assigned to enter and come to an anchor first, our Admiral with his squadron in the next place, and then the Rear-Admiral with his squadron./

When it was thus resolved to go to Puerto de Santa Maria, it was moved in Council to proceed to a resolution for the manner and order of our landing and touching such actions at sea or on shore as we should then forthwith fall upon, lest else we might be driven to consult in a straight when we ought more properly to be in action or execution. More especially the Lord Cromwell did often press this point which yet was not at this time considered of any further, My Lord Lieutenant declaring that he intended to take Puerto de Santa Maria chiefly to relieve the fleet with fresh water, and that when we were come to an anchor according to our present resolution, he would there advise what was next to be done; so (it growing towards night) the assembly dissolved./

Immediately afterwards our whole fleet, whereof about 96 sail besides the Hollanders were now in view one of another, began to bear for the bay of Cadiz.

21 Octob. The 21st of October I desired his Lordship to give me the names of the Council of War and how they were to be ranked in order; who thereupon dictated them unto me to be these.


In our course towards Cadiz we descried three ships to whom some of the most windwardly of our ships gave chase. They sought a while to save themselves by good sailing, but, being deep laden and finding that our ships did win upon them and were come up so near to them that now one of our ships began to shoot at them, they quickly struck sail and submitted themselves.

The ships were called the Post Horse, the Red Hart, and the Fortune, belonging to Copenhagen, Calais and Hamburg, laden with cochineal, wines, wool, figs, raisins, oranges, lemons and other commodities taken in at Sanlúcar and consigned all to Calais in France.

However we suspected the goods to be Dunkirkers' or other enemy's shipped in those bottoms and thus consigned to Calais only for a color to obscure and conceal the true owners.

These ships were commanded to attend our fleet till the matter concerning them might be better examined; and for our better security of them we took out their Masters and some of their men, putting into them in their steads others of our own sufficient for skill and number to command them./

Saturday the 22nd of October about three o'clock in the afternoon we came into the Bay of Cadiz, my Lord of Essex with his squadron entering first. There were riding now at anchor before the town of Cadiz 15 or 16 good ships of the enemy's, whereof the Admiral of Naples, said to be 1200 tons and carrying 60 good brass pieces, was the chief. There were also here eight or nine galleys of the enemy. Our fleet came on by squadron and squadron in three divisions, with convenient distance between every squadron and in very good order, save only that the ships of the Vice-Admiral's squadron fell too much astern, sufficing him to enter into the Bay and pass up before the town alone, a great way before all the rest of the fleet.


Upon the full discovery of our fleet the enemy's ships and galleys riding before El Puntal [a fort at Cadiz which was taken by Essex on the 23rd Oct. 1625, i. e., the very day following the present entry. See Gardiner, as before, s.v.] raised their sails, cut their cables, and ran ahead of our Vice-Admiral athwart the bay of Cadiz up into a creek called Puerto Real, where they thrust themselves as far ashore as they might.

As our Vice-Admiral came on to pass by the town they made a shot or two at him from the shore before ever he or any of our fleet shot at them or at their ships.

Also the enemy's ships and galleys as they passed ahead of our Vice-Admiral's Squadron shot at us and we at them.

The first that came up to second my Lord of Essex were Sir John Chidley in the Rainbow and Captain Gilbert in the Reformation, who among them shot one of the enemy's galleys into the Wast [waist, i.e. mid-hull.] and as some say sunk her./

It was thought that if my Lord of Essex had been more immediately seconded and have attempted it, he might have prevented the enemy's ships from gaining Puerto Real and taken them in the Bay of Cadiz. But his Lordship had no special order other then only to come to an anchor hereabouts and expect the resolution and direction of a further consultation; which he did.

Yet others were of opinion [they] needed not to have foresaken their anchors, being there under protection of the town of Cadiz in such sort that we could not assault them without coming within the danger not only of their ships but also of the town's ordinance.

It was flowing water when we came in, giving the enemy's ships the means thus to put up into Puerto Real; which if we had come in at an ebb towards low water they could not have done.

My Lord of Essex being now come to an anchor above the 40 town of Cadiz, our Admiral with his squadron and the Dutch cast anchor before the town. And the Rear-Admiral before Puerto de Santa Maria at the entrance into the Bay.

Our fleet being thus at anchor, the opportunity of pursuing the enemy's shipping (fled up into Puerto Real) was for the present lost, and my Lord Lieutenant-General calling to mind that both by promise and for necessity's sake he was here speedily to advise what was next to be done, caused the flag to be forthwith hung out for assembly of the Council of War.

While the Council was assembling, there came aboard us one Jenkinson Master of an English ship laden with fish, who lay here at Cadiz to sell his fish and was ashore in the town when our fleet was first descried.

He told us that we were come to the town unexpected. And that they were not well manned nor provided for us, but in great fear and distraction, blaming the Conde de Olivares [See Gardiner, as before, s.v.] as the chief cause of provoking us to come thus to invade them.

Yet he told us that the last night there came news to Cadiz that our King had been lately at Plymouth, And that there was a fleet of above 80 Sail to come from England, but when to set forth or whether bound they could not certainly tell; whereby we were confirmed in our opinions that nothing of importance is publicly done in England but the Spaniard has intelligence of it with all speed possible.

He informed us likewise that the enemy's ships fled up into Puerto Real were for the most part Neopolitan, drawn hither lately for the King of Spain's special service, and that the Spanish fleet, which had lately been at Brazil, was now at Malaga or Gibraltar, as the constant report went at Cadiz.

This man being observed by the enemy to take boat and make towards us, they shot at him so as a great shot bassed [bruised: or qy. abased, laid low, tumbled over by 'bruising] him 41 between his legs, making a round hole the width of the bullet in his breeches, yet touched not his skin, only with the splinters of the shot he was a little hurt in the nose and in one of his hands.

At a Council of War held aboard the Anne Royal Saturday the 22nd of October 1625 in the Bay of Cadiz.

The Council being met, it was taken into consideration what was necessary further to be done for the effecting of our designs. And it was conceived that by the flight of the enemy's ships at our entrance into the Bay, and by such intelligence as we had now gotten from Cadiz, that we were come hither unlooked for and the town not very well provided, but in great fear and distraction by reason of our sudden approach, so as for any thing yet appearing to the contrary it seemed unto some that by a present attempt upon the town of Cadiz before they might recollect and settle themselves or obtain further supplies of ammunition, men and victuals to withstand our forces, we might probably carry it with assault or composition in a short space. But our ships rode yet (some of them) within shot of the town and others within shot of the fort of El Puntal. And it was held a vain thing to consult or think of attempting Cadiz or any other place until we had provided a safe harbor for our ships, the chief bulwarks of England and only hope of our return, which was now conceived could not be done without gaining the fort of El Puntal; for the water up towards Puerto de Santa Maria, upon better information or discovery thereof appeared now to be shallow, namely but ten or twelve feet at full sea and five or six feet at low water, that it was no fit harbor for our whole fleet. And that we should not be able to make altogether so ready use of that place for landing our men as was once hoped. And by reason we must row somewhat far with our boats to deliver our men ashore. But about El Puntal was very good anchoring, so as if we were once masters of that fort 42 all our ships might well be disposed of to ride in the Bay of Cadiz in safety.

It was therefore resolved by the Lord Lieutenant-General, with the assent of the Council of War, that the fort of El Puntal should be forthwith assaulted by a battery to be made upon it by five Dutch ships, to be particularly assigned by the Admiral of Holland and by 20 colliers or Newcastle ships, to be particularly assigned by the Lord Lieutenant-General, with three of the King's Ships to make towards the place for the better countenance of the service; the Dutch ships and colliers to go up as near to the fort as they might, whereby their battery and small shot might have the better effect.

In the next place it was moved by some of the Council, that a present course might be agreed upon and prosecuted, for the taking, sinking, blocking up, or firing of the ships and galleys, fled from us up into Puerto Real, as being a thing of great consequence to weaken the enemy and strengthen us if we could get their Ships, or but their ordinance and lading, which we were informed to be of great value. And that it was not good to give them any respite, who by the benefit of time having the shore to friend and being well skilled in the channel might gather more heart, and upon long and serious advice take some course to frustrate our desires touching those ships, by landing their ordinance and planting them ashore or by other means; or peradventure the change of wind and weather might hinder us of coming at them when we would. But it was replied that those ships were in effect our own already, being lodged in a place where they were safe enough and could not stir from us, And that El Puntal was first to be obtained and a safe harbor for our fleet thereby to be provided, before any other thing was to be thought upon. These speeches prevailed so far that without any further resolution or consultation at this time, either touching the landing of our army upon the Island of Cadiz (which points had been lightly touched at) the Council was soon dissolved.


According to this resolution for the assault of El Puntal, the Admiral and Vice-Admiral of Holland being present at the Council, took notice what was to be done by them. And my Lord Lieutenant-General appointed Sir Michael Geare and Master Francis Carew to go forthwith by barge and warn 20 of the Newcastle ships of our fleet particularly to join with the Hollanders and begin an instant battery upon the fort of El Puntal. And the Earl of Essex, Vice-Admiral in the Swiftsure, with Sir John Chidley in the Rainbow, and Captain Gilbert in the Reformation, were appointed for the King's three ships that should countenance this assault.

Sir Michael Geare and Master Carew attended the service, and gave notice to such Newcastle ships as should particularly go on upon this employment.

The Dutch with six or eight ships began a battery forthwith upon this fort and continued it till nine or ten o'clock, but few of the English came up this night to second them. And the King's ships by reason of the ebb could not this night come up to the service.

About eleven o'clock at night the Dutch gave over their battery, having by this time made about 500 shot at the fort, which returned not one for ten to them again, whereby we collected that they had few or no pieces mounted, or else that they wanted powder and shot; which did the more embolden and encourage us against them.

23 Octob. The 23rd of October, being Sunday, by four o'clock in the morning as we were about to go to prayers and receive the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, the Admiral of Holland with some of the Dutch came aboard us, complaining (and as it seemed not without cause) that they were not well seconded the last night in the assault begun upon El Puntal, alleging that they might have taken it that night if our ships had assisted as it was ordered in Council. He further alleged that two of their ships were aground and very 44 dangerously shot in such sort that if there were not a speedy course taken to relieve them against it should be daylight, they would be utterly lost.

My Lord Lieutenant made answer that he would take present order herein, and so dismissed them./

Before five o'clock we went to prayers and began the Communion, which as soon as my Lord with Sir Thomas Love and some others had received, they left the ship before the Communion ended and without my knowledge went to the Earl of Essex's ship, riding near to El Puntal; where they spent the whole day.

As soon as it was clear daylight we might observe that some passed between El Puntal and the town of Cadiz, reinforcing it with men and munition as we conceived. The town also began to shoot at our Admiral where she rode at anchor; but they had not above one or two pieces that would reach us and that but at random, so as having shot one only bullet into our ship which did us no hurt, about noon, they gave over shooting at us any more.

In the mean time my Lord Lieutenant-General had drawn some of the King's ships and other of the fleet very near to El Puntal and began and continued the battery afresh upon the fort from morning til mid-afternoon, both with great ordinance and also with musket shot: for diverse of our ships came close up within the distance of caliver and pistol shot and plyed the defle [played the devil. The MS. looks like 'deftle'.] so busily from our ships, that by reason of the parapet of the fort was but low, they that defended the fort could not attend to travas [traverse—a phrase used for maneuvering weapons in fight, i. e. to wheel or alter the direction of a cannon to left or right. There is a substantive 'travis.'] and manage their ordinance, but after a while gave over shooting at us, the rather (as it seemed) for that some of their ordinance were become useless through the shot which they received 45 from us, so as they had not above one serviceable piece of ordinance left in the fort, which Don Francisco Bustamente (who at/ this time commanded the fort) did himself in his own person charge and discharge; few or none else of his Company (as it seemed) having the skill or courage to do it.

In this assault Captain Porter in the Convertive and his Master, Mr. Hill, and Captain Raymond in the great Saphire with his Master, Mr. Kenton were moved to do the best service, whereof the two latter were slain with a great shot from the fort.

This day about noon we perceived from our ship that the enemy's galleys passed from Cadiz to Puerto de Santa Maria carrying as we thought the wealth of the place and might come back in the night bringing men or munition or both, to our prejudice, and albeit some of our ships which rode about those parts put themselves under sail and shot at the galleys, yet it was to litle purpose for any thing we could observe, of all which I forthwith advertised his Lordship by letter praying him to take it into present consideration and apply a fit remedy.

Towards four o'clock my Lord Lieutenant-General gave order for the landing of some of our troops with intent to scale the fort of El Puntal, and so to take it or at least to take from them all hope of relief from the town of Cadiz, and so force them the sooner to surrender.

The first that attempted land was Captain Edw. Bromigeham, Captain of my Lord Duke's Company, who coming on valiantly with his sword drawn under the fort walls was slain in his boat with a musket shot and divers of his men that came in the same boat with him were killed with stones rolled over the parapet./

What the reason was why he adventured to land thus under the fort, I know not, but have heard he did it by direction, and that the reasons of such direction were, for that the fort, not having made any shot at us in a long time before nor many musketeers 46 showed themselves of late upon the platform, it was thought safe enough for him to go ashore in this place and more for the honour of our action, and for that it was doubted there might be ambushes placed in the parts adjoining; but the enemy who had long before much concealed and contained themselves, taking present advantage of his approach so much within distance of the fort and in effect just under it, made us quickly to see our error; which was instantly reformed by commanding the next companies to land further off, which they speedily performed, finding no ambushes there, and began to draw themselves into order.

Colonel Burgh by special order from the Lord Lieutenant-General had the charge and command of the first troops that landed of what regiment soever they were, until the other commanders and the rest of the army (if there were cause) should also be landed; which service he performed with good resolution and judgment.

They of the fort no sooner saw our men landing and drawing into order but they hung out flags or made signs for truce and parley whereupon we sent a drum to them and put Sir Alexander Brett [See Gardiner, as before ii. 132, 182. Query brother to Arthur Brett and the Countess of Middlesex, wife of the Lord Treasurer (Middlesex)? See further in the Progresses of King James I. vol. iii. pp. 970, 984, and "Diary of Walter Yonge, Esq." (Camden Society), p. 76.] into the castle to secure Don Francisco Bustamente, while he came forth and treated first with Sir John Burgh and then with Sir William St. Leger to agree the conditions for a surrender./

At first he demanded not only to march away with their colors flying, their swords by their sides, their muskets charged with match burning in cock, their bandoliers full, and bullets in their mouth, but very boldly propounded to have away all their ordinance belonging to the fort and a certificate from us that he had behaved himself like a valiant and good soldier to his 47 King in defending the fort as long as might be; but at last he agreed and did surrender without the two latter conditions and forgot to contract when or to what place he should be suffered to go.

The fort being thus taken in, there were found to be in it about 120 men and 15 barrels of powder with some great and small shot, but no great store of either. There were also found some dead bodies which the enemy to dissemble their loss had cunningly buried in the rubbish. Don Francisco Bustamente behaved himself like a noble and brave captain in defending of this piece, alleging in excuse of himself for his surrendering it so soon that it was suddenly manned (not with soldiers, but for the most part with townsmen), who, being over terrified with the incessant battery of our great shot and utterly dismayed with the continual volleys of our musketeers threatened to kill him if he would not surrender, or else he (as he affirmed) would have made us buy it dearer; yet he pretended that we had made at it in all above 2000 great shot.

He sought to lessen all things that might encourage us and advance the contrary, saying to that end that he doubted not but he had slain at least 100 of our men, yet affirmed confidently that he had not lost above one or two; both which pretenses were utterly false, for we, having slain many more of his men then he would confess of, lost yet scarce so many of our own in all the service about taking in this fort as we slew of his.

He reputed Cadiz to be extraordinarily well-manned and victualled and thoroughly stored with ammunition. But in respect he was an enemy and we had observed his humor by his former speeches we were sparing to give overmuch credit to his words.

The fort of El Puntal is situated upon a point of land shooting forth between two litle bays on either side and is set so far into the water that at every flood it becomes an island.

When we came into it, we found it to be a large and goodly 48 foundation intended for 30 or 40 pieces of ordinance in several platforms one above another, but it was now but in building, nothing near finished nor furnished; for there were only eight pieces mounted on the lower platform towards the sea, the rest of the platforms not being yet well capable of ordinance nor their parapets raised, neither was the gate of the fort as yet finished but another slight door hung on to serve for the time, the defect whereof was supplied by a great multitude of stones rolled and heaped up together in the arch and entrance into the fort, wholly filling up the passage, in such sort as did sufficiently secure it. This fort was built of a kind of stone not apt to splinter, and so well filled between the walls for mounting of the platforms that our great shot had done but litle hurt save in battery of some part of the parapet which seemed to be the only defect in all the fortification; for it was thought by us to be too thin and too low, not answerable in strength or proportion to the rest of the work.

There was within the fort a pit well of bad water, which the enemy before they quitted the place had dammed up that it might be of no use to us till it were new digged and cleared again.

The enemy having quitted the fort, we placed therein a garrison of 200 of our men, under the command of Capt. Gore and Captain Hill and conveyed Don Francisco Bustamente with his company to the other side of the bay and there set them ashore that they might go to the town of Cadiz. So we were become master of a sufficient part of the harbor for the safe riding of our ships out of shot of the town and for the safe landing of all the rest of our men with our horses, ordinance and provisions upon the island, if it should be so thought fit.

About nine o'clock at night my Lord Lieutenant-General returned to his own ship, having given order that all the rest of the army with the horses and ordinance should be landed at El Puntal with all speed possible. Wherein such diligence was 49 used that most of our forces were landed by the next morning, save only 600 or 800 men transported out of English ships belonging to the Rear-Admiral's squadron remained yet aboard, for those ships riding far below before Puerto de Santa Maria could not land their men so soon as our other ships by reason of the great distance between that place and El Puntal. And albeit the fort of El Puntal were now taken in and manned, whereby the full intent of yesterday's resolution in council for providing in the first place a safe harbor for our ships was accomplished, yet we proceeded to land still more and more of our soldiers upon the island of Cadiz and spent this whole Sunday night with great diligence in that service. By what order it was so done I know not, only I suppose that my Lord Lieutenant General this Sunday while he was in my Lord of Essex's ship, where also divers of the Council of War were present with him, came there to some latter resolution for the landing of our whole army and power in this place, and to think no more of Puerto de Santa Maria./

24 Octob. Upon Monday morning the 24th of October my Lord Lieutenant General took his barge from his own ship which rode then between Cadiz and El Puntal and rowed up to the Earl of Denbigh, riding then before Puerto de Santa Maria, and after some short conference had with the Earl, they both took barge and rowed towards El Puntal.

As they passed, a rumor met them that the Reformation was on fire, the suspicion whereof was increased by the great smoke that arose from her; and the danger that might grow thereby was apprehended to be the greater by reason most of the ships of our fleet having resorted to El Puntal about the assault thereof or for the landing of our men lay there abouts very thick together in great disorder and confusion. My Lord dispatched away Sir Michael Geare to inquire out the state of the Reformation touching the suspected fire, and held on his course for El Puntal, where he arrived about nine o'clock, the whole army well near by this time landed 50 save only such soldiers as had been transported in the Rear-Admiral's squadron, who riding far below from El Puntal could not so soon land as those that rode nearer up to El Puntal.

There were divers of the Council of War now assembled at El Puntal and my Lord Lieutenant General declared his intention here to advise with them what was next and best to be done.

Sir Michael Geare brought word that all was well in the Reformation, but with all a sudden rumour came that some forces of the enemy's were coming on by land towards the town of Cadiz, and were in some nearness to skirmish with our men. Hereupon his Lordship thinking that his personal presence would be requisite in the army to direct and assist our troops for the receiving and repelling of the enemy, and calling to mind also that the points touching which he intended now to have held his Council were of much importance and required good expedition, he called unto him the Earl of Denbigh and acquainted him in few words how the state of things stood; and withal desired and assigned his Lordship to supply the place of Admiral of the whole fleet, while my Lord Lieutenant-General should remain ashore, and more especially that he would forthwith go aboard the Swiftsure, riding then near to El Puntal, and there by the proper flags hung out to assemble a general Council and by their advice to settle these three points with their necessary circumstances.

  1. To make provision for victualling of the land forces for some competent time from hence forth till further order might be taken.
  2. To dispose of the whole by their several squadrons to ride in the most convenient places and best order that might be, for their own safety and for offence to the enemy.
  3. To consider and resolve what is fittest to be done touching the enemy's ships and galleys which were run up into Puerto Real.

According to this direction of my Lord Lieutenant General, the 51 Earl of Denbigh went forthwith aboard the Swiftsure and caused the flag of council to be hung out.

Before the Council could be assembled the Earl of Denbigh, calling to mind that besides the three points given in charge by my Lord Lieutenant-General to be settled in Council, his Lordship had absolutely commanded another thing to be done touching the present landing of such soldiers transported by the Rear-Admiral's Squadron as were not yet set ashore, gave order for a warrant to be drawn to that purpose; which was speedily accomplished. This warrant required all captains and commanders of shipping in the fleet to visit the ships of the Rear-Admiral's squadron and inquire what soldiers unlanded were in any of them. And that they should attend and apply themselves with all their ketches and boats forthwith, to land such of them as were not yet landed and then repair again to their own squadrons.

This warrant was no sooner drawn and signed but it was sent to Sir John Watts to be by him put in due execution.

While these things were in doing, Capt. Johnson, who commanded in a ship of ammunition, came and complained to the Earl of Denbigh that he wanted a boat to supply his occasions for the landing or conveying to or fro of himself and such provisions as were requisite to supply the sea and land service; for remedy whereof, his Lordship took present order, giving him a warrant signed agreeable to his desire, whereby he enabled him to press and take any boat of the fleet that he should think fit (except the boats belonging to the king's ships).

Between ten and eleven o'clock a competent number of the Council of War and other sea captains being assembled the three special points committed to the Earl of Denbigh's charge were taken into consideration and well debated and in conclusion thus far resolved./ 52

At a Council of War held aboard the Swiftsure in the Bay of Cadiz upon Monday the 24th of October 1625.

This Council was assembled and held by the right honorable the Earl of Denbigh deputed by my Lord Lieutenant-General to be Admiral to all purposes when my Lord Lieutenant-General should be ashore (as now he was) about land-service.

More especially the Earl of Denbigh was desired at this time to settle these three points with their necessary circumstances, namely:

  1. To make provision for victualling of the land forces for some competent time from henceforth til further order might be taken.
  2. To dispose of the whole fleet by their several squadrons to ride in the most convenient places and best order that might be for their own safety and for offence to the enemy./
  3. To consider and resolve what is fittest to be done touching the enemy's ships and galleys which were run up into Puerto Real.

Between ten and eleven o'clock in the forenoon a competent number of the Council of War and other sea captains being assembled, these three points were taken into consideration and well debated and in conclusion thus far resolved.

For the first, it was held fit and agreed that the captains and commanders of all ships in the fleet wherein any soldiers were transported should send and convey from every of their ships provision of meat and drink for such number of soldiers as were or should be landed out of their several ships respectively for seven days from the time that their soldiers were discharged from them after the rate of five to a mess, accounting such provisions of this kind (if any were) as they had formerly sent to be parcel of their seven days' store. And in every such case to add now only a proportion to make up the rate for the whole time. It was also thought fit and agreed that the seven days provisions for the first three days of the seven should be bread and cheese, and for the latter four days bread and beef, and the drink for the whole time beer or beverage [a sweet kind of cider made of the leavings of the better kind.] as 53 it could most readily be come by in every ship. That all these provisions should be delivered to the commander of the fort of El Puntal or to his deputy, the bread and cheese, beer, and beverage forthwith and the beef ready-dressed as soon as it could be watered and boiled; furthermore that all these provisions should be carefully stowed and sent in bags or vessels fit for the purpose with an inscription to be set upon every such bag or vessel, making mention of the quantity and quality of every parcel of meat and drink therein contained, and for how many soldiers, and of what company or regiment the same was assigned and belonging. And that every one delivering such provisions should take an acquitance from the Commander of El Puntal or his deputy, testifying his receipt of the same provisions accordingly.

Also it was thought fit and agreed that the Commander of El Puntal or his deputy should receive into custody all these provisions of meat and drink, and bestow and keep the same in safe and convenient places, and not to issue them forth other then by warrant from the Lord Lieutenant-General, or some other of the colonels, captains, or commanders of the field for their several troops, regiments, and companies respectively. And that the same Commander or his deputy, by the help of some fit clerk, should keep a true note of the quantity and quality of all such victuals as they received, and of the time when and parties from whom they so received the same.

In preparation of the resolution for this first point the Council intended and took care that the army should be victualled for such a time as might not too soon require any other consultation to be held about the same matter. And yet not for so long a time as might peradventure exceed the time of their staying ashore. That every ship should victual her own soldiers and know certainly what to send and how to compute the 7 days. That the soldiers should not be put to any fish allowance this first week, but be victualled of the best for their encouragement. And if it 54 had been conceived that beer enough could have been come at in every ship without rummaging, beverage had been for this week excluded. That the soldiers provision might come wholesomely and neatly to them. That it might be discernible who did observe and who did neglect these directions, whereby offenders might be punished if there were cause. That all provisions to be sent ashore might there be safely kept in a place of fit distance and secure access to serve the army. And that every company of soldiers might know how to challenge the victuals belonging properly to themselves without trouble or confusion. All which particulars are conceived to be competently provided for in the precedent Act.

Touching the second special point referred to the Council, it was thought fit and agreed that all the ships of the Admiral's Squadron should forthwith prepare to ride in fair berths about the Anne Royal, in the place where she was then at anchor, being between Cadiz and El Puntal. And that all the ships of the Vice-Admiral's squadron should forthwith repair to ride in like sort about the Swiftsure near El Puntal, being the place where she was then at anchor. And that all the ships of the Rear-Admiral's Squadron (having landed their soldiers) should repair forthwith to ride in fair berths about the St. Andrew over against Santa Catalina, [the point to the west of Puerto de Santa Maria.] where she was then at anchor, and dispose themselves there into such order that they might keep all ships, galleys, and boats of the enemy's from going in or out to or from Cadiz and Puerto de Santa Maria, or other the parts adjoining. But for the Dutch squadron it was thought fit and agreed to leave them at their own liberty, to ride in such place as they themselves should elect and think most convenient, so as it were without prejudice to this order assigned for the English fleet.

For the third, which was held the most important of all the rest, it was alleged that it was a shame to us that those ships and 55 galleys fled up by Puerto Real had been so long neglected, and that it argued fear or improvidence in us to suffer them so long unattempted. That we rode in very great danger of being fired in harbor if we dispatched not our business and put to sea again with expedition. That if the enemy's fleet and ships of war should come in upon us, as we were hourly to expect they might by help of their galleys and by some other means row or get out of Puerto Real and so assault us before and behind and from the town of Cadiz all at once, to the great endangering of our whole fleet and dishonour of our nation. And lastly that these ships and galleys would be a fair purchase if they could be taken, or a great loss to the enemy if they might be confounded; wherefore it was thought fit and fully agreed, that the Vice-Admiral of our fleet with all the ships belonging to that squadron (the Admiral of Holland and all his ships joining with him) should forthwith prepare themselves to attempt these ships and galleys of the enemy. And that with the first opportunity of wind and tide they should go in hand with this service and prosecute it to effect with all expedition, till they had taken or fired or otherwise destroyed those ships and galleys, or so many of them as possible they might. But touching the further means and manner how to undertake and accomplish this design, it was thought fit and agreed, that it should be left to the judgment of the chief commanders of the ships belonging to these squadrons; for whose better enabling nevertheless two of those vessels of our fleet wherein horses were transported, with sufficient combustible matter to be expended in either of them, should attend the pleasure of the commanders for this action; disposed and to be made use of as they should direct, for setting on fire of the enemy's ships and galleys as occasion should be offered, and that whosoever should be found remiss or negligent in performing any part of these directions should answer the same at their uttermost perils.


At this meeting, it was moved that the Council would be pleased to set an order and prescribe the means how the soldiers and land service might be supplied with powder and shot. But it was not taken into consideration, partly for that it was none of the three points specially referred by my Lord Lieutenant-General, and partly because it was conceived to belong partly to the care and charge of the Viscount Valentia as he was Master of the Ordinance in this expedition.

At the rising of the council the Earl of Denbigh, observing that as the weather and tide then were nothing could forthwith be done touching the assault of the ships and galleys at Puerto Real and bearing special respect to my Lord Lieutenant-General who was now ashore, but was not conceived to be very far off, showed himself desirous that his Lordship should be made acquainted with the proceedings and effect of this consultation and his approbation thereof obtained before it should be put in execution. To this purpose it was forthwith ordered that I should forthwith go to the fort of El Puntal and there acquaint my Lord Lieutenant-General with what had passed at this meeting, or if I found him not there then to command a horse and seek out his Lordship elsewhere and so accomplish the service enjoined./

It was now about one o'clock and so the Council dissolved. According to the commandment of the Earl of Denbigh I went to El Puntal, being conveyed thither by Sir John Chudley in his Barge, but, missing my Lord Lieutenant-General there, I was forced to seek him out elsewhere, and so with much ado I got a dull and ill-paced horse, by the help whereof I rode as far as to Hercules pillar [This would ordinarily mean Gibraltar, but it must here be some place in the Isle of Leon.], where I found the Lord Lieutenant-General with seven or eight regiments of the army ready, as they then expected, to encounter instantly with the enemy, supposed to be at hand in good number, though afterwards it proved otherwise. I told 57 my Lord the occasion of my coming, offering to read unto him my notes touching the resolutions taken aboard the Swiftsure but he alleged he had then no time to hear them read, desiring me to inform him shortly of the effect thereof: which I did, and his Lordship declared instantly that he did well approve and fully ratify the same in all things, desiring that the Earl of Denbigh would no longer forbear to have it put in execution.

Moreover, his Lordship gave in charge to commend to the Earl of Denbigh's consideration how a company of 100 foot or more might be raised out of the sea men by selecting and arming a man or two out of every ship that could best spare them; of which company he would have Captain Osborne to be made Captain, and to attend his further directions about El Puntal.

Also he willed me to put the Earl of Denbigh in mind that/ for want of attendance of boats at El Puntal, messages could not be readily conveyed between the army and the ships, nor the victual of the soldiers brought from El Puntal to Hercules Pillars and such places further up in the Island of Cadiz as the service of the soldiers in these parts seemed now to require.

I made back for El Puntal with what speed I could, but by reason of the ill way and badness of my horse, it was almost night before I got there and it was so long before I could get a boat that it was hard night before I could get aboard the Admiral.

The Earl of Denbigh at this time was gone aboard his own ship riding far down before Puerto de Santa Maria, three or four miles distant from the Admiral, so as by reason thereof and for that the boats of the ship were now abroad on other service, I could not go nor send that night to the Earl of Denbigh. But his Lordship had promised to come aboard us the next morning betimes, there again to sit in Council if need were, and to dispatch such business incident to the Admiral's place as might fall out to be necessary. And then I thought I might in good time acquaint him with my Lord Lieutenant-General's answer and directions.


By my late being ashore in the Island of Cadiz I understood that my Lord Lieutenant-General had by word of mouth given order for the bringing of some victuals for the soldiers to El Puntal, whereof I knew nothing, while the Earl of Denbigh sat in Council in the Swiftsure; and in my return from Hercules pillars I observed many boats rowing to and fro between that and El Puntal with provisions for the army, not well knowing where nor to whom to deliver them; the reason of which disorder as I understood afterwards was, because those of El Puntal where my Lord Lieutenant-General had appointed the provisions to be delivered and where most of the boats offered first to deliver the same, refused to receive them, saying they had no order to that purpose. This caused much loss of time and labor and was a further reason why some of the ships assigned to go for the Puerto Real could not well attend the same this day for want of their boats; which were occupied for the most part in the service of conveying victuals for the soldiers to El Puntal and from thence to other places, finding there no discharge.

While the Earl of Denbigh bestirred himself thus on shipboard, my Lord Lieutenant-General being ashore, the same 24th of October, began to march with the whole army towards the Bridge of Cadiz, intending as it seemed to possess that or the Straight of the Island and to make it good there, to hinder the enemy's bringing any supplies into the town of Cadiz by land.

But it was now discovered that those of the town had drawn forth an ambush of musketeers into a vineyard or orange garden behind El Puntal not far from the way where our men and carriages were to pass with our field ordinance and provisions from El Puntal towards the army; whereby they cut off some few of our improvident [careless] and straggling men.

To prevent this inconvenience therefore and such others as might 59 happen to us while the main body of the army was removed further off, my Lord Lieutenant towards the evening appointed two regiments to march back towards Cadiz under the conduct of Colonel Burgh and Colonel Bruce, to descry and disperse the enemy's ambushes for preservation of our loose men and to keep those of the town from sallying out upon us, lest else the enemy's forces coming on from the bridge, we might at once be set upon both behind and before to our great danger.

Sir John Burgh and Sir Henry Bruce, marching back with so many soldiers of their regiments as were now landed, took up their lodging that night before Cadiz, but not near the town; yet so as they secured us against the ambushes and sallies of the town.

My Lord Lieutenant with the rest of the army marched on two or three miles beyond Hercules pillars, where they found the houses of diverse gentlemen and cavaliers utterly forsaken by the inhabitants and all their goods carried away, save only what was left to do us mischief; for there was found in these houses exceeding great plenty of new wine in iron-bound casks, four or five hundred pipes or more.

It was now grown so late that my Lord Lieutenant, not being well able to march any further, took up his lodging here with all his troops for this night. Here the soldiers of his Lordship's special favor having obtained a competent proportion of a butt of wine for every regiment, therewith to refresh themselves, were so disordered in the expence [expenditure, or using] thereof, that some of the worser sort, being first distempered therewith, set on the rest and grew to demand more wine, in such disorder and with such violence that they contemned all command and set light not only by their ordinary officers but even by the more eminent commanders, not respecting my Lord Lieutenant himself, nor abstained from slighting his authority, using base and contemptuous words both against his person and place. No words of exhortation, no blows of correction would restrain 60 them, but, breaking with violence into the rooms where the wines were, crying out that they were King Charles his men and fought for him, caring for no man else. They claimed all the wine as their own, due to them for their service, and proceeded to distemper themselves therewith still more, till in effect the whole army except only the commanders, was all drunken and in one common confusion: some of them shooting one at another among themselves. Nor could this mischief be wholly restrained, though by the special command of his Lordship all the rest of the wine was staved with as much expedition as might be; for then with their hats and head pieces they dipped it up in the cellars and vaults where it swam about, swearing and protesting many of them that they had not tasted a drop of beer or wine that day, nor the day before, though they were absolutely drunken when they said so.

Howbeit true it is, that some of them by reason of the uncertain course which was yet held touching their victualling and the not delivery and misdelivery of their provisions had not been at all relieved with meat and drink since their landing, or at leastwise not in such orderly and good sort as they might or should have been; for being suddenly landed, either for haste or want of good order formerly taken, many of them brought not in their knap sacks such victualling as had been fit, or else they had wastefully consumed at one meal that which should have served them for divers days; but the case of the most was that they brought with them only their knap sacks without any victuals at all.

The next morning, being Tuesday, my Lord Lieutenant finding the unworthiness of the soldiers and their unfitness for service by reason of their base condition and unskillfulness in the use of their arms, as also through the long fasting and late distemper of the most of them, resolved to desist from marching any further towards the bridge. And therefore his Lordship with the main body of the army returned towards the town of Cadiz to the other two regiments. Some of the Soldiers through the weakness of their late 61 drunkenness or other faintness not being able, and others through their base unworthiness not caring to carry their arms with them./

The same Tuesday morning between four and five o'clock, our fleet was put into no little fear of firing; apprehended by reason of the hull of a ship of the enemy's of about 200 tons, which came floating with the tide from Puerto de Santa Maria or Cadiz towards our fleet, supposed to be a ship with fire works sent forth by our enemies, to float or drive in among us and there to take fire by a train. But at last manning out some boats with musketeers, we fastened grappers in her and so towed her ahead of, over to the Puerto Real side, and then entering and searching her, found her to be an empty vessel ready prepared to be sunk, and broken loose by negligence as most men conceived. Howbeit, some they were who thought she was let go only to try the true inclination of the float and drift of the tide against another time. And that if she had been now manned by the enemy, who by boats brought for the purpose might probably have escaped in the night when the train had been ready almost to take fire and she got so near to our fleet, that we could not thus have fastened a tow [rope or cable] unto her, nor prevented her driving in among us, especially if three or four ships and boats fastened together at good distances with iron chains had so come towards us.

Having thus towed her aside, we sunk her forthwith in the bay, for she was so leaky and forward in sinking when we entered her, that we could not preserve her any longer to make other use of her.

This morning also there swam to us from Puerto Real a Dutch boy that was formerly detained prisoner in some of the ships fled up there.


This boy declared unto us in what manner those ships had disposed of themselves and what means they had used to prevent us from coming up to them.

About eight o'clock the Earl of Denbigh came aboard the Anne Royal and being by me advertised how my Lord Lieutenant-General had confirmed the resolutions of yesterday's Council, he thereupon signed two warrants, dated as of yesterday; the one directed to the captains and commanders of the ships for the victualling of the soldiers for seven days, and therein to observe the directions of the resolution touching that point taken aboard the Swiftsure. The other directed to the Commander of El Puntal or to his deputy, requiring the performance of so much of the same resolution as concerned them.

These warrants were delivered forthwith to Mr. Westbrook one of our Master's mates, who spent the whole day in rowing to El Puntal and from ship to ship to deliver and notify them to the parties whom they concerned.

As soon as his Lordship had dispatched away these warrants he caused the flags of Council to be hung out, and it was not long before diverse of the Council were assembled, proceeding as follows./

25 Octob.

At a Council of War held aboard the Anne Royal in the Bay of Cadiz, Tuesday the 25th of October 1625.

At this Council I declared how I had attended the Lord Lieutenant-General yesterday, and acquainted him with the resolutions of the Council held the same day aboard the Swiftsure, and how his Lordship had in all things ratified the same, willing it to be put in execution with speed. Also I now acquainted the Council (as the truth was) that his Lordship had given me further in charge to deliver unto them how he desired a company of foot of 100 or more sea men to be raised and armed by taking one or two men out of every ship as they could spare and to assign them under the command of Captain Osborne to attend his Lordship's/ pleasure about El Puntal for his Majesty's service. And that order should be 63 given for boats to attend at El Puntal to carry passengers and provisions of victual and ammunition to and fro to places requisite upon all occasions.

It was now about nine o'clock and instantly hereupon the Earl of Denbigh by the approbation of the Council of War now assembled, enjoined Sir Samuel Argall, Captain of the Swiftsure, who in the absence of the Earl of Essex (now on shore attending his charge there of Colonel-General) was to command at sea as Vice-Admiral of the fleet; that he with all the ships of that squadron should forthwith attend and prosecute to full effect the service upon the enemy's ships and galleys at Puerto Real/ according to the resolution taken yesterday.

Advertisement was also now given to the Dutch squadron of the same resolution and intention that they might join with us in the service.

At this time many mariners and sea men belonging to the Vice-Admiral's squadron were now on shore about El Puntal, without whom their ships not being well manned could not conveniently set about the service required, wherefore the Earl of Denbigh, by assent of the Council of War now assembled, sent speedily a warrant directed to the Commander of El Puntal or to his deputy, thereby willing and commanding him forthwith to proclaim by beating of a drum, that all mariners and sea men belonging to any ships of that squadron, which then were ashore at El Puntal or in the parts adjoining, should forthwith repair aboard their several ships, upon pain of death.

Also at the same time, out of his further care to advance the service, he granted by like assent of the Council of War another warrant to Sir Samuel Argall, thereby authorising him to take and dispose as he should think fit any one or two fly boats ["A large flat-bottomed Dutch vessel, whose burden is generally from 300 to 600 tons. Distinguished by a remarkably high stern resembling a Gothic turret and by very broad buttocks below. Also a swift canal passage-boat." (Admiral Smyth's Sailors' Word-Book).] 64 then empty, wherein horses were transported, that he might make use of them for the service now enjoined as occasion should be offered.

By that time these things were finished, many of the Council had withdrawn themselves to attend their particular charges, so as the Earl of Denbigh finding now no just cause to attend here any longer, departed for this time; promising to come again tomorrow morning, and willing me then to put him in mind about the matter of raising a company for Captain Osborne, and for the boats to give better attendance about El Puntal.

In the afternoon, about two o'clock, my Lord Lieutenant, &c., came aboard the Admiral, whereby he declared that he had given order if any soldiers remained yet aboard, they should not now be landed at all, unless further order came from him to that purpose; whereby I collected some inclination in his Lordship not to keep the army long ashore in the Island of Cadiz; and after a while his Lordship went again ashore to attend the service by land, leaving still the sea command to the Earl of Denbigh.

As soon as the wind and tide would permit Sir Samuel Argall, with the squadron and ships assigned to that service, weighed anchor, and set sail for Puerto Real, taking with them for their better information the Dutch boy that had so swum unto us this morning and a ketch; which was employed to go before and sound the channel for the better direction of their entrance. At their coming up before the creek, where the enemy's ships were run in, they found four ships to be sunk in their way, with a passage left only for one ship to enter at once as the Dutch boy had before informed us; wherefore, considering now that our ships could enter but one and one and only bring their chase pieces to play upon the enemy who had so disposed of their ships that many of them at once might play upon us with their whole broadsides. And for that it was suspected they had also planted ordinance on shore for our further annoyance if once we came on within distance, 65 it was feared to be a service very dangerous and unlikely to succeed well if we should further attempt the taking of the said ships and galleys of the enemy by force in the place where now they were.

And touching the confounding of them by firing or blocking up, this also was become very difficult: and the masters of the horse boats appointed to this service (whether out of a desire to save the vessels or for that they were not yet fully discharged of their horses, hay, and other provisions I know not) showed a backwardness in attending the commands of Sir Samuel Argall, concerning the same.

This day also Captain Oxenbridge, captain of the Dragon began a battery upon a sconce [fortified place (usually small)] of the enemy at Santa Catalina near Puerto de Santa Maria, requiring Captain Plumley of the William and Thomas to fall astern and assist him, saying he had order so to do, whereas indeed he had not. They received some damage from the sconce but did litle or none to it.

My Lord Lieutenant being returned to the army, consulted there this evening with divers of the colonels and Council of War, whether without loss of honour they might ship their soldiers again, quitting the town of Cadiz: and what was fittest to be done for preservation of the fleet and army and accomplishing the service enjoined us by his Majesty.

Hereupon in the first place, it was held no matter of dishonor for us to quit the town upon good judgment, having not yet engaged ourselves by any battery against it, nor breaking ground to entrench ourselves before it.

In the next place it was thought best to ship our army again with all convenient expedition; of which opinion I conceive these to be the reasons.

  1. For that the main matter given us in charge was the intercepting 66 of the plate fleet, which by our stay here was neglected, the utmost time of their approach by the course of the year drawing on now apace; and if we lay still here it could not be expected that they would come in upon us or to Sanlúcar: rather by the benefit of such advice as might be sent them would put in at Lisbon or elsewhere more northerly, so to escape us while we remained in these southeasterly parts of their country.

  2. For that our ships riding here in the enemy's harbor were thereby subject to those dangers whereof some observation is here before made upon another occasion.

  3. For that the town of Cadiz was apprehended to be so strongly fortified that it was not to be carried without a siege, for which we were not thoroughly victualled.

  4. For that the galley having already passed to and from the town they had in all probability carried away the best of their goods, eased the place of their superfluous inhabitants and supplied it with soldiers and munition; which must needs occasion the longer and more difficult siege.

  5. That, the town being situated in an island, between which and the continent was no passage for our shipping, we could only besiege it by sea on the one side before the town, where we might ride at anchor by the benefit of the bay or harbor, but in other places on the other side towards the points of the island, they might take advantage, especially in the nights; and by the help of their galleys to relieve the town with all things necessary, wherein we should no way be able to prevent or hinder them./

  6. And lastly for that our Soldiers by the experience which the Commanders had now gotten of them were found very unserviceable and unfit for a design.

I was not present my self at this consultation but have followed in this relation thereof the best observations that I could make out of other relations.


My Lord Lieutenant lodged this night ashore in the army, walking the round twice or thrice in the night to see all things in good order.

Sir Thomas Love, who had been ashore during this deliberation, came again aboard the Admiral the same Tuesday night and there directed how in the march of the army towards the Bridge of Cadiz [The Puente de Zuazo, joining the island with the main land.] there were found a litle beyond Hercules pillars 10 or 12 great boats or shallops for tuna fishing, with great store of nets and Cork, supposed to belong to the Duke of Medina Sidonia [Son of the Duke who commanded the Armada.], which shallops would be very useful for us to ship our soldiers again, and might in some sort repair our damage formerly sustained in the loss of our long boats. He added further how my Lord Lieutenant had directed that the next day some of the boats belonging to our shipping should attend to fetch away these shallops and bring them to El Puntal for shipping the Soldiers: His Lordship with the former seven or eight regiments of the army intending to march back to the place where they remained (drawn ashore and stowed in store houses) the better to secure and guard the fetching thence of them; and for the better speed and furtherance of the service, he gave command that our barge and other boats of our fleet should attend the next morning betimes, ready manned to go for these other boats of the enemy.

The next morning being Wednesday the 26th of October, Sir 26 Octob. Thomas Love with the barge and boats belonging to our ships and a competent number of other boats, went to fetch the shallops from Hercules pillars; and seven or eight regiments of the Army marched also to the place, the better to secure the bringing of them away.

This morning also the Earl of Denbigh came again aboard the Admiral, there to dispatch such occasions of sea-command as might be requisite, where observing the negligence of our horse-boats in not 68 going up towards Puerto Real, he sent a command in writing under his hand to the masters and owners of all vessels in the fleet wherein horses were transported, requiring them upon pain of death forthwith to go up to the Swiftsure, there to acquaint Sir Samuel Argall of their coming and to perform his further directions in all things.

This afternoon there came a message from my Lord Lieutenant, desiring the Earl of Denbigh to take order that all captains and pursers of ships in the fleet should be at the fort at El Puntal at three o'clock in the afternoon, with all their boats, there to attend the Lord Lieutenant-General and to receive his further/ direction; his Lordship (as it seemed) intending at his return from taking the shallops to begin to ship his men; and upon conference with the pursers to understand the state of the victuals of every ship, thereby the better to ground a consultation for the further proceeding of the fleet and Army.

My Lord of Denbigh upon receipt of this message, took present order by a warrant signed, to publish it through out the fleet.

But his Lordship being put in mind of the matter of a company to be raised for Captain Osborne and the boats to attend better at El Puntal, his Lordship conceived that the late restraint of landing any more men and the purpose to ship again those that were landed, had made the former needless; and some boats being this day employed to fetch the shallops and the rest assigned to attend at three o'clock according to a more special direction of my Lord Lieutenant, the latter also was in effect discharged, so that his Lordship forbare to do any thing more concerning either of them.

While the Earl of Denbigh remained yet aboard the Admiral, a message came to him from the Vice-Admiral's squadron, that the channel at Puerto Real was of itself so narrow and shallow, and now become inaccessible through the enemy's ships sunk in the passage, that they doubted of doing any good by proceeding further into the attempt upon the enemy's ships, 69 yet would not for their own honor's sake desist nor fall off without new order. And therefore they desired that the place might be viewed by some sea captains of best judgment not being of this squadron, nor particularly assigned to this service, who in all likelihood would be aptest to certify most indifferently [impartially], how they found the occasion feasible or not, upon return of whose certificate such further directions might be given touching the same as should then appear most requisite.

The Earl of Denbigh holding this request reasonable and much to concern his Majesty's service, dispatched forthwith a warrant signed, whereby he desired Sir Thomas Love and Sir Michael Geare to view the channel at Puerto Real the next morning at nine o'clock, and thereupon to certify their opinions whether they thought it fit to proceed in the attempt for burning, taking, or sinking the enemy's ships there, or else to sink some other ships/ in that channel for the blocking up of the enemy, or what other course was fittest to be taken touching the same.

When it grew towards three o'clock, I would have gone to El Puntal, there to attend such employment as my Lord Lieutenant-General might have for me at his meeting of captains and pursers; but I could not get a boat, till the Earl of Denbigh as he was returning down to his own ship put me aboard the St. George, and desired Sir Michael Geare to send me to El Puntal in the barge belonging to that ship.

After a while Sir Michael Geare went with me to El Puntal, where I understood the meeting of captains and pursers was put off to eight o'clock the next morning, My Lord Lieutenant being not yet returned from this day's march, nor expected till it should be late at night.

Here also we found many soldiers complaining of sickness and others of faintness, affirming that they had not tasted any meat 70 nor drink since Sunday. Sir Michael Geare mediated so far on their behalf, that he got a promise of Captain Grove, one of the commanders of El Puntal, to take the most distressed for that night into the fort, all men else seeming to neglect them.

This whole day was spent in fetching the shallops from Hercules pillars; yet of twelve we brought away but 8, burning the rest with all the provision of nets and cork belonging to them.

At the place where these shallops were, we found one of our soldiers dead with his ears and nose cut off.

These shallops being gained, my Lord Lieutenant placed an ambush of 300 musketeers in some of the buildings thereabouts, which were commodious enough for the purpose, with direction for them not to shoot at any enemies that should come on till they were clear within their distance and danger. And then returned with the main body of the army towards the town of Cadiz. As they were in their march of retreat, some horse of the enemy to the number of [blank], as near as I could inquire out the certainty, showed themselves before the place, where our ambush lay, sending forth a small number of themselves, not above eight or ten horse, for discovery, who approaching well near within distance of our ambush, they gave fire at them somewhat of the soonest before they were come up, whereby we did them no damage at all: however the alarm thereof reached unto our troops that were then about to eat and drink some what for their refreshing, causing them suddenly and hastily not without much disorder and confusion to march or rather some of them to run back with apprehension of the danger; which yet when they came near appeared to be litle or none, for the enemy was retired.

The whole army was quartered this night beside El Puntal before the town, where my Lord Lieutenant in his own person performed very carefully all the duties of a General.

It was very foul and rainy weather almost all the time the army 71 was ashore; which, together with the noisome serene [mildew damp. See note on page 8.] falling every night, did not a little weaken and cast down the poor soldiers, lodging open and being ill-clothed. And, though the ground was of a sandy and dry nature, yet it was very uneven and ill to go upon, adding thereby very much to the toil and weariness of our men in three days march to and fro, with litle or no respect/ at all afforded unto them for their refreshing, circumstances much conducing to make the more unserviceable.

Thursday the 27th of October betimes in the morning, I went 27 Octob. ashore to El Puntal, where I found my Lord Lieutenant-General with diverse of the Council of War formerly assembled, about the dispatch of shipping of our men, and quitting the fort of El Puntal.

For his Lordship told me that he had been overruled by most voices in Council. That we should not man this fort but only to take thence the enemy's ordinance; which were 8 brass culverins [culverin, ordinance so-called a cannon of about 5-1/2 inch bore, 9 to 12 feet long, carrying a ball of 18 lbs. It was a favourite sea-gun. From coluber, because it had a snake and dragon upon it forming its handle. (See Admiral Smyth's Sailors' Word-Book.)], and raze the structure as much as we could, and so leave it.

The reasons hereof I collected to be thus. That being but a single fort not fully finished, in an enemy country, it was not likely that we could keep it against them by force; nor of any great importance to hold, since we must come over with a strong navy and excessive charge to relieve a place that would not make us commanders of any territory at all, nor hinder the enemy in any such sort but that he should still have a sufficient part of the Bay of Cadiz out of command of this fort, to serve for a harbor to his shipping in general and more especially for the ships belonging to Cadiz.

Before we went in hand to ship our men, two things were 72 necessary to be done, the one touching the ships at Puerto Real, the other touching the ordinance at El Puntal; for Sir Thomas Love and Sir Michael Geare having taken no view of the channel nor made any certificate concerning that affair, Sir Samuell Argall refused to relinquish that attempt till he should have further order. Wherefore my Lord Lieutenant, being confident of the wisdom, valour, and integrity of Sir Samuell Argall, and willing to speed the landing of our men, sent him a warrant signed, that if Sir Samuell in his own judgment found difficulty in presenting [carrying out or prosecuting] the design, which he had in hand, he was now left at liberty to desist. And that thereupon he should take order for all such ships of the Vice-Admiral's squadron as carried soldiers, forthwith to repair to El Puntal, to ship them again, with as many boats of their own and others to further the service as possibly he could procure, upon which warrant Sir Samuell Argall made his retreat and caused that squadron to attend for the shipping again of their soldiers. For the ordinance at El Puntal his Lordship had sent three several warrants to the captains of the Anne Royal, the St. George and the Convertive, commanding them forthwith to send 40 men a piece to El Puntal, to take down and ship those ordinance. Sir Thomas Love from the Anne Royal forthwith sent his boatswain Master Rabnett with 40 men, who bestirred themselves so well in the business that within an hour or two, the ordinance were all dismounted and six of them conveyed aboard our fleet, and the other two aboard some of the Dutch ships, to whom my Lord Lieutenant adjudged them to belong by conditions that were between his Majesty and them touching the division of the pillage or spoils to be gotten this voyage.

And that the more expedition might be used in shipping the Soldiers, his Lordship appointed Captain Boteler to dispose of the boats of the fleet for that service according to the directions of 73 his Lordship, giving him withal a special warrant under his Lordship's hand to procure the better obedience to his commands.

When the enemy's ordinance were agreed to be taken down, it was propounded to bring and plant there out of our ships, two or three pieces of old iron ordinance of small value, therewith the better to guard the retreat of such of our forces as should come off last. But then it was alleged that to leave any of our ordinance behind us, though of never so mean a value, would be dishonorable, and that our musketeers from the fort and our great shot from some of our ships where they rode at anchor, might as aptly secure our final retreat as any ordinance from the fort, or else by planting some of our field pieces near the fort the work might be as well affected. So the proposition of planting any of our ordinance upon the fort, finding no further seconding, died away of itself.

And now most of the ships being come up close about El Puntal, we began to ship our men apace, to which purpose the 8 shallops which we had gotten from the enemy afforded us no mean assistance.

There came to El Puntal this day above 62 pursers [The "Purser" was an officer in the Navy who took charge of the provisions, etc. He is now called "pay-master," though formerly he had little to do with the pay. In Elizabethan days there were "pursers" in other than vessels of the Royal Navy: and so it is still.] of ships, the rest absenting themselves, and by the acknowledgment of such as were present, taken by Captain Mason, Commissary-General of the army, it was found that 34 of them were victualled for full 4 months, twelve of them for 3-1/2 months, eight of them for three months, and the rest for 2-1/2 months in meat, but that there was some want of beer, water, and candles among some few of them, which he thought might be supplied by beverage to be made of wine to be had out of the prizes which we had taken, himself 74 offering to deliver candles out of the store to such as were in most need.

After dinner, my Lord commanding me no further special service and nothing being now in hand but the execution of what was resolved touching the shipping of our men, I went aboard again, where I stayed till towards the evening. By this time most of our forces were close by retired and shipped. When the town perceived our troops to be drawn off, they sallied out in loose companies without order, and so skirmished with that part of our army which kept the field to accomplish the final retreat, which were the Lord of Valentia's and Colonel Harewood's regiments.

The wind and tide served now very well for our ships to get out of the bay, and it was feared if we neglected this opportunity, the enemy, when we should be gone aboard and no ordinance of ours left in El Puntal, might draw some of theirs out of the town and plant them on the shore to beat us as we rode at Anchor, which would endanger us very far, especially if the wind should come contrary. Wherefore by the allowance of Sir Thomas Love I and our Master went ashore to El Puntal, there to move his Lordship that our ship (which was to take in no Soldiers) might fall down this tide towards the Puerios [See former note (p. 67) on Puente de Zuazo.] and there cast Anchor, leaving his Lordship to come after in another ship. But my Lord was now absent from El Puntal, rowing from ship to ship and giving further order about the speedy reimbarking of our men, and more especially taking care for the shipping our horses, for that it would be a great dishonour to leave any of them behind us. This work belonged properly to the charge of the Master of the ordinance but it seemed not to be by him set forward with such diligence as our present condition did require, which caused my Lord Lieutenant himself thus extraordinarily to intend [superintend, as before.] it.

Though we happened now to find my Lord Lieutenant at El Puntal, 75 yet was our coming thither useful to another purpose, for at this time our regiments who for a while retreated orderly enough, being now at want of ammunition or at leastwise pretending so to be, having blown up or wasted their powder, began at last to fall off some what too hastily, the enemy following very eagerly, and by the fair carrying of their pieces. it was manifest that some of them were Harque-bush of Crocke.

Sir William St Leger observing the disadvantage of our men and conceiving that part of our fleet rode in place apt to relieve them, willed us to give order to such of our ships as rode most conveniently for the purpose, that they should play upon the enemy with their great shot.

We rowed to diverse of our ships informing them what was to be done and they instantly applied themselves to accomplish the directions given them; which made the enemy to stagger and intermit now and then the pursuit of our retiring troops. However at last they took the boldness to follow us so near to El Puntal that they killed one of our men in the fort with a small shot. But then we discharged upon them some of our drakes [small piece of ordnance so-named.] or field pieces laden with small shot; which slew some of them and so far discouraged all the rest that they never more showed themselves against us, but suffered us to ship the rest of our men at our pleasure. So we got them all aboard this night except the garrison of the fort, who held it this night under the command of Colonel Burgh; for as he was the first colonel that landed so had he the honor to come off the last./

Some of our horses were not shipped till the next morning and one or two of them being unserviceable were by us killed, lest the enemy might take it their glory to say we had quitted their shore in such fear that we had left our horses behind us for haste. There was in the island of Cadiz, near El Puntal, a magazine of masts and yards for shipping, out of which some of our ships 76 that had defects relieved themselves, and the rest of the store was burned, cut in pieces, and destroyed by us.

This night the town of Cadiz shot off all the ordinance in the town and all their muskets placed in a ring round about their walls, in a kind of triumph and exultation at our retreat.

Howbeit we quitted not the fort of El Puntal till the next day, when our horses, field pieces, and all our other provisions were shipped.

But then we set sail, falling down towards the mouth of the bay, and came there again to an anchor, well near within shot of the town of Cadiz.

As we passed down, the town shot at us, especially at our Vice-Admiral and at the Admiral of Holland, one of whose ships being become unserviceable, was fired or sunk that she might not remain as a spoil for the advantage of the enemy.

Being come to an anchor, the flag was hung out for the Council of War to come together; who were quickly assembled, and proceeded thus./

28 Octob. 1625.

At a Council of War held upon Friday the 28th of October 1625. aboard the Anne Royal, riding at anchor about the mouth of Puerto de Santa Maria.

The Council being set, diverse things were drawn into dispute, whereof some were ordered, and others referred to a further time.

In the first place information was given that not only the Dreadnought formerly complained of, but also the Rainbow, another of his Majesty's ships was very leaky and unserviceable, not fit to be continued any longer in the voyage but to be sent home with all speed possible: Touching which it was ordered without contradiction that both these ships should be visited by such committees as my Lord Lieutenant should think fit; and upon their certificate further order to be taken.

In the next place it was moved to be considered of whether we 77 should now put forth to sea and lie off and on for the intercepting of the plate fleet or else seek harbor there, to destroy the King of Spain's other shipping, which point being first well debated and then particularly voted, it was resolved without a negative voice, that we should put to sea to lie for the plate fleet; the reasons of which resolutions were these, first, that our chiefest strength is by sea. Secondly, that no man proposed any harbor safe for us to now to put into, where it was likely to find shipping fit to be attempted. Thirdly, that the sea is a like friend to us as to the enemy, whereas we have no advantageable shore in these parts to friend. Fourthly, that a contrary wind may keep us long in harbor, to our utter overthrow. Fifthly, that the plate fleet was ever the main project of our voyage and therefore chiefly to be attended. And that the time was now at hand wherein the same fleet must come home, or else not at all for this year.

Also it was offered to the consideration of the Council whether we should put to sea without first taking in fresh water, and if need so required, how we might go into Puerto de Santa Maria to that purpose.

That what rendezvous to agree of in case we should be separated at sea and what course was fittest to be taken for our sick, wounded, and unserviceable men; all which being matters of good importance, towards the right ordering whereof the information and opinions of all the captains and masters of ships in the fleet was held necessary, they were all referred to a further general council to be held the next morning between seven and eight o'clock.

This day Sir John Chudley complained to his Lordship that through the sickness of his Men he was so far distressed that he wanted some to help pump and pull ropes in his ship. His Lordship granted a warrant directed to Captain Oxenbridge, Captain of the Dragon, commanding him to deliver to Sir John or to his assigns out of Sir Edward Conway's companies which were aboard the Dragon, 30 78 good and able men with victual proportionable for the whole voyage.

29 Octob. The 29th of October about seven o'clock in the morning, diverse captains and masters of ships being come together, the wind blew very fairly to carry us forth to sea, according to the resolution taken yesterday in full council; whereof his Lordship (as he had just cause) was very loath to loose the advantage; only the matters yesterday referred to the resolution of this morning's Council were some of them so essential to be first determined, that without the deciding thereof our going generally to sea could not promise any good success; for no limits wherein to lie off and on at sea nor rendezvous in case of separation were yet agreed or assigned.

The Council of War was slow in assembling, in so much that his Lordship thinking he should lose too much of the fair wind if he stayed any longer for their coming together, did decide upon hearing of the advice of divers of the captains and masters who/ were now aboard him, to take up and publish a present resolution to this purpose.

That the whole fleet should forthwith set sail and ply [sail usually short trips to and fro] from the Bay of Cadiz to the Southern Cape, standing off to the Westward 60 leagues from the land; where his Lordship proposed to spend as much time as might be to look for the plate fleet and to keep themselves as near as they could in the latitude of 37 degrees and a half and in the latitude of 36 degrees and 36 and a half, for that his Lordship intended not to go any further to the southward.

That if by strong westerly winds they should be forced to bear up into the Straights, the rendezvous should be at Budgeroe [No such name occurs in the map, but in a chart on a large scale of the last century, a place called Burge is marked just outside Malaga to the west, as if it had a tower on a hill, which would therefore serve as a good sea-mark.] to the westward of Malaga, where his Lordship intended all the fleet should then meet and there water.


That if by strong southerly winds they should be forced to the northward, then they should repair to the Isles of Bayon in Galicia [The following rare book explains this: "A True Relation of a Brave English Stratagem, Practised lately upon a Sea-Town in Galizia (one of the Kingdomes in Spaine), and most valiantly and successfully performed by an English Ship alone of 30 Tonne .... 1626 (4o)." The islands of Bayon lie off the town: hard by is the "Bayona's hold" of Milton's Lycidas.], where in such case it was intended to meet and water.

With a perclose [Conclusion. The 'close' which is 'per' or through is a definite close or ending.] that what other instructions should be thought fitting, they should receive the same as occasion should present, in the mean time charging all commanders carefully to observe these directions and to keep company with his Lordship and the fleet, and to look out to seize upon the subjects and goods of the King of Spain, or others our enemies.

Touching the points whether there were a necessity to water before we put to sea, and whether it might aptly be done at Puerto de Santa Maria, the latter was first spoken to; and it was now alleged by divers masters that there are but two wells in Puerto de Santa Maria, which will dispatch but two or three ships in a day, whereby it would take too much precious time from our going to lie for the plate fleet if our whole fleet should here seek water.

Besides, it was evident, that no water was now to be had in this place without landing of forces; which also would not only spend time but extremely incumber us, in a kind whereof wee lately felt the trouble, and had in effect resolved to make no more such landings.

For the unfitness therefore and difficulty to water here, it was thought best not to attempt it: And this opinion (for this time) prevented the dispute of the other question: Because if we should not water at Puerto de Santa Maria, none other fit place was propounded, so as then of necessity we must to sea without first watering./

And touching the sick, wounded, and unserviceable men, we 80 were to carry them along with us in the way towards England till we came to the South Cape of Spain and we might between this and that have many opportunities to consult touching them; for whom it seemed no course could be so proper as to send them into England; which might thus be dispatched without loss of time, though it were not now resolved.

So we instantly weighed anchor and set sail, plying for the Southern Cape.

This forenoon eight ships were discovered plying for the Bar of Sanlúcar [bar of San Lucar or Lucar de Barrameda, the port of Seville.]; for the chasing and taking whereof his Lordship gave instant order; which I think was attempted but in vain, our ships being foul and consequently ill sailors, and the other ships too far out of distance when they were first discovered./

About three o'clock in the afternoon, the wind failing us, his Lordship thought fit to make the best use of the time and by a Council now to be held to resolve and settle the points under proposition left unresolved yesternight and this morning: so the flag was hung out and the Council assembled.

29 Octob.

At a Council of War held aboard the Anne Royal the 29th of October, 1625.

The matter for our places of rendezvous in case of separation appeared to be settled by an order of his Lordship's taken and published this morning, against which no man now opposed, neither did any man move to draw us back to Puerto de Santa Maria to water, but seemed to rest satisfied with the reasons formerly made against that course:/ howbeit diverse of the fleet protested themselves to be in such want, that of necessity they must speedily go to some place or other to relieve themselves with fresh water.

Hereupon it was taken into consideration when, where, and in what manner we should go to water. It was alleged that to 81 put back into any of the straights was to loose the opportunity for the plate fleet. That there was no port in Spain in the way of our course, where any great number of ships could quickly be dispatched for fresh water, unless it should be gained by landing forces; which would spend too much time and cross with our former resolutions.

That the ships complaining of extreme necessity were very few. That the most part of the fleet had reasonable store of beer, though they wanted fresh water; and they might use salt water to dress their meat and spend their beer first, abating some of their daily proportion to make it last the longer, and upon their watering, afterwards come to their beverage in the last place. That some extremity was to be undergone for his Majesty's service now that need so required rather then to disperse ourselves and quit one another, when the season of the year assured us that the plate fleet was at hand or else would not come home this year.

That the course which we were to hold for the meeting with the plate fleet would bring us a good way onward for England, as at Bayon in Galicia (being further in our way) it was said there was/ good easy watering for our fleet.

For these reasons, and especially for the zeal which every man had to do his Majesty service and to run all hazards whatsoever, rather then to lose any opportunity for the accomplishment thereof, the thought of present watering was now laid a side; and thereupon it was resolved and ordered by the Lord Lieutenant-General with the consent of the Council of War, that when absolute necessity should require, the whole fleet should go to water at Bayon in Galicia by Squadron and Squadron.

After this resolution they entered into dispute what should be done with our sick, wounded, and unserviceable men.

Some few would have only the wounded men sent for England,/ alleging that sickness might be counterfeit and those that are sick now may recover again and be serviceable when those that are 82 now well are grown sick. To this was added that sickness was incident to all sea voyages, and if the same might once be allowed as a sufficient reason to send men home, the example might prove dangerous to future actions, and occasion many to pretend sickness without just cause. For unserviceable men, it was said they were hardly to be discerned unless they were such through apparent sickness or wounding, and that many of the best men in the fleet or army might easily be shifted away under color of unserviceableness in the general.

The rest were more clearly of another mind, as our particular case now stood, concluding that not only the wounded but the sick and unserviceable should be sent home. Their reasons were these: that we were now in hand with a sea-service yet had 10,000 land soldiers aboard us, whereof more then the greatest part might well be spared, for that they would but cumber the ships and endanger the loss of more men if we came to fight with the enemy's fleet.

That no overture was yet made for any land service: wherefore if some few able men slipped away under color of sick or unserviceable, it was no great matter; our present estate and intentions duly considered.

And that the captains and officers in every ship and company whose informations and certificates were to be had in this case, could by observation give some good judgment who was a man dangerously sick and absolutely unserviceable as well as discern by the view who was a hurt man though not altogether so certainly.

These latter reasons gave best satisfaction, so it was resolved and ordered by the Lord Lieutenant-General and the Council of War, that all our sick, wounded, and unserviceable men should be sent into England with the first convenient opportunity.

At the rising of the Council a motion was made to know what should be done with our horses: whereupon without dispute or 83 contradiction it was resolved that they should all be likewise sent home.

While Sir Francis Stewart was Rear-Admiral of the fleet before his discharge at Plymouth by reason of the leakiness of his ship the Lion, the Earl of Denbigh in the St Andrew was Vice-Admiral to the Admiral's squadron, carrying in the foretop a red flag with a little white, and St George's Cross therein at the top of the flagstaff. My Lord of Valentia in the Constant Reformation was Vice-Admiral to the Vice-Admiral's squadron, carrying in the foretop a blue flag. And my Lord Cromwell Vice-Admiral to the Rear-Admiral's squadron carrying in the foretop a white flag. But upon the discharge of Sir Francis Stewart, the Rear-Admiral's place with the white flag to be borne in the maintop was assigned by his Lordship to my Lord of Denbigh; and the flag and place of Vice- Admiral to the Admiral's squadron formerly belonging to my Lord of Denbigh and now void by his removal and preferment was by his Lordship's free choice bestowed upon my Lord Delaware going in the St. George; which flag and place he bore and exercised from our setting forth out of England till our remove from before El Puntal. But now my Lord Cromwell alleged that he and my Lord of Valentia, being Viscountes of Ireland, were in place before my Lord Delaware, being but a Baron, though of England. That in the instructions for this voyage they were ranked or named before my Lord Delaware. That by succession upon the preferment of my Lord of Denbigh, his former place ought to devolve to the next in place; which as he alleged was my Lord of Valentia, my Lord of Valentia's former place to him and his to my Lord Delaware. And though my Lord of Valentia seemed to neglect his right yet my Lord Cromwell desired that he might not suffer therein, but be preferred to be Vice-Admiral to our Vice-Admiral's Squadron, with power to carry the blue flag in the foretop.

Upon this information and request, my Lord Lieutenant-General 84 perusing his instructions and finding the Irish viscounts to be there ranked before the English baron and considering withal not only how in England the Irish viscounts take place of English barons but also that we were all now out of England where the territory could give no privilege to my Lord Delaware, he assigned the red flag to my Lord of Valentia, the blue to my Lord Cromwell, and the white to my Lord Delaware. Whereupon my Lord of Valentia and my Lord Cromwell altered their flags accordingly. But my Lord Delaware, being advertised hereof by letter did not presently take down his former flag, insomuch as now he and my Lord of Valentia did both bear one and the same colors, in the same manner as if we had two Vice-Admirals to the Admiral's Squadron. But withal my Lord Delaware both wrote and spoke to my Lord Lieutenant-General, desiring he might continue the flag and place he was in possession of till his cause were heard and resolved by a Council of War, alleging for himself these reasons./

That under-offices in a fleet or army are not always to be conferred by succession or upon the man of next precedence but by the election of the General.

That it was no wrong to my Lord of Denbigh in the first distribution of the Commanders in the fleet, though Sir Francis Stewart being but a knight was allotted to go Rear-Admiral before his Lordship being an earl.

That my Lord Lieutenant-General had of his own free choice bestowed the place of Vice-Admiral to his squadron on my Lord Delaware without his seeking; which office he had exercised now three weeks and could not be removed without dishonor and disgrace to his person, which he had no way deserved; implying that he either should have never been preferred or else not now displaced without cause arising since his preferment.


That this was an English and not an Irish action, and the colors contended for the flag of St George and not of St Patrick, which he intimated to himself being a Baron of England much ancient to my Lord Cromwell (who also is a baron of that realm) to be more proper and worthy to carry then any Irish viscount whatsoever.

That however the Irish viscounts have a precedence of courtesy they are there to be placed and ranked after them, as appears by the Act of Parliament, whereby the subsidies were granted that were the chief means of setting forth this fleet; for there the Lord Carew, a baron of England, is named before the Lord Grandison [John, Viscount Grandison, later Baron Tregoze in the English Peerage. See Gardiner, as before.], a viscount of Ireland: the matter of right having been first disputed and resolved in the House of Commons; and that the writing of his name sooner or latter in my Lord Lieutenant-General's instructions (which how it might occur he knew not) must not conclude [lead to a conclusion or decision.] him of his right.

Upon these allegations of the Lord Delaware, the Lord Lieutenant-General was contented things should stand as they were and that my Lord Delaware should bear his old flag till the matter were decided by a Council of War.

Other passages there are belonging to this question which fell out shortly after: however I think it will not be amiss to rehearse them here all together for that the time concerning the same is not material./

At the next Council of War towards the rising of the assembly, the matter was offered to their considerations. But then they instantly rose, showing an unwillingness to be troubled with determining a question which had grown altogether out of my Lord Lieutenant-General's acts and was in his own power to 86 determine of himself without drawing them to express themselves on either side in a cause of personal contestation.

These three lords imbarked in this controversy, showed no unkindness one to another in all the proceedings but rather conversed lovingly together as if they more desired a true judgment touching the right in general then the victory to any of themselves in particular.

However my Lord Lieutenant-General, fearing the worst and considering/ what discord grows often times among great lords about matter of honor and precedence, to the disturbance of great actions, as also bearing a good and equal affection to all the parties involved in the question; out of these respects and his natural ingenuity [ingenuousness] (inclinable and studious to maintain amity and concord) applied himself to devise some way of reconciliation whereby all might receive satisfaction; to which purpose he declared himself that he intended the flag of St. George to my Lord Delaware at first but provisionally: and then it was no disgrace for him to quit it now according to the condition of the first donation, and that this would be rather the expiration then the taking away of an office. But my Lord Delaware protested that what ever my Lord Lieutenant-General's private intention might be he never heard of any provisional conferring of the flag upon him, nor would have accepted it upon such terms, had he known it or but suspected the same.

Wherefore my Lord Lieutenant-General, in pursuit of his former good intention, was compelled to bethink himself of some other means for effecting and perfecting the reconciliation intended.

It was very inconvenient and strange that both my Lord of Valentia and my Lord Delaware should continue to bear the same flag after the same manner without difference; wherefore the more speed was to be used for bringing the business into order./


My Lord Delaware desired only that he might not be disgraced by being put out of a place which he had not deserved to lose. My Lord of Valentia had hitherto been merely passive in the business. My Lord Cromwell seemed without all question to be now in his right place, being Vice-Admiral to the Vice-Admiral; for if my Lord Delaware as a baron of England ought to be preferred before the Irish viscounts in this action, my Lord Cromwell as a puisne baron of England ought to have the place next to my Lord Delaware before my Lord of Valentia, who was only a viscount of Ireland, but had no English honor at all. And if the Irish viscounts were to be preferred then was my Lord Cromwell to be next to my Lord Valentia as puisne viscount of Ireland, my Lord Delaware having no Irish honor at all, neither did the Lord Cromwell (as I hear very credibly) disclaim now in his English title, even though the first motion by him of removal or alteration touching these places was grounded upon the Irish title.

To bring things back to the state they were before this late alteration would offend and discontent both my Lord of Valentia and my Lord Cromwell; who both should be thereby dispreferred without cause grown since their preferment.

In the end therefore my Lord Lieutenant General devised a way which he hoped might have reconciled all, which was that my Lord of Valentia should carry the red flag with the St George's Cross in the maintop as a kind of extraordinary or chief or chief deputy or Vice-Admiral to the Admiral or to his squadron, so to distinguish him from my Lord Delaware with some preferment also to my Lord of Valentia; and by warrant from my Lord Lieutenant General my Lord of Valentia for a while wore his flag in the maintop accordingly. Howbeit within some few days after, whether it were that the novelty of this course which was applauded at first continued not to please, or that if the Lord Cromwell's Irish viscountship were a sufficient title for him to claim the 88 next place to my Lord of Valentia he might upon that ground seek now to be removed from the place he was in to the place which my Lord Delaware now had and so ran upon worse terms the question so much sought to be extinguished; or for what other cause I know not, my Lord Lieutenant-General wished my Lord of Valentia to wear his flag no longer in the maintop; who declared his unwillingness, saying it would be a dispreferment undeserved from that which without suit he had been put in possession of by his Lordship's own directions. To this my Lord Lieutenant-General replied that what he did therein was but provisionally; whereof nevertheless my Lord of Valentia denied knowledge and seemed to be a litle discontented at their proceedings; howbeit he acknowledged my Lord Lieutenant-General's power and professed a readiness to obey his Lordship's commands. And not long after both my Lord of Valentia and my Lord Delaware for reasons best known to themselves took down their flags and the fleet grew to be separated so as no final resolution was ever had of this question of naval honor and right of preferment to such an office of command in a fleet at sea.

30 Octob.

Sunday the 30th of October we discovered 4 ships to windward of us, and conjectured them to be Spanish ships, but we could fetch up none of them, and this day and night the weather was very gusty and showery of great rain.

31 Octob.

The 31st of October we had a scant and bare wind inclining to drive us from the Coast of Barbary or back into the Straights of Gibraltar.

The same day by direction of my Lord Lieutenant General I took the examinations of Francis Gonzales, and Emanuel Muschade two of the Portuguese taken in the litle caravel that came from Terceira, but they informed of nothing material, more then what was vulgarly known to us before; wherefore their examinations are not here inserted.

89 1 Novemb.

At a Council of War held aboard the Anne Royal November 1, 1625:

At this Council the Lord Lieutenant General proposed three things to be treated of.

First what should be done touching all the ketches in the fleet which were not like to live at sea in such storms as the season of the year began now to threaten.

Secondly how to fit a dispatch of men and ships for England.

Thirdly how to man the three prizes which we had taken, for masters and mariners to conduct them, and how we should dispose of them.

  1. Touching the first it was insisted upon by some, that the ketches had endured as great a storm outwards as has been ever known to any sea men in the fleet; wherefore they might adventure to do the like homeward. And that to sink them would bring an unnecessary charge upon the King, who in such case must answer the values of them to their owners. But on the other side it was alleged that the former storm came with a fair wind, which if it had come otherwise, not only the ketches but many of our best ships would hardly have endured it. That the ketches were not many nor of great value to be sunk, the rather for that only the hulks of them should be so disposed of, their anchors, sails, and tackling first taken aboard our other shipping. And that to prefer the saving of a small charge before the care of so many men's lives as were in the ketches was an unworthy and unchristian thing, which we ought in any case to shun.

    These latter reasons gave clear satisfaction to the Council; and it was thereupon resolved and ordered that the hull of every ketch in the fleet, whose Master and company were unwilling to hazard themselves any longer in such ketches should be sunk, her anchors, Sails, and tackling, men, victuals, and other lading being first taken aboard the Admiral, Vice- Admiral, or Rear-Admiral respectively, to whom such ketch so to be sunk did belong.

  2. 90

    It was resolved in the council of the 29th of October that all our sick, wounded and unserviceable men should be sent into England with the first convenient opportunity and likewise our horses; but who should be those sick and unserviceable men intended by the former order, or what ships in particular, or what number of ships should be employed in this service was not yet declared./

    Wherefore the second proposition now to be handled (namely how to fit a dispatch of men and ships for England) gave occasion to the council to inquire further into the present state of the fleet touching the sickness of men and defects of ships, whereby they might the better ground their judgments touching the matter wherein their advice was now required.

    The captains or masters of diverse of the King's ships and of many other ships of the fleet were now present; who being all enjoined to declare what number of men and of those how many sick men they had aboard every of their ships, it was thereupon affirmed that of 200 sea men in the Swiftsure there were sick 60, of 250 in the St. Andrew sick 30, of 220 in the St. George 60, of 180 in the Bonaventure 50, of 180 in the Convertive 50, of 250 in the Rainbow 60. However Captain Raleigh Gilbert, Captain of the Constant Reformation, protested that all his 250 men were well and in good health (a rare thing and giving just occasion to inquire into the causes, how those of his ship should be all well when none other were in the like condition nor scarce any ship in the whole fleet).

    The captains of merchant and Newcastle ships now present were about to give in the like informations for the state of their several ships. But it was like to prove so tedious a work for one man to take the same in writing in the sitting of the council that they were directed to set down in writing the present state of their several ships in respect of sickness or leaks or any other defects, and deliver the same to my Lord Lieutenant-General's 91 Secretary, to be presented to his Lordship for his better consideration thereof hereafter.

    This particular overture touching the weak estate of the King's ships (which indeed was seconded with the like information in general touching the whole fleet) made the council see that it was time to hasten their dispatch for England, though it gave them no full light how to cull out the particular ships or men that should be sent, or to ascertain their number.

    But consultations must have an end that execution may follow. The horses were resolved to be sent home, which could not now be but in the same vessels wherein they were already shipped. And the keeping here of the prizes which we had taken brought but care and trouble upon us, delaying the use that might be made of them in England. Wherefore as to the intended dispatch it was resolved and ordered by the council that the horse ships and prizes should be some of the ships that with the first opportunity should be sent for England.

    But it was conceived that these ships only were not capable of so many men as should be sent home; wherefore it was taken into consideration how many other ships and of what kind would be fittest to go with them. The ships carrying munition for the army and enjoined by the Council of War of the 11th of October to attend the Rear-Admiral and not engage themselves in fight without order, seemed the best to be spared, in regard that no overture was yet made for any further land service, albeit this were the third meeting in council since we left El Puntal; whereby there was litle or no likelihood for any such to be propounded and embraced in this voyage. So the name of three or four of those ships were called for and a note taken of them in writing, with the names also of one or two Newcastle ships informed by some of the sea captains now present to be of the most defective and unserviceable ships in the fleet;/ and the Council showed an inclination to set a resolute order now that these ships with the 92 horse ships and prizes should be the ships which should go for England. However at last they concluded not so fully nor so particularly but resolved only thus:

    That 12 ships of the most unserviceable in the whole fleet (in which number the horse ships and prizes were to be included) should be sent into England with the first opportunity and consigned to the harbor of Plymouth, with this particular, that the Golden Cock should be one other of the number, and Captain Beaumont, Captain of the same ship, to bear the office of Admiral in this fleet of 12, in their passage homeward.

    There were yet four or five of the 12 ships that should go for England not certainly and absolutely named and assigned; and the wounded, sick and unserviceable men who should be sent home were not yet particularly declared. Neither was there any more spoken at this Council of these matters, nor of the means or manner how to man the prizes.

    The reason hereof I conceive might be, that so long as our fleet was short of Cabo de Sao Vincente no time was left touching our dispatch for England; for till then, we and such as were bound for England, were run all one course, and by reason of bare and bad winds we were yet far short of that Cape.

At this Council Sir John Prode accused Captain Squibb, captain of the Lyon, upon many circumstances, that cowardly and against his duty he had wilfully shunned to come near two or three Spanish ships (which were discovered in our passage from England towards the Southern Cape, while the fleet was separated by the storm), and had in like sort refused to make up to Captain Osborne and a ship or two more of our fleet, to assist them for a fight to have been had with those Spanish ships: whereof one came and hailed Captain Osborne and very proudly required him to come and speak with their Admiral. Sir John Prode declared further how Captain Osborne in his answer to this proud demand and in seeking by all means to provoke the enemy to fight, behaved himself very bravely, and yet had Captain Squibb given 93 out words of disgrace against him as if Capt. Osborne were only in the fault that the Spanish ships were not fought with. Wherefore it was desired that the matter might be examined, and Captain Squibb punished according to his demerits; but by occasion of some intervenient division no further consideration was now had of this complaint nor any order given therein.

At the close of this Council the Right Honorable the Earl of Denbigh gave information that while his Lordship rode at anchor before Puerto de Santa Maria, Captain Oxenbridge, Captain of the Dragon, one of the Ships belonging to his Lordship's squadron, did without any order or direction from his Lordship begin a battery upon a fort or blockhouse at Santa Catalina near the entrance into Puerto de Santa Maria, and drew Captain Plumleigh, Captain of the William and Thomas (another of his Lordship's Squadron) to fall astern and second him in this attempt, saying he had order for what he did, whereas he had none. That this attempt tended to the disgrace and prejudice of our fleet, and was in his Lordship's opinion an offence to be punished for example's sake. Wherefore he desired that he might be questioned and proceeded against according to his demerits. But the Council being now rising made not any order nor gave any directions at all touching this business.

From this first of November to the 4th of the same nothing memorable occurred.

Upon the 4th of November, in the morning, we discovered two ships to be shoreward of us, which our ships that were next unto them could not well chase by reason it was a calm. But our Admiral manned out her barge with musketeers under the charge of one of our master's mates; who willingly undertook the service of discovering what ships they were and bringing certain word with all speed possible.

The calm continuing caused my Lord Lieutenant General for the better husbanding of time (which could not now be spent in sailing) to hang out the flags for a Council; which being assembled proceeded thus./


At a Council of War held aboard the Anne Royal the 4th of November, 1625.

It stood resolved by former councils that our wounded, sick, and unserviceable men should be sent home and that to this purpose 12 of our most unserviceable ships should go for England; whereof some ships were particularly agreed on but the rest not; nor could the choice of them be well made, nor the sick and unserviceable men that should go home in them, until perfect certificates were had touching the state of every ship in respect of sickness or otherwise; for diverse captains and officers not now present nor at the last council, had not yet certified touching this matter, and many of those which were then present, being taken on the sudden, could not peradventure deliver in so perfect certificate as they might make upon better survey of their ships and companies; and something fit to be known might have happened since. Besides it was alleged that the sickness began greatly to increase in our fleet, more men falling down now in a day or two then in a week or two at the beginning of our voyage, and that more and more defects in our shipping and provisions began daily to break in upon us, or discover themselves to press some very sore (things most seriously considerable) not only touching the fitting of a dispatch of some few ships for England, but peradventure might occasion a just dispute what new or further course it were best to take for preservation of the whole fleet. Wherefore it was propounded and accordingly resolved and ordered by the whole Council, That the sea and land officers in every ship respectively, should forthwith make a list in writing of the names of all their wounded, sick, and unserviceable men in every ship and company respectively. And should in like sort set down the defects of their several ships as well in the vessels themselves as in their victuals or any other provisions whatsoever, and send the same forthwith aboard the Admiral of the fleet.

My Lord Lieutenant-General by his resolution of the 29th of 95 October prescribing the place and manner where and how our fleet should lie to intercept the plate fleet, had declared that he intended to spend as much time as might be to that purpose; which being somewhat uncertain (though expressing a noble purpose in his Lordship to undergo the utmost toil and hazard that his Majesty's service should require), it was now proposed to be consulted of whether it were not fit to limit the certain day how long our fleet should so lie out in expectation of the plate fleet without going to take in water.

The reasons insisted on to have a certain day agreed upon and published to this purpose were these:

That so long as it was left thus indefinitely (to as much time as may be) all ships separated from the fleet in the night by foul weather or other causes (though not by strong westerly or Southerly winds, in which cases only several places of rendezvous were provided) might take a colorable occasion to leave the fleet and go for England or peradventure about their own private ends, upon pretence they had stayed out in the latitude and distance prescribed as long as might be. That our ships were provided of victuals, beer, and beverage, some for longer and some for shorter time, and if they once knew the certainty how long we should lie out for the plate fleet it would give them such a guess of the length of the voyage, that thereby they would grow both able and careful to shorten or enlarge their allowances accordingly; whereas now peradventure being in expectation every day to hear of a resolution to make for England they might omit that duty and perish in conclusion through the omission thereof. That it would be a comfort to the sea men and soldiers to know the utmost time they were to stay out, and every one would be encouraged and arm himself with more patience to endure all extremities incident to the voyage, when he should know the period of his attendance. That the weather grew every day now more stormy then other by the coming on of winter, and if we 96 took not a resolution herein at this meeting, we might peradventure want seasonable weather to assemble in and come to such a resolution when we would: which (in case of separation of our fleet, without knowledge of the time how long, the latitude and distances hereunto assigned should be kept) might occasion many of the best affected among us out of a desire not to quit their station without warrant, to endeavor so long to maintain the same through all hazards till they miscarried in striving to observe their duty. And that by appointing a day with the longest, we might in some sort be sure to lose no opportunity of effecting our desires by such reducing of our time of stay unto a certainty. But the difficulty was upon what day to pitch; for the deciding whereof the opinions of the sea captains and masters of ships understanding the course of Spain touching the usual arrival of the plate fleet were demanded; who seemed to be all of one mind, that the plate fleet was either in Spain already or would be here by the middle of this month at the farthest, or else would not come home at all for this year. It being very probable that some advice so to do had been sent unto them out of Spain since the coming of our fleet upon these coasts. The debate being ended, the point was held of good importance and not fit to be concluded without particular voting, which was accomplished.

And so it was resolved and ordered by the Lord Lieutenant-General with the consent of the Council of War, that the time which our fleet should keep the sea to await the coming home and intercepting of the plate fleet should be only until the twentieth day of this month of November 1625, and that in the meantime we should not go to take in fresh water.

Hereupon Captain Ruckwood, Captain of the Lion, of Ipswitch, being now present, and having in his ship as he alleged 30 sea men and 112 land men, did solemnly protest that he had only two tuns of beer and two of water unspent, so as it was not possible for him to observe the order now taken, and prayed some 97 course might be prescribed for his enlargement from the order, or to supply him with beer and water. But it was a particular case and concerned not any of the king's own ships; for which causes as I conceived, the Council of War took not his request into consideration, whereby he seemed to remain as one left to be relieved by order of my Lord Lieutenant-General upon his suit, to be made unto his Lordship in time convenient for that purpose.

In the next place a motion or complaint was made that the sea captains in general keep not their proper squadrons, much less their subsquadrons or divisions, according to the distribution of the instructions dated 2nd of October 1625, nor do in any good order spread themselves abroad in their sailing, nor look out as they ought for the discovery of the plate fleet or other prize; whereupon it was without any dispute or contradiction assented unto and ordered by the Council,

That whosoever should hereafter offend in any of these points should be punished by a strict imprisonment.

Also it was now observed and spoken of, that ships not of our fleet falling in among us by night might pass through all our squadrons and get off undiscovered; which was an inconvenience tending not only to our loss of many good prizes but also giving means to our enemies by the escape of such ships to have intelligence of our being at sea and by observation of our course and order of proceeding to guess at our intentions and seek to prevent them; for remedy thereof it was advised and without debate or opposition ordered by the Council,

That our fleet should have a word to know one another by in the night and that whatsoever ship coming near any of our fleet in the dark could not give that word should be taken for a stranger and might be shot at or dealt with accordingly. And the word agreed upon and assigned to this purpose was St. George.

Lastly the Council being at pause, Sir John Watts spoke briefly 98 to them to this effect. That he should be heartily sorry to go home without doing yet some better service if possibly it might be. That we were gotten now so far off at sea that with a southerly wind we might reach the Madeiras. That those islands were rich, and would yield good pillage for the relief of his Majesty towards his great charges and the encouragement of the poor sea men and soldiers after their ill bargain at Cadiz. That to go back to the appointed rendezvous to the westward of Malaga within the mouth of the Straights, all along the enemy's country and forts, now we were grown so weak and the year see far spent, was to expose the whole fleet to unnecessary hazard and almost to certain ruin if we should there be wind-bound but a very litle while.

That as the Madeiras are more leagues from England then the mouth of the Straights so do they lie better in the way of a wind for England, which is a sufficient recompence for their greater distance from thence. That we should come to the Madeiras unlooked for and might happen to take them not well provided; which if we did the King of Spain could not readily supply them, being remote islands, as he might his cities and towns in the main continent of Spain. Wherefore he moved that it might be duly considered if the winds should prove southerly and blew strong, whether in such case it would not be both fitter and safer for us to go to the Madeiras and attempt the taking and pillaging thereof, then to put back into the Straights only for the rendezvous' sake and to take in fresh water, there being no order or overture as yet made for any service to be therein performed.

This motion contained matter of great weight and was very fairly induced [brought in, introduced], which made the Council desirous to handle it as it deserved. And because the most considerable circumstances whereby the same was rightly to be decided were to rise from a 99 true knowledge of the nature and state of the islands themselves, Such Captains and Masters of ships now present as had of latter times been there, were required to inform the Council herein.

So it was alleged that there were in the Madeiras several strong forts usually well stored with ordinance, soldiers, and munition, situated in places most apt to annoy our shipping and hinder our approaches to land. That there is not any harbor at all belonging to those islands but only some wide and unsafe roads lying open very dangerously to many winds.

That the danger of these roads is much increased by the deepness of the seas; the best places to anchor in being for the most part in thirty fathoms of water or thereabouts.

That the landing of men there is more difficult then in other places partly through the nature of the shores and partly through the working high going (or Zuft [variant of 'Sough'—"An old northern term for the distant surging of the sea; a hollow murmur or howling, or the moaning of the wind before a gale." (Admiral Smyth, as before). "A buzzing, a hollow murmur or roaring …. the form 'swough' is common in early English " (Halliwell Phillipps, s.v.)] as they call it) of the sea against the same shore. That there being only one place where men may land out of shot of the forts, the way to march from thence to the chief town of the Madeiras is so ill and narrow that a very few enemies by advantage of place may here cut off a whole army in their passage.

These allegations being heard, the Council of War (as it should seem) conceiving them to be of more importance to dissuade us from going to the Madeiras then the former inducements were to incline us, did not enter into any reasoning among themselves about the matter of this motion, but rose, leaving it wholly unresolved; whereby of course the former order of my Lord Lieutenant General dated the 29th of October 1625, touching the rendezvous at Budgeroe remained still of the same force it was before.


It had been proposed to the Council of War that they should consider how to man our three prizes and how to dispose of them; wherein nevertheless they had as yet done nothing. But my Lord Lieutenant-General further perusing (as it should seem) his instructions from the King's Majesty and from the Duke of Buckingham, observed therein that which gave him occasion this 4th of November 1625 to direct a warrant to be drawn in this manner, by the good use whereof the Council of War might be eased of this matter. The warrant was drawn as his Lordship directed and it was thus:

Whereas by virtue of several Commissions and instructions from the King's most Excellent Majesty and the Duke of Buckingham his grace, I am enabled and authorised among other things to constitute and appoint four or more Commissioners, the one half of land officers and the other half of sea officers, to take upon them the care and charge of all such prizes as are or shall be taken by his Majesty's fleet or any part thereof, and of all such goods and commodities as are or shall be found in any of the same prizes, that no part thereof be concealed, embezzled or wasted but safely preserved to his Majesty's use, and to do all other things necessary/ touching the same service. These are therefore to enable and require you six, or any five or four of you whose names are hereunder written as commissioners in that behalf, to nominate and assign a competent and sufficient number of men for the conducting and manning of all and every such prizes as aforesaid. And also to have and take the care and charge of the several goods and commodities therein to his Majesty's use as aforesaid and speedily to place such men as aforesaid in every of the said prizes to the purposes aforesaid. And to inform yourselves of all ways and means you can of the true estate of every such prize and of her lading and commodities and all other things and circumstances necessary for the same, or his Majesty's service therein. And of all your doings and proceedings therein from time to time, and with all convenient expedition, to 101 give me advertisement; and for your so doing these shall be your sufficient Warrant, dated &c.

This warrant his Lordship caused to be directed to six such Commissioners as he thought best to nominate for this service, and it was not long after delivered to some of the same, but what they did therein I never heard.

5o Novemb. Saturday morning the 5th of November our Barge which we had manned forth with musketeers the day before, upon discovery returned, bringing word that they had been aboard a floating ship laden with sugar ready to sink through the leaks; which as they thought were wilfully cut and made in her by some man of war who had taken her as a prize and towed her a good while in view of some of our fleet but quitted when they could or durst tow her no further. This night was a storm.

6o Novemb. Sunday morning the 6th of November, being foul and close weather, a Turkish man-of-war commanded by a Portuguese renegado fell in among our fleet: ere [we knew] he was near, as it seemed; being shot at by us, he presently came under our lee and submitted himself to our disposal. So we sent our Barge to command the chief of them to come aboard, which was performed; and among the rest an English renegado who was one of their company came aboard us. This Turkish man-of-war had now with him two ships which he had taken, the one a Brazil ship and goods as prize, the other English, whereof the master was a Scottish Man, dwelling at Dover; which ship the Turk said he had but seized upon to make her lading prize. The chief among them and some others of them were examined by his Lordship, but the Portuguese, a man of a fluent speech and subtle wit, protested himself so seriously to be of Algiers. and not of Sally [Salee on the coast of Morocco.] nor of any 102 other place enemy to us, and that he lay there only to take Spaniards and Spanish goods, and no way to molest the English; making his allegations so probable by some circumstances wherein the rest and more especially the Dover man agreed in substance with him, That his Lordship only commanded him to attend our fleet awhile for chase or discovery, his ship being an extraordinary good sailer; and so dismissed him, without putting any guard of ours into his ship that might be too strong for him and so command his company. The Brazil prize had spent his masts so as before he met with us he towed her, and now my Lord assigned some of our ships to perform that service. The Dover man was laden with timber and Iron, and other Spanish goods taken aboard in Bisque and bound for Lisbon.

The Portuguese renegade alleged that he would only make use of the vessel to carry the goods for Algiers, paying her full and due freight for the same, and then leave her free to go where she would.

And the master of the Dover ship confessed that such was the Turk's saying unto him upon his first seizing of him and ever since. Howbeit some among us suspected that the Turk's so saying was only a trick to make the Dover man yield the more easily unto him, and that when they should have once brought him to Algiers or any other Turkish port, they would there both detain the ship and put the men to ransom, or sell them for slaves. This suspicion was increased by that which followed; for by the next/ morning this Turkish man-of-war was slipped away so as we never heard more of him.

7 Novemb. Monday, the 7th of November, we chase some of the ships of our own fleet, thinking they had been enemies.

8 Novemb. Tuesday, the 8th of November, we lay by the lee to accommodate and finish all things touching our dispatch for England. And to that purpose had both our flags of council out all day; which drew many of the Council of War and divers captains and 103 masters of ships aboard us. However no sitting in council was had, but the time spent by his Lordship in preparing many things necessary about the dispatch; but all was not finished this day./

9 Novemb. Wednesday, the 9th of November, we lay also by the lee and spent the time as yesterday in preparing the dispatch for England: only the flags of council were not now hung out. The finishing of the dispatch was somewhat hindred by the absence of some of our ships upon a chase, and the dispersed and remote lying of some others, whereby it was very difficult for his Lordship to call out and come by those men and ships which were intended to go for England; insomuch that at last the delay pressed him to a resolution to take the most convenient of such other ships near him as might be had.

This day certificate was made to his Lordship by such commissioners as to that purpose he had deputed, of the state of the Rainbow and of the Dreadnought, whereby the former was certified to have a very dangerous leak, and that she was insufficient and unfit to be continued and hazarded any longer at sea; but the latter was found and certified to be staunch and serviceable.

We were now in the latitude of 37 degrees and his Lordship's observations of the unskillfull or negligent proceedings of diverse of our fleet since our coming from Cadiz, together with his desire and care to explain and reinforce his former directions, dated 3 October, which some men seemed in part not well to understand, gave occasion to his Lordship upon this day to deliver out to the sea captains new papers of instructions under his hand, the tenor whereof was thus:

By reason of the difficulty of the journey and the variation of the weather, we being now come unto the latitude of 37 degrees, it was thought fit to add these instructions that all the fleet may take notice to proceed accordingly.

The resolution holds to lie 60 leagues off the land. And for that it is conceived the West-Indian fleet may as well hail in for 104 the rock as for the South Cape, we do intend to ply between the degrees of the latitude of 36 and 37, and not to go further to the Southward then the degree of 36.

If the wind be Easterly I would have the Squadrons lie two or three leagues distant one from another upon a north-and-south Line, and so far as you may not lose sight one of another. It is conceived that these four squadrons may spread near a degree in latitude.

If the wind be westerly we will lie upon a north-and-south line as aforesaid, and ply to the windward, keeping ourselves in the latitudes aforesaid.

If the wind be northerly or southerly, we will keep ourselves in the distance of longitude aforesaid, and strive to keep our selves in the latitude aforesaid.

It is also intended that every morning all the fleet shall strike a hull [take down or furl all sail, as before.], and there lie an hour or two to look out what they can see abroad, and then set Sail.

As the squadrons spread, so may each ship in every squadron, some ahead, some astern, some to windward, some to leeward, to be near and ready for any chase in the morning.

It shall be lawful for every ship and ships in any squadron, to undertake any possible chase, giving some sign to the rest of the fleet by shooting of one piece or many pieces as there be ships, or brayling up [drawing up the sail before it is thoroughly stowed away. See Skeat, s.v. haul, as before (scarcely accurate).] his main sail or foresail together if it be a fleet, if otherwise by striking and raising his main topsail and fore topsail, if there be cause that the rest of the fleet may take notice that he is chasing.

If you discover any of our squadrons and give chase unto them, the chased shall strike his top-Sail and brayle up his mainsail and foresail, whereby it may be known that he is of our own/ fleet, to the end we may not chase one another.


If you meet with the West Indian fleet or enemies, you shall assail, and by all means endeavor to take them by boarding or otherwise, especially the merchant ships. And for all ships seized or taken no man shall presume to break hold or bulk, but in case of fight, and that only between the decks, but shall bring them to me or to my officers.

Lastly, I do hereby charge and command all captains and masters to speak with the admirals of their squadrons every morning, and to keep themselves in their several divisions, and not to depart but by licence of their chief commanders or for chase. And whosoever shall neglect his duty herein for want of looking night and day, or do not observe these orders, he shall be dismissed and discharged of his office and place with disgrace, and the same conferred upon some other.

10 Novemb. Thursday Morning the 10th of November, we chased for a while about 20 of our ships: the rest of the day was spent in prosecuting the preparation of our dispatch for England.

11 Novemb. Friday the 11th of November, we lay again by the lee keeping out both our flags of council from morning till it was almost night.

Nevertheless, there came not aboard us this day above three or four of the Council of War, and those not till late in the afternoon and long one after another. So as whatsoever was by his Lordship intended, there was no Council of War held this day. But diverse sea captains (not of the Council of War) to the number of almost 30 being found aboard us, My Lord Delaware made declaration and complaint to my Lord Lieutenant-General of the sickness in his ship the St. George, so greatly increased on the sudden that unless some of his sick men were taken from him and other healthy sea men given him in their steads, his company was so weak they could not man nor conduct the ship but must let her drive in the sea.

The matter concerning a ship of his Majesty's of good burthen and great value, my Lord Lieutenant General was very sensible of it, 106 and so careful to apply a timely remedy that he forthwith assembled all the sea captains now present, and causing a note of their names to be taken, did strictly require and command them to deliver with all speed possible by their own boats aboard the St. George, two good and healthy sea men apiece, and to receive and accept out of the same two sick men apiece in stead of them.

This evening my Lord Lieutenant had finished his dispatch and sent away 12 ships, who now set sail for England, being consigned to the Port of Plymouth.

The 12 ships were his Majesty's ship the Rainbow, three of our horse ships, two of our prizes (the third being missing) and six other ships, not all of them the same which his Lordship desired, but the most convenient that could be had, while our fleet grew every day more dispersed then other.

Into these ships were conveyed diverse wounded, sick, and unserviceable men, but not such a number nor the same men peradventure as should have been sent home upon a view or muster of them if the dispatch had been made ashore; for the difficult access of one ship to another especially in variety of weather makes it almost impossible (within any reasonable time) exactly to accomplish a work of this nature at sea.

12 Novemb. The 12th of November we lay at hull in the morning according to the late new instructions, but the day brought forth nothing of note.

13 Novemb. November 13 we gave chase to a ship of our own, in which kind of error we had too often before been unfortunate, to the loss of much time and often diversion of our course; an inconvenience which great fleets are much subject unto, albeit they use never so much caution by signs or otherwise to prevent it.

14 Novemb. Monday 14 November Sir William St. Legar and Captain Porter, Captain of the Convertive, came aboard us, and complained of the sickness so far increased in their ship that they wanted men to raise and take in their sails; whereby without a present course 107 for their relief the ship must needs be let drive at the mercy of the sea and wind. The complaint concerning a ship of the King's which my Lord Lieutenant-General held to be of such importance/ that he thought fit to call a Council of War to advise how to relieve her. So the flags were hung out and a warning piece shot off; whereby a Council was assembled, proceeding thus:

At a Council of War held aboard the Anne Royal the fourteenth day of November 1625.

The first point considered of was how to supply the Convertive with more sea-men in her distress; to which purpose only two ways were propounded. The first by causing some other ships of the fleet to deliver a man or two as they could spare, The second to sink one of the ketches and to take all her Men for this service. The former course had been in part already made use of to relieve the St. George, and was found to come off but hardly with some of the sea captains, many of whose ships were also in much distress, though they could not justly challenge altogether so great a care to be had of them as of the King's ships. Besides by their former parting with men, they were become the less able to do so again. And there were now here one or two sea captains of other ships making the like complaint as Sir William St. Leger did for want of sea men; whence my Lord Lieutenant General being to take care of all he had yet none other means to relieve them but by pursuing the course he took for my Lord Delaware; wherefore it was conceived that a sufficient supply of men proportionable to the wants of the Convertive and other ships now complaining, could not well be had from the rest of the fleet without sinking some of the ketches. But if any ketches should be sunk as by a former act of Council was provided that they might, then ought the King to answer to their owners the value of their hulls, which being uncertain and not easy to be cleared in England after the ketches should here be sunk, that uncertainty might put a poor owner to a longer or 108 more chargeable suit for his money then would be requisite. To prevent which inconvenience and towards the supply of the present want of the Convertive, it was thus finally agreed and ordered by the Council of War:

That Captain Beamont and Captain Wolliston, William Hill and Richard Hooper, Masters William Apsley and Robert Tomber, carpenters, should forthwith visit the ketch called the Anthony and set a reasonable and indifferent [impartial, as before] value upon the hull of her as she was then worth to be sold in their judgments, which being done, her anchors, sails, and tackling with all the men and victuals in her should be received into his Majesty's good ship the Convertive, and the said ketch to be sunk or employed for wood to burn./

We found ourselves now to be in the latitude of 38 degrees and a half and estimated that we were 50 or 60 leagues off from the shore; whereupon three things were moved.

  1. To send home our weak ships.
  2. To return into the degrees of 36 and a half &c.
  3. To lie nearer to the shore.

But none of them were entertained nor any order therein given by the Council.

After the Council of War ended, my Lord Lieutenant-General caused a note to be taken of the names of all sea captains now present who had not sent any men to the relief of my Lord Delaware, and assigned some of them to deliver a man apiece more to Sir William/ St. Leger, because those of the ketch appointed to be sunk being but nine in number were not sufficient. And others of them he commanded to do the like to other sea captains now present and complaining of their extremities.

This evening there were about 60 of our fleet in view of the Admiral, but the whole Dutch squadron with our Vice-Admiral and all or the most part of his squadron had been absent and out of view ever since the 9th of this month.


15 Novemb. The 15th of November in the morning there were only about 20 of our ships in view; but the next day towards night there were about 60 of them again in view./

17 Novemb. Thursday the 17th of November the Earl of Essex with his whole squadron or the greater part of them, having been missing now a full week, came into us again and hailed us, and withal gave notice that they were extremely distressed through the increasing sickness among their men, himself in particular, to whose ship there belonged 250 sea men, not having two or three and thirty sound men, namely 16 to serve in one watch and 17 in another; which was much too small a number to attend and man the sails of so great a vessel, especially in gusty and stormy weather, whereof we had of late felt more then enough and could not expect better, the winter drawing on now apace./

This complaint of sickness in the fleet came now so thick and grew so general, that it seemed impossible the sound should be able to supply the defective and suffice to man home all our fleet if speedily we returned not into England or relieved and refreshed ourselves elsewhere; the consideration whereof gave occasion to my Lord Lieutenant-General even this afternoon, while the weather would permit and that fleet was happily reunited (all but the Dutch squadron) to call a general Council for the handling and settling of this great business, by the opinions of all, which so much concerned the honor of his Majesty and the safety of his whole fleet and army.

The flags were hung out and the Council of War came speedily aboard the Admiral; where being assisted by many other captains and masters of ships they proceeded thus.

At a Council of War held aboard the Anne Royal the 17th of November, 1625.

The matter proposed by my Lord Lieutenant General to this Council to be considered of, was whether our fleet at the 20th of this month should stand directly for England or else for Bayon, there to water.


This overture tending to the conclusion of the voyage, wherein the honor of our King and nation was very much concerned, begot in all the council a desire to handle with as much care and gravity as the weight of the matter deserved, which desire also they accomplished as follows:

For our going to Bayon it was alleged, that it stood resolved by a former Act of Council and it would savor of inconstancy to reverse it, that if diverse in the fleet could hardly forbear going to water almost 3 weeks since, they could worse forbear it now. That many ships taking notice of the former resolution had no doubt spent their provisions of beer and water accordingly, in expectation to water at Bayon; which if they should now be put from would in all probability very much distress them. That if we adventure to stand for England without touching first at Bayon, then if a strong east wind should take us and hold us long when we came near home (as was to be feared it might) we should be driven off to sea unable to relieve ourselves anywhere and peradventure perish for want of fresh water, and whereas it was objected by some who inclined to go for England that at the islands of Bayon there was not sufficient store of water to be had in any convenient time to supply the wants of so great a fleet as ours, hereunto it was replied that our ships might ride safely at those islands and we with our ketches and boats repair not far off to the mainland from whence we might relieve ourselves with sufficient speed and safety.

On the other side, for the standing of our fleet directly for England, thus it was resolved, that the Council had power to control their own acts, and it is the part of wise men to change their opinions and resolutions upon new and better reasons.

That the former act of Council, being passed in October, one reason (not then observable) has since occurred, which tends more to persuade us for England and from Bayon, then almost all the rest, namely, the excessive increase of sickness in our fleet as 111 well among officers as inferior persons, not likely to leave us men enough to bring home our ships at all if we make not the more haste. That the ships greatly complaining for want of water were not many, and if some ships needed a different order from the rest, it was fitter to provide for them by a particular exemption from the general order touching the whole fleet then to hazard the whole fleet for a few ships' sake. That to go for Bayon was to lose the opportunity and benefit of a wind for England, the same wind serving to carry us for either place. That it was dangerous in time of winter to unbay [sail out of the bay. To 'embay' is to get into a bay and be unable to get out.] ourselves so deeply as we must do by touching at Bayon, especially with so great ships as his Majesty's. That we ought as much more to fear that a westerly wind might keep us from coming out of Bayon as that an easterly wind should surprise us going for England. That if we stood directly for England and passed a good way to the northward of Bayon, those contrary winds which would keep us from gaining England would for the most part serve to bring us back again to Bayon, where at last in case of necessity, and not otherwise, we might best adventure to put in. That if we came to an anchor at Bayon, our ships being already in so great weakness, we should never be able to get them out again but remain as a pray for our enemies, to the scorn of ourselves and our nation, if the sickness among us (which was the most likely) increased for the time to come as it had done far these 10 or 12 days past, especially if we met with any adverse winds to hinder our speedy retreat. That all men would arm themselves with the more constant resolution to endure extremities when they knew they were homeward bound, without any special intention to divert or interrupt that course. That the victuals in many of our ships began to grow short, and albeit we could supply ourselves with fresh water at Bayon yet could we not hope there to increase 112 our store of victuals, nor be more assured of going from thence towards England. That an East wind should not befall us by the way, than if we made directly homewards without going at all for Bayon. And to meet with a cross wind when we should irreparably want victuals, would bring an equal if not worse mischief upon us then to be so encountered, wanting only fresh water.

That, as we could not hope at Bayon to renew our victuals, so was the same no fit place for our fleet to stay in, for the search and amendment of our leaks, now grown so many and so great that diverse of our ships were thereby in danger of perishing if we got not home with expedition.

That if all circumstances else favoured us to go for Bayon, yet could we not (as it was said by some) get fresh water upon the continent there, without landing of forces, which would spend more time than we had now to spare.

That the town of Bayon itself (our present weak estate considered) was too strong for us, and for any of the other villages or places thereabouts, it was conceived they were altogether unworthy of our attempt.

That it was fit to make haste homeward now when the time for sea service was almost past and no approved new overture as yet made for any further land service. That by all our late actions at El Puntal we had declared ourselves enemies to the Spanish nation and so far provoked their King that it was expected he would against the next spring make some preparation to invade or annoy us in England or Ireland; for which cause it was necessary that our ships which had been long off the ground were grown very foul, should be in England as soon as conveniently might be, to be new trimmed and made ready for the better guarding of our narrow Seas and defence of our realms against the times of need.

And lastly that the safety of his Majesty's ships and the rest of our fleet (depending much upon our speedy going for England) 113 was a matter especially recommended to the care of my Lord Lieutenant-General and a point highly to be regarded as well in respect of the condition and great values of the particular vessels now abroad, as in regard of the singular usefulness of our Navy for the safeguard of our coasts and kingdoms. And upon this reason did my Lord Lieutenant-General chiefly insist and ground his judgment.

The debate being ended, the particular votes of the Council of War were solemnly taken, and by the clear opinions of them all but one, it was resolved and ordered,

That the whole fleet should stand directly for England immediately/ after the expiration of the time formerly set for our keeping the sea to expect the plate fleet; with this nevertheless, that if any particular ships were in urgent and absolute necessity of fresh water, they were left liberty to go to the islands of Bayon to relieve themselves, using all care and diligence for their own safety in their entrance, stay, and return. But none without such urgent cause should presume to go thither under color of pretended necessity, upon pain of severest punishment.

This resolution being passed, it was observed that it prescribed not what course we should hold immediately from henceforth until the 20th of this month; for which cause a motion was made to know the certainty in that particular: Whereunto it was replied by one of the Council of War and not contradicted by any, that we should in this mean time run as northerly a course as we might.

In the assembly of this Council, all the sea and land officers were again admonished and required forthwith to bring in their lists and certificates according to the resolution and order of the 4th of this month, which hitherto, as it seemed, had not been duly performed.

18 and 19 Novemb. The 18th of November was stormy, gusty, and rainy. So was the 19th; upon which day Master Wriothesley [Doubtless of the Southampton family. Shakespeare's Earl of Southampton and his eldest son both died in 1624, in the memorable wars of "the Low Countries."] our purser died, and by 114 our observation of the sun taken this day at noon we found ourselves to be in 40 degrees and 15 minutes.

From the 19th to the 22nd of November it continued still gusty and stormy weather, with variable and ill winds, whereby our fleet was much dispersed, only 20 or 30 sail of them being now in view. And by our observation of the sun this day, we found our selves beaten back into the latitude of 39 degrees and 27 minutes.

Hereupon my Lord Lieutenant-General taking notice how by contrary winds our voyage might be so much prolonged that our state of drink might fail us, unless some timely course were used to prevent it, gave order and made declaration to the company of our ship that from henceforth (till God should send us better wind and weather) a third part of the ordinary allowance of beer should be cut off from every mess and only two cans a day allowed unto them, whereas formerly they had three.

23 Novemb. The 23rd of November we had a scant wind blowing so hard and driving us so much to shoreward, that we doubted greatly of weathering the Cape. In the afternoon and at night it was a storm, wherein we slipped our foretop sail which we had been forced to bear out to keep us from driving too much towards the lee shore.

24 Novemb. The 24th and 25th of November were also very gusty and stormy days, but the next day we had reasonable good wind and weather.

27 Novemb. Sunday the 27th of November, a sudden gust broke our fore yard into four pieces, which put us to no litle trouble and hindrance; for the wind now and for some days following blew very fair and a fresh gale for England, while we through this disaster could make but litle use of it; for our great ship, not being able to bear either fore sail or foretop sail, would neither sail speedily nor steer orderly, only for the present by the advice of Mr. Apsley our Master Carpenter (a well tempered ingenious, and industrious man), we took our main 115 mizzen [mizen. The mizen mast is the after-mast, the mizen yard is the lowest or chief yard (spar or timber on which the sail is set) of the mizen mast.] yard and sail and fastened the same as well as we might, in place, to supply our want of a fore sail.

The next day we went in hand to lift up our mizzen mast (which was a work of no mean difficulty) intending according to the further direction of our Master Carpenter, to have it hewn and fitted for a new fore yard; for we had besides it a rear or Bonaventure mizzen, which would somewhat help our ship to steer, and it was much better to want our main mizzen then our fore yard.

Upon view of the pieces of our broken fore yard, it appeared by an old cleft piercing quite through it about the midst of the tree, that it was very old, rotten, and insufficient before our coming out of England.

By Monday noon we had gotten up our mizzen mast. By Tuesday noon it was wrought into a fore yard, and before night it was done on to the fore mast and the sail put to it, two breadth thereof being first taken out to make it fit, for the mizzen was about two feet shorter then the old fore yard.

We had no sooner fitted ourselves with our fore sails, but the wind scanted [lessened] very much upon us, and as we estimated we could not lose less then the running of a whole degree by the occasion of spending our foreyard.

The next day we had good wind and weather and found ourselves to be in the latitude of 46 degrees and 30 and odd minutes.

1 Decembr. The first and second of December we had ill winds and weather, and great complaint was now made for want of wood and candles, as also touching the disorderly and excessive expense of beer, through the fraud of quarter masters, coopers, swabbers [driers or cleaners of the decks after being washed. Hence 'swabs'—a sort of long mop of rope yarn, to clean or dry up the decks. Often now used by sailors in a reproachful sense. Formerly in the Royal Navy there was a petty officer, whose duty it was to see that the deck was clean, and he was called 'swabber' par excellence.], and the over-bigness 116 of some cans of allowance; which complaints our captain took into examination and sought to reform./

The surgeon of our ship being now required to make a list of our sick men, gave in the name of above 130. Besides we had formerly thrown diverse men overboard and had now in our ship many other weak and unserviceable persons, not reckoned in the number of men absolutely sick.

3 Decemb. The third of December the wind came very fair, but we lost a great part of the benefit thereof in bearing less sail then we might to stay for one of our ketches, which we conceived to be in some distress by reason of her not coming up to us, and it was thought unchristian to forsake her. Howbeit we were shortly informed by another ketch which we sent to hasten her up, that she was not in any distress, but bore all the sail and made all the haste she could, whereby it was concluded by some that in a strong and fair wind a ketch cannot keep company with a great ship if the ship bear out all her sails (an observation very considerable if it be true), for albeit ketches being short and round built be very apt to turn up and down and useful to go to and fro, and to carry messages between ship and ship almost with any wind in fair weather and to sound a shore or creek upon occasion, yet if they can hardly live in a grown storm happening with adverse winds, and be not able to keep company with the greatest ships when the wind blows strong and fair, then are they not fit to be employed among such a fleet as ours, partly for that they are so apt to miscarry in storms and partly for that they must in the best winds be forsaken by the fleet, or the fleet lose a great part of the benefit of such winds by staying for them, as our ship the Admiral did now by staying for this ketch; which would be to any fleet and at this time was to us, no small inconvenience.

4 Decemb. Sunday night, the 4th of December, was a strange kind of tempest: no wind at all stirring, yet did the sea work and go so high 117 that our ship did roll more and fetch deeper and more dangerous seeles [lurching, or sudden heeling over and quick return] then in the greatest storm we met with all this voyage./

The next day we were in the latitude of 40 degrees and a half, and estimated our selves for longitude to be between 20 and 30 leagues off from the coast of France. The night was stormy and gusty, causing some of our shrouds to break, which formerly were insufficient. But so good industry was used that the defect was speedily and soon amended.

The two next days nothing of note occurred.

8 Decemb. The 8 of December we met a distressed bark of Plymouth, but she could give us no information for our instruction.

The same evening we saw 6 or 7 ships far off ahead of us, which by the flag of one of them we took to be some of our fleet.

We were glad to see them, hoping the next morning to fetch them up, for having every day lost more and more of our fleet since the 17th of the last month, when we resolved to stand directly for England, we had but 2 or 3 ships and 2 ketches of all the fleet now left to attend the Admiral.

By our sounding this day, we were in 48 fathoms with such gravel as is usually found about the gulf, and some thought we were near the shore; however we could not before night discover any land; and therefore we tacked about again and stood off to sea till four o'clock the next morning, and then returned to our former tack, giving notice thereof by a piece shot off.

The ships which we saw last evening were not this morning to be seen, whereby it seemed they took not themselves to be so near the shore nor did therefore tack about nor stand off to sea as we did.

This day we fell again to conjecture by our soundings where we should be for longitude. But we were in diverse opinions; 118 some thinking we were shot far into our own channel, and others that we were yet much to the west of Scilly, so as between our care not to fall foul upon our own shore in the dark, and our fear of losing time and opportunity by standing so much off to seaward in the nights that we could hardly fetch it up again in the days, we remained a while in some doubt what course was best for us to take.

But about four o'clock in the afternoon, we descried a small French bark and by a message sent unto her by one of our ketches, caused her to come to us; of whom inquiring whereabouts she took us and herself to be, she told us she had even now seen the islands of Scilly and thought they were still within ken from our top masthead.

Upon this information we sent up some to look out, who were not gone half mast-high, but they plainly discovered the islands of Scilly to be three or four leagues off, and bearing towards the east of us.

This gave us assured knowledge where we were and settled all our doubts, but the wind was now at East South-East; with which it was impossible to get either Scilly or any other part of England. Wherefore, the night coming on, we easily resolved to tack about and stand off to sea to avoid the danger of the shore, and in hope of a larger wind. This tack we held all night, but the wind continued still where it was and blew very strong, so as although our ship caped south, yet was she driven much to the westward. This night three of our men died.

The next morning a proposition was made by our master and his mates to stand for Cork or Kinsale in Ireland.

Their reasons were these—That England could not be gained with this wind. That above 130 of our men were found sick and unserviceable above a week since, and the number was now so far increased that we were hardly able to man our sails and pump: for the weather was uncertain and gusty and our ship 119 grown very leaky, so as we were driven to pump twice a watch, with very short intermissions of rest. That if we kept the sea awhile longer with this wind, we should be driven so far to the west, that we should be able to get neither England, Ireland, nor France but perish through our leaks, wanting men to ply our pumps. That a fair wind to carry us into England was as likely to befall us going for Ireland as standing off to sea; and if any such change happened in our passage, we might at any time stand about and take the benefit thereof, otherwise Ireland was a good country of his Majesty's, affording safe harbor for our shipping till God should send us a good wind for England; and where in the mean time we might refresh our sick men ashore with fresh victual at a cheap rate, renew store of fresh water, have our ship searched and our leaks stopped, and peradventure also get some supply for our want of seamen. Against this proposition some light objections were made to this effect, that we looked yesterday upon Scilly, a parcel of the kingdom of England, and it would argue litle courage in us if we kept not the sea more then one night after, in hope of a fair wind, before we set sail for another shore. That questionless many of our ships have already gotten England and it will cause some ill rumours to the disgrace of our judgments if we with the same winds shall not be able to do the like. That we want a long boat wherewith to moor our anchors, and that our going into any harbor would surely occasion a great expence of time, to the delay of our return into England. Hereunto was answered that if we stood off to sea with this wind till we could reach no land at all and then perished, it would be a rashness and no true courage that carried into such a mischief. That safety was to be preferred before rumor. That if any ships be already gone home they have the more offended in foresaking their Admiral; for they were to wait upon us, not we on them. That we met with a particular disaster of breaking our foreyard, whereby we lost more than the running of a degree, 120 which may justly excuse us, though we have not gotten England with the same winds that others have. That our other boats with the help of our ketches or such fisher boats as we shall be sure to find in Ireland, will serve us very well for the mooring of our Anchors. And that if it were necessary to stay long in harbor for supply of defects then such stay was not to be blamed; if otherwise by good order and direction it might be prevented, and our dispatch out of harbor sufficiently speeded.

My Lord Lieutenant-General being informed of the substance of this proposition and reasoning, did in his judgment soon resolve and give order that we should stand directly for Kinsale in Ireland, and about nine o'clock in the morning we set sail accordingly.

We had not now in our company above two or three ships and two ketches of all our fleet, having lost every day more and more since the 9th of the last month; and the whole squadron of the Dutch had been absent from us ever since that day. But whether to impute this great separation of our fleet (who should wait on their Admiral) to the carelessness or willfulness of the captains, masters and other officers in ships or to the casualties of sea service or badness of the weather, which was for the most part stormy ever since the second of the last month, when we sent away the 12 ships for England, or what other cause to ascribe it to, I know not.

11 Decemb. Sunday the 11th of December about noon we came into the harbor of Kinsale, not having sea men enough in health for the fitting of our ship to come to an anchor without assistance of the gentlemen volunteers and their servants, who all wrought with their own hands for the better accommodating of the business.

Being come to an anchor, we searched our ship and found her to have now six foot water in hold, whereby we concluded that if we had kept the sea but a day or two longer we must needs have perished.

Here we understood that some of the King's ships and many 121 others of our fleet were lately put into several harbors of this kingdom, and others came in shortly after, distressed for the most part, as we were, with sickness among their men.

The Lord President of Munster [We learn incidentally from Walter Yonge's "Diary" (Camden Society) that he was Sir Edward Villers [or Villiers], p. (95). He was half-brother of the Duke of Buckingham.] and the Earl of Cork, having notice of my Lord Lieutenant-General's arrival at Kinsale, came speedily unto him and with much diligence assisted his Lordship to provide for the relief and refreshing of our sick men.

It was like to be long before our ship could be made fit to put to sea again and many winds for England might be lost in the mean time.

Hereupon it came aptly into consideration whether my Lord Lieutenant-General were best to stay in Ireland till this ship might be made ready for him or else to take some other good ship or bark, and therein seek the speediest passage that might be had, leaving his own ship in the charge of her captain and master to be brought home with the first opportunity of wind and weather after her defects should be supplied.

But his Lordship's care and desire to shun the imputation and dishonor of abandoning his Majesty's ship in her distress, seemed to prevail so far above any reasons presented to him to the contrary, that he resolved only to send a dispatch for England and not to go himself, till his own ship were ready for him.

So, leaving Sir Thomas Love at Kinsale to see her new trimmed and to get her defects supplied, his Lordship went to Youghal there to remain with my Lord President till he should hear from Sir Thomas Love that all things were ready, which it was conceived could hardly be till after Christmas./

In the mean time his Lordship sent a dispatch for England by Master Francis Carew from Youghal, and I with his Lordship's leave upon Christmas eve went to Lismore to the Earl of Cork's, two miles 122 from Youghal, purposing to stay there but three or four days at the most, and then to return and wait upon his Lordship. But I was prevented by a long and dangerous sickness which also is the cause that I can give no further account of this voyage./

A list of the names of the chief commanders, captains, lieutenants and ancients of his Majesty's army employed this voyage:

  1. His Excellency's Regiment:—Captains Sir John Prode, Sergeant Major Thornix, Capt. Gifford, Knolles, Capt. Elpheston, Capt. Paddon, Capt. Reynelles, Capt. Kirton, Capt. Countrey, Capt. Preston. Lieutenants Bromingham, Prowde, Pottes, Neuell, Tremayne, Colwell, Whitehead, Donne, Brett, Lee. Ensignes Owen, Russell, Barsey, Greene, Moore, Pennannt, Fearne, Otby, Warde, Bagg.

  2. Lord Marshal's Regiment:—His Company—Captains Sir George Blundell, Farrer, Croftes, Christmas, Crispe, Paprill, Bridges, Gore, Edw. Leigh, Anth. Leigh. Lieutenants Powell, Booth, Basset, Grimshaw, Cheverton, Wormewood, Burthogg, Homer, Browne, Felton, Talbott. Ensignes Hawkins, Marbery, Carlisle, Halls, Dodson, Lindsey, Dyson, Carew, Pagett, Dedham, Bagnall.

  3. Master of the Ordinance's Regiment:—His Company—Captains Sprye, Fennithorp, Hammond, Brett, Taylor, Fisher, Hackett, Bruce, Porter, Tolkarne. Lieutenants Frodisham, Searle, Judge, Bowyer, Appleyard, Wilton, Brooke, Bemersyde, Reynolds, Mathewes, Barnett. Ensignes Bowyer, Greenfield, Bennett, Markham, Appleyard, Leigh, Ogle, Bullock, Fullerton, Veale, Ogle.

  4. Colonel General's Regiment: His Company—Captains 123 Sir Thomas York, Hacklett, Carleton, Tucke, Hone, Shugborough, Alley, Crispe, Leake, Bowles, junior. Lieutenants Frogmorton, Hynton, Hacklett, Ottey, Spring, Barington, Calvert, Quarles, Jarman, Goodridge, Vernon. Ensignes Pelham, Trye, Gwynne, Kelke, Watts, Smith, Ban. Leigh, Heigham, Pottes, Mathewes, Jennison.

  5. Sergeant Major General's Regiment:—His Company—Captains Gibson, Frier, Courtenay, Richards, Mathews, Mostyne, Reade, Bowles senior, Bucke, Moldisworth. Lieutenants Judd, Abraham, Stevens, Prideaux, Grove, Powell, Warde, Cole, Sherrock, Coop. Ensignes Whitney, Hall, Spilling, Trefuse, Bockard, Parker, Hookes, Madison, Bowles, Bruerton, Sidenham.

  6. Colonel Rich's Regiment:—His Company—Captains Sir John Ratcliff, Standish, Stewart, Grey, Skelton, Leighton, Waller, Cooke, Staverton, St Leger. Lieutenants Rich. Leigh, Drury, Waller, Crispe, Grover, Gray, Williams, Brand, Parry, Chadwell, Holdham. Ensignes Frith, Coitt, Hunkes, Bowyer, Ramscroft, Story, Price, Dudley, Jarves, Wormwood, Wright.

  7. Colonel Conwey's Regiment:—His Company—Captains Willoughby, Clapham, Pelham, Rainsford, Williams, Alford, Goring, Dixon, Hammond, Ogle. Lieutenants Dawson, Chaworth, Browne, Powell Morg., Huson, Heigham, Shelley, Moone, Welcombe, Markham, Plesington. Ensignes Pinchbecke, Ottey, Welles, Kettleby, Bartlett, Cross, Hudson, Maxey, Ayres, Netherton, Browne.

  8. Colonel Harewood's Regiment:—His Company—S4 Tho. Moreton, Watkins, Jackson, Abraham, Gibthorp, Gibthorpe, Heatley, Douglas, Seymour, Masterson, Morgan. Lieutenants Alcock, Dawson, Humfreys, Tillier, Lewkin, Bridges, Briges, Anderson, Woodward, Wescott, Love, Games. Ensignes Arkeld, Betnam, Stewart, Stanton, Champnowne, Lucas, Lucas, Hunt, Saltingstone, ffoscue, Stevens, Eden.

  9. Colonel Burgh's Regiment:—His Company—Captains Sir Alexander Brett, Sir Edw. Hanley, Bettes, Terrett, Hill, Bond, Lindsey, Grove, Lindsey, Greenfield, Parkinson. Lieutenants Jeffereyes, 124 Tourney, Watts, Yates, Atchinson, Outridd, Searles, Jones, Dodsworth, Jones, Pollard, Long. Ensignes Fanshawe, Bluddell, Watnam, Gibbes, ffoliatt, Knolles, Foy, Thorpe, Cludd, Thorp, Ayleworth.

  10. Colonel Bruce's Regiment:—His Company:—Captains Sir Hen. Killegrewe, Scott, Wood, Cornwell, Gilpin, Ashley, Glynne, Meutus, Norton, Yates. Lieutenants St Paule, Broadribbe, Cowley, Saundilaunce, Coffin, ffoxe, Honniwood, Powell, Bathurst, Jarvis, Houghton. Ensignes Gibbes, Bruce, Boswell, Willoughby, Lowe, Vaughan, Robinson, Hobbes, Williams, Webb, Greene./




  Ships. Commanders. Tons. Seamen. Landmen.
King's Ships Anne Royal Lord Marshall
Sir Tho. Love, Knt.
1000 400  
St. George Lord Delaware
Sir Michael Geare, Knt.
895 250  
Convertive Sir William St Leger
Captain Porter
500 200  
  Assurance Capt. Osborne 373 69 198
Prudence Capt. Vaughan 350 64 181
Anne Capt. Wollaston 245 40 150
Royal Defence Capt. Ellys 304 57 160
Lesser Sapphire Capt. Bond 303 56 158
Assurance of Dover Capt. Barsey 300 58 159
Jonathan Capt. Boteler 371 69 197
Amity Capt. Malyn 203 32 131
Jacob Capt. Gosse 218 34 134
Anthony Capt. Blaque 240 40 150
Hermit Capt. Turner 203 32 131
Hopewell of Newcastle Capt. —— 179 30 116
Abraham Capt. Downes 235 36 134
Barbara Constant Capt. Hatch 351 64 197
Cameleon Capt. Seymore 213 34 132
Sea Venture Capt. Knivett 216 35 133
William Capt. White 225 37 138
Return Capt. Bonithon 212 34 132
Helen Capt. Mason 200 37 142
Talbot Capt. Burden 260 47 135/
Great Sapphire Capt. Baymond 420 73 220
Golden Cock Capt. Beamont 250 45 151
Globe Capt. Stoakes 290 56 160
George Capt. Stevens 298 56 200
Mary Magdalen Capt. Cooper 257 40 150
Anne Speedwell Capt. Polkenhorne 192 32 130
Provision Ship Amity of Hull Capt. ffrisby 260 30  

The sum of this squadron.

Sea men2087
Land men4014



  Ships. Commanders. Tons. Seamen. Landmen.
King's ships Swiftsure Earl of Essex
Sir Sam. Argall, knt.
876 250  
Reformation Lord Viscount Valentia
Capt. Gilbert
750 250  
Rainbow Sir John Chudley, knt. 650 250  
  Zouch Phoenix Capt. Philpott 319 60 169
Martha Capt. Barber 278 50 142/
Sea Flower Capt. Sidenham 200 38 142
Mary Anne Capt. Harman 208 33 131
Carnation Capt. Walsingham 209 33 131
Robert Capt. Gurling. 244 37 138
True Love Sir Jo. Hamden, knt. 242 40 150
Friendship Capt. John Harvey 311 57 164
Mary Constant Capt. Mervin Burley 276 50 140
Tiger Capt. Welden 240 40 150
Return Capt. Hagthorp 216 34 133
Mary Magdalen Capt. Whiddon 242 40 148
Timothy Capt. Pawlett 200 32 132
Venture Capt. Mohun 218 34 134
Royal Exchange Capt. Edw. Harvy 453 83 236
Esperance Capt. William Reskymer 212 34 132
Patient Adventure Capt. Bargrave 221 36 135
Amity Capt. Skipwith 232 38 140
Barking Capt. Fitton 177 30 116
Lyon of Ipswich Capt. Ruckwood 168 30 112
Samuel Capt. Walters 239 38 140
Munition Ships Peter Bonaventure Capt. Johnson 213 39  
Sara Bonaventure Capt. Carew 200 38  
Christian Capt. Wharey 167 37  
Horse ships Chestnut   300 20  
Fortune   400 20  
Ketches William and John Tho. Tentes, Master      
George William William Sueddall, Master      

The sum of this squadron.

Sea men1771
Land men3015



  Ships. Commanders. Tons. Seamen. Landmen.
Kings ships St. Andrew Earl of Denbigh
Sir John Watts
895 250  
Bonaventure Lord Cromwell
Capt. Collins
674 200  
Dreadnought Sir Beverley Newcome 458 160  
  Abigail Capt. Povie 309 58 163
Trial Capt. Stradling 200 33 131/
Jane Bonaventure Capt. Rous 182 31 122
Supply Capt. Duppa 183 31 112
Matthew Capt. Jo. Reskymer 222 36 135
Convert Capt. Barna. Burley 240 36 146
Centaur Capt. Jones 189 31 127
Dragon Capt. Oxenbridge 453 83 304
Hopewell Capt. Marbery 240 40 150
Adventure Capt. Browne 206 33 121
Susan Capt. Sacheverill 245 40 150
Rose Capt. Powell 250 40 150
William and Thomasin Capt. Plumleigh 188 32 130
Samuel Capt. Cheeke 371 69 197
Alyan Capt. Hake 266 50 141
Blessing Capt. Kettelby 210 39 142
Confidence Capt. Dunne 213 34 132
Desire Capt. Morgan 233 34 132
Isaac Capt. Peywell 207 33 133
Lion Capt. Squibbe 210 33 131
Munition ships Susan and Hellen Capt. Levitt 253 40  
William of London Capt. Amadas 198 37  
Hope Sir Tho. Pigott 277 40/  
Horse ships Fox        
Ketches Prosperous Roger Barton, Master      
Isaackson Austin Carpenter, Master      

Sum of this squadron.

Sea men1583
Land men3949

Sum total.

Sea men5411
Land men9983



An index to an html document such as this detracts from rather than enhances its usefulness. Searching for text will usually result in finding more and better information than can be found through any index, and that certainly is the case with the index that was including in the Grosart edition, which is omitted here.

Footnotes to the Modernized Edition.

Port Eliot. Port Eliot was (and is) a large estate near Saltash in Cornwall. It was the residence in the 17th century of Sir John Eliot and was still, in the 19th century, the seat of the Eliot family as Earls of St. Germans. St. Germans was the parish church of Port Eliot. [Return.]

the late Earl of St. Germans. Two earls of this title died in the years before publication of the Journal. The third Earl of St Germans, Edward Granville Eliot (1798-1877) served in Peel's and Palmerston's governments. His third son, William Gordon Cornwallis Eliot (1829-1881) succeeded as 4th Earl. [Return.]

Sir John Eliot. Sir John Eliot (1590-1632) is a central figure in the Parliamentary history of England during the 1620s. As Grosart mentions, Eliot bore a grudge against George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham, hence his collecting of papers bearing on Buckingham's direction of affairs. For the life of Eliot, see John Forster's Sir John Eliot: a biography volumes 1 and 2, which, though occasionally inaccurate, remains the standard biography. [Return.]

witness in recorderships. "Witness" in this sense is a court officer whose duty was to attend hearings in a recorder's court and later relate what occurred during those sessions. Glanville's point is that if he is absent on the Voyage, the cases for which he is witness will not be able to progress. [Return.]

Paris garden. Paris Garden in Southwark was a liberty of London. It adjoined Lambeth. In the late 1500s, it was the home of several theatres and of bull- and bear-baiting pits. [Return.]

Veritas premitur, sed non opprimitur. Translation: The truth may be suppressed, but not obliterated. [Return.]

Harque-bush Crocke. An arquebus supported on a rest by a hook of iron fastened to the barrel. [Return.]

Castañeta. Antonio de Gaztañeta (1656-1728) came from a family of Basque sea men. He founded the shipyard of El Astrillo. In the 1718 action referred to by Grosart, Gaztañeta commanded a Spanish transport fleet carrying soldiers to Italy. His fleet was attacked (some say treacherously) by the British off Cape Passaro in Sicily. Gaztañeta was wounded in the foot and taken prisoner. [Return.]

Widdrington. Widdrington was a doughty knight of Northumberland, immortalized in the old ballad of Chevy Chace:

With Widdrington needs must I wail,
   As one in doleful dumps,
For when his legs were smitten off,
   He fought upon his stumps.


Biography. Dalton's biography of Cecil appeared in 1885, in two volumes published in London by Samson Low, Marston, Searle and Rivington. Volume 1 covers the period to 1622. Volume 2 continues the Life and contains the details of the Cadiz expedition. [Return.]

Gove. Richard Gove (1587-1668) was ordained on leaving Oxford in 1608. Some time later he became domestic chaplain to John lord Paulet. The reason for their dispute is obscure. After the Civil Wars, Gove wrote two controversial books, referred to by Grosart. [Return.]

Notary and Prothonotary. A notary was a clerk of the court. The Prothonotary was First Clerk. [Return.]

Hamper. The Hamper, or Hanaper, was an office in the Chancery responsible for storing writs. The name comes from the rush container where the writs once were kept. (There was a second office for storing other documents, called the Petty-bag). There was a stream of revenue from fees paid the crown for filing the writs. Glanville's stipend was paid out of that stream. [Return.]

Critical case. The case of Davis came before Glanville in his capacity as Recorder of Bristol. A letter from Bishop Skinner to Laud exists as the main record of the affair. The Annals of Bristol in the Seventeenth Century, (p. 145) contain this instructive paragraph:

A letter from Bishop Skinner, of Bristol, to Archbishop Laud, dated August 26th, shows the manner in which the royal minions attempted to intimidate judges in the administration of justice. A man named Davis having been arraigned at the local gaol delivery—it is not said for what offence, though it seems probable the prisoner was a Puritan preacher—the Bishop, one of Laud's most zealous instruments, states that he waited on the Recorder on the evening before the trial, and expressed his desire "that a matter of this high nature should not be slubbered over, but carried with severity." Sergeant Glanville replied that he had advised upon the case with the Lord Keeper, and the Attorney-General, and also with the Primate himself, and the Bishop departed. But when the trial came on, though the Recorder showed a "semblance of severity," the jury returned a verdict of not guilty, to the great joy of the prisoner, who knelt down in the dock and prayed for the King, the archbishop, and the bishops. The irritated meddler concludes:—"My conceit is that the whole business was a mere scene, wherein the judge acted his part cunningly, the jury plausibly, and the prisoner craftily."


Speech addressed to the king Glanville-Richards gives additional extracts from the speech. The entire speech can be found in the Parliamentary History, vol. 2. [Return.]

fast and idle life The story is given a little more meat by Mrs Bray in the Description of the Parts of Devonshire... vol. 2, p. 336:

It was Serjeant Glanville who first appreciated the then obscure talents of Sir Matthew Hale,—obscure by fortune, by the want of opportunity, and doubly so by an idle course of life. This fault he represented to Hale in strong terms, roused his energies, encouraged his perseverance, and opened to him that path by which he afterwards arose to so much dignity and repute.


conquered four times Presumably Cecil means by the Romans, Saxons, Danes and Norman French. [Return.]

makes the king of Spain so great The economic and naval power of Spain was already waning by 1625, but this is far more obvious in retrospect than it was at the time. The Spanish land armies were still the terror of Europe, and the veteran legions were considered unbeatable. [Return.]

his Majesty presses them It's not known what percentage of the sea men were impressed (conscripted) into service on the expedition under the laws then in place. The crews of the merchant ships probably contained a large contingent of men who were rented along with the ships. [Return.]

che pieu [Chi più] a spende manco spende This is a slight mangling of an Italian proverb "chi manco spende, piĆ¹ spende": who spends more, spends less. [Return.]

Chatham men I suppose this refers to the "regular" crews of the king's ships, who normally resided near the royal navy yard in Chatham. In later times, "Chatham men" meant the shipwrights and others who worked in the yards. [Return.]

Sir Charles Morgan Morgan was the chief commander of British forces on the Continent from 1624 until his death in 1642. See his entry in the Dictionary of National Biography. [Return.]

Henry Viscount of Valentia Sir Henry Power, d. 1642. [Return.]

brass ordinance In 1626, brass cannon was still considered superior to iron, in part because it had better accuracy and reliability. Within 40 years, however, iron cannons would almost completely replace brass on ships. [Return.]

Newcastle ships These were small, sturdy cargo ships designed for carrying coal from Newcastle to London. [Return.]

Cabo de Sao Vicente Cape St Vincent is the soutwest-most projection of the Portuguese coast, about 100 miles south of Lisbon. [Return.]

caravel 'Caravel' described a particular type of 2-, 3- or 4-masted ship in the 14th-16th centuries, but by the 17th probably just meant 'Portuguese vessel'. There was an obsolete fighting ship, the caravela redonda, still in use early in the 1600s, but Glanville's description does not seem to apply. [Return.]

Terceira Terceira is the third largest of the islands of the Azores archipelego and one of the commercially most important. [Return.]

Gibraltar It was not until 80 years later that the British took Gibraltar. In 1704 a joint British and Dutch fleet attacked the town and overran the citadel. In the Treaty of Utrecht which ended the war of the Spanish Succession, the territory was ceded to the British crown. Those who argued Gibraltar as the mission's proper target probably underestimated its defences; but those who opposed it greatly underestimated its value. [Return.]

Malaga Malaga, an important city on the Andalusian coast about 70 miles east of Gibraltar, was never attacked by British forces, but about a week after the taking of Gibraltar in 1704, a large naval battle was fought off its coast. The enemy was the French rather than the Spanish, but the fleet was again a joint British-Dutch force. [Return.]

cochineal Cochineal is the name of an insect from which is derived the dye called carmine. The word was (and is) often used as a synonym for carmine. Because the insect is found mainly in inland districts of Central and South America, the derived dye was a valuable cargo. [Return.]

Earl of Denbigh William Feilding (1587-1643), first Earl of Denbigh. The son of a gentleman, he rose to the peerage on the back of his marriage to Buckingham's sister, Susan. Feilding accompanied Buckingham and Prince Charles to Spain in 1623; commanded the rear in the Cadiz voyage; and led the fleet dispatched to relieve Rochelle in 1628. He supported the royalist party in the civil war and was killed before Birmingham in 1643. See his DNB entry. [Return.]

Earl of Cork Richard Boyle (1566-1643), the first earl of Cork. He was also Baron Youghal, in which town the President of Munster, Sir Edward Villiers, resided. [Return.]